Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

Eraslan, Hulya and McLennan, Andrew (2013) Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory, 148 6: 2195-2222. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.007

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Author Eraslan, Hulya
McLennan, Andrew
Title Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
Journal name Journal of Economic Theory   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0022-0531
Publication date 2013-11-01
Year available 2013
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.007
Open Access Status DOI
Volume 148
Issue 6
Start page 2195
End page 2222
Total pages 28
Place of publication Maryland Heights, MO, United States
Publisher Academic Press
Language eng
Subject 2002 Cultural Studies
Abstract We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposer's identity is randomly determined, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. The theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique. This generalizes Eraslan [34] insofar as: (a) there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions; (b) different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions; (c) there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected.
Keyword Coalitions
Fixed point index
Fixed points
Legislative bargaining
Multilateral bargaining
Noncooperative bargaining
Simple games
TU games
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Grant ID DP0773324
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Official 2014 Collection
School of Economics Publications
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 20 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
Scopus Citation Count Cited 22 times in Scopus Article | Citations
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Created: Tue, 03 Dec 2013, 22:26:01 EST by Professor Andrew Mclennan on behalf of Scholarly Communication and Digitisation Service