Why are fishers not enforcing their marine user rights?

Davis, Katrina J., Kragt, Marit E., Gelcich, Stefan, Burton, Michael, Schilizzi, Steven and Pannell, David J. (2015) Why are fishers not enforcing their marine user rights?. Environmental and Resource Economics, 67 4: 1-21. doi:10.1007/s10640-015-9992-z


Author Davis, Katrina J.
Kragt, Marit E.
Gelcich, Stefan
Burton, Michael
Schilizzi, Steven
Pannell, David J.
Title Why are fishers not enforcing their marine user rights?
Journal name Environmental and Resource Economics   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 1573-1502
0924-6460
Publication date 2015-12-31
Year available 2015
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1007/s10640-015-9992-z
Open Access Status Not Open Access
Volume 67
Issue 4
Start page 1
End page 21
Total pages 21
Place of publication Dordrecht, GX, Netherlands
Publisher Springer Netherlands
Language eng
Subject 2202 Aerospace Engineering
2002 Economics and Econometrics
2308 Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
Abstract Over-fishing is a global problem that damages the marine environment and compromises the long-term sustainability of fisheries. This damage can be mitigated by restricting catch or other activities which can occur in marine areas. However, such management is only effective when restrictions are enforced to ensure compliance. We expect fishers to help enforce restrictions when they have exclusive user rights and can capture the benefits of management. In a number of such cases, however, fisher participation in the enforcement of user rights is absent. In this analysis we used central Chile as a case-study to investigate why some fishers may not participate in enforcement even when they have exclusive territorial user rights for fisheries. We used a best-worst scaling survey to assess why fishers would choose not to participate in enforcement through monitoring their TURF management areas, and what would help to increase their participation. We found that the main reason fishers may not monitor is because they consider government policing of marine areas and punishment of poachers to be ineffective. Increased and timely responsiveness by government when poachers are detected and more stringent penalisation of poachers may lead to greater involvement in enforcement by fishers.
Keyword Best-worst scaling
Chile
Marine management
Monitoring
Small-scale fisheries
TURFs
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Grant ID NC-120086
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Management Publications
Official 2016 Collection
 
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