Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions

Menezes, Flavio M. and Ryan, Matthew J. (2009) Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions. International Journal of Game Theory, 38 3: 349-366. doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0164-7

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Author Menezes, Flavio M.
Ryan, Matthew J.
Title Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions
Journal name International Journal of Game Theory   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 1432-1270
Publication date 2009-05-27
Year available 2009
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1007/s00182-009-0164-7
Volume 38
Issue 3
Start page 349
End page 366
Total pages 18
Editor S. Zamir
Place of publication Germany
Publisher Springer
Language eng
Subject C1
140104 Microeconomic Theory
Abstract We extend the Coase conjecture to the case of a seller with a single object, who faces n potential buyers and holds a sequence of English auctions until the object is sold. In an independent-private-values environment in which buyers and sellers share the same discount factor, we show that the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium path of reserve prices obeys a Coasian logic. Moreover, the equilibrium reserve path lies below that for the repeated sealed-bid, second-price auctions studied by McAfee and Vincent (in Games Econ Behav 18:246–276). Nevertheless, the open (English) and sealed-bid formats are shown to be revenue equivalent.
Keyword Dynamic auctions
Coase conjecture
Reserve prices
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: 2010 Higher Education Research Data Collection
School of Economics Publications
 
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Created: Thu, 22 Apr 2010, 02:06:20 EST by Alys Hohnen on behalf of School of Economics