Perceiving contradictions

Priest, Graham (1999) Perceiving contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77 4: 439-446. doi:10.1080/00048409912349211


Author Priest, Graham
Title Perceiving contradictions
Journal name Australasian Journal of Philosophy   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0004-8402
Publication date 1999-12-01
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1080/00048409912349211
Volume 77
Issue 4
Start page 439
End page 446
Total pages 8
Place of publication Oxford, U.K.
Publisher Oxford University Press
Language eng
Subject C1
440107 Metaphysics
780199 Other
Formatted abstract
When it is suggested that contradictions might be true, many an analytic philosopher will screw up their face into a look of anguish, and say 'But I just don't see what it could be for a contradiction to be true'. They might mean many things by this. 'See' might simply mean 'understand', in which case they might be complaining that classical two-valued semantics leaves no room, as it were, for something to be both true and false. Such a lack of understanding can be rectified by explaining to them the semantics of a suitable paraconsistent logic, which does allow for this possibility.

But often, I think, the angst (real or imagined) is of another kind. What such a philosopher is trying to do is imagine what it would be like for a situation to be contradictory. They are trying to visualise how an inconsistent situation might look--and they fail. But it can be done. First, I will point out how; next, we will explore some implications of this fact.
Q-Index Code C1

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry
 
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Created: Tue, 10 Jun 2008, 23:39:03 EST