Dynamic inefficiency, endogenous growth, and Ponzi games

King, I and Ferguson, D (1993) Dynamic inefficiency, endogenous growth, and Ponzi games. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32 1: 79-104. doi:10.1016/0304-3932(93)90036-F

Author King, I
Ferguson, D
Title Dynamic inefficiency, endogenous growth, and Ponzi games
Journal name Journal of Monetary Economics   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0304-3932
Publication date 1993-01-01
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/0304-3932(93)90036-F
Open Access Status
Volume 32
Issue 1
Start page 79
End page 104
Total pages 26
Language eng
Subject 2002 Cultural Studies
2003 Language Studies
Abstract We show that in competitive endogenous growth models without externalities, balanced growth equilibria are dynamically efficient. With learning-by-doing externalities, dynamic inefficiency may exist, but due to the mix of capital rather than its scale. These results are obtained independent of whether or not lifetimes are finite or generations overlap. In OLG models with externalities we show that Ponzi games may be feasible even though equilibria are characterized by undersaving.
Keyword Debt
Public finance
Technological change
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Unknown

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: Scopus Import - Archived
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 42 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
Scopus Citation Count Cited 45 times in Scopus Article | Citations
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Created: Thu, 24 Mar 2016, 21:25:21 EST by Karen Warren