After the OFR: Can UK shareholder value still be enlightened?

Johnston, Andrew (2006) After the OFR: Can UK shareholder value still be enlightened?. European Business Organization Law Review, 7 4: 817-843. doi:10.1017/S1566752906008172

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Author Johnston, Andrew
Title After the OFR: Can UK shareholder value still be enlightened?
Journal name European Business Organization Law Review   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 1741-6205
Publication date 2006-01-01
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1017/S1566752906008172
Volume 7
Issue 4
Start page 817
End page 843
Total pages 27
Place of publication The Hague, Netherlands
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Language eng
Subject 18 Law and Legal Studies
1801 Law
1899 Other Law and Legal Studies
Abstract This article examines the likely impact of the United Kingdom's Company Law Review (CLR) on its system of corporate governance. The CLR recommended that company law should be amended to require companies to pursue ‘enlightened shareholder value’. This would be ensured primarily through a requirement on listed companies to produce an Operating and Financial Review (OFR). The OFR was introduced into law but was recently unexpectedly abolished by the Chancellor. The article examines the theoretical approach taken to corporate governance by the CLR and the way in which the OFR was expected to affect corporate governance. It then asks whether shareholder value would in fact have been enlightened by the OFR, given the institutional context in which it would have operated. While there are considerable grounds for scepticism about whether the OFR would have worked as the CLR expected, it is unfortunate that it was withdrawn because it was an important experiment in disclosure of qualitative information about intangible assets. The article concludes with some thoughts about whether shareholder value could still be enlightened in the absence of a mandatory OFR.
Keyword Corporate Governance
Shareholder Wealth
Institutional context
Company Law Reform
Qualitative disclosure
Q-Index Code C1
Additional Notes .

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Excellence in Research Australia (ERA) - Collection
TC Beirne School of Law Publications
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Citation counts: Scopus Citation Count Cited 10 times in Scopus Article | Citations
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Created: Mon, 16 Nov 2009, 21:38:16 EST by Rosalind Blair on behalf of Faculty of Business, Economics & Law