Signalling quality with posted prices

Khezr, Peyman and Sengupta, Abhjit (2014). Signalling quality with posted prices. School of Economics Discussion Paper 532, School of Economics, University of Queensland.

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Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads
Author Khezr, Peyman
Sengupta, Abhjit
Title Signalling quality with posted prices
School, Department or Centre School of Economics
Institution University of Queensland
Series School of Economics Discussion Paper
Report Number 532
Publication date 2014-09-02
Publisher The University of Queensland School of Economics
Total pages 14
Language eng
Formatted abstract
We study a game in which the seller of an indivisible object wants to sell her object to a finite number of potential buyers with a posted price. The environment is such that the seller has some private information about the quality of the object that cannot be communicated with buyers at zero cost. We focus on the separating equilibrium of this game in which the seller signals her actual type via the posted price. The conditions of the existence and the uniqueness of this equilibrium are studied. In an example, we calculate the seller’s expected payoff at this equilibrium and further discuss some comparative statistics.
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Working Paper
Collection: School of Economics Publications
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Created: Mon, 23 Feb 2015, 16:24:09 EST by Alys Hohnen on behalf of School of Economics