Strategic trade in pollution permits

Dickson, Alex and MacKenzie, Ian A. (2017) Strategic trade in pollution permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, . doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.009

Author Dickson, Alex
MacKenzie, Ian A.
Title Strategic trade in pollution permits
Journal name Journal of Environmental Economics and Management   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0095-0696
Publication date 2017-01-01
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.009
Open Access Status Not yet assessed
Total pages 20
Place of publication Maryland Heights, MO United States
Publisher Academic Press
Language eng
Abstract Markets for pollution have become a popular regulatory instrument. In this article we investigate the implications of strategic trade in pollution permits. The permit market is developed as a strategic market game, where all firms are allowed to behave strategically and their roles as buyers or sellers of permits are determined endogenously with price-mediated trade. In a second stage, firms transact on a product market and we allow for a variety of market structures. We identify a unique equilibrium in permit exchange, investigate the properties of this equilibrium, and consider the effect of strategic behavior in the product market.
Keyword Market power
Pollution market
Strategic market game
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: HERDC Pre-Audit
School of Economics Publications
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Created: Wed, 24 May 2017, 16:35:42 EST by Alys Hohnen on behalf of School of Economics