Meaning rationalism, a priori, and transparency of content

Szubka, Tadeusz (2000) Meaning rationalism, a priori, and transparency of content. Philosophical Psychology, 13 4: 491-503. doi:10.1080/09515080020007625

Author Szubka, Tadeusz
Title Meaning rationalism, a priori, and transparency of content
Formatted title
Meaning rationalism, a priori, and transparency of content
Journal name Philosophical Psychology   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0951-5089
Publication date 2000-12-01
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1080/09515080020007625
Volume 13
Issue 4
Start page 491
End page 503
Total pages 13
Place of publication Abingdon, U.K.
Publisher Carfax
Language eng
Subject C1
440109 Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition)
780199 Other
Formatted abstract
Most current theories of meaning and mental content accept externalism. One of its forceful exponents is Ruth Garrett Millikan. She argues that externalism leads to the abandonment of "the last myth of the given", that is, of the idea that identity of meaning and mental content is somehow unproblematically given to us, and that we can easily recognize the sameness of meaning and mental content. If one refuses such a "mythical" giveness or meaning rationalism, one has to admit that there is no logical possibility known a priori. The paper tries to show that even if one abandons meaning rationalism one can still hold that there are logical possibilities known a priori. The claim is defended by arguing that a priori knowledge is not completely independent from experience and does not demand the absolute transparency of meaning from the first-person point of view. A priori knowledge requires only a priori justification, that is, such a justification that is based merely on relations between meanings or contents.
© 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd

Q-Index Code C1
Additional Notes Special Issue: "Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics, Part 2"

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: School of Languages and Cultures Publications
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Created: Tue, 10 Jun 2008, 21:41:42 EST