Self-reporting, investigation and evidentiary standards

Gerlach, Heiko (2013) Self-reporting, investigation and evidentiary standards. Journal of Law and Economics, 56 4: 1061-1090. doi:10.1086/674098

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Author Gerlach, Heiko
Title Self-reporting, investigation and evidentiary standards
Journal name Journal of Law and Economics   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0022-2186
Publication date 2013-11-01
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1086/674098
Open Access Status File (Publisher version)
Volume 56
Issue 4
Start page 1061
End page 1090
Total pages 30
Place of publication Chicago, United States
Publisher University of Chicago Press
Language eng
Abstract Self-reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement. This paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort. I show that this leads to a negative relationship between self-reporting incentives and investigation effort. Three main conclusions arise. First, violators self-report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered. Second, self-reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high. Finally, authorities can increase the incentives to self-report when they convict without hard evidence. However, a hard-evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior.
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Official 2014 Collection
School of Economics Publications
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Created: Thu, 09 Jan 2014, 04:11:49 EST by Alys Hohnen on behalf of School of Economics