Investment decisions under first and second price auctions

King I., Welling L. and Preston McAfee R. (1992) Investment decisions under first and second price auctions. Economics Letters, 39 3: 289-293. doi:10.1016/0165-1765(92)90263-X


Author King I.
Welling L.
Preston McAfee R.
Title Investment decisions under first and second price auctions
Journal name Economics Letters   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0165-1765
Publication date 1992-01-01
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/0165-1765(92)90263-X
Volume 39
Issue 3
Start page 289
End page 293
Total pages 5
Subject 2002 Cultural Studies
2003 Language Studies
Abstract A seller of an indivisible object faces multiple buyers, whose valuations are a function of their unobservable prior investments. A second price auction generates efficient investment, but the seller prefers a first price sealed bid auction, which induces inefficient investment.
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Unknown

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: Scopus Import - Archived
 
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 6 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
Scopus Citation Count Cited 8 times in Scopus Article | Citations
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Created: Thu, 24 Mar 2016, 22:20:05 EST by Karen Warren