Intensional paradoxes

Priest G. (1991) Intensional paradoxes. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 32 2: 193-211. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1093635745


Author Priest G.
Title Intensional paradoxes
Journal name Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 1939-0726
Publication date 1991-01-01
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1305/ndjfl/1093635745
Volume 32
Issue 2
Start page 193
End page 211
Total pages 19
Subject 2609 Logic
Abstract The topic of this paper is that class of paradoxes of self-reference whose members involve intensional notions such as knowing that, saying that, etc. The paper discusses a number of solutions that have been proposed by, e.g., Prior and several AI workers, and argues that they are inadequate. It argues, instead, for a dialetheic/paraconsistent resolution. A formal theory of propositions is given; this is based on arithmetic, and treats propositions as sentences. In the theory the paradoxes are accommodated in a satisfactory manner. An Appendix establishes that the contradictions in the theory do not spread to the underlying arithmetic machinery.
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Unknown

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: Scopus Import
 
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Created: Tue, 05 Jul 2016, 13:04:48 EST by System User