A unifying impossibility theorem

Man, Prisclla and Takayama, Shino (2012). A unifying impossibility theorem. School of Economics Discussion Paper 448, School of Economics, The University of Queensland.

Author Man, Prisclla
Takayama, Shino
Title A unifying impossibility theorem
School, Department or Centre School of Economics
Institution The University of Queensland
Series School of Economics Discussion Paper
Report Number 448
Publication date 2012-01
Publisher University of Queensland, School of Economics
Editor Mohammad Alauddin
Total pages 22
Language eng
Abstract/Summary This paper considers social choice correspondences assigning a choice set to each non-empty subset of social alternatives. We impose three requirements on these correspondences: unanimity, independence of preferences over infeasible alternatives and choice consistency with respect to choices out of all possible alternatives. With more than three social alternatives and the universal preference domain, any social choice correspondence that satisfies our requirements is serially dictatorial. A number of known impossibility theorems — including Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem and the impossibility theorem under strategic candidacy — follow as corollaries. Our new proof highlights the common logical underpinnings behind these theorems.
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Working Paper
Collection: School of Economics Publications
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Created: Wed, 27 Feb 2013, 17:20:50 EST by Alys Hohnen on behalf of School of Economics