Do implicit and explicit belief processing share neural substrates?

Naughtin, Claire K., Horne, Kristina, Schneider, Dana, Venini, Dustin, York, Ashley and Dux, Paul E. (2017) Do implicit and explicit belief processing share neural substrates?. Human Brain Mapping, 38 9: 4760-4772. doi:10.1002/hbm.23700

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Author Naughtin, Claire K.
Horne, Kristina
Schneider, Dana
Venini, Dustin
York, Ashley
Dux, Paul E.
Title Do implicit and explicit belief processing share neural substrates?
Journal name Human Brain Mapping   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 1097-0193
1065-9471
Publication date 2017-06-23
Year available 2017
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1002/hbm.23700
Open Access Status File (Author Post-print)
Volume 38
Issue 9
Start page 4760
End page 4772
Total pages 13
Place of publication Hoboken, NJ United States
Publisher John Wiley & Sons
Language eng
Subject 2702 Anatomy
3614 Radiological and Ultrasound Technology
2741 Radiology Nuclear Medicine and imaging
2808 Neurology
2728 Clinical Neurology
Abstract Humans rely on their ability to infer another person's mental state to understand and predict others' behavior (“theory of mind,” ToM). Multiple lines of research suggest that not only are humans able to consciously process another person's belief state, but also are able to do so implicitly. Here we explored how general implicit belief states are represented in the brain, compared to those substrates involved in explicit ToM processes. Previous work on this topic has yielded conflicting results, and thus, the extent to which the implicit and explicit ToM systems draw on common neural bases is unclear. Participants were presented with “Sally-Anne” type movies in which a protagonist was falsely led to believe a ball was in one location, only for a puppet to later move it to another location in their absence (false-belief condition). In other movies, the protagonist had their back turned the entire time the puppet moved the ball between the two locations, meaning that they had no opportunity to develop any pre-existing beliefs about the scenario (no-belief condition). Using a group of independently localized explicit ToM brain regions, we found greater activity for false-belief trials, relative to no-belief trials, in the right temporoparietal junction, right superior temporal sulcus, precuneus, and left middle prefrontal gyrus. These findings extend upon previous work on the neural bases of implicit ToM by showing substantial overlap between this system and the explicit ToM system, suggesting that both abilities might recruit a common set of mentalizing processes/functional brain regions.
Keyword Implicit theory of mind
FMRI
Temporoparietal junction
Mentalizing
Social cognition
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: HERDC Pre-Audit
School of Psychology Publications
 
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