Archaeology of Colonisation: A Critical Voyage from the Caribbean to Australia

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Abstract

This research is a historical-theoretical examination of how colonisation was operationalised in Queensland, Australia. It argues that colonisation was constituted as a form of government that had two constitutive dimensions: one metaphysical framed by aesthetic judgement and one technico-political framed by administrative functionality. The mapping of both dimensions provides a more accurate description of the operationalisation of colonisation.

This research applies a Foucauldian archaeology to the ongoing process of colonisation, and its findings are outlined in two parts. The first part discusses the global origins of how the colonial West first aesthetically conceptualised aboriginality and blackness in the Caribbean, and the second part discusses how this conceptualisation was wielded locally in Queensland through the administrative design of the Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act). Foucauldian archaeology is understood as a historical engagement with the origins of a given notion, concept, or praxis, and with its relationship to forms of governance (Agamben, 2009; Deleuze, 1985; Foucault, 1974).

This thesis begins with mapping the global origins of colonisation, which are found in the first European colonial experiences in the Caribbean in the 15th and 16th centuries where the Western conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness were formed. I argue here that these conceptualisations were aesthetic assemblages that predate the post-Enlightenment discourses of anthropology. The first of these conceptualisations, aboriginality, was assembled at the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th centuries from the aesthetics of monstrosity. Through casting aboriginality in the imagery of the monstrous, and particularly of the cannibal, this conceptualisation justified the enslavement of aboriginal peoples, the first slavery in the Americas. A second conceptualisation, blackness, was assembled later in the 16th century. Blackness became historically tied through the conceptualisation of aboriginality to slavery. These two conceptualisations - aboriginality and blackness - were later used interchangeably in the 1897 Act as tools used to subjectify Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Queenslanders.

The thesis continues with analysing the functions of colonisation as a local form of governance. I term this the Blanket Approach, a wordplay that describes the pure function of colonisation as a form of governance. The operation of colonisation
in Queensland is illustrated through the triple functions of the Blanket Approach: totalisation, multiplicity, and the creation of desire. Thus, the 1897 Act through its Blanket Approach imposes Western colonial conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness through its totalising effect on the possible relationships between colonial subjects and the state, is distributed through a multiplicity of functions, and creates the conditions for a tailored relationship in the space of subjectivity.

Lastly, this research concludes that the two-fold operation that I describe links the local governance processes with global historical conceptualisations through a conceptualist movement, which is an administrative non-political movement whose concern, in the manner of conceptualist art, is with the appearance of things or of relationships in the world rather than with their substance. This conceptualist movement as a form of power aids colonisation as a localised form of governance. In this sense, colonisation is understood not only as a local process, or only as global machinery, but also as machinery that simultaneously operates micropolitically and macropolitically.
Declaration by author
This thesis is composed of my original work and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly authored works that I have included in my thesis.

I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award.

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Publications during candidature

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- She functioned as a professional editor for this thesis. She proofread the thesis and focussed on grammatical issues.

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None.
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Part 1: Introduction
Wulpura, Yir-Yoront¹, and many more nations are the Queensland Aboriginal peoples and were those nations who existed well before colonisation and who still assert their nation status. This is the same with Aboriginal nations in Australia, Aboriginal nations in the Caribbean, Aboriginal nations in the Americas and Aboriginal nations around the world. This research acknowledges that the use of the category of “Aboriginal” and other racialised terms are problematic because it reifies the coloniser-colonised binary and, by that, “the binary of superior and inferior beings that justifies the logic of domination” (Chalmers, 2014, p. 28). However, in order to critique the operationalisation of colonisation this work is limited by the problematic language of colonisation to use, at times, the word “Aboriginal” to refer to the subject position of the end point of the operation of colonisation, and this “naming” can be problematic because it can (re)produce colonising practices. Note that the use of the non-capitalised term “aboriginal” is also prevalent in this thesis and refers to the adjectival descriptor of an object rather than the proper noun for people and countries.

Racialised categories have been used as a vehicle to enable a subject position of disadvantage in colonisation (Chalmers, 2014; Grosfoguel, 2008a; Quijano, 2000). In the cultural and legal sphere, terms such as “Aboriginal” have been ‘defined’ in hierarchal lower positions to function as a tool for colonising practices. In order to problematise racialised terms, Yanyuwa scholar Gordon Chalmers calls for:

A decolonial analysis of taken-for-granted terms like “Aboriginal” [to] provide us with another option to reorient ourselves away from continuing to make the same mistakes regarding indigenous peoples’ place in this nation [Australia]. (Chalmers, 2014, p. 29)

¹ Names retrieved from the *Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies* website, [http://aiatsis.gov.au/](http://aiatsis.gov.au/)
Though this research attempts a decolonial critique of the mechanism of colonisation and how it is operationalised, it must be acknowledged that problematic racialised categories are used throughout the thesis to address the end point of colonising practices. Therefore, there is a danger of (re)producing the colonising practices that this research aims to critique in the first place.

While my intention is to communicate respect through using the capitalised words “Australian Aboriginal” and “Aboriginal” in this thesis, these terms do not cease to be problematic simply by writing about my intentions. The potential problematic nature of this term must be acknowledged; however, this problematisation is not the focus of this research. In sum, this thesis uses the capitalised words of “Australian Aboriginal” and “Aboriginal” in order to attempt to communicate the utmost respect to Aboriginal nations in Queensland and around the world; however, this research must begin by acknowledging that the function of the word “Aboriginal” and its complicity with colonisation must be problematised.
Chapter I

Archaeology of Colonisation: A Transversal Approach

Every society, and every individual, are thus plied by both segmentarities simultaneously: one molar, the other molecular. If they are distinct, it is because they do not have the same terms or the same relations or the same nature or even the same type of multiplicity. If they are inseparable, it is because they coexist and cross over into each other… In short, every-thing is political, but every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 213, emphasis in original)

The following research is a historical-theoretical critique of colonisation that attempts to answer the broad question of “How has colonisation been micro and macro politically operationalised?” It will be argued that colonisation was constituted as a form of government and it is operationalised micropolitically (locally) and macropolitically (globally); colonisation’s global operation originated within the frame of aesthetics (not within the frame of the discourse of anthropology) and its local operation is defined by the pure function of the administration of the colonised in the specific way that the context dictated (in this case the context of Queensland, Australia). In order to understand how colonisation has operated specifically, this research engaged in a Foucauldian archaeology of colonisation. Though this archaeology of colonisation draws from a Caribbean and Latin American political-theoretical perspective in conversation with an Australian Aboriginal political-theoretical perspective, Foucauldian archaeology is used here as a methodological tool to unearth the fundamentally Western operationalisation of colonisation. This archaeology of colonisation unearthed the origin of the conceptualisations for the colonised and the way in which they were used as tools for domination. This research finds that the conceptualisation of the subject in the historical materials that surround
the *Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act)* was located in the Western conceptualisations of *aboriginality* and *blackness*\(^2\). These conceptualisations were not originally formed in the 18\(^{th}\) or 19\(^{th}\) centuries, but rather this research argues that they were first formed and conceptualised aesthetically in the 15\(^{th}\) and 16\(^{th}\) centuries in the first colonial experiences in the Caribbean (from 1492 to 1538). Drawing from the literature and historical processes, and from the theory of colonisation of the Australian experience and of other parts of the world, particularly the experience in Latin America (coloniality/decoloniality network), this thesis applies a Foucauldian archaeology to the ongoing process of colonisation. The findings are outlined in two parts: the first discusses how the Colonial West first conceptualised aboriginality and blackness, and the second discusses how this conceptualisation was exerted in Queensland through the *Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act)*. The three key findings of this archaeology are as follows:

1. The Western conceptualisation of aboriginality in the 15\(^{th}\) and 16\(^{th}\) centuries revolved around an aesthetic imagery informed by ‘Monstrous Anthropology’;
2. The Western conceptualisation of blackness in the 15\(^{th}\) and 16\(^{th}\) centuries was not directly associated with slavery and slavery was inherited from aboriginality. However, the conceptualisation of blackness became entangled with the conceptualisation of aboriginality, which were the first colonial racial devices not

\(^2\) The intention of unearthing the origins of colonisation located in the objects that it ‘spoke of’ is not to define these conceptualisations, but rather to present the processes that historically constituted and animated the *praxis* of colonisation.
informed by the discourse of anthropology but by an aesthetic discourse; and

(3) Utilising these conceptualisations, the mechanism that exerted colonisation was manifested in the local administrative operation of the 1897 Act in a ‘Blanket Approach’ manner.

Colonisation in Australia has been rigorously researched, locally, by numerous Australian scholars (Augoustinos, Tuffin & Rapley, 2007; Evans 2007; Kidd, 1997; MacCorquodale, 1987, Moreton-Robinson, 2003; Nakata, 2007; Reynolds, 1993; Uhlmann, 2006); when looking at this abundant scholarship, it is evident that there is a close relationship with the colonial issues that are faced globally (Smith, 1999). In addition, the literature on colonisation almost collectively indicates that it has strong global systemic influences (Anzaldúa, 1999; Bhabha, 1994; Castro-Gómez, 1996; Dussel, 1993; Fanon, 1990; Grosfoguel, 2008b; Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Mannoni, 1991; Mignolo, 1995, Oliver, 2004; Pagán-Jimenez & Rodríguez-Ramos, 2008; Said, 1978; Smith, 2000; Spivak, 1999). Therefore, it is not an oversimplification to conceptualise colonisation as a process that encompasses multiple countries and, by extension, it is not limited by distance. Thus, colonisation has been regarded as a form of globalisation that has unified the “old” world with the “new” world: a globalisation that is constituted by the praxis of domination (Rivera-Santana & Fryer, 2014). The colonality-decoloniality studies network conceptualises colonisation as a global process that occurs simultaneously with modernity, capitalism, and patriarchy; rather than colonisation being a domination that is resolved through self-determination, the colonality-decoloniality studies network argues that colonisation is historically rooted within the forms of thought that are informed by Eurocentrism (Dussel, 1993; Quijano, 2000; Grosfoguel, 2011; Mignolo, 1995). Consequently, in this thesis,
colonisation is understood as an ongoing global process (Dussel, 1993; Smith, 1999; Wallerstein, 1982) that includes yet is not limited to nationalism issues; however, this research investigates the local historicity of colonisation in Queensland, Australia, and this becomes the grounds that this archaeology excavates.
Inquiry Stance

*Carlito’s Way* (1993) 1:21:05

Gail: Can I ask you a personal question?
Carlito: Anything
Gail: Did you ever kill anybody, Charlie?
Carlito: … (snorts)
Gail: I’m sorry.
Carlito: Well, you know, it’s just like, ahh, it’s just not a simple question.
- I mean, I just can’t answer it like…
Gail: That’s all right.
- You don’t have to…
- You don’t have to answer.
Carlito: When I was a kid in East Harlem…
- … the wops\(^4\) said…
- … no spics\(^5\) could go east of Park Avenue.
- Spooks\(^6\) said: “No ‘Ricans west of Fifth Avenue.”
- Now, that don’t leave you much room to manoeuvrer. Say you want to go to Central Park, play with the ducks. You’re shit outta luck. So what do you do? You go anyway.
- I’m up on 106\(^{th}\) Street, Central Park, near the lake. I get caught by these Copiens\(^7\). Right?
- They surround me. So I get my blood up, pulls out my blade. I said: Como one! I’ll take any of you mothers!”
- They say: “No, man. We’re gonna kill your ass”. Out come the zip guns. Homemade gun. You pull the hook back, catch the bullet square, ping. Hit your head, man, you got serious problems.
- That was the last chase on me like that…because from then on I carried my own piece.
- Guys went down, yeah, but it ain’t like, you know, you just… decide one day, and then that’s it. No.
- You just do what you gotta do to survive. Somehow, you know, you just end up where you are.
Gail: That’s how everybody ends up where they are. Everybody.

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\(^3\) The film *Carlito’s Way* (1993) is the story of a Puerto Rican man living in the ‘barrio’ or the ‘Spanish Harlem’ who cannot escape his history. Carlos Brigante is a former heroin drug lord who is released from prison due to a legal technicality, and he is determined to abandon his criminal past and retire to the Caribbean. The film, directed by Brian de Palma, is based on two novels (*Carlito’s Way*, 1975 & *After Hours*, 1979) written by Edwin Torres, who is a former Supreme Court judge for New York. The film is far from being a masterpiece, but it achieves a brilliant presentation of East Harlem in the 1970s, privileging the atmosphere over the individuality of the main characters (Maison, 1993).

\(^4\) Pejorative word for Italian Americans.

\(^5\) Pejorative word for Puerto Ricans.

\(^6\) Pejorative word for African Americans.

\(^7\) Another pejorative word for African Americans.
In this dialogue from the film *Carlito’s Way*, Carlito’s answer to Gail illustrates the inquiry stance of this archaeology of colonisation. The fact that *Carlos Brigante* (the real name of the main character in the film *Carlito’s Way*) is a Puerto Rican entrapped in a racially segregated, impoverished, and subalternised part of New York is a just “happy coincidence”, and there are many coincidences that are found throughout this research. To “honestly” answer the question of how colonisation operated or operates, the *arché* must be determined. According to Agamben (2009), archaeology can be defined as the search for the *arché*, which is the Greek term with two meanings: the origin and the command. Agamben (2008), who is a post-Foucauldian scholar (Clemens, 2008), states that Foucauldian archaeology is the search for the beginning and the command, and their constitutive complicity because “the beginning not only commands the birth, but also the growing, the circulation, and the transmission…in one word the history, of whatever this may be, an idea, a praxis, an institution, etc.” (Agamben, 2009, p. 100). Therefore, the origin is not merely a start that disappears in what follows: on the contrary, the origin never ceases to command, to govern, and to control. This inseparable relationship between the origin and the command is the central discussion in Foucault’s *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1974) when he locates the origins of Western knowledge in their threshold of formation and their inseparability from power, with knowledge being the *commander* of the exertion of power (Agamben, 2012a; Rachman 2007). Perhaps Carlito or Edwin Torres knew about Foucault or other similar philosophies; however, it appears that Carlito’s answer to Gail draws upon that exploration of the origin that will dictate the command of surviving through (at times) killing people. Carlito’s answer, rather than a simple yes or no with times, names, and dates, provides a more complete

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8 A more elaborate discussion on the methodology is presented in *Chapter II: Theory, Methodology and Method: Foucauldian Archaeology*. 

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answer that begins with the origin of the behaviour and continues through the command; in this thesis, it is argued that a focus on the origin and the command will similarly provide a more complete answer to the operationalisation of colonisation. How is this quote from *Carlito’s Way* related to the question of colonisation in Australia and Puerto Rico, or more broadly the Caribbean? The short answer lies in how Carlito honestly and insightfully answered Gail’s question. The purpose of this Foucauldian archaeology is to answer the question of colonisation with the same honesty that Carlito did when asked if he ever killed anybody.

What was colonisation (with the assumption that the process is over, which contradicts the argument in this research)? The answer for this question should be simple if colonisation is only defined. Colonisation is defined as “to settle and establish control over the indigenous people in a given area” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, n.d.). Therefore, colonisation can be understood simply through the settlement and establishment of control in Australia, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and every other colonised country. However, as has been foreshadowed, just like Carlito when he answered the question “Did you ever kill anyone?”, the question of “What is colonisation?” is not easy to answer. Carlito’s question has an individual element to it, expressed using the pronoun “you”, that he appears to resist. Instead of answering with a simple “Yes, I did” or “No, I didn’t”, Carlito begins to tell a story that is located in the event when he first encountered explicit territorial violence. The story sets the grounds for what would be the climax of the answer, which is “Guys went down, yeah, but it ain’t like, you know; you just... decide one day, and then that’s it. No.” This answer disregards the “Yes, I did” and “No, I didn’t” answers that would indicate that killing is simply an isolated and independent incident, or as though the answer can be located in one or many individual moments of time buried in the past.
The response that describes the history of his environment locates the answer of the question in a more or less accurate place where the situation might be found along the pathway from which it came and where it is going. Carlito’s response maps the answer that starts drawing his story in the beginning where he can recall not killing people. That threshold moment not only maps the location of the answer, but it also demonstrates the direction of the narrative that his life has taken and will likely continue to take. The dialogue concludes with locating the nature of Carlito’s answer in a specific place, or as stated by Carlito, “Somehow, you know, you just end up where you are”; then Gail states, “That is how everybody ends up where they are. Everybody.” Similarly, the answer to “What is colonisation?” cannot be fully answered using isolated events in history or the times and places where it happened. The answer must be mapped starting at the threshold moment of colonisation. From there, the task is to map how we all ended up here, the colonisers and the colonised. If this is true, then the question of “what is colonisation” must be reconceptualised to “How has colonisation occurred and worked (operated) to produce different peoples (both colonised and coloniser) who ended up where they are now?” This research is interested in the mapping of colonisation rather than the specifics of how colonisation can be defined as an outcome of a linear logical sequence.

**Literature Review**

In other words, the essential thing here is to see clearly, to think clearly – that is, dangerously- and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, fundamentally, is colonization? To agree on what it is not: neither evangelization, not a philanthropic enterprise, nor a desire to push back the frontiers of ignorance, disease, and tyranny, nor a project undertaken for the greater glory of God, not an attempt to extend the rule of law. To admit once
and for all, without flinching at the consequences, that the decisive actors here are the adventurer and the pirate, the wholesale grocer and the ship owner, the gold digger and the merchant, appetite and force and behind them, the baleful projected shadow of a form of civilisation which, at a certain point in its history, finds itself obliged, for internal reasons, to extend to a world scale the competition of its antagonistic economies. (Cesaire, 1972, p. 33).

This brief literature review attempts to review and connect (integrate) the works addressing colonisation from different parts of the world, with a focus on the Latin American and Caribbean, and Australian theoretical contexts. It follows the complexity of Cesaire’s question that he proposed 60 years ago and that remains relevant today. Even though there is general agreement that colonisation is strongly influenced by a global ongoing process (Anzaldúa, 1999; Bhaba, 1994; Castro-Gómez, 1996; Dussel, 1993; Fanon, 1990; Grosfoguel, 2008a; Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Mannoni, 1991; Mignolo, 1995; Oliver, 2004; Pagán-Jimenez & Rodríguez-Ramos, 2008; Quijano, 2000; Said, 1978; Smith, 2000; Spivak, 1999), its theorisation is often limited by the segregated spaces that are dictated by the coloniser’s agenda. Colonisation studies are usually regarded as beginning with the works of Frantz Fanon in the context of the global fight for self-determination. After self-determination was achieved in most countries, colonisation lost relevance and a new body of research was formed called “post-colonialism”, which focuses on the subaltern, deconstruction, and decolonization of the “mind” focused mainly on post-structural studies on subjectivity (Castro-Gómez, 2007). In Latin America, another form of colonial studies emerged from the context of social justice, and it was closely linked with theology of liberation; together, they have been labelled as coloniality-decoloniality studies (Grosfoguel, 2008b). These studies have focused on intellectual
colonisation and later the way that colonisation focused on the thought forms rather than only on the occupation of the land. In contrast, theorists from New Zealand, Australia, and other countries have declared that for them, particularly for Aboriginal peoples, colonisation is not over and decolonisation must still happen (Anzaldúa, 1999; Moreton-Robinson, 2003; Nakata, 2007; Smith, 2000). Therefore, ways to critique racism and Eurocentric thought, and to decolonise knowledges have been researched and theorised. This exceptional body of research, regardless of the consensus that colonisation is an ongoing process, is often divided by national Western practices such as languages. For example, Latin American (Spanish and Portuguese-speaking) literature is often not considered in Anglo (English-speaking) countries, and vice versa. Although some theorists have begun to reference each other given the useful concepts and critiques that they have developed, e.g. Nakata, Nakata, Keech & Bolt (2012) and Pagán-Jiménez & Rodriguez-Ramos (2008), significant work remains to be undertaken. A key intention of this research is to re-instate that colonisation is a global process of domination, without losing the mainly historical local complexities of a given place, and to integrate research from Latin America, specifically the coloniality-decoloniality studies, with that from Anglo countries (predominantly Australia), i.e. colonisation-decolonisation studies.

**Colonisation: Coloniser and the Colonised Across Borders**

Every colonised person—in other words, every person in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality—finds itself face to face with the language of the civilising nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country (Fanon, 1952, p. 55).

Through various international events and, somewhat constituted between the First World War and Second World War, the issue of colonisation was ideologised
through the promotion of national sovereignty, which positioned colonisation as a nationalistic issue (Berriós, 1972). The United Nations created the Special Decolonization Committee and this institution dominated the discussion and meanings of colonization (UN, n.d.). The Committee went on to promote the independence of the nations. In this context, the subjugating processes of colonisation in other forms roamed free\(^9\) and authors including Fanon, in the context of Algeria, and Said (1978), in the cultural context of Palestine, theorised about colonisation. It could be said that colonisation, which is understood as the relationship between the colonised and coloniser that is a battle to the death, was inaugurated with Frantz Fanon’s work portrayed in *Black Skin, White Mask* (1952):

> A Negro behaves differently with a white man and with another Negro. That this self-division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond question… No one would dream of doubting that its major artery is fed from the heart of those various theories that have tried to prove that the Negro is a stage in the slow evolution of monkey into man. Here is objective evidence that expresses reality. (p. 32)

This theorisation that is located in the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised implies a subjugating relationship, not only from the coloniser as a person, but also the coloniser as a representation that can be located in the coloniser-as-person, coloniser-as-institution, and even in the colonised-as-person. In *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization*, Mannoni (1991) projects the image in an “attitude” of colonisation as the colonised hopelessly accept domination but with the

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\(^9\) Garcia-Canclini (1995) and other authors argue that Capitalist and Neoliberal practices, such as the Americanisation of various countries, roamed free as non-nationalistic entities and directly impacted these countries, for example through pop culture.
unsatisfying expectation to support themselves; here, he projects the structure of a discourse or imaginary ideology, and not the literal voice of the people.

However, before this, the accumulation of knowledge, socio-political processes, and particular moments in history have provided the discursive devices to create this constituted body of knowledge. For example, the master-slave relationship first unveiled explicitly by Nietzsche and Hegel, has been broadened to include the civil movements of African Americans in the United States, the post-Second World War debate on the Decolonization of the Nations promoting their self-determination, the Indian civil movements against British domination, Napoleon invading Egypt using science (Said, 1978), and so on. From the context of the French domination in Martinique and later in Algeria, Fanon engaged in a strong critique of the process of colonisation and its subjectification to the self. However, from that critique, a defined socio-political agenda of liberation emerged in which Fanon participated actively for the self-determination of Algeria and to reach the free post-colonial subject (Fanon, 1990). Ironically, Fanon’s work was echoed in academia, where it created a multiplicity of works from different contexts. One such work was Edward Said’s who in 1978 wrote Orientalism, from a Palestinian context, that critiqued the way in which the Westernised gaze portrayed and subjected a particular gaze on the Orient that could not be seen in any way other than the “ideal other” that accepted particular ways in which the Middle East was idealised that served the specific purpose of a subjugating agenda of Western culture. These authors did not only claim the independence of their nations, but they also denounced the coloniser and colonised struggle in everyday life practices.

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10 Hegel in his Phenomenology of the Spirit discusses the master-slave dialectic yet it is not as explicit as Nietzsche’s discussion (Fukuyama, 1992).
It appears that the significant colonisation theorists have been subjected to the dominating discourse of the cause of nationalism. When most countries acquired their “independence”, the debate grew older and older. Therefore, the domination drive from the colonisers from a nationalist logic did not align. From here, however, the postcolonial approach aligned and it pinpointed subjectivity and subjugation from a poststructuralist perspective that predominantly utilised Westernised theoretical elaborations to understand domination. Spivak (1988) theorised that a double form of domination was embodied in Indian women. This was the domination of Westernised practices and male domination. Spivak and the New Delhi School drew from Derridian, Marxist, Foucauldian, and Deleuzian theories in order to understand subjugation.

Intellectual colonisation (Martín-Baró, 1986) is a vivid form of subjugation, the same as land conquering. Firstly, Western forms of thought “others” native and subjugated forms of knowing and understanding particular phenomena. In order to privilege, rigorous reading of a historicity of philosophers and, reading itself, subjugates particular forms of knowing and imposes imported understandings of colonisation, in particular, that come from a coloniser’s context. Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2000) was very aware of these notions of colonisation and she argued that the “post” prefix suggests that colonisation is over. However, her Maori-Indigenous background cannot accept that it is over; she refuses post-colonialism as a political stance and re-politicises the colonisation notion through re-taking the de-colonizing gesture, particularly regarding methodology and Indigenous ways of knowing.

In Latin America, colonisation and decolonisation were extensive as a result of the Eurocentric dominating perspective and the US interventions in the sovereign nations of El Salvador, Chile, and Guatemala, among others. These conditions created
a body of academic theorisation that is heavily influenced by Marxism with a socio-political agenda that addresses Eurocentrism and colonising interventions of the US and that engages in a *praxis* of decolonising practices that were manifested through disciplines such as Liberation Psychology, Liberation Pedagogies, and Liberation Theology (see Freire, 1970; Matín-Baró, 1986; Montero, 2004), in which concepts such as intellectual colonisation have been coined in order to address different forms of imperialism and colonisation. The colonisation and decolonisation influences are also evident in the Caribbean where the French, British, US, and Spanish colonies exist(ed), in which colonisation is an everyday life reality. While this debate was transpiring, the historical reconstitution of the international socio-political processes re-framed the debate from a colonial debate to a post-colonial one through various moments in history. For example, India was “officially” independent of British rule; the United Nations Decolonization Committee pressured colonised nation-states to create the conditions that enabled them to self-determine themselves; for example, the Algeria occupation was no longer an issue (Algeria was a “Mecca” for the intelligentsia to socially “intervene”); these, among other moments, made it possible to discuss a “post-colonial” time. This also functioned to expand the notion of colonialism (primarily referring to nationalism) into even more oppressed subjects, such as women, African-Americans in the US, and self-determined countries that still lived in the hegemony of subalternity. From here, theorists such as Gayatri Spivak and Edward Said were framed as post-colonial thinkers who produced a particular body of work such as *Can The Subaltern Speak* (1988) that drew from post-structural perspectives and Marxism; it could be argued that such works inaugurated another way to understand colonisation. Postcolonial thinking assumed different perspectives, such as Subaltern Studies that focused on contemporary hegemony studies from the
works of Gramsci (Gramsci, 1986; Spivak, 1988), Critical Race Theory (Williams, 1992), Post-structural Feminist approaches, Comparative Literature (Said, 1978), Critical and Liberation Pedagogy (Freire, 1970), Liberation and Critical Psychology (Martín-Baró, 1986; Montero, 2004; Prilleltensky & Nelson, 2009; Sonn, 2006), and so on.

Colonisation and subjectivity are concepts that at first glance can be understood as a transition from a general process to a particular process, with a deductive directionality. However, when it is understood as a process that interlocks in the relative space where the global process intersects with subjects, colonisation cannot assume this logic. Furthermore, the notion of subjectivity in this research is understood not in relation to the differences of each other or even the understanding of subject position and subjectivity as a “lived experience” (Oliver, 2004), but in relation to the subjectivity that is located in the power relations (re)produced by knowledge and normativity (Foucault, 2005). More closely related to colonisation, Fanon theorised on the subject positioning of the colonised in relation to the coloniser in which the colonised needs the coloniser in order to constitute its subject positioning, as much as the coloniser needs the colonised in order to maintain its subjugation (Fanon, 1952, 1990). Within this theorising, a psychoanalytic tradition was inaugurated in order to understand the self (also with Mannoni’s work in 1950). Subjection implies subjectivity, and the subject positioning and its processes (particularly the dialectic logic) is a way to understand the ‘inferiority complex’, the battle to the death gesture of the coloniser and the colonised position. Psychoanalytic versions of subjectivity, which continue to place particular attention on representation, language, non-linguistic visceral responses, and any bodily responses (which mediate affects, will, and drives), require responsivity and relation in order to (re)constitute
the subject positioning (Oliver, 2004). This indicates that contemporary Freudian psychoanalysis perspectives on subjectivity separate the subject position and the subjectivity or the lived experience of the self (Soler, 1997). Furthermore, the oppressed-oppressor relationship operates within these coordinates of subject position, where the colonised are in the subject position of the oppressed and lived experience of the self becomes a by-product of that subject position (Fanon, 1952; Oliver 2004). The outcome feelings of colonisation, such as inferiority, melancholia, and even psychotic reverberations, are located in the psyche (Oliver, 2004; Soler, 1997).

Post-colonial thinkers such as Spivak (1988) and Bhabha (1990) have assimilated the post-structural perspective on subjectivity. The deconstruction of the subject of Modernity demonstrated that subjectivity focuses solely on subject formation (Derrida, 1995). That is, behind subject formation – i.e. behind the social and historical constructions that subjected the self – there is nothing else. The very idea of an individual, a centred self with a psyche, a personal lived experience, and emotions, was contested because in its deconstruction (Derrida, 1995) or in its genealogy (Foucault, 2007) it was found that these notions were produced and situated in a particular time, in a particular social context, and with a particular agenda. When referring directly to subjectivity and colonisation, Spivak states “between patriarchy and imperialism, subject constitution and object formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into pristine nothingness but into a violent shuffling which is the displaced figuration of the "third world woman" caught between tradition and modernization" (1988, p. 102). The constitution of colonisation is affected in the constitution of subjectivity, obliterating the previous subject formation of a woman and the subject formation of cultural processes.
Another aspect of subjectivity and colonisation that is found in Australian academia is subjectivity as praxis in an ethnographic exertion from Bourdieu’s (1977) perspective. However, in Uhlmann’s ethnographic study on Australian kinship and family (2006), which was undertaken in Newcastle, New South Wales, subjectivity is seen in how the theory of practice engenders a particular set of constitutions of families in Australian subjectivity (Uhlmann, 2006). In contrast, colonisation and subjectivity are elaborated from psychoanalytic and discourse analysis perspectives that engage in the way subject positions have constituted the projection of the Australian Aboriginal as a threat to the “Australian nation” or nationalism (Riggs & Augoustinos, 2005).

Latin American subaltern studies, which were influenced by the works of post-colonial thinking and the theology of liberation, have found echoes in many fields, particularly in Latin American and North American universities (Castro-Gómez, 2007). Theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein, Anibal Quijano, Nestor García-Canclini, Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo, and Ramon Grosfoguel, among others, initiated coloniality-decoloniality studies and their coloniality-modernity network, which will be used in this thesis indistinctively. Theorists such as García-Canclini, Dussel, and Grosfoguel from the field of cultural studies assimilated colonisation, assuming the idea of subjectivity, in this re-appropriated space for theory in which the social is dissolved in the category of the self, because they are one, the same, and mutually inclusive (Castro-Gómez, 1996; García-Canclini, 1995; Mignolo, 1995). In this method of theorising, the categories of analysis refer to the person rather than to society, although they add that it is an effect of post-modern times in which globalisation and neoliberal practices, de-territorialisation, and the evident classes of epistemic frameworks that constitute contemporary times (Harvey, 1990; García-
Canclini, 1995; Mignolo, 1997). With this diffusion in mind, in which the subject is lost, the Latin American perspective has identified certain particularities of colonisation including that it operates simultaneously with the processes of modernity, capitalism, and patriarchy (Dussel, 1993; Quijano, 2000). In particular, colonisation was described in the triple formation of the colonisation of power, the colonisation of knowledge, and the colonisation of the being (Castro-Gómez, 1996; Dussel, 1993; Mignolo, 1997). According to some coloniality-decoloniality theorists, the colonisation of power operates through the system of social classifications established in the 16th century in which social privileges are established according to the symbolic and phenotypic race of the subjects (Castro-Gómez, 2007; Grosfoguel, 2012; Mignolo, 1997). These triads of symbolic indicators have their genealogical roots in the ideological processes of the Biblical story of the descendants of Noah who populated the Earth after the Great Flood (Castro-Gómez, 1996; Dussel, 1993; Mignolo, 1997). The descendants of Jafet, Sem, and Cam respectively represent the socially implied hierarchy of European, Aboriginal, and African peoples (Castro-Gómez, 1996; Dussel, 1993; Mignolo, 1997). The colonisation of knowledge refers to the way that technocratic science rationality represents a determinant factor of the “progress” of industrialisation and the movement from a “Third World” ideology to a “First World” ideology. Castro-Gómez (1996) illustrated how after the Borbonic Reforms in Spain (18th century), the idea was imposed that “to know” was to distance oneself from the world and to see it in a “passion-free” and systematic manner. This supposes a colonisation of the mind that threatens and directly battles the epistemic multiplicity of the world. This notion is what is referred to as coloniality.

The form of the colonisation of the being is the direct colonisation of the body (not only the organism itself but also the social construction of it), which refers
directly to the Foucauldian concept of bio-politics (Castro-Gómez, 2007; Foucault, 2005; Grosfoguel, 2012). Transcending the Westernised-European notion of the centred self through which the colonisation of the being is not about manifestly making the subalterner die, but rather it is about making them live within the logics of the project of modernity, which implies a governmentality and control of the subject (Castro-Gómez, 2007). Furthermore, within the structures of subjectivity, the colonisation of the being is not only perceived as a process that oppresses but also as an element of desire because it produces the material and dialectic conditions of a particular existence of populations.

Psychoanalysis, subjectivity, and colonisation in Australia have been discussed in many forms including the research on whiteness studies that does not only explore this concept as discourse but also serves as a decolonising agenda of pointing the White-Western-European weapon of research “right back” at them (Sonn, 2006). For example, Riggs & Augoustinos, (2005) located the dominant discourses of whiteness in subjective investments through analysing white Australian talk in relation to indigenous title claims. They located exclusion in the discourses and in the projections of the (re)constitution of white hegemony as a device that represents a logic of pragmatism and of Australian national identity in the “one flag” rhetoric (Riggs & Augoustinos, 2005). Furthermore, Augoustinos, Tuffin & Rapley (2007) located the subject positioning of Australian Aboriginal peoples in the media within the discourses of an:

…imperialist narrative of Australian history exculpatory of colonialism; an economic-rationalist/neo-liberal discourse of ‘productivity’ and entitlement managing accountability for a contemporary Aboriginal ‘plight’; a local
discourse of balance and even-handedness which discounted the seriousness of discrimination and racism in Australia. (p. 721)

These discourses that present subject positions that are presented as “imperialist anxieties” attempt to further visualise the self of the coloniser in an explicit decolonising and socio-political agenda.

Given the context of this work, knowledge claims about the Australian Aboriginal community would be unproductive. Thus, it would be more interesting to determine the extent that colonisation has operated to re-constitute subjectivity in a seemingly contradictory condition, albeit no less true. Perhaps the most contradictory discourse that operates on the subjectivity produced by colonisation is that the Aboriginal inhabitants of Australia are subjected to the logics of disposition and migration. Moreton-Robinson (2003) argues:

The subsequent legal regimes we all live under are outcomes of post-colonising conditions. Indigenous people’s circumstances are tied to non-Indigenous migration and our dislocation is the result of our land being acquired by the new immigrants. We share this common experience as Indigenous people just as all migrants share the benefits of our dispossession. (Moreton-Robinson, 2003, p. 37)

In the most ironic of ways – and also in the most perverse – the discourses and explicit manifestations that Australian Aboriginal peoples are subjected to are within the logics of a dispositif or a conceptual apparatus (immigration) that first ironically dispossesses the native subject of their neoliberal land rights and that second positions the first migrant as the native owner (Moreton-Robinson, 2003). This is contradictory, even using Aristotelian logic, but the colonisation process is shaped by the logics of white possession.
In one manifestation of Australian Aboriginal resistance – native title claims – many argue that the Koiki Mabo decision and the *Native Title Act* (1993) have positioned Australian Aboriginal people as “trespassers” in their own land until proven otherwise (Moreton-Robinson, 2003). Claimants are obliged to convert and frame an oral history perspective into a Westernised-European constituted medium, such as written reports, constructed by people working in “valid” disciplines such as anthropologists, historians, lawyers, police, and public servants. The (re)constitution of the title and land ownership is dependant on White-Patriarchal-Westernised-European decision making. Within the logics of the Common Law and the Crown (*terra nullius*), there is still a policy driven debate revolving around the juridical effects of the invalidation, and therefore the illegal occupation of Australia (McNeil, 1998).

Closer to where the context of this archaeology of colonisation was performed is Rosalind Kidd’s (1994) doctoral thesis “Regulating Bodies: administrations and Aborigines in Queensland 1840-1988”, which was later published as *The Way We Civilise: Aboriginal Affairs, the Untold Story* (1997), which is a ground-breaking work that tells the stories of Australian Aboriginal people’s subjugation through the numerous control procedures that the government has exerted through labour, health, and many other institutional devices. Kidd’s book also serves the political purpose of these files being accessible and making visible the terrible things that Australian Aboriginal people have been subjected to. Since that time, Kidd’s work has been an obligatory citation when discussing the history of Aboriginal Australia in Queensland and elsewhere, particularly from the coordinates of the *Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897*. Kidd’s extensive and rigorous historical
analyses is a significant contribution that, in one way or another, guides this research, particularly in the common agenda of telling a story of oppression.

Lastly, the renowned academic Torres Strait Islander Martin Nakata produced a historical-theoretical problematisation of colonisation in his book *Disciplining the Savages, Savaging the Disciplines* (2007). Like this research, Nakata’s book has also been influenced by Foucault’s framework, focussing on the notions of power and knowledge, and using archaeology as his methodological framework. His book critiques the knowledge provided to Torres Strait Islanders by Westernisation; it rigorously critiques the production of knowledge in the fields of education, language, spirituality, and other Western inscriptions. Nakata revises more than 200 years of history in order to contest the knowledge produced from the coloniser’s eye. For example, when critiquing the reports on Torres Strait issues written to feed the broad field of social sciences, he states:

…these were academic treatises designed to expand the intellectual landscape of the then infant social sciences. Their purpose was to objectively observe and document, not to change or distort what they were observing and documenting. Yet, in effect, the work of these scientists was later to do precisely this. For they were to shape and inform disciplines, leaving behind a legacy embedded in knowledge that has not yet been properly recognised or acknowledged (e.g. Roldán, 1993). As such, this invisibility makes the legacy of their work more insidious. (Nakata, 2007, p. 28)

This ‘legacy’ was the construction and inception of a classification system that made Torres Strait Islanders, but arguably Australian Aboriginal peoples in general, slip into the hierarchy of racial inequality determined by social Darwinism (Nakata, 2007). Nakata’s work, and others from different perspectives, unearths the social
Darwinist discourse of modern anthropology. Through problematising the “taken for granted” knowledge that is built, by social sciences for example, for Aboriginal peoples, another sense of being can be imagined. Nakata decisively describes his problematisation to social sciences as follows:

The data contained in the Cambridge team’s reports (1904, 1908 & 1912) is impressively extensive and detailed. The product of a lengthy intellectual gestation, it was not to be published in its entirety as a general ethnography of the Torres Strait until 1935, decades after the studies were carried out. As noted earlier, this report is increasingly regarded by both Islanders and non-Islanders a valuable source of data on the Islander beliefs and traditions and, by definition, of Islander people. Yet, despite the wealth of detail, *these remain little more than random snapshots*. In fact, they can never more than this no matter how carefully they are reinterpreted or filtered simply *because the viewpoint from which they were framed was, from the beginning, constrained both historically and intellectually*. (Nakata, 2007, p. 101, emphasis added)

Certainly, the problematisation of the discourse of modern anthropology is powerfully described here. However, has it always been the case that Western culture conceptualised Aboriginal peoples along the lines of this Darwinist system of inequality? If not, how then have Aboriginal peoples been conceptualised before this? How has colonisation operated to initiate its ‘viewpoint’, which can be the origin of this ‘historical and intellectual constraint’? How has colonisation’s conceptualisation started in order to enable this mechanism?

In order to critique the ongoing global process of colonisation, research must be united and not segregated, linking and not alienating, and transversal and not
isolated. This does not mean that arguments of the diagnosis of colonisation should not be contested; it means that the direction of the critique or the politics should all aim towards the same problem with a united overarching goal. This research critiques colonisation through an unearthing of the phenomena following the inquiry stance of Michel Foucault; that is, archaeology. The colonisation literature described above provides the foundations for this research, with a particular focus on the theorisations of the coloniality-decoloniality studies and the colonisation-decolonisation bodies of works primarily from Australia. Through using Foucauldian archaeology in the context of the colonisation of Australia, unearthing both the origin of colonisation in the Caribbean and the command in Queensland, a transversal critique of colonisation can be performed that will not be limited by the colonisers’ segregation agenda.

The first part of this thesis is devoted to describing the global origins of the formation of Western conceptualisations of aboriginality and of blackness, because they determine the instituting relationships of how colonisation understands and captures the colonised subjects that it considers. The chapter on Monstrous Anthropology argues that the first Western conceptualisation of the colonised subject was aboriginality as framed in reference to anthropocentric monsters as understood in the 15th and 16th centuries. The historical thresholds, i.e. the entry point of the beginning, of the aforementioned Western conceptualisations demonstrate the original relationships (processes) that determine the outline within which to capture the colonised subjects. The conceptualisations of monstrous anthropology and Western blackness are discussed separately, but the initial historical path of colonisation connects them. Differing to the Western racial conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality, which are located in the narrative of racial inequality predicated by social Darwinism, this research discovers that the origins of this conceptualisation are
located in the space of Western anthropocentric aesthetics. When reading the first *Chronicles of Christopher Columbus* from 1492 to 1493 and analysing the first drawings and paintings from the most influential kingdoms of Western culture, the aesthetic of ‘ugliness’ appears to be the place where this first conceptualisation of aboriginality emerged. Furthermore, this Western aesthetic appreciation locates the conceptualisation of aboriginality in the readily available imagery of monstrosity framing it in the illustration of the cannibal from where it can be captured and enslaved. The historical threshold space of colonisation is located from when it was the route through which to grasp an ‘understanding’ of the colonised to when there was a solidified sense of what can be the colonised, predominantly Aboriginal or African slaves; this illustrates the historical processes that encode the Western conceptualisations of colonisation. *Chapter III Monstrous Anthropology* argues that the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality was formed through aesthetics in the historical threshold that depicted Aboriginal peoples as monstrous, and specifically as cannibals, which served the initial purposes of colonisation.

In *Chapter IV Blackness*, it is argued that the second Western conceptualisation emerged in the history of colonisation encoded in the context of Western aboriginality and of slavery, and finalised through granting relevance to colour in determining social positions. The historical threshold of Western blackness in this chapter is described beginning with an account of slavery when it was not associated with blackness and an account of blackness when it was not associated with slavery; then, it is personified by the first documented black *conquistador*, Juan Garrido. Thirdly, a (short) historical pathway of slavery is presented, and the connection between the historical process in which slavery (first being associated in the Americas with Aboriginal peoples) was linked with blackness, which initiated the
colouring of social positions, is clarified. At the end of this chapter, the first painting of the Américas, *Los Mulatos de Esmeralda* by Adrián Sánchez Galque in 1599, is used to demonstrate the linked chain of historical processes that constituted the relationships of the Western conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality. This painting illustrates the solidification of the historical processes contextualised in the monstrous anthropological conceptualisation of aboriginality, constituted by narratives of tragedy and of capture from an anthropocentric gaze, and motivated by conquest (tragedy-capture-anthropocentrism-conquest). It also presents the historical processes of the Western conceptualisation of blackness that follow and that are constituted by the relevance of colouring and of cultural practices, the positioning of social status, and association with value (colouring-cultural practice-social status-value).

The third part of this thesis is the description of the command of colonisation that locates its model in the operationalisation of the 1897 Act in Queensland, Australia, which I refer to as the Blanket Approach; this is the main topic of Chapter V *The Blanket Approach*. It is argued that the 1897 Act, as an illustrative case study of the operation of colonisation, has a triple function that used the mechanisms that are defined by the Blanket Approach. In the same manner that Foucault (1973) described the exertion of power via the taxonomy or classification system dictated by Western

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11 The *Taino-Awarak* language, which is the language group of the Tainos who were the first Aboriginal group that made contact with colonisation and from which I am a descendant, named complex notions using various concepts. For example, the origin of humanity was conceptualised as *Atabey-Apito-Yermao-Guacar-Zuimaco* and the notion of hurricane was conceptualised as *Guabancex-Guatauba-Coastrisquie*. Each notion referred to a process; for example, the hurricane referred to one process of capturing the winds, the other lifting the waters, and lastly the process of releasing both. The numbers of concepts were odd, usually 3, 5, or 7 when referring to nature. I have used the numbers of 4 and 8 in order to position the colonisation notions as unnatural. However, I have chosen not to subject this theoretical strategy to formal logical scrutiny.
knowledge, or the spatial distribution of the mechanism of power described as panoptism (Deleuze, 1985; Foucault, 1976), the **1897 Act** used a complex mechanism described using the ‘wordplay’ of this Blanket Approach notion. This non-discursive operation (Deleuze, 1985) is a pure function that is used to subjectify the object it speaks of. That is, this research discovers that the Blanket Approach, which is only constituted by its function, is a modern mechanism that delivers the origin and command of colonisation. In general, a Blanket Approach refers to something that is used to cover everything or everybody; when it is used to describe the **1897 Act**, it refers to this *Act* being imposed on every aspect of the Australian Aboriginal subjectivity that is defined by Westernisation for every individual person. The *Blanket Approach* delivered the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness, constituted by their historical linkage, through the triple function of totality, multiplicity, and the creation of desire. The historical processes of tragedy-capture-anthropocentrism-conquest and colouring-cultural practice-social status-value are the threads used to weave the Blanket of the **1897 Act**. The Blanket Approach’s triple function of totalisation, multiplicity, and the creation of desire is the modern formula for the pure function of colonisation. Through an example of contemporary aesthetics, in the form of art, the last chapter in part three uses an example from contemporary art and aesthetics to illustrate how colonisation integrates its colonial content or discursive devices with a movement to transform the landscapes of the colonised. Dannie Mellor’s technique of blue-and-white Spode china (blue-china) is used to exemplify how the origin of colonisation connects with the command or the movement of colonisation to surround the landscapes and the mental landscapes of the subjectivity of the colonised. The blue-china technique is also used to exemplify the double fold mechanism of colonisation, the discursive formations or
conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness, and the operation or pure function of colonisation described as the Blanket Approach, and the specific technology or form of power that carries out this operation is considered to be the conceptualist movement.
Chapter II

Theory, Methodology, and Method: Foucauldian Archaeology

…what would it mean to invent a new kind of critique based neither in the supposition of God’s infinite understanding (or its “hermeneutic” equivalents) nor in the sort of finitude of Man central to Heidegger’s reading of Kant. Foucault’s own solution to this problem in the 60s was to imagine a form of critique elaborated in his talk of a “historical a priori” in the *Archaeology of Knowledge*. Could we not see the conditions of what we say and see as a matter of changing, materially rooted “regimes”, with no basis in a larger philosophical anthropology (or related human sciences), but in relation to which there could arise a new archaeological style of critical investigation based instead in the supposition of critical moments in which we start to depart from those conditions or “regimes” and invent new ways of talking about and seeing? (Rajchman in Foucault, 2007, p. 21)

This archaeological research critically investigates colonisation in order to see it and talk about it in new ways. Using this archaeological method also aids in conceptualising colonisation outside philosophical anthropocentrism. However, in order to achieve this, archaeology must be (re)discovered. That is, the theorisation of this notion as a method must be navigated. In this research, archaeology refers to the investigation of specific historical processes through the identification of their *origin* and *command*¹², as well as their intimate relationships (or the mechanisms through which the commands are delivered) (Agamben, 2009). The etymological definition of archaeology signifies both origin and command. Therefore, this notion explicitly refers to the notion of history, but not a history founded in Kantian anthropocentric

¹² The specific use of these terms is explained later in this chapter.
philosophy or philosophical anthropology. Archaeology is the history of words and objects, and their relationships. Furthermore, the words and objects are understood and perceived by their positivities (presence), and this positivity implies a topological distribution of history, power, and discourses (Deleuze, 1985). The archaeology of knowledge that Foucault engaged with in his work *The Order of Things* (or literally translated as *On Words and Things*) is the beginning of the search for the history of knowledge in Western culture through unearthing its origins and the operation of its command. From here, Foucault maps the almost interchangeable relationship between power and knowledge (Agamben, 2008; Deleuze, 1985; Rajchman, 2007). Later, Foucault attempts to make this form of inquiry more explicit in his book *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 1974). Deleuze and Agamben’s readings of Foucault’s work guide my theorisation of the Foucauldian archaeology in this research.

This chapter elaborates on the theoretical and practical implications of Foucauldian archaeology. It argues that Foucauldian archaeology is not an inquiry of formal or interpretative history, nor is it a structuralist method like the history of ideas. Foucauldian archaeology is an inquiry that navigates between origin and command, and maps the historical threshold processes of the concept, notion, or praxis in question in order to construct a history of the presences (positivities) and their correlation with the absences (negativities) in order to identify its constituting processes. In order to support these arguments, an initial elaboration on the notion of archaeology is outlined; a set of distinctions regarding notions of history is constructed; and Foucauldian archaeology is separated from the structuralist method of the history of ideas. Furthermore, *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* are discussed in order to support the interpretation of Foucauldian
archaeology that has been undertaken in this research. Lastly, a contemporary understanding of Foucault is discussed using the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s insights on Foucault and aided by Gilles Deleuze’s book *Foucault* (1985). A key reason for this discussion is not only to clarify the methodological stance of the Foucauldian archaeology, but also to elucidate the perspective of Foucault’s works used in this research given that there are diverging interpretations (Rajchman, 2007).

Michel Foucault (1964) attempted to exorcise the demon of philosophical anthropology instituted by Kant, starting with his work on *Madness and Civilisation*. Psychology was a very comfortable place to speak of subjects in philosophical anthropology, and this was the revelation that Foucault endeavoured to explain. He argued that to think from the logos of anthropocentrism is the space where psychiatry and psychology organised and controlled people. This organisation and control of people had a specific space that he also investigated. Instead of investigating knowledge from an anthropocentric perspective, Foucault investigated it from the furthest perspective that he could find. He hoped that the archaeology of knowledge would escape the anthropological philosophical discourse and would force the demonstration of new ways to think about Western culture. For many philosophers, works such as *The Order of Things* (1973) and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1974) proclaimed that the ‘man’ that defined modernity in Western culture was dead (Deleuze, 1995). Who is this ‘man’ that Western culture often speaks of? Geertz (1979) provided an illustrative definition of ‘him’:

The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgement and action, organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against such wholes and against social and natural
background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of world’s cultures. (Geertz 1979, p. 229)

The centre of modernity in philosophical anthropology is this conceptualisation of ‘man’. This is not the description of a person, but rather it is the primary tool for the discourse of modern philosophical anthropology in Western culture (i.e. the discourse of anthropology). Foucault excavates this important cultural artefact and instead of allowing this artefact to speak for itself like the modern sciences such as anthropology and psychology pretend to do, he slowly removes the dirt from it in order to see and say new things about it. He sees it and speaks of it as it would speak of us; this is Foucault’s archaeological method.

**The notion**

Archaeology is better understood through accessing the original meanings of its roots in Greek: ‘origin’ and ‘to command’. A simple search for the word *archaeology* will immediately assume that its origin comes from the Greek word *arkhaios* (αρχαιος), which means ancient history, or the later modern Latin *archaeologia* that comes from the Greek *arkhaiologia* (αρχαιολογία), which means the science of ancient things. However, if the root *arché* (ἀρχή) is isolated, then the original understanding and use by the Greeks in philosophy reveals that it has a double meaning. The first meaning refers to the origin or beginning, and the second meaning refers to command, execution, or even domination (Agamben, 2012a). Therefore, it can be said that the meaning of archaeology finds its origin in *arché* and not in its institutionalisation as an academic discipline. The meaning of the concept archaeology is broadly the link between the concept of origin or beginning and the concept of command or domination.
The study of origins does not aim to uncover the “authentic” meaning of words in this case, but rather to locate the initial place of historicity where any given concept first emerged. Authenticity or claims to truth are problematic in Foucauldian and other postmodern approaches because they reflect a claim to power rather than a claim for a continuing understanding of the complexity of the object in question. That is, to refer to the ‘origin’ is to find the place from which it all started. However, this does not mean that the first meaning is the authentic meaning; it means that from the origin onwards, there is a pathway (more specifically, a history) that must be constantly referred to in searches. This also means that the origin is the creation and remains the creator of the concept in question because it can still be traced back to the place of origin. When Agamben (2009) traced the origin of the concept ‘paradigm’ in the first elaborations in Aristotle, then in Kant and in Kuhn (1971), he did not claim that the authentic meaning of paradigm is what it means in Greek para meaning ‘next to’ and deigma meaning ‘example’, which would mean that paradigms are examples or metaphors for understanding the world. In his genealogy of ‘paradigm’, Agamben (2008) provided a counter-history that stems from one of the initial conceptualisations of paradigms. This provided not only the counter-history that genealogy usually seeks out, but also the pathway of the origin through which he could highlight the places where the counter-history could be found. Therefore, the part of the meaning of arché that refers to origin cannot be understood as the place where “real” meaning can be found, but rather the place where the first meaning was created, which is like the initial commands that God gave during creation: “Let there be light… Let there be a vault between the waters to separate water from water… Let the land produce vegetation…” (John 1:1-5). God in the beginning created objects with a command; he did not create the world through assembling its pieces. In other words, God did not
build the world; he ordered the objects in the world to be created. Towards the end of this chapter, the notion of commandment is investigated further.

**Interpretative history vs. archaeology**

Archaeology does not concern itself with searching for a reconstruction of the past in the same way that mainstream history does. Certainly, interpretative history is useful, entertaining, and even necessary in order to narrate an account of the past that can be intelligible. It also can have the function of appearing to shed light on seemingly intentionally obscured histories. However, the method of accessing this narrative is constructed through the objects that are considered positive evidence, which are usually tangible objects, with some space for interpretation framed by the rules of formal logic. Foucauldian archaeology aims to excavate words and objects, and it describes the processes surrounding the object of study in their complexity and in their disparate nature. This means that Foucauldian archaeology is an approach that requires us to think topologically.

Interpretative history is important because it can also be used to shed light on subjugated stories and it can resist dominating discourses. It must be noted that there is a very productive body of scholarship that uses many historical approaches, even Foucauldian approaches, to history in order to tell subjugated stories from the perspective of Australian Aboriginal peoples and to highlight their silenced resistances. Authors such as Kidd (1997), Nakata (2007), Morris (1992), and Reynolds (1993), among others, have used interpretative history and Foucauldian perspectives to subvert the effects of colonisation through privileging the voices of those whom have been historically ignored. For example, the book *The Way We Civilise: Aboriginal Affairs, the Untold Story* (1997) is a groundbreaking work that tells the stories of Australian Aboriginal peoples’ subjugation through the many
control procedures that the Australian government exerted through labour, health, and many other institutional devices. It also serves a political purpose for these files in making accessible and visibilising the atrocities that Australian Aboriginal peoples were subjected to in the state of Queensland. Kidd (1997) and others have rigorously navigated the official documentary record in order to narrate a story evidenced by letters, reports, diaries, newspapers articles, and other creative sources to positively validate the interpretations of events that happened and to bring them into the status of history. The interpretations are heavily dependant on objects (materials) and on words or what the words hide in terms of their meanings. The words written in objects are the nucleus of what is history, which is extended through interpretation. Normal evidence must hold a claim to authority regarding its ‘reliability’; furthermore, it needs to be ‘present’ or positive.

Interpretative history aims to narrate a generalised and evidenced history that relies on formal logical deduction. Historical materials are not evidence by themselves because objects (materials) in interpretative history require explanations and stories to be told about them. This interpretation, which is told in narrative form, is the result of a formal Aristotelian logic; that is, the interpretation of materials is ruled by the formal system of logic (Husserl, 2009). This type of linear logic is commonly expressed in the statement: “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, he must be mortal.” (Aristotle in Pierce, 1893). This is what Derrida (1995) and Husserl (2009) refer to as a formal ontology in the Western system of knowledge, which rules over interpretative narratives of history. If valid evidence of linear asseverations is found, then interpretative history can make the claim that this conclusion is valid. However, any contradictory information regarding any part of the asseverations will make this conclusion false or questionable. This formal ontology has been
demonstrated to be useful in many disciplines, including physics, biology, and other ‘hard sciences’. However, are non-linear logical elements, such as contradiction, possible? Does the conclusion provide the only information about the situation? Is a reason that follows a linear outcome absolutely necessary? These questions point towards history being porous and subject to multiple interpretations, as well as perhaps not only being informed by linear logical assumptions. If this is true, then it generates further questions that revolve around there being other ways to enact historical inquiries.

Foucauldian archaeology is not driven by the linear ontology of interpretative history because it excavates the materials as events and aims to describe these objects and ultimately the non-linear processes that surround them. Archaeology ‘thinks’ by describing positivities that surround words and objects in order to paint a picture of a concept or topic in its true multidimensional nature (Deleuze, 1985). Interpretative history relies on the authority of materials or objects that is granted by a given system of knowledge. That is, evidence is granted the status of evidence by the system of knowledge that authorises the object to be evidence. Once this is achieved, the interpretation of the object can be permitted. This also results in other objects not being authorised as evidence, because evidence cannot have an interpretation. This unavoidably transmits the power of the system that authorises and de-authorises, and the system becomes legitimatised through being able to grant an interpretation of one object and not the other. This reproduces the power of a given system of knowledge. These authorities speak volumes about the topology of the grounds of power and history, but these grounds occur in tensions, linear and non-linear relationships, and bi-polarities that not only make these grounds visible/constituted but also determine them through making us see them. Foucauldian archaeology presents these tensions
and paints a different picture with a different set of colours that interpretative history might not use.

**History of ideas vs. archaeology**

Foucault’s notion of archaeology differs from the structuralist method of the history of ideas because the latter focuses on changes in the manifestations of thoughts (opinions), whereas archaeology abandons this focus and aims to excavate the very “monuments” that make discourses (and therefore domination) possible (Foucault, 1974). That is, the history of ideas focuses on the dominating thought in peoples, whereas archaeology endeavours to escape this anthropocentric view through focusing on the elements that enable these ideas to be thought. Therefore, it is understandable for readers to assume that the method used in *The Order of Things* was a history of ideas. However, the inquiry into the manifestations of thoughts through ideas attempts to describe, as much as possible, *when* discrete general ideas were formed, *how long* these dominant ideas lasted, *what* were the material conditions that surrounded them, and *where* the ideas were explicitly seen. It can be said that *The Order of Things* focussed on the grounds on which these thoughts were possible, which Foucault called *episteme*. Foucault (1973) discussed a progressive narrative of the history of ideas that was framed using the multiple ontological natures of truths throughout history. However, he attempted to de-naturalise this ‘progressive’ narrative as he stated in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, “[b]ut archaeological description is precisely such an abandonment of the history of ideas, a systematic rejection of its postulates and procedures, an attempt to practice a quite different history of what men have said” (Foucault, 1974, p. 138).

The history of ideas revises the discrete and already formed ideas throughout the history of a concept (Foucault, 1974). Its purpose is to understand as much as
possible the manifestations of thoughts during a determined period of time throughout all possible areas in which these manifestations of thoughts could be located. For example, the manifestations of thought can be similarly found in different forms of art and disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and psychology. Foucault states, “[t]he history of ideas, then, is the discipline of beginnings and ends, the description of obscure continuities and returns, the reconstitution of developments in the linear form of history” (Foucault, 1974, p. 137). Therefore, the history of ideas follows the form of interpretative history through only displaying a linear narration of what might be the story of discrete “ideas” in determined periods of time. The linear narrative takes a progressive form in which it tells the stories of evolving ideas (Foucault, 2007) into an intuitive perfection of thinking. That is, it tells the story of how “problems, notions, themes may emigrate from the philosophical field where they were formulated to scientific or political discourses” (Foucault, 1974, p. 137). Archaeology endeavours to implode the linear narration of history in order to tell a different story to that which interpretative historians have told.

Archeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules and being constituted by certain processes. (Foucault, 1974, p. 138)

Archaeology inquires about these formed ideas, but it focuses on the rules and conditions in which these ideas were formed and became possible in the first place. Rules are understood in Foucault (Deleuze, 1985; Foucault, 1974) from a theory of law perspective that focuses on the productive and reproductive nature of rules and law, because its institution creates the command and the illegality (Dworkin, 1998). The correlative nature of laws and illegalities – similar to the almost interchangeable
nature of knowledge and power – explains the way Foucault understood rules and processes. As Deleuze outlines:

One of the strongest themes in Foucault’s book consists of replacing the crude opposition of law and illegality with the subtle correlation made between illegalisms and laws. Law is always a structure of illegalisms, which are differentiated by being formalized. We need only look at the law of commercial societies to see that laws are not contrasted worldwide with illegality, but that some are actually used to find loopholes in others. (Deleuze, 1985, p. 29, emphasis in original)

This distinction between the history of ideas and archaeology must be understood in the context of The Archaeology of Knowledge being written to clarify the frustrating interpretations of The Order of Things (1973). The frustrated tone can be detected when in The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault dedicates an entire chapter to differentiating the history of ideas from archaeology (see in Part IV, Archaeological Description: Archaeology and History of Ideas, pp. 135-141). Foucault states that archaeology is not interested in the apparent content of ideas nor in “hidden obsessions in discourses”, which is a reference of the Marxist interpretation of the history of ideas (which focuses on ideology or false conscience); he further states: “Archaeology is not an interpretative discipline; it does not look for another hidden meaning” (Foucault, 1974, p. 235). Foucault rejects the status of hidden meanings:

Lastly, archaeology does not try to restore what has been thought, wished, aimed at, experienced, desired by men in the very moment at which they expressed it in discourse; it does not set out to recapture that elusive nucleus of processes in which identities are exchanged; in which thought still remains
nearest to oneself, in the as yet unaltered form of the same, and in which language has not yet been deployed in the spatial, successive process of discourse. (Foucault, 1974, p. 236)

**Archaeology as history**

History is always the object of a construction in an un-constituted place. It is not constituted by homogenous time but by a full-time, time-of the now.” (14 *Thesis for a Philosophy of History*, Walter Benjamin, 1934)

The direction of inquiry in archaeology is from a history of the present; that is, archaeology as a form of history projects its inquiry from the now to the positivities of the past. The only positive objects that can be unburied from history are in the perpetual present. Therefore, they can only be understood from the perpetual present frame of mind (the past remains in an absent or negative space). Archaeology aims to unearth the regularities of enunciation in order to locate how these enunciations are manufactured through the positive accumulation of historical processes. Unearthing the historical sedimentation means to first follow the footsteps of the processes surrounding the conceptualisation that makes it possible and, second, to simultaneously follow the footsteps of the rules of the formation of this concept as it illustrates the initial place of origin and, through that, its command.

History is only understood from the place of the present and never from the past. In the philosophy of history, the past cannot be captured in the place of the past, but it is always from the grounds of the present (Benjamin, 1934). Furthermore, history can be informed by its practices of memory, repetition, and conservation (Derrida, 1995). In the notion of the archive, history finds its practice of conservation in the outside, as Derrida (1995) highlights:
The archive…can never be the spontaneous memory and amnesia, lived only inside. Quite the contrary: the archive has its place in the original and structural death of such memory. There is no archive without a place of consignation, without a technique of repetition and without a certain exteriority. No archive without an outside. (Derrida, 1995, p. 9)

The ambivalent movement of an archive from the point of origin to the operation of law can be simultaneously institutionalizing and conservative. Once it is constituted, the archive makes society remember what its duty is to remember through assembling, which is a dispositive whose function is to conserve, to repeat, and to memorise. However, there is no archive without a frame of mind in the present, or an enunciation of current discourse. Therefore, in this regard, there is no history without a thought system to process it. The duty and the command to remember its origin, and the process that (re)constitutes it (in the present) is history; archaeology is the reversal of that history. In this sense, archaeology can be seen as history because it draws a picture of the process of a concept as it is (with its surrounding processes) and as it ought to be (the command).

The history analysed and, in someway, constituted by archaeology makes claims for a new form of presences, or a new form of positivities. Positivities are constituted through discursive or non-discursive practices (Foucault, 1973) given that:

Its scope, the depth of the strata it has affected, all the positivities it has succeeded in disintegrating and recomposing, the sovereign power that has enabled it, in only a few years, to traverse the entire space of culture, all this could be appraised and measured only after a quasi-infinite investigation concerned with nothing more nor less than the very being of our modernity. (Foucault, 1973, p. 220)
This suggests that the present in archaeology, i.e. the positive form of history, is no longer determined by positive evidence, which is determined by material epistemologies that are objects that are present and can be perceived by our senses. A new positivity is the possibility of describing the presences of discursive and non-discursive practices as they are captured through the constitution of words, propositions, and enunciations, and as seen in the ‘objects’ it constitutes. In a way, the words, propositions, language, enunciations, and discursive practices at large gain the status of perceived things in the traditional sense of positivism. However, objects, particularly non-discursive practices, gain the status of words and discursive practices because they are all constituted by discourses, their histories, and the knowledges (also power) that make them be a pen and not a computer, a cup of coffee and not a sandwich, and so on. For example, a coffee cup is used to hold coffee and it is not used as a hat, because the coffee cup is constituted by its practices and its history, the knowledge that deploys a command to use the coffee cup for coffee. This implies a different way to consider presence or positivities, and a new way to consider materialism (St. Pierre, 2011).

**Foucauldian archaeology: The Order of Things/On Words and Things**

*The Order of Things* is not an excavation of the structures underlying the thoughts of different periods of history, but rather it is an excavation of what surrounded the things and words in order to map the history of discursive and non-discursive processes (Deleuze, 1985). Foucault summarised it well when he attempted to explain that “an episteme is archaeology” (Foucault, 1973, p. 377). It is not the structure or even the order of thoughts in a given time, but rather it is “the group of relationships that makes discourses possible” (Foucault, 1973, pp. 322-323) and that group of relationships is the grid in which is “imposed to discourses” (Foucault, 1973,
Considering this as the aim of Foucauldian archaeology, as mentioned before, archaeology is not focused on words or things (Deleuze, 1985). Foucault has a characteristic way of writing in which he uses words sarcastically to take them away from the meanings that he was opposed to and he played with them through placing them in meanings that would be their anti-thesis. This is the case with words such as order, structure, words, things, and so on. As Deleuze states:

Foucault never considered writing as a goal or an end in itself. This is precisely what makes him a great writer and imbues everything he writes with an increasing sense of joy and gaiety. The Divine Comedy of punishment means we can retain the basic right to collapse in fits of laughter in the face of a dazzling of perverse inventions, cynical discourses and meticulous horrors. (Deleuze, 1985, p. 23)

However, if this “profanation” (Agamben, 2012b) of concepts is understood, it becomes apparent that Foucault becomes the “new cartographer” as Deleuze refers to him (1985, p. 49). This refers to Foucault’s method of re-understanding space that enables a new form of mapping that is not so much about locating words, things, objects, etc., as it is about locating the background in which all these things become intelligible and therefore possible. In The Order of Things, Foucault writes a map in which Western knowledge is produced and he identifies where these processes are located. This map was presented in a particular order, but an order that becomes transient, liquid, chaotic, and polarised in contradictions; it has a structure but it is mapped on the surface of the relationships and distributed into the field of multiplicity; and they refer to things and words but as a synthesis of the borders that created and drew these objects.
The episteme in *The Order of Things* is sometimes wrongfully framed as a worldview perspective. It can be understood in this way because Foucault describes epistemes from within rather than from without; he describes them as landscapes of knowledge formation, focusing on their features rather than their content. For example, he describes the episteme of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, but then he specifically mentions that he will “brutally generalise it in a period” (Foucault, 1973):

Such, sketched in its most general aspects, is the 16\textsuperscript{th} century episteme. This configuration carries with it a certain number of consequences. First and foremost, the plethoric yet absolutely poverty-stricken character of this knowledge. Plethoric because it is limitless. Resemblance never remains stable within itself; it can be fixed only if it refers back to another similitude, which then, in turn, refers to other; each resemblance, therefore, has value only from the accumulation of all other, and the whole world must be explored if even the slightest of analogies is to be justified and finally take on the appearance of certainty. (Foucault, 1973, p. 29)

Here, Foucault describes the episteme of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century as he would describe a painting through highlighting what features brings the topological formations of knowledge together. Later on in the text, he states:

In fact, it is not from an insufficiency of structure and rigour that the 16\textsuperscript{th} century knowledge suffers. On the contrary, we have already seen how very meticulous the configurations that define its space. It is this very rigour that makes the relation of magic to erudition inevitable- they are not selected contents but required forms. (Foucault, 1973, p. 31)

He continues on to describe the possible forms of the epistemes not in a prescriptive or formed in manner, but in a continuing flux. This accords with Foucault’s
understanding of the notion of episteme, which focuses on its capacity to produce multiple discursive and non-discursive forms (Foucault, 1973). Later in The Archaeology of Knowledge, he attempts to explain what the notion of episteme entails:

By episteme, we mean, in fact, the total set of relations and processes that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems; the way in which, in each of these discursive formations, the transitions to epistemologization, scientificity, and formalization are situated and operate; the distribution of these thresholds, which may coincide, be subordinated to one another, or be separated by shifts in time; the lateral relations that may exist between epistemological figures or sciences in so far as they belong to neighboring, but distinct, discursive practices. The episteme is not a form of knowledge (connaissance) or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations and processes that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive practices. (Foucault, 1974, p. 191)

In the notion of episteme, there is careful explication of the possibility of different processes occurring or not, or what Aristotles terms the “potency of no”, which is discussed later in this chapter (Agamben, 2009). Foucault’s careful writing allows the potential for something not occurring in the space of the episteme; hence, the use of the speculative grammatical model of can. His rigorous mapping allows for all possible events that can occur in a given space in a given time period. Foucault is systematic in inspecting every possible aspect, but he does not have a system to do
this; that is, there is no single story. If epistemes were understood along the aforementioned lines in *The Order of Things*, they would develop into a different book. Thus, it is no longer the explication of a set structures of reasoning that Foucault ‘unveiled’ under specifically discussed periods of Western culture history: it is a mapping of the places of discourses illustrated in a determined time period. It is no longer a narration of the time periods from the times that can no longer be accessed: it is an illustration of how epistemes illustrate how we can relate to these places of history that are in the present and, if they feel distant, it is not because they are in the past but because they are in a different place as distant as another country or continent.

The French translation of Foucault’s book title was not *The Order of Things*, but *On Words and Things* (*Les mots et les choses* or in Spanish *Las palabras y las cosas*). Following this line, even from the title, Foucault plays another trick because the book is about everything but words and things. Deleuze explains this through reading Foucault in the following way:

In *On Words and Things*, Foucault explains, was not about things or words. The task of archaeology is firstly to discover a true form of expression, which cannot be confused with any linguistic study, be it a signifier, word, phrase, proposition, or linguistic act. In particular, Foucault lays into the Signifier, where ‘discourse is annihilated in its reality by entering the processes of the signifier’… We must therefore break open words, phrases or propositions and extract enunciations and its processes of formation… (Deleuze, 1985, p. 52)

Therefore, this title should be understood ironically. The historical tensions of structuralism need to be considered when reading this book because Deleuze and Foucault reject structuralism. If anything, Foucault’s work is broadly about liquefying
the empire of the structure in order to have some degree of freedom. This is not the place to explain what was happening intellectually in France regarding structuralism, Marxism, and later on what was coined as post-structuralism; however, it can be seen how Foucault rejected these notions in his particular way, but he faced co-optation by many structuralists through coining *The Order of Things* as structuralist. Evidently, Foucault was either unsuccessful in explaining what he attempted to do, as many thought he made a highly sophisticated structuralist work, or the book was a trap that he would unveil in his later work, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Regardless of this, Foucault knew too well the power conferred to the debate through rejecting structuralism or Marxism. Therefore, he took the words structure, order, system, language, things, and propositions, among others, and profaned them through using them outside of the realm of structuralism. Order meant what it meant for Borges (1960) in his famous essay *The Analytical Language of John Wilkins*. Order is not organised, but rather it is an arbitrary arrangement. Foucault seeks the order of the possible configurations of the episteme, but in its chaotic and dispersed nature. There is no order of things occurring, no prescriptive order, that was the order of things and words. Something similar happened with the notion of structure, but Foucault addressed this notion quite specifically as he traced its relationship with “classification”. Foucault not only uses the notion of structure profanely (albeit fewer times than order) to explain the mapping of discourses, but he also searched its origins alongside its command to classify it (Foucault, 2007) and its relationship with power and domination.

In *The Order of Things*, Foucault traced a map using spatial references to see the processes surrounded by Western knowledge that are not ‘left’ in the past but are

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[Foucault states in the preface that this book (*The Order of Things*) was born out of the “trembling laughter this essay causes when one reads it” (1973, p. 1)]
left somewhere else in the epistemic map. Rather than through a structural understanding of discontinuity, it is understood in opposition to the discrete separation of systems; it is understood in the elongation of one episteme from another conserving the link constituted by its tension. Foucault further states:

Discontinuity – the fact that within the space of a few years a culture sometimes ceases to think as it had been thinking up till then and begins to think other things in a new way – probably begins with an erosion from outside, from that space which is, for thought, on the other side, but in which it has never ceased to think from the very beginning. (Foucault, 1973, p. 57)

Origin is not understood as a place only in the past but as an archë, i.e. the place of the configuration of the start (spatially) that never ceases to command, to govern, and to control. In sum, The Order of Things can be understood as a constant mapping of the history (as archaeology) of Western knowledge and of science, which shows the relationship between power and knowledge. Later, Foucault states his conclusion of The Order of Things in The Archaeology of Knowledge the complicit relationship between power and knowledge.

Foucauldian archaeology: The Archaeology of Knowledge

This work can be understood as an extended epilogue to The Order of Things in which Foucault aims to answer some misunderstandings from his previous book and to solidify his conclusions regarding the non-linear relationship between knowledge and power. In the first part, this book clarifies Foucault’s method through unpacking the language contesting the idea that his analysis might be structuralist or a traditional form of historical inquiry, such as a history of ideas. He differentiated words through prepositions, enunciations (d’enonciation, a notion that he highlights), and the rules of these discursive formations, and behind all that constitutes discourses.
In this book, Foucault makes his thesis of the intricate relationship between power/knowledge and discourses digestible. In this new form of analysis, away from the linguistic interpretations and structuralist analyses, Foucault coined the word positivity:

…to describe a group of enunciations (d’enonciation)… is what I am inclined to call positivity. To analyse a discursive formation therefore is to deal with a group of verbal performances at the level of the enunciations of the form of positivity that characterises them; or, more briefly, it is to define the type of positivity of a discourse. (Foucault, 1974, p. 125)

This is not only a re-appropriation of positive approaches, but it suggests a new form of empiricism. If words and things are equated in the same field and their processes can be described, then these processes, practices, and objects are present and positive, and they can constitute evidence to support the mapping of a concept. This new cartography aims to locate the point in which the map is possible. The Archaeology of Knowledge almost functions as an aid or a legend of the map drawn in The Order of Things: from the beginning, it establishes that power and knowledge, as the origin and the command, are intrinsically related, and this is the beginning and the end of archaeology.

Propositions and phrases are surrounded by enunciations, and these are surrounded by formation rules located in the grounds of a discourse, which is a command constituted by power and knowledge. Prepositions are the closest notion to words governed by the rules of grammar, semantics, and syntax. Foucault states that they are “found in the limits of discourses; they give what objects can be spoken of, or better yet they determine the set relations and processes that discourses must effect so objects could be talked about” (Foucault, 1974, p. 75). Prepositions are in the space of
language as the dispositive or mechanism of discursive practices. Therefore, sentences, phrases, or in sum prepositions are understood in their configuration and not what they communicate semantically. This is the entry point of discursive practices, but it is a frontier as well (Foucault, 2007).

The next important notion discussed in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is enunciations. If Foucault mentions a specific definition of enunciations, it would be “a finite grouping of rules that authorises a finite group of relationship processes” (Foucault, 1974, p. 44). This is sufficiently open to discuss all possible processes that occur in the regularities of discursive practices and it is notable by its productive capacity to exert knowledge/power backed by the push of history. Enunciations are the point of connection with power, fuelled by history; they are the space where objects are formed and something *can* be said and also *can* be seen (and also *can* be unseen or unsaid). They are the rules, but Foucault does not mean rules in the sense of scientific laws. For Foucault, laws and rules do not only state what can happen or cannot happen (by prohibiting it), but they also set the grounds for the ‘other’ to happen (Deleuze, 1985). For example, a formal rule or law (the same applies with informal rules) could be “slaves are not citizens”, but that rule does not only refer to a prohibition, but rather it also sets the grounds for an illegality or unlawfulness, and makes possible the idea that “slaves could be citizens”. If the rule were not present (positive), then it would not make sense to even consider the citizenship of slaves. Another important notion that Foucault clarifies in this book is discursive practices. Discursive practices are not discourses: they are the practices mediated by language forms or related dispositives (but are not limited to these because they form objects) that abide by the weight of discourses, power/knowledge, and the sediment of history. This notion is further explicated in the method section of this chapter.
The conclusion of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, which is stated in the beginning (perhaps because Foucault believed that he demonstrated it in the previous book), is that the intrinsic relationship between power and knowledge can be demonstrated in the excavation and in the mapping of Western knowledge. In this way, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* names the places in the map and attempts to explicate how the ‘voyage’ provides the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of the map. The archaeology of Western culture illustrates that it is a framework ruled by discourses and movements of power, and its complicity with knowledge. However, it is a framework that presents various ontological and epistemological implications for inquiry that are better presented here by Deleuze (1985):

…the world is constituted by layers of surfaces… The world is also knowledge. But the layers are intersected by a line that distributes them into visual frames, and into sonorous curves; enunciations (*d'énoncéation*) and visibilities in each layer, the two forms of irreducible ways of knowing, light and language, two vast forms of exteriority in which the origin and the command are reconstituted. We are trapped in this double movement. (Deleuze, 1985, p. 61)

This system, bi-polar but not dichotomous, is what prefaces the archaeology of the knowledge of Western culture. In the case of Foucault’s inquiry of knowledge, he determined that this double movement is knowledge and power.

**Contemporary archaeology**

Since Deleuze’s eulogy to Foucault’s work in which he highlights the creative nature of his archaeological approach, little work has been undertaken along the coordinates of archaeology. However, there is one contemporary theorist who has closely followed Foucault’s project who can shed more light on archaeology as
inquiry, and that is the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. Agamben is considered a post-Foucauldian theorist, and he is very careful to present his work in that way. Agamben’s (2009) work uses a methodological approach that is always an archaeology of bipolarities; bipolarities that can never be resolved because they are constituted by the ongoing processes of tensions. In this sense, Agamben also engages with genealogical approaches; however, his genealogies are considered his early political attempt to contest power, as he believed that Foucault did. Agamben (2009) himself explains his overall methodological approach as “philosophical archaeology” in his work *The Signature of all Things: One Method*, where he clarified that the archaeological approach overarches all his inquiry.

**Topological understanding of archaeology**

Foucauldian archaeology is an approach that enables a spatial understanding of concepts through navigating in, between, and around words and objects. However, Foucault discussed their location in relation to the direction of history and proposed a re-understanding of space in order to enable this form of inquiry. The key to enabling this topology is to locate objects and words in the same space. That is, through an unconventional way of understanding space and locations, a different form of interpretation of historical processes can be reached. This form of inquiry maps history, which is defined by the pathways and locations that different elements of thought take, in order to inform the direction of specific concepts. In this sense, and as mentioned before, to undertake an archaeology is to undertake a cartography\(^\text{14}\) of the concept, notion, or praxis in question (Deleuze, 1985).

Foucault used archaeology for the first time to diagnose the problem with contemporary philosophy in a complementary thesis that he submitted with his

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\(^{14}\) In his book *Foucault*, Deleuze dedicates a complete chapter entitled *A New Cartographer*; see pages 23 to 47.
doctoral thesis. In his thesis *A Brief Reading of Kant: Introduction to Anthropology in a Pragmatic Sense* (Foucault, 2009), Foucault states that a science centred on anthropology (which he referred to as anthropocentrism at large) would be a science reduced to the standards of people and therefore a means through which the normative forms from which thinking takes place would be deployed (Rajchman, 2007). It is better stated in Foucault’s own words:

Accompanying the critique in favour of an anthropological teaching, that monotonous reference point in which Kant has doubled his efforts of a transcendental reflexion by lobbying for a consistent accumulation of empirical knowledge about people. His 25 years of teaching anthropology is related to the university context of the time; that obsession is linked to the very structure of the Kantian problem: How to think, analyse, justify and how to build finitude, inside a reflexion that cannot be thought from an infinity ontology, and doesn’t regret a philosophy of the absolute? A question that effectively is within the realm of anthropology, but it can’t form a genuine dimension, since it cannot be reflected by itself from an empirical form of thought. (Foucault, 2009, p. 217)

This anthropological reasoning, or logos of anthropocentrism, is doomed to find a narrowed understanding of philosophy and fails to find its purpose, which is transcendentalism. In contrast, archaeology – Foucault states in accordance with Heidegger – allows for different surfaces of understanding that might be an antidote to the poison of anthropocentrism (Foucault, 2009).

The formal ontology, which was stated earlier, is the way in which “men think” accompanied by a vast history of what a “man is”. A different approach to the way *men* think is a topological approach: topology is the approach that understands
abstract space (imagined) in relation to how things are related, connected, and arranged (Rajchmann, 2007). It has its historical roots in *mathesis* and is often related to geometry as Husserl stated and further elaborated (Husserl in Derrida, 1995). From this perspective, topology cannot be only linear. It cannot be prepositional. It is not concerned with identifying the true meaning of the *content* of lines, or the meaning of dimensions and space; after all, they are often imagined figures. It does not hide anything, as its function is to be seen but often it is not visible. Topology is a pure form, pure space, pure surfaces, with depressions and elevations, emptiness and substance. Deleuze (1985) states:

And not only is each enunciation (*d'énonciation*) in this way inseparable from a multiplicity that is both ‘rare’ and regular, but each enunciation is itself a multiplicity, not a structure or a system. This topology of enunciations contrasts both with the typology of propositions and with the dialectic of phrases. (Deleuze, 1985, p. 31)

Thus, an enunciation is a rare but related monument in a set accumulation of objects that speaks volumes, but does not talk. To think topologically is to be able to map and describe the forms of these discursive practices as the objects are described and to be able to recursively see non-discursive practices such as objects that are formed in the same way that propositions and words are formed.

If mapping becomes a natural form of the exertion of thinking topologically, then the inquirer becomes a “new cartographer”.

And what a strange twist of the line was 1968 [referring to the events in France of May ‘68], the line with a thousand aberrations! From this we can get the triple definition of writing: to write is to struggle and resist; to write is to
become; to write is to draw a map: ‘I am a cartographer’ [Deleuze cites Foucault from a 1975 interview]. (Deleuze, 1985, p. 71)

Cartography is defined by the separate Greek notions of *chartis*, which means map, and *graphein*, which means writing. Thus, to map is to write and to describe the forms, the directions of lines, and to allude to the depth and altitudes of the surfaces. Therefore, to do cartography or to map, is not to illuminate a determined pathway that is caused by sole predetermined elements that highlight the end of the line as conclusions or results. To cartograph is not to follow a given formula about assumed consistencies in quantity (Deleuze, 1985; Derrida, 1995; Hussel, 2009); to cartograph is not to establish closed dichotomies of choosing one or the other (different from polarities that are constituted by their tensions).

Without a doubt the “exterior form of thinking” is going to show that in Foucault nothing really completely closes. Power relations lie beneath (the diagram) the history of the forms, the archive. Power ‘appears’ in “every relationship (tension) of one point with another”; a diagram is a map, or better said a superposition of maps. (Deleuze, 1985, p. 71)

The relationships, constituted by the tensions of the polarities, are what constitutes the map of a given notion, concept, or praxis. They can be between an infinite set of relationships, such as the origin and the command, positivities and negativities, power and knowledge, constituted power and constituting power, signifier and sign, etc. The topological interpretation of archaeology enables the mapping of these relationships as processes that tell different stories from those that the anthropological discourse of Western culture has told.
The Power of Negation

A contemporary example of Foucauldian archaeology is the research of Agamben (2012a) entitled The Archaeology of Commandment. This is also a good example of the implementation of an archaeology that can become a “kind of paradox” (Agamben, 2012a, p. 3). As mentioned earlier, arché means both origin and command. This means that the archaeology of commandment is the search for the origin and command of commandments. This apparently contradictory task is at the heart of language – assuming that the nature of language is polysemic (i.e. one word has the potential to have multiple meanings) and constituted by polarities. When searching for a history of commandments, Agamben (2012a) found that no philosophy scholar had written about commandments in more than a few lines or phrases. Agamben went to Aristotle to find a hint on commandments, which provided a route to understand why commandments and other similar activities are not written about in philosophy and other similar disciplines. In On Interpretation, Aristotle distinguishes two forms of statements: apophantic and non-apophantic statements. Apophantic statements are those that can be shown to be true or false; for example, “I am sitting and typing on my computer”. This statement is apophantic because it can be shown to be true or false. Non-apophantic statements cannot be shown to be true or false, such as when communicating a command. That is, I can say, “Sit down” in its imperative form. Regardless of whether the command is obeyed or not, it remains a command; whether the statement is true or false is outside the realm of the order. Another example of a non-apophantic form is a prayer: it is not the concern of the prayer if it is or becomes true or false. The prayer states a petition based on faith. Aristotle states in his book that philosophy is only concerned with apophantic discourse, and that non-apophantic discourse is a matter for other practices such as poetry (poesis). Therefore, Agamben recalibrated his gaze into non-apophantic
practices, which the discourse of philosophy has intentionally ignored. He turned to theology and found the first book of the Bible, Genesis, and the books of John. He found that God created the world with a command: “Let there be light…Let there be a vault between the waters to separate water from water… Let the land produce vegetation…” (John 1:1-5). In the Alexandrian translation of the Bible, the specific word used was arché. From there, Agamben (2012a) continues to theorise how Western culture is constituted by this complicity between origin and command, which are expressed together in the one word, arché.

As mentioned previously, the origin is never the past in the sense that the origin disappears from the concept. In contrast, the origin sends the command to constantly be in the present. Thus, the origin and command can impart a significant understanding about power. This implied a series of processes outside formal logical thinking, because apophantic forms of expression rule it. An important aspect that it implies is that power is not defined by truthfulness or wrongfulness; it is not constituted only by its capacity to give a command and for that command to be obeyed or not; rather, it is defined by its capacity to give orders. When a government is weak, the commands expressed by laws do not necessarily fail, because commands are not concerned with the power of the government; rather, they are concerned with laws that are broken. The structure of a weak government will remain almost intact because it will still determine what is legal and what is illegal – even if illegalities are often perpetrated. For example, only when the Berlin Wall fell did the capacity for command and the law of the State disappear; it was then that its power was broken (Agamben, 2012a).

Thus, the mechanism of power can be understood not necessarily by the positivities of what happened, but by the positivities of potency, in particular the
power of negation or, as Aristotle calls it, the *potency of no* or that which ought not to happen (Adorno, 1994; Agamben, 2012a; Clemens, Heron, & Murray, 2008). This way of thinking is based on Aristotle’s notion of *potency*. For example, a child has the potency (colloquially, the capacity) to build a house. However, he or she might have to study, grow, and probably go to university, maybe study some architecture, and then he or she can build the house. The difference between the child and an architect (in the same time frame) is that the architect has, today, the potency to build a house and not to build it, exactly like the potency of law. The architect has the capacity today of not doing it given that he *can*. The child, in the present time frame, cannot not do it, but can only do it one day in the future. This *potency of no* is what Foucault constantly frames as the productive capacity of discourses and power in its negative form, and he attempts to describe the topology of discourses and power considering the grids of potency in any given space. That is, archaeology in the description of a topological dispersion of propositions, enunciations, visibilities, etc. of what ought to happen in correlation with what ought not to happen. These relationships or processes are what draws the picture of the notion, praxis, or phenomenon in question.

In sum, Foucauldian archaeology is the historical inquiry that aims to map the origin and its relationship with command through drawing the relationships that determine the object in question. It achieves this through mapping the areas of a given concept, notion, or praxis, and illustrating the various situations that can occur around where its productive and reproductive capacity is coalesce in historical processes, usually located in historical thresholds.

The Foucauldian archaeology in this study has the following six elements.

1. Relationships are not only determined using linear associations but are also explained using the correlations between polarities or close concepts
such as words and things, origin and command, power and knowledge, or as in the non-discursive relationship between the architecture of the Panopticon and judicial system; it is understood as a non-linear relationship.

(2) The relationships or processes between words and things, for example power relationships, discourses, discursive and non-discursive practices, history, etc., is understood in the same level that empirical objects are understood in traditional positivism; that is, they are considered as ‘real’ as that which is experienced through the senses.

(3) The origin is not understood as a place in time, usually the past, but as a place from which the command originates. Therefore, the classical genealogical assumption of an implied hierarchy of the origin is not suitable here. The origin is simply where the non-linear ‘line’ begins to be drawn via specific bipolar relationships and its processes begin to be formed.

(4) The non-linear relationship of the origin and command speaks to the same relationship with power and knowledge, which is how this relationship emerges, at least in Western culture.

(5) Discursive practices are differentiated from non-discursive practices (visibilities) because the latter refers to ‘things’ defined by their pure function in relation to the concept of inquiry, and the former refers to the productive capacity of words to speak of a subject from the concept, notion, or praxis in question.

(6) Law, rules, and their derivatives (e.g. customary law or cultural conventions) are defined by their positivity and their capacity to command
and to institute illegalities. This is where the *potency of no* becomes relevant when laws or rules are formed in the capacity of not abiding by the rule is predicated by itself.

**Method**

**Justification**

There is a very productive field of indigenous methods (Smith, 2000), decolonizing methods (Denzin & Smith, 2008; Smith, 2000), decoloniality-inspired methods (Mignolo, 1996, 1997), and other non-Western methods to engage with research; thus, why use the Western-located Foucauldian archaeology? Is it an attempt to use ‘the master’s tools to disassemble his house’? Or, better phrased by Spivak (personal communication, May 5, 2012): is it an attempt to perform “affirmative sabotage of regularly hybridised European Enlightenment thinking, corrected in the process, turning poison repeatedly into medicine, since we are contaminated historically”? A key element of Foucauldian archaeology is that it is not interested in the individual; it is not interested in the communication forms for self-expression; it is interested in the language and the ‘things’ that destroy all circular, enclosed, narcissistic forms of the subject and oneself. Foucauldian archaeology assumes that the Western culture has attempted to build the figure of man in this anthropocentric or egocentric way. Foucault stated this in an interview in 1971:

…from the moment when Western culture will actually be liberated from the system of constraint- not only the systems of economic constraint but the system of political, moral, cultural constraint, that capitalism has oppressed
man with for centuries- from the moment that liberation will have been achieved; then, what kind of knowledge will be possible? (Foucault, 1971)

Foucauldian archaeology assumes that in Western culture, in order to ‘know’ something, it must be first excluded. That is, in order to ‘know’ madness, sexuality, laws (prisons), and other civilisations, they must be constrained by the Western system of knowledge. In order to ‘know’ non-Western cultures, they must be marginalised, looked down upon, and exploited in order to be conquered. As Smith (2000) suggested not so long ago, Indigenous peoples around the world have been for far too long the object of research of the Colonial West. Other methods can be used to produce non-Western knowledges directed at Indigenous peoples, but we can also turn the research back onto the Colonial West.

This research is an attempt to avoid the problem of subjecting peoples to Western research. It does so through using a proven method to move away from the narcissistic obsession of Western culture with the method of Foucauldian archaeology. Foucault’s work attempted to destabilise the arenas of madness, the systems of Western knowledge (such as many sciences), the penal and judiciary systems, and the systems of moral regulations expressed more prominently in sexuality. If these systems prove to be a product of specific situations, in a specific context in history (and not pre-existent as the ‘law’ or ‘nature’ of humanity), then they could be overturned politically (2007). If we accept that Foucault was somewhat successful in destabilising the Western institutions he attacked, then his methods worked. Thus, to use Foucauldian archaeology is to use a proven method to disestablish Western cultures’ subjectifying institutions. However, this is not a decolonising method. Moreover, through focussing its inquiry on the process of colonisation, its discursive and non-discursive devices, and its systems of
knowledges, the Foucauldian archaeology in this research aims to have a decolonising effect.

**Origin of colonisation: Monstrous anthropology**

The materials used to map the conceptualisation of aboriginality include traditional historical materials to tell the story of the origins of colonisation in 1492, such as the diaries of Christopher Columbus, but also it includes other texts such as drawings and paintings. These drawings and paintings inform how the historical threshold constituted the conditions for what later became a solidified imagery of aboriginality. The first descriptions of the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas – the first ones being the Taínos in the Caribbean – were not prefaced with the hierarchy of races as it was understood after the 17th century. Therefore, racial classification was useless to aid the analysis of the first conceptualisation of aboriginality; the first colonisers thought that they arrived at the Indies, a civilisation that Europe had commercial relationships with for centuries. The first descriptions of aboriginality can be read in the diaries of Christopher Columbus from 1492 and 1493; these diaries are also aided by the coloniser’s first drawings of aboriginality. The colonisers’ first drawing depicted Aboriginal people as monsters. This is consistent with the first descriptions of Aboriginal peoples in the diaries of Christopher Columbus (see the chapter titled *Monstrous Anthropology* for direct quotes) and the writings of Fray Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Acosta. For this reason, an analysis of monstrosity is performed from the framework of the anthropocentric perspective that Europe held in the 15th and 16th centuries. The analysis is from the perspective of aesthetics, specifically the aesthetic of ugliness, in which monstrosity is seen in the realm of Hell’s creatures in Christianity. This is why *The Temptations of St. Anthony*, a triptych by Hieronymus Bosh, provides a useful inventory of monstrous creatures that can be
used as a framework to understand the first conceptualisations of aboriginality in the Americas from 1492. From there, various drawings are analysed and the consistent thread throughout these images is depicted in the imagery of the cannibal and the Aboriginal group named the Caribes. Following this thread, a contested history of the very existence of the Caribes is found in the essay by Juan Ignacio de Armas. Below is a list of the described materials.

- *The Temptations of St. Anthony*, triptych by Hieronymus Bosch, 1505-1506
- *Diario del Primer Viaje*, Cristóbal Colón, 1492
- *Diario del Segundo Viaje*, Cristóbal Colón, 1493
- *Historia natural y moral de Indias*, Juan Acosta, 1589
- *Brevisima relación a la Destrucción de las Indias*, Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, 1552
- *Uslegung der Carta Marina*, Johannes Grieninger, 1525
- *Map Kunstmann II*, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 1505
- *Wahrrhaftige History*, Hans Staden, 1557
- *La Fábula de los Caribes*, Juan Ignacio de Armas, 1884

**Origin of colonisation: Western blackness**

The materials used for the conceptualisation of blackness were limited to one specific story of blackness before it was interchangeable with slavery, the story of Juan Garrido, and the painting that illustrates the solidification of the conceptualisation with blackness, *Los mulatos de Esmeralda*. The remainder of the excavation of blackness is informed by a historiography (a study of the interpretation of history), critically engaging with authors including Sued-Badillo (2008), Alegría (1990), and Saco (1879). Following the historical thread of Western aboriginality, the stripe of slavery has entangled Western blackness. Therefore, the historical threshold
of Western blackness is analysed using the history of blackness in the first decades of colonisation when blackness was not aligned with slavery. The processes of the conceptualisation of Western blackness include blackness when it was not interchangeable with slavery and slavery when it was not interchangeable with skin colour. The history of Juan Garrido personifies blackness before African slavery, because he was the first documented black conquistador. Furthermore, a brief review of the history of slavery in the 15th and 16th centuries illustrates slavery not being tied to skin colour, but rather being commanded by royal decree and other influential institutions. The emergence of African slavery in the Americas is also revealed as a cornerstone for the solidification of capitalism. Lastly, the first painting from the Americas, Los Mulatos de Esmeralda (Zambo Chiefs), confirms the unification of Western blackness and aboriginality in an aesthetic that reveals the processes solidified in the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness. Below is a list of the analysed historical materials.

- *Probanza de Juan Garrido*, 1538
- *Los Mulatos de Esmeralda* (Zambo Chiefs), Adrian Sánchez Galque, 1599

**Command: The Blanket Approach**

The materials used for this part of the research refer to specific policies and the materials surrounding them such as Parliamentary debates, reports, etc. The focus was first on the discursive saturation of the conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness, and then on the non-discursive way in which the policies enacted the praxis of colonisation. The command of colonisation is illustrated in the operation of the *Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897* (1897 Act) in Queensland, Australia. This *Act* is analysed as a case study example of the way colonisation dominates the subject it speaks of, in the specific machinery described as
the Blanket Approach. In order to analyse the pure function of the 1897 Act, former laws and their Parliamentary debates were considered because they spoke of Western aboriginality and blackness. The 1897 Act itself was analysed alongside the main documents that the Queensland Government produced from 1898 to 1965 that explicitly related to the 1897 Act. Below are the specific historical materials analysed.

- **Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1881**
- **Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fishery Act, 1881**
- **Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1884**
- **The Native Labourers Protection Act, 1884**
- **Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1897, and its amendments in 1899, 1901, 1928, 1934, 1939, 1946, and 1965**
- **Annual Reports from 1899 to 1959 (in 1917 and 1941 no reports were produced).**

**Procedure**

In this part, I detail how the Foucauldian archaeology was conducted. It is important to note that these series of actions did not necessarily occur in a chronological fashion and, for the sake of replication, it must be highlighted that *Foucauldian archaeology cannot be undertaken using a step-by-step procedure.* Therefore, the description of these actions can be considered as guidelines or specific tools for the tasks required in this method. This procedure exemplifies how the origin of colonisation was conceptualised in the coagulated space of Western aboriginality and blackness, and how the command was exercised in the non-discursive function of the Blanket Approach.

**Framework**

When undertaking a Foucauldian archaeology, the first step is to assume a Foucauldian ‘frame of mind’. This refers to the theoretical framework that
understands the following axioms or assumptions. The question that guides this research is ‘how is colonisation operationalised?’ given that it is an important problem for the subject it speaks of. The history of the problematisation of colonisation is guided by this framework.

1. Words and things, and what lies between them, constitute the corpus that informs the research. That is, the ontology or reality of the world assumes that theoretical productions and processes are as real as the things and words that are seen, heard, and touched.

2. History is not the history of the past, but a history of the present. History is the accumulation of situations that define societies today and they are readily available to be inquired.

3. Knowledge, and Western knowledge in particular, is not only the outcome of how we see the world, but also the way we capture it. Therefore, knowledge claims are not only the explanation of an object but also the command that wills the object to be the “one” and not anything else.

4. The experience of individuality (the first person experience) is determined by the accumulation of a history of experiences in a given culture. In this case, the experience of individuality in Western culture is determined by the modern discourse of anthropology.

A more specific Foucauldian theoretical framework can be seen in full in the introduction of this chapter; however, the following elements are important and must be considered for the Foucauldian archaeology.

1. Topological understandings of words, things, language, systems of knowledge, history, discourses, power relationships, institutions, and subjectivity are crucial. If words and things, and their relationships, are
positive (present), then they can be located and illustrated by mapping them.

(2) Power is relational and it is not self-generated. The complex diagram of society is constituted by the core relationships between peoples. Like any other relationship, they live in tensions. As a result of the convoluted history of Western culture, layers of complex social mechanisms that deliver these tensions shelter the power relationships. The focus of power indicates where these complex mechanisms are located.

(3) Archaeology is the way in which Western culture defines the intrinsic relationship between power and knowledge. The origin of the object of study delivers the command because it is the origin, and vice versa. In this sense, to ‘know’, in Western culture, is to be able to talk about what an object ‘is’ by excluding it from what it ‘is not’.

(4) The architecture of social structures is defined through discourses that are delivered in discursive, and sometimes in non-discursive, practices legitimated by social institutions. The way this architecture operates is manifested in most Western societies’ cultural productions (science, art, literature, etc.); some are more illustrative than others.

(5) Language, in Western culture, predicates how social processes occur. The tensions between words and things dictate how Western culture functions most times. Here, the semiotic processes define the broad operation of language. In this sense, discursive practices can be painted and things can define the discussion.
Reading

Reading in this part does not only mean reading words, sentences, and paragraphs in written documents, but it also means reading the discourses in discursive and non-discursive practices. This is where the topological understanding of words, propositions, enunciations, things, and their references to discourses and institutions in history functions. For example, when reading the *Queensland Parliamentary Debates* from 1881 to the 1960s, the discursive practices of aboriginality and blackness were deployed to subjectify Australian Aboriginal peoples into these two, often times, interchangeable categorisations. The manner in which they were deployed (the strategy or the operation) could be described functionally, but the content that constituted the conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness was already solidified historically in the 19th and 20th centuries. Therefore, a further historical unearthing of the colonial artefacts of aboriginality and blackness needs to be excavated. The specific actions taken in this stage of the method of Foucauldian archaeology are described as follows.

(1) Conceptualisation: This element of archaeology refers to the coagulation of the tension that power relations provide. This is what Foucault refers to as enunciation or *d'énonciation*: the irreducible unit of discursive practices though it is framed as conceptualisation due to the aesthetic construction of the identified discursive practices in colonisation. Some English translations use the notion of statement and others use enunciation. Conceptualisation means locating where power places its pressure through reading of whom the text speaks of. Throughout most of the analysed documents, the coagulation of power is located in the conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality. The Colonial West spoke of their conceptualisation of blackness and aboriginality, and hence why they are

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the Western conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality, and not the other way around. This was a discursive practice; however, the Australian Colonial West also spoke in a non-discursive manner when it referred to blankets. These three clues, i.e. blackness, aboriginality, and blankets, indicate the ‘landmarks’ in which the monuments of colonisation would most likely be found. From there, the task is to excavate them through the sediments of history. In contrast, the blankets were found repeatedly on the surface of the grounds of colonisation; given that it was a non-discursive practice, it was only defined by its function. Therefore, the task for non-discursive devices is to unravel the mechanisms of its functions.

(2) Polarities: Given that the nature of rule formation abides by the same relationship between power/knowledge, words/things, origin/command, etc., when reading discursive practices, the (bi)polarities must be identified. An illustrative example of how this can be undertaken is in the same way that the negative of a picture is seen. The negative of a picture is defined by the inversion of the colours, i.e. black is white and white is black. In a negative, the entire substance of the content of the picture is inverted: all that is white is blackened and vice versa, but the picture remains discernible. Therefore, we can identify what the picture shows, regardless of the complete inversion of its substance. This occurs because the relationships between the colours are intact. Every concept is constituted by its negative and defined by its relationships or processes. When reading the discursive practice of Western blackness, it can be found that in its origins there is an inversion of the substance of Western blackness defined by slavery: there are stories of black conquistadores.
The same applies to Western aboriginality: at its origin, a complete inversion of inferiority in monstrosity, or the supernatural civilisation that can destroy the Colonial West in the worst nightmare imagined in the 15th and 16th centuries, through cannibalism is found. The task here is not to understand its substance, but rather to understand its relationships or processes. For this research, processes are used to identify the constitution of a given conceptualisation.

(3) Origin: When a conceptualisation or a coagulation of the pressure illustrated in history is identified, which is a manifestation of the command, the origin of such conceptualisation must be excavated. In order to fully understand the command, we must understand where the command originated and how it was constituted as a command. To read the origin is not to read its ‘real’ meaning; it is to find the point in which it was forming and, to an extent, to find when it was not the conceptualisation found on the surfaces. This research reads the origins of Western blackness and aboriginality at the moment in history when they did not refer to the Western aboriginality and blackness defined by the inequality of races (hierarchy of races).

**Discursive practices**

Discursive practices are defined by the enunciations (conceptualisations) of discourses through words, prepositions, sentences, texts (including paintings and imagery), and other language forms. They are practices understood as actions and are not only understood by their manifestations in writing, or talk, or other textual forms. That is, discursive practices are as much actions as moving a chair or swinging a sword. However, discursive practices must be identified as such in order to
distinguish them from the non-discursive practices. The discursive and non-discursive practices are both defined and ruled by discourses and their constituting knowledges.

(1) Speech acts: These practices are defined by the expression manifested in talk. To read speech acts is dangerous because they can be relayed back to the individualistic-anthropocentric framework. As discussed earlier, Foucauldian archaeology aims to avoid that focus. In this research, the speech acts, which are mostly concentrated in the *Queensland Parliamentary Debates*, were read as documented histories of the artefacts in question. That is, these speech acts of the, mainly, Members of Parliament of Queensland, are understood as oral histories of the Parliament. Given that the context of the debates is institutionally constitutive of law (in some cases, the Parliamentary debates are consulted in order to interpret laws), this is an oral history of the law and not an oral history of the Members of Parliament.

(2) Writing acts: These are practices defined by the expression manifested in writing. Writing acts are influenced by their genre, e.g. genres in literature, in philosophy, and in law and policy. The genre that this research focuses on is the genre in the broad topic of policy and laws, and early history (e.g. chronicles). The discursive practices read here were laws, reports, a *probanza*, the first colonial experience chronicles (that functioned as reports), etc. Some of these documents held the power of law (some even functioned as a constitution) and others functioned as official histories of the implementation of the law (e.g. the *Annual Reports*). These writing acts assumed a depersonalised stance in which other documents and institutions provided the rules for these writing acts.
to be performed. Therefore, to read these discursive practices is to read the processes in which the discourses operated through their institutionalised practices.

(3) Other textual practices: These are the practices that are defined by other ways of representation, e.g. through art forms such as paintings, drawings, and sculptures, or architecture, etc. For this research, the imagery expressed in drawings and paintings was read in order to locate the discursive practices used by the Colonial West. Most of these functioned as documents in history to state the method through which the conceptualisation of Western aboriginality and, to a lesser extent Western blackness, were read.

**Non-discursive practices**

Non-discursive practices are any other practice that does not operate on the language level and it is defined by its pure function. It is the ‘thing’ or the ‘object’ that discourses also rule, but in a non-discursive form: it can be seen; therefore, it becomes a visibility. However, they do not have the quality of representation. Non-discursive practices can be an architectural distribution such as a Panopticon or any object or artefact. They do not refer to the thing in and of itself, but rather to the function it is assigned to the object. Non-discursive practices can be read because they can be seen and therefore their function can be described; they can describe the function of the command or the mechanism of the process in question. For this research, the way that colonisation functioned after the 18th and 19th centuries is described using the non-discursive practice of the Blanket Approach.

(1) Positivity or presence: In order to read non-discursive practices, the object or visibility in question must be presently available. That is, it must be
part of the coagulation of history revolving the object of which it speaks. In this research, blankets were suspiciously available in part of the materials and describing their function is illustrative of how colonisation operated.

(2) Function: Non-discursive practices are defined by their mechanism to perform, for instance, colonisation. To read non-discursive practices is to describe how the mechanism of colonisation operated: it is to describe the command. The play on words of the Blanket Approach illustrates the way colonisation functions to totalise using Western culture, but at the same time to distribute this totalisation to each person through creating individual power relations with colonisation delivered like a blanket.

Rather than engage with the theorising of method, this chapter presented a discussion referring to theory, methodology, and method from a non-traditional reading of Foucauldian archaeology that was guided by the readings of Giorgio Agamben, John Rajchman, and Gilles Deleuze. The discussion of this reading of Foucauldian archaeology is unconventional primarily because it moves away from the structuralist interpretation of archaeology. It does so by reading archaeology as the topological inquiry that maps a given concept, notion or praxis outside the anthropological philosophical stance by identifying the composition of the origin and the machinery of its command. In this research this reading of Foucauldian archaeology translates into unearthing the origins of the praxis of colonisation, specifically the origins of the discursive tools that will be used to speak of the colonised, the conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness; and unearthing the way the machine of colonisation functioned, or how the command operated. In this way the archaeology of colonisation will answer the question of “How colonisation is
operationalised?” through unearthing the solidification process of the tools that will be used for the operation of the machine of colonisation.
Part 2: Origins
Part 2: Origins (1492-1538)

Part 2 illustrates the founding aesthetic conceptualisations (*d'énonciation*) of colonisation that were used as tools for domination. This research found that the two main conceptualisations of colonisation were *aboriginality* and *blackness*. These two conceptualisations are usually deployed from the discourse of race and, as Quijano argues, “race is the most efficient instrument of social domination produced in the last 500 years” (in Chalmers, 2014, p. 28). The next two chapters explain how colonisation aesthetically forged the conceptualisations of *aboriginality* and *blackness* as Western tools for social domination. Chapter III, *Monstrous Anthropology*, illustrates that the origins of the conceptualisation of aboriginality in a historical threshold were informed by aesthetics because the racial hierarchisation of aboriginality occurred with the emergence of the discourse of anthropology and social Darwinism, which was almost 300 years later. This aesthetics is located in the frame of ugliness, specifically in a monstrosity predicated by the *logos* (reasoning) of anthropocentrism that provides the first set of processes to enable domination, explicitly in the form of slavery. Chapter IV, *Blackness*, follows the historical thread of this form of domination where it meets with blackness, but when it is not yet interchangeable with slavery. The origins of the conceptualisation of blackness are recounted through illustrating a short account of the historical threshold of slavery, an example of blackness in the role of the coloniser personified by Juan Garrido, and how African slavery emerged as one of the most profitable industries by the end of the 16th century. The historical thread of domination, as explicitly expressed in slavery, ties blackness to slavery and produces another set of processes that also constitute the conceptualisation of blackness, which is the second tool for colonisation. Both tools of colonisation have important functions in operating the
machinery of the command of colonisation; their specific use is predicated by the set of processes that are incorporated in the historical threshold of the origins of colonisation.

**Working Notions**

In order to describe colonisation, the following set of Foucauldian notions must be converted in order for them to speak more appropriately in the context of colonisation.

**Colonial West**

The Colonial West refers to the space in which the *episteme* of Western culture is deposited in all its history. It is colonial because they are predominantly constituted by the histories of the countries that participated in the colonisation of non-Western countries. However, peoples and nationalities do not limit the Colonial West, as illustrated in the next chapter. This is not to say that real persons do not constitute the space and place of this episteme, because it is built by and through peoples. The notion of Eurocentrism is often used to express this idea (Borda, n.d.; Dussel, 1993; Grosfoguel, 2011; Quijano, 2000); however, this term is insufficient to highlight the colonial history of the *episteme* and the cultural centre of the origin of Eurocentrism.

**Western culture**

Western culture means the place where Eurocentrism is located and produced. Once it is used for the *praxis* of colonisation, it becomes the notion of the Colonial West. However, culture has many definitions and, as Rothman notes, “it is more than the sum of its definitions” (2014, p. 4). Therefore, culture will be understood as Foucault explained to Alan Badiou during an interview in 1965: “By culture, I
understand, given a determined cultural form, with specific forms of knowing and specific institutions; there is liberated a language that is proper to it, eventually a certain type of discursive practice is enabled” (1965). This apparently circular definition speaks to culture being the relational link that enables a set of discourses, institutions, and epistemes. Thus, Western culture is the whole and the links of a given civilisation; in this case, the civilisation whose history emerges in Europe, whose meta-narrative is predicated by modernity (Lyotard, 1987; Harvey, 1990), who is at the centre of capitalism and patriarchy, and who is responsible for the ongoing process of colonisation (Dussel, 1993; Quijano, 2000; Grosfoguel, 2003; Mignolo, 1996).

Discourse of anthropology

The discourse of anthropology refers to the way Western culture (at least) engages with the world through making meaning from an anthropocentric perspective. At the centre of this discourse is the personification of how modern ‘man’ ought to be; as Geertz stated, “organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against such wholes and against social and natural background is” (1979, p. 229). Anthropocentrism is characteristic of the period when colonisation first occurred (15th and 16th centuries) and its knowledge-making was dominated by institutions, particularly those of Christianity. Foucault argued that Kant solidified this method through which Western culture conceptualised its ontology in his institution of philosophical anthropology in The Critique of Pure Reason, but he stated it better in a short paper published in 1784 entitled Was ist Aufklärung? (Foucault, 2007, 2009). Foucault elaborates further on this in many of his works, but it can be found clearly in The Politics of Truth (2007). He explains that Kant’s philosophical anthropology is the solidification of modernity and the birth of the modern technology of the self that
is defined by modern philosophical anthropology. When explaining this operation, he states:

Even if it is relatively and necessarily vague, the Enlightenment period is certainly designed as a formative stage for modern humanity. This is anthropology in the *Aufklärung* in the wide sense of the term to which Kant, Weber, etc. referred, a period without fixed dates, with multiple points of entry since one can also define it by the formation of capitalism, the constitution of the modern man (defined by the bourgeois world), the establishment of nation-state systems, the foundation of modern science. (Foucault, 2007, p. 57)

Therefore, the discourse of anthropology refers to the “man” of modernity that is produced by capitalism, modernity, and patriarchy; for this research, colonisation from the Enlightenment period is embedded into race and social Darwinism.

*Conceptualisation*

As described in the method section of the previous chapter, the term *conceptualisation* is used to refer to the notion that Foucault called *d’enonciation*\(^\text{15}\) (enunciation), because it highlights the specific phenomena of the aesthetic colonial historical dimension of the creation of the Western tools of aboriginality and blackness. This notion maintains the verbal fluidity that enunciation refers to; however, it changes the linguistic importance that it denotes and places greater emphasis on the imagery or abstract idea that the notion of the concept denotes. This is particularly important given that this part investigates the conceptual formation of aboriginality and blackness from the perspective of aesthetics. Conceptualisation, like *d’enonciation*, is defined as the irreducible discursive practice “that is constituted by a

\(^{15}\) Both the concept of enunciation and the concept of statement can be found English translations.
finite body of rules that authorises an infinite number of performances” (Foucault, 1974, p. 27).

Processes

Processes typically refer to what Foucault called rules, or rules of formation, or what he later termed as law (Foucault, 1973; 1974; 1976). However, the notion of processes that is used in this paper highlights the changing nature of the discursive formation. Foucault understood rules and law from a sophisticated perspective of the theory of law (Deleuze, 1985), which is predominantly informed by theorists such as Dworkin (1998) and Kelsen (2005). However, for this research, it is important to have readily available a naturalised series of changes to which the notion of processes implies. Therefore, instead of having a set of discursive rules or laws, which is constituted by its illegalities (Deleuze, 1985), for this research a conceptualisation is constituted using a finite body of processes that will “authorise an infinite number of performances”.

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Chapter III

Monstrous Anthropology

This chapter focuses on the foundations that colonisation was built upon and it is argued that these foundations were the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality. In order to investigate these foundations, the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness are examined in the Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act). The words ‘black’, ‘indigenous’, and ‘aborigine’ are used thousands of times in the totality of the documents surrounding the 1897 Act. However, more importantly, the practices enacted by the 1897 Act were based on the combination of those words, which is the enunciation (conceptualisation) of aboriginality. However, the Western Colonial conception of aboriginality was forged in the first colonial experience (15th and 16th centuries) when aboriginality had not yet been conceptualised using the racial inferiority-superiority and civilised-uncivilised binaries, which were informed by the social Darwinism used in the modern discourse of anthropology. It is argued that the Western Colonial conceptualisation of aboriginality was portrayed in the monstrous anthropology grounds informed by the aesthetic of ugliness of the times, in order to justify enslavement and other forms of domination over non-Western Colonial peoples. To start in the period of the first colonial experience is not to insinuate that the space of the proposed monstrous anthropology in the 15th and 16th centuries has a more significant causal hierarchy than the modern anthropological space; rather, it is as if the space of monstrous anthropology competes with the importance of modern anthropology. The importance of the space of monstrous anthropology in the 15th and

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16 By aboriginality, I do not mean the concept utilised to create the Aboriginal and Indigenous people’s identity. In order to avoid confusion, “aboriginality” must be understood as it is accompanied by “Western” in order to identify this conceptualisation as predominantly constituted by the Colonial West.

17 Note that blackness will be discussed separately in the following chapter.
16th centuries is that it is a privileged laboratory in which to view colonisation’s first assembly.

In this chapter, the modern discourse of anthropology is discussed briefly with connections to the work that explicitly instituted inequality in the idea of races, *The Inequality of Human Races* by Gobineau (1852). This work is used as a landmark where the analysis of the conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness must not cross. Once the grounds of the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness are separated from where they are not located, it is revealed that the grounds are located in the imagery of the Western aesthetic of ugliness. The Western aesthetic of ugliness is framed from what is known in Western culture and it says very little about the original civilisations in the Americas. Bosh’s triptych *The Temptations of St. Anthony* presents a large inventory of medieval representations of ugliness through the monstrosity of hell’s creatures. It is not surprising that the first drawings of the Americas follow this style and have similar representations of the content depicted in Bosh’s painting. Another important element is that in Bosh’s painting the depictions of the monsters have anthropomorphist representations that are located in the epistemological frame of anthropocentrism from that time, which will be transformed into an anthropology (the logos of anthropocentrism). Bosh’s monstrous anthropocentric representations are the frame of the monstrous anthropology that determines the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality.

Following the thread of monstrosity, the depiction of the cannibal is the first monstrous depiction of the first colonial experience. This is not only seen in the writing in the diaries of the ‘cronistas’, such as those of Christopher Columbus, but it is also eloquently seen in the first pictures drawn that are found in those diaries (Acosta, 1589). The monstrous depiction of the Aboriginal civilisations of the
Americas marks the way in which they will be interpreted: colonised and therefore enslaved. The imagery descriptions and textual descriptions are the first conceptualisation that forms the narrative frame and the classification system of Western imagery of aboriginality. This is referred to as ‘monstrous anthropology’\(^{18}\) in the formed narrative frame and in the set of processes in practice in the first colonial experience in the 15\(^{th}\) and 16\(^{th}\) centuries.

Lastly, the manifestation of the first recorded example of monstrous anthropology in action is what anthropologists, historians, and some cronistas (Robiou, 2008; Sued-Badillo, 2003) describe as the Caribe tribe. The Caribe tribe are depicted as a warrior tribe that are cannibals, which at one point in history the terms Caribe and cannibal were used interchangeably. However, the veracity of the existence of this ‘tribe’ does not concern this research. The Caribe example is important because it portrays the first description of aboriginality using an explicit monstrous anthropology conceptualisation. The description of the narrative frame of the Caribe is a road map for the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality. The description of the tribe and the denial of their existence are described in the essay written by Fernando de Armas in 1884, *The Fable of the Caribes*. These historical processes encode the set of processes (rules of discursive formation) of the conceptualisation of aboriginality that are discussed at the end of this chapter.

**The Inequality of Human Races**

When examining every historical period, the boundaries of where one period finishes and the next period begins must be determined. That is, the beginning of the next period of colonisation must be identified in order to analyse the colonisation

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\(^{18}\) This term is used briefly by Robiou (2008) in his book *Tainos y Caribes en las Antillas* to differentiate from a ‘humanistic anthropology’. However, the term is not further elaborated or referred to in other parts of his works (or in the works of others).
praxis of the 15th and 16th centuries. The explicit manifestation of modern anthropology’s epistemological period can be located in Count Joseph Arthur De Gobineau’s book *The Inequality of Human Races* (1852). He illustrates the outcome of his book in the following excerpt:

I have shown the unique place in the organic world occupied by the human species, the profound physical, as well as moral, differences separating it from all other kinds of living creatures. Considering it by itself, I have been able to distinguish, on physiological grounds alone, three great and clearly marked types, the black, the yellow, and the white. However uncertain the aims of physiology may be, however meagre its resources, however defective its methods, it can proceed thus far with absolute certainty. (De Gobineau, 1852, p. 205)

However, he did more than rigorously institute a racial hierarchy that still echoes today (in science and in everyday racism). De Gobineau marked the end of the period when inequality was directly commanded by institutions and the beginning of the period where inequality became naturalised in the space of race (Burnnet & Hutza, 2008; Sabine, 1998). That is, he stated that the inequality of human races was not determined by royal decree that determines if someone would be a slave, a peasant, a count, a Christian, or any other social status, but that they were now determined by something more permanent: by racial differentiation predicated by skin colour. The research scope of this work does not allow a full elaboration on De Gobineau’s book; academics have rigorously undertaken this previously (Kale, 2010; Burnnet & Hutza, 2008; Sabine, 1998). However, the scope of this research allows reference to this book in order to mark what it is not about. De Gobineau’s book marks the
manifestation of the solidification of the modern discourse of anthropology in colonisation.

Once this boundary in history is drawn as an epistemological frontier, the question becomes even more apparent: before modern anthropology, what was the space where inequality was conceptualised? It is known that institutions determined inequality; however, the way in which it was conceptualised remains unclear. Although De Gobineau’s book marks the end of a period of inequality, it does so by drawing from its previous space that, to say the least, continues to have influence in the modern anthropological space where colonisation continues in places such as Australia. The differentiation and inequality between the Colonial Western peoples and non-Colonial Western peoples of the Americas started from their first contact; however, this differentiation was not predicated by skin colour. Therefore, how was inequality first conceptualised? What did the first conceptualisation of aboriginality look like and how did it function if they were not aided by the primacy of racial hierarchy?

**Aesthetics of Ugliness**

If the modern judgement of the biological notion of race and the anthropological notion of civilisation are removed, few ways are left to understand how the Colonial West first understood different societies and civilisations. The aesthetics of beauty and ugliness can provide a pathway into what was ‘seen’ in the first encounters that framed colonisation. In particular, ugliness provides an unexplored frame of analysis that can assist in determining a different perspective through which the Colonial West understood Aboriginal societies in the 15th and 16th centuries in their first encounters in the Americas. In the Colonial West, ugliness is a space where the socio-political conditions are symbolically manifested (Marx, 2002;
Eco, 2007), and it also manifested the moralisation of Western society (Rosenkrantz, 1853). Finally, ugliness is all too human (Nietzsche, 1889) for the Colonial West as it is the mirror of what it can be and, to an extent, what it is. That is, ugliness is all too Western and it becomes a manifestation of its own anthropocentrism.

The first comprehensive written elaboration of ugliness was composed by Karl Rosenkrantz in 1853 in his book titled Aesthetic of Ugliness. Rosenkrantz theorises ugliness from a framework in which it autonomously moralises ugliness assuming that beauty already has its own autonomous moralisation. Eco (2007) explains:

Rosenkrantz performs a meticulous analysis of ugliness in nature, spiritual ugliness, ugliness in art (and the various forms of artistic incorrectness), the absence of form, asymmetry, disharmony, disfigurement, and deformation (the wretched, the vile, the banal, the fortuitous and the arbitrary, the gross), the various forms of the repugnant (the ungainly, death and the void, the horrendous, the vacuous, the sickening, the felonious, the spectral, the demoniac, the witchlike and the satanic). Too much to allow us to carry on saying that ugliness is merely the opposite of beauty understood as harmony, proportion, or integrity. (Eco, 2007, p. 16, emphasis added)

Rosenkrantz argues that ugliness has a complexity of its own and is not dependant on beauty. This complexity is nothing other than the autonomy of the moralisation that Eco proposes that ugliness can be equivalent to evil. Rosenkratz’ (1853) argument assumes that aesthetics is the manifestation of a form of moralisation. Therefore, for him, evil manifests in ugliness and, contrastingly, goodness and virtue manifest in beauty. Rosenkratz rejects the idea that ugliness is dependent on beauty, because if he is right, then virtue is dependent on evil and vice versa. Therefore, he attempts to unravel the complexity of ugliness in order to distinguish it from beauty and to
demonstrate that these concepts are not dependent on each other. In contrast, Eco (2007) argues that the lack of appreciation of ugliness can stem from ugliness historically being less contemplated, less written about, and therefore less often researched.

Karl Marx (cited in Eco, 2007) states that ugliness and beauty are often determined by “socio-economic and political conditions” (p. 116). Marx (2002) did not only refer to the power to buy that which could be the tools to become beautiful, but he also referred to beauty itself being an ideology that is constituted by the hidden interest of capital. This suggests that ugliness is part of the ideology of the binary of beauty and ugliness in reality; from this understanding, Eco stated that Marx intimated that a materialist dialectic is manifested in symbolic form through the beauty-ugliness binary. That is, the symbols manifested in beauty are represented in the buying power of the bourgeois position (and everything that surrounds that position), and the symbols manifested in ugliness are represented in the proletariat position. The ugliness of the proletariat position is characterised by an ideology of the need for consumption, which attempts to possess that which could function as an antidote to the ugliness-proletariat position. Beauty and ugliness become the symbolic dialectic that recursively confirms inequality.

Nietzsche (1889) provides a more interesting account of ugliness in his piece entitled *Twilight of the Idols*, where he states:

> Ugliness is seen as a sign and a symptom of degeneration… Every suggestion of exhaustion, heaviness, senility, fatigue, any sort of lack of freedom, like convulsions or paralysis… all this provokes an identical reaction [just before he was discussing narcissism], the value judgement “ugly”… What does man
hate? There is no doubt about this: he hates the twilight of his own type.

(1889, p. 78)

Ugliness, in Nietzsche, is the parallax\textsuperscript{19} reflection of the Western notion of beauty. The twilight of humanity in Western aesthetics is ugliness, and this is an important part of what defines Western history (Eco, 2007). The value judgement of ugly is only understood from a judgement defined by a history that values vigour from exhaustion, lightness from heaviness, youth from senility, strength from weakness, and movement from paralysis. This history is the Colonial Western history. From this perspective, ugliness is as much part of the Colonial West as all that it deems to be beautiful because it is produced and reproduced through the value judgement of beauty. Ugliness is not hidden: it is as if ugliness needs to be decoded in order to find a treasure: it is there to be seen, but it is not exposed as much as beauty is exposed. If beauty is historically (and therefore socially) defined, then the same applies to ugliness. This indicates that the framing and mindset that makes us see beauty also makes us see ugliness. Moreover, beauty and ugliness do not refer to inherent attributes or all elements of that which is beautiful or that which is ugly. If anything, the attributes that define beauty or ugliness are inherent elements of the culture in question; in this case, the Colonial West. For example, the Colonial West often regards the desert as rough, lifeless, and sometimes ugly. However, these descriptions often convey very little about the desert itself (assuming that a distinction between desert and jungle, or valley, or forest, or any other landscape), but rather it conveys what the Colonial West values. It values that landscapes have smoothness and ease, and that it does not pose a threat to the way in which Western societies live. Moreover, it values abundance of what the Colonial West wants to ‘see’. The desert

\textsuperscript{19} The effect whereby the position or direction of an object appears to differ when its reflection is viewed.
certainly has the aforementioned attributes and more, but not within the frame of the Colonial West. Therefore, a desert that is sometimes classified as ugly and is often regarded in low judgement values can reveal more about the Western frame of classification than about the desert itself. Through ugliness, we can understand the Colonial West frame of classification, which is to understand the Colonial West mindset including that which is highly valued and that which is poorly valued. In this sense, a history of ugliness in the Colonial West is a history of ugliness of the Colonial West’s ‘spirit’, and not the history of the object that it calls “ugly”.

As an inquiry pathway, the Colonial West conceptualisation of ugliness provides an obscured and often ignored account of its inherent history (Eco, 2007). Through the realm of Western ugliness and motivated by domination, peoples were conceptualised and therefore captured in the Colonial West framework. For this reason, this is an important framework to consider in order to elaborate on how the Colonial West historically engaged in practices that continued to form and reproduce the first colonial discourses. These first West Colonial frames were deployed almost immediately to what were mostly unknown civilisations at the moment of first contact. These conceptualising practices were first manifested in writing and drawing in the colonial records of the diaries or “chronicles” (crónicas) of the conquistadores. These recorded what they saw, but they also formed what became known as aboriginality in the 17th and 18th centuries, and even today. However, where

Marco Polo and other incursions can be considered as pre-existent historical processes that are prior to the frame of the Western narrative and therefore have influence on the colonial narratives; see Fedirici (2006) and Sáez-López (2011).

Conquistadores was a specific term that was instituted by the Kingdom of Spain to differentiate the first colonisers that participated in the first wars, particularly in México, from the colonisers that continued to arrive from the Americas towards the end of the 16th century (Alegria, 1990).
can imagery references be located that convey how the ugliness of the unknown was represented in the late 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century?

**Bosh’s Triptych: The Temptations of St. Anthony**

![Bosh's Triptych: The Temptations of St. Anthony](image)

**Figure 1 Hieronymus Bosh’s triptych: The Temptations of St. Anthony (1505-1506)**

Bosh’s triptych of *The Temptations of Saint Anthony* (1505-1506) is used in this part to map the framework of the aesthetic of ugliness of the 15th and 16th centuries. That is, this triptych was chosen as a rich chart of monstrosity enclosed in a given set of narratives. This brief description will follow the narratives from the left panel to the right panel in an attempt to highlight specific imageries but also to describe its potential narratives. The identified imageries will be considered as the arrangement for the conceptualisation (discursive devices) of aboriginality and the processes that form (rules of formation) the underlying narratives of this conceptualisation. Therefore, this mapping begins from an aesthetics of ugliness.
focused on monstrosity in order to follow the conceptual arrangement of these imageries and narratives.

There are three panels in Hieronymus Bosh’s triptych of *The Temptations of Saint Anthony* (1505-1506). In the first panel on the left, and from the top to the bottom, the calmness is immediately disturbed by flying sea voyages that are being attacked by fish-like creatures. One fish-like religious man is praying, but his body is horizontal. On top of this man, there are wolf-like creatures that reassure the imminence of danger. Similar indescribable images disturb the calmness of the horizon, which indicates a stable past. Focusing on the top middle of the first panel of the triptych, the calmness precipitates the depiction of the aftermath of the battle in the second panel. The pale and dry colours in the first panel indicate death, the end, and the lack of hope. Then, the dark gradients of black, brown, and red in the first panel alter the perspective to an imagery that suggests a closer experience of ‘seeing’.

There are numerous possible interpretations of the situations depicted in the painting, and as the focus moves to the bottom of the first panel, the perception changes and it makes the viewer believe that they are inside a wall. Then, it is clearly seen that two men are helping another, apparently injured, man and they are all walking on a boarded walkway. These images suggest that they are moving away from the battle scene, perhaps to a safer area. However, on their left, there is a blackness that suggests that anything could intercept them on their way to safety and put them in further danger. In the bottom right, closer to the viewer, there is an indescribable bird-like creature. It is dressed in soldier’s armour and its dark eyes penetrate the viewer. In the picture, it is uncertain if this creature is malicious or not, dangerous or not, but the creature is from hell and therefore must be one of the devil’s servants. The image depicts the creature as being from hell, but in an odder more than terrifying manner.
The creature is handing a document in the direction of a representative of the Catholic Church. This man of the cloth is discretely reading another document. He is hiding below the boarded walkway with other indescribable things in the same blackness on the left of the three men walking on the walkway. The fish-like monsters, the wolf-like monsters, the creature being used as a carriage, the non-Christian priest-like creatures, and the hatching egg giving birth to a bird, with a bird-fish-like creature on top: these images and imagery suggest that these monster-like creatures are not to be worried about just now, and thank goodness because they look terrifying. However, some are being represented as having the ability to attack, which indicates that an attack is imminent.

The second panel represents war: fire, blackness, armoured ships, destruction, beasts, more strange creatures, men from the Church, an owl, a bird, crosses, evil fish-like creature, giant rodents, dogs, soldiers, and a crucified Jesus Christ are the representations that aid the imagery of war. Combined, this imagery also attempts to highlight the chaos of war. With the same perspective as the first panel, the second panel moves from being distant to the battle to being in the midst of it. It appears to suggest a double movement that simultaneously depicts a long view and a close view. The last movement has the effect of bringing the viewer inside the picture. The truth is even further contested in this panel through the highlighting of the strangeness, with hell being the most feared form of monstrosity in that time period, and a re-composition of Western objects of war (e.g. ships, carriages, armour, etc.) that are unique and had never been seen before this painting.

A representation that is prominent in the second panel is the fish-like creature with the red cloth and a machine on top. This is the second creature in red that is prominent due to the intense red in comparison to the grey and black gloomy colours
that saturate the three panels of the triptych. This fish-like creature (with its part machine) converses with the bird-like creature and the man in red. At this point, red appears to communicate a form of noble distinction in men, while the red distinction in the (monster-like) creatures suggests a high ranking command in the forces of hell by Western standards. The strangeness of the bird-like creature and fish-like creature also appear to be important in the ranks of creatures from hell, which indicates that hell’s creatures have a similar organisation to those of Westerners.

The colour red operates as a representation of battle, and it explicitly refers to blood, but it also refers to importance, officialdom, and hierarchy. The blood colour is shared by both humans and non-human creatures alike. The non-human creatures appear to have a degree of Western sophistication and intelligence, or simply Western similarity. The red colour appears to be a form of anthropomorphism rather than the mark of violence, of hierarchy, and of sophisticated civilisation. The representations indicate leadership, titles, and differentiation from other creatures of hell, which are anthropomorphisms. The hell creatures that bear red are “civilised” by Western standards and are not savages in the sense that is understood today.

The third panel in the triptych has less darkness. Faded pastel colours comprise at least one-third of the picture. However, there is more red-blood coloured imagery than in the previous two panels. This panel presents the aftermath of a great battle, the aftermath of chaos. A flying fish-creature takes a man away from the ground from right to left, which suggests that they are moving away from the situation, towards sundown in the west. It is the third time that the city is being represented, and it is depicted as an invaded city with the remnants of a battle, with death very visible, and with many other post-war objects and activities. In the centre of the panel, an old woman, similar to the Virgin Mary, is pouring blood into a cup for
the Anti-Christ, who can be seen as an infant. A sizable red cloth covers part of the infant, and the cloth covers more than ten per cent of the picture and connects with other strange creatures. Also, there is a man under a dark cloth looking at the viewer. He is hiding his intentions of reading a book; in the context of the image, it suggests that the book is a religious book. At his feet lay blood and dead bodies of both humans and the monstrous creatures from hell. At first glance, the triptych as a whole gives a sensation of hopelessness. However, the aforementioned man, hiding in the black cloth and looking at the viewer, provides a sensation of action: an invitation, an announcement of action, and perhaps a clue that the war is not over. The man appears to suggest that this is a never-ending battle of good against evil, or Western men against Bosh’s creatures from hell. Men who respond to the holy story and command of being made in the image of God, and this carries with it a large responsibility. The non-human creatures from hell are monsters because they are not human. However, their origin and command in Bosh’s creation remain in the imagery of Bosh’s creatures and humans.

This brief description of Bosh’s triptych of *The Temptations of St. Anthony* (1505-1506) is not intended to decode this complex artwork or rigorously describe the denotative elements of the triptych. This beautiful piece is suspiciously complicit and relevant to the Colonial West’s depiction of the assembled frame of ugliness in the conceptualisation of aboriginality in the first colonial experience of the Americas. The construction of ugliness by the Colonial West to the Aboriginal civilisations of the Americas was a monstrous one. Bosh’s painting describes better than words the ugliness of monstrosity in the 15th and 16th centuries. Hieronymus Bosh (1450-1516) did not live to experience the Reformation in full; therefore, Eco states that he is a
“son of his epoch” (2007, p. 102)\textsuperscript{22}. When theorising about *The Temptations of St. Anthony*, Eco also (2007) states:

His infernal creatures are hybrids reminiscent of the diabolical collages in Baldus… They do not spring from a combination of “known” animal features but have their own nightmarish independence, and we do not know whether they come from the Abyss or whether they live, unobserved in our world. (Eco, 2007, p. 101).

What is known is that the natures of these monstrous creatures are unknown; the unknown feature is crucial given that it is the space in which Western culture attempted to conceptualise what was new for them. That is, that which was new or simply unknown had to be grasped and conceptualised using a set of existing imageries that Bosh introduced in this painting. The monstrous creatures, almost naturally in a battle with men, are odd, strange, and at times horrendously, terribly, and explicitly evil. The suggested attributes of having a hierarchal organisation, a class differentiation, and even the capacity to fight a battle using Western standards are characteristics that come from Western culture and are therefore cultural anthropomorphisms. The creatures from hell are the product of “men” (Western culture) because they are similar to them, culturally and politically. How does this anthropocentric view of fictional creatures from hell become relevant to the immersion and colonisation of the West to the Americas? How does this Christian fictionalisation relate to what would become known as the “New World”?

**The Cannibal**

According to French historian Jules Michelet (1798-1874), “the real discovery of men started when Christopher Columbus arrived to the islands of the Caribbean in

\textsuperscript{22} This does not go against the art theory and art appreciation claims that Bosh was very influential in the surrealism movement in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (Breton, 1929).
1492” (cited in Sáez-López, 2010, p. 470). The importance of this “discovery of men” (men here could be used interchangeably with the Colonial West) was expressed very early after 1492. In his dedication in the book *General History of the Indies* (1522), Francisco López de Gómara said, “the discovery of the Américas was the biggest event since the creation of the world” (p. 156). Furthermore, Fernando de Oviedo was considered to be the first cronista (an early historian) of the Americas who captured what he was experiencing through both words and images; he felt that he had to also capture everything in drawings and images of the marvels he had seen (Oviedo, 1533). He states:

> [i]t is like seeing painted by a Berruguete\(^{23}\) or another great painter like Leonardo Da Vinci… or other famous painters I met in Italy that words cannot fully describe their pieces… all this is better seen that written. (Oviedo, 1533, Fol. 91)

That is, many cronistas agreed that the power of words was unable to fully describe this “New World” that they were colonising. As a result, the cronistas drew images alongside their words in their diaries\(^{24}\). These images, to say the least, provided a different account of how the Colonial West understood the Americas, and particularly their peoples. The following two drawings are from the beginning of the 16th century and they were the first drawings of the Aboriginal civilisations from the Colonial West perspective. In the obscured history of the ugliness and monstrosity of the Americas, the method of framing monstrosity was through cannibalism. It is immediately noticeable that the styles of drawing can be readily compared with Bosh’s creatures in *The Temptations of St Anthony*.

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\(^{23}\) Alonso Berruguete (1488-1561) was a Spanish painter.
\(^{24}\) The drawings made by the cronistas were later re-drawn by artists usually located in Spain or other European countries. The cronistas did not have authorship other than in the books that were later published (Alegria, 1978; Sued Badillo, 2003).
Figure 2 Lorenz Fries, *Auslegung der Carta Marina* (Estrasburgo, Johannes Grieninger, 1525)

The first time that the word ‘cannibal’ was written by the Colonial West (in the Spanish language) was on November 23, 1492. In Christopher Columbus’ diaries, he mentions:

\[\ldots y otros se llamaban canibales, a quien mostraban tener un gran miedo. Y desde que vieron que lleva este camino, dice que no podían hablar, porque, los comían y que son gente muy armada.\] (de Las Casas, 1522)\(^{25}\)

In this fragment of Columbus’ diaries, it is important to highlight that what he emphasizes is a tone of fear, the practice of eating human flesh, and the alleged presence of armed peoples. The narrative that Columbus presented was already a prelude to a battle against armed and flesh-eating peoples that set the scene for them

\(^{25}\) ...and others were called *cannibals* to whom they showed great fear. And since they observed that we shared the same route, they said that they could not say a word about them, because they could be eaten (by the cannibals) and that they were very armed people.
to be considered monsters. This description is not far from Bosh’s depiction of the monsters from hell. Columbus further proves this point in the days leading up to this entry on November 4, 1492, when interpreting the descriptions of these peoples who attacked the Aboriginal peoples from the Caribbean:

…gente que tenía un ojo en la frente... entendió también que lexos de allí avía hombres de un ojo y otros con hocicos de perros... criaturas monstruosas...

(in Varela, 1984,)²⁶

This description is quite similar to the drawing in Figure 2 of an Aboriginal group capturing and preparing a man to be eaten. In this drawing, which was finalised in 1525, Aboriginal men are represented with inhuman heads, i.e. dog-like heads, but with human bodies. From left to right, one of the creatures is riding a llama with a captured Aboriginal man. He holds a whip for the llama. In the centre, another creature (a cannibal) is chopping a man into body parts. The cannibal creature is using a cleaver to chop the body parts. The body parts that are hanging above him suggest that they are being preserved as the Colonial West would preserve meats (using salt) to be eaten later. Another cannibal Aboriginal creature is helping with related chores. At the far right, a fourth cannibal Aboriginal creature is observing the chores being done while eating a human body part, an arm, under a wooden structure. These monstrous creatures inspire fear and sorrow for the fate of the victims represented in this drawing.

The ‘authenticity’ of the objects, peoples, practices, and cultural elements is the subject of debate in other important works (Alegría, 1978; Robiou, 2008; Chicangana-Bayona, 2008), yet mentioning them can help further illustrate the western historical formation of the imageries and narratives of aboriginality. It is

²⁶…one-eyed people… he understood from those languages that they were men with only one eye and others with dog-like muzzles… monstrous creatures…
noticeable that a cleaver (or a metal knife) is used to cut the body parts, and it is well known that metal was not used for cutting devices in any recorded Aboriginal group in the Americas (Alegría, 1978; Federici, 2010). Furthermore, another historical error can be seen in the practice of hanging meat for preservation and the use of a whip to ride the llama. The preservation of meat, the use of the whip, and metal knives are all distinctive objects and practices from the Colonial West in medieval times. This early depiction of cannibalism depicts more than an explicit attempt to Westernise cannibal Aboriginal peoples and more than the fantasies of sailors that undertook long voyages on the high seas. Instead, it depicts a preconceived style of illustrating how the Colonial West understood and conceptualised Aboriginal peoples in the first colonial experience. That is, this image depicts what the Colonial West was bluntly imagining and conceptualising when they experienced the civilisations of the Americas.

The portrayal of Aboriginal peoples here is evidently outside the “civilised” and “uncivilised” logic; this is seen in the picture through the Colonial West assigning Western cultural attributes such as similar cultural objects (metal knives, wooden hut, etc.) and similar quotidian practices (hanging meat for preservation, the way the captured person is carried using the llama, etc.). The Western attribution to the cannibal Aboriginal peoples can be compared with the portrayal of the creatures from hell in The Temptations of St. Anthony because Western culture is the point of reference in which these monstrosities are described. The cannibal illustration demonstrates how Western culture is the point of reference even in completely different civilisations, and it goes as far as recording historical errors. The cannibal monstrous creatures are not uncivilised or inferior; the Colonial West illustrated them with similar cultural practices, almost all identical except that they were monstrous creatures.
The beginning of the use of the term “cannibal” by Spanish colonisers occurred only one month after the arrival of the Colonial West in the Americas. The narrative of feared Aboriginal peoples began in the description of the first day of the arrival in the Americas on October 12, 1492:

_Ellos todos a una mano son de buena estatura de grandeza y Buenos gestos, bien hechos. Yo vi algunos que tenían señales de heridas en sus cuerpos, y les hice señas de qué era aquello, y ellos me mostraron como allí vienen de tierra firme a tomarlos por cautivos_.

It is important to highlight that the Colonial West framed two distinct groups of Aboriginal peoples from the first moment of colonisation: those that collaborated with the Spanish _conquistadores_ and those who appeared to be a menace to their conquest by fighting back.

Figure 3 Map Kunstmann II, ca. 1505, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Múnich (Cod. Icon. 133).

The picture in Figure 3 was finalised in 1505 and it is considered to be the first drawing of Aboriginal peoples in the Americas (Alegría, 1978; Sáez, 2010). The

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27 They all had good height and made proper face gestures. I saw that some had signs of injuries, and I asked them in signals that what have caused the injuries, and they showed me how other peoples would come and try to capture them.
drawing is thought to have been drawn by Americo Vespucio, but this has not been confirmed (Alegria in Sáez, 2010). This is a simpler representation of the Aboriginal civilisation of the Tupinamba: an Aboriginal man “roasting” another man. The drawing itself is a map, and at the bottom the man is using a rotating device to cook another whole man over a relatively intense fire. Given the white skin colour of the victim, it is believed that he is European (Chicangana-Bayona, 2008; Sáez-López, 2011). Therefore, this functioned as a warning to the Colonial Western peoples, and it was a sign of the narrative around the dangers that needed to be addressed through defending themselves against the cannibals. Furthermore, this illustration is the first depiction of the immersion of the Colonial West as actors in a narrative of a possible tragedy in the Americas. As in the previous picture, the debate around the factual inconsistencies is not the focus of this research, yet the picture is a useful tool to highlight that the roasting method depicted is a European one. However, this again demonstrates the Colonial West cultural anthropocentric attributions to the Aboriginal civilisations of the Americas; furthermore, it depicts Aboriginal peoples as a menace to the colonisers.
In the illustration in Figure 4, which has not been preserved well, there is a later depiction of the “cannibal” Aboriginal peoples in the Americas. It is a group feasting on human body parts while cooking another human. From left to right, the integration of a woman in the practices of cannibalism can also be seen. In the background, there is a depiction of Aboriginal houses in the Americas called *bohíos* (Acosta, 1589). In the middle of the illustration, there are some men devouring the human flesh after it has been cooked. Men of all ages are represented here: bearded men (suggesting old age), bald men (suggesting middle aged), and young men. Notably, they all are effectively naked, but their appearances resemble the physical appearance of Europeans portrayed in the religious paintings of the time. In the middle, there are human body parts cut in pieces that resemble the way a chicken is cut by a butcher. The human body parts are on top of a roasting device that is fuelled by an intense fire and it is being kept intense using a fan that another Aboriginal man is holding. In the bottom right, there is a child eating a small piece of the cooked
human. The child also resembles the religious paintings of children or angels of the Renaissance. However, in this picture, this representation of innocence is disturbing given the context.

The imagery in this picture appears to be less Westernised given that the bodies are represented without clothes, their houses resemble the structures that existed in the Americas at the time (of which some remain today), and the drawings suggest movement that feels like a foreign celebration or a foreign type of feast. However, the Westernised attribution remains and it appears to be located in the bodies and in the roasting device. The monstrous communication of this picture lies in the feast of human flesh. Notably, the picture also highlights a child eating the human flesh, which projects pure evil. This imagery of Aboriginal peoples in this cannibal feast presents a conceptualisation that is determined by a knot of horror and tragedy.

Around the same time as the painting, the priest Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, who was a cronista and the first advocate for Aboriginal human rights, wrote a letter in 1552 to the Spanish Crown entitled Brevisimo en relación a la destrucción de las Indias. This letter was a summarised account of the situation of the Americas that highlighted the horrible events caused by the Spanish conquistadores. In one part, when he describes the actions of an unnamed captain of the Kingdom of Guatemala (today Guatemala), he writes:

Tenía éste esta costumbre: que cuando iba a hacer guerra a algunos pueblos o provincias, llevaba de los ya sojuzgados indios cuantos podia que hiciesen guerra a los otros; e como no les daba de comer a diez y a veinte mil hombres que llevaba, consentiales que comiesen a los indios que tomaban. Y así había en su real solemnísima carnerería de carne humana, donde en su presencia se

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28 A short letter about the destruction of the Indies: however, it was more than 100 pages long.
mataban los niños y se asaban, y mataban el hombre por solas las manos y pies, que tenían por los mejores bocados. Y con estas inhumanidades, oyéndolas todas las otras gentes de las otras tierras, no sabían dónde se meter de espanto. (de las Casas, 1552 folio VIII)²⁹

This account (and much of de las Casas’s letter) tells a different story that portrays a picture of terror, of chaos, and of monstrosity as the context and as the underlying narrative, yet this was produced by colonisation and not by the Aboriginal peoples. It is not that the Aboriginal peoples were good or bad in Western culture’s terms. Many stories tell the history of the Aboriginal peoples being portrayed as victims of the conquistadores, and therefore being depicted as in the famous description of the “noble savage” (Alegría, 1978). Even the heroic narratives of certain Aboriginal peoples, such as the narratives of Tupac Amaru and Lautaro, among others, appear to follow the “noble savage” narrative given that even these warrior groups only went to war with the Spanish, the Portuguese, the French, the Dutch, and the British, in sum with the Colonial West, for valid reasons according to the Colonial West framework (Sued-Badillo, 2003). This horrendous narration from a position that condemns the colonisers appears to escape the monstrous conceptualisation of aboriginality, blaming the Spanish; however, it illustrates that even in the ‘reality’ of this tragic situation, a different view will conceptualise the situation of aboriginality in horrendous terms. There is no doubt that the first colonial experience was a genocide and a crime against humanity, starting with the

²⁹ This person had this practice: that when he went to war against any people or province, he took as many indigenous peoples he could so they could fight against them; and since he would not give them any food, 10 and even 20 thousand at a time, he persuaded them to eat the other indigenous people they would capture. Then, he witnessed a brutal butchery of human flesh, that in front of him infants were killed and roasted, and they killed men only to eat their hands and feet, which were regarded as the most delicious parts. When the other peoples would hear these inhumanities, they could not hide their fear.
enslavement of Aboriginal peoples; moreover, the historical process of tragedy and horror appears to stem from the framework of monstrous anthropology and not the other way around. That is, the conceptualisation of aboriginality began with the process of framing it in the horror and tragedy in the cultures of Aboriginal peoples; it did not begin with the process of horror and tragedy that came from the Colonial West’s violent murderous colonisation process.
...aunque dice que el comienzo fue sobre el habla de los Caniba, que ellos llaman caribes, que los vienen a tomar, y traen arcos y flechas sin hierro, que en todas aquellas tierras no había memoria de él ni de otro metal, salvo de...
oro y cobre, aunque cobre no había visto sino poco el Almirante. El Almirante le dijo por señas que los Reyes de Castilla mandarían destruir a los caribes y que a todos se los mandarían traer las manos atadas.30

On December 26, 1492, one month after the first written use of the word cannibal and two months after Columbus arrived on the first island of the Caribbean in the Americas, the term Caribe was written as a way to correct the Aboriginal word caniba. They gave a name to the cannibals, and they grouped the cannibals in the term Caribe. Furthermore, Columbus promised to capture the Caribes because it appeared that they were the evil Aboriginals that needed to be stopped. The Caribes were depicted as warrior tribes that raped and pillaged the first Aboriginal peoples in the Caribbean. According to mainstream history, the Caribes were a warrior tribe that historically had an ancestral grudge against the Arawak group, which were mainly located but not limited to the north of South America (Alegria, 1990; Robiou, 2008).

The Aboriginal peoples that Columbus first interviewed were called Taínos, which are an Aboriginal group from the Arawak group, located in what is known today as Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Guadalupe, Jamaica, Cuba, and the Bahamas (Sued-Badillo, 2003). The Caribes would sail at specific times of the year, according to specific astrological constellation beliefs, and go to war capturing women and men. They would keep the women as slaves and marry them. The men were sacrificed in very elaborate ceremonies to honour their ancestral rivalries with the Arawak groups (Robiou, 2008). They lived in the smaller islands of the Caribbean including what is today called Martinique (Robiou, 2008). According to various historians (such as

30 ...although he said that they were called Caniba, that they call caribes, the ones who come to take them, and whom are equipped with bows and arrows not made of steel, that in all that land there is no memory of another type of metal, other than gold and copper, although copper was not so much seen. Columbus communicated through sign language that the Kingdom of Castilla would order the destruction of the caribes and would have them all bound by their hands.
Alegría, 1978; Robiou, 2008), the Caribes not only practiced ceremonies that involved the sacrifice of captured peoples, but they also practiced ritualistic consumption of human flesh (Alegría, 1990; Robio, 2008). The Caribes also played ritualistic ball games in which the winners would be sacrificed as well (Roboiu, 2008). However, the existence of the Caribes as a distinctive ‘tribe’ separate to the Arawak is an ongoing debate (Alegría, 1990; Robiou, 2008; Sued-Badillo, 2003); later in this section, the first argument against their existence is presented.

The Caribes were depicted early on as the monstrous creatures of these new lands, and the first Aboriginal peoples in contact with Columbus, i.e. the Tainos, were depicted as the good Aboriginal peoples, or at least the ones who could be ‘saved’. This statement is true to the point of being manifested in the naming of the ‘good’ Aboriginal peoples that ‘informed’ Columbus of the existence of these cannibals. The word tainú, and later known as Taino, was the word used in the Arawak language to mean ‘the good ones’, and the Aboriginal peoples from Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba were known (and today are still referred to) as Taino (Alegría, 1978). The Caribes appeared to become the explicit conceptualisation space where the Colonial West conceptualised all creatures from hell, as in The Temptations of St. Anthony, and to justify going to war with them, capturing them, and using them as slaves for mining gold and silver (Sued-Badillo, 2003). That is, the Caribes is where the conceptualisation of monstrosity began and followed through historically; thus, it is from this point that its “othering” and evolving processes must be examined.

In 1884, Juan Ignacio de Armas, who was a Cuban anthropologist, published an essay entitled The Fable of the Caribes that critically analysed the concept of the Caribes. In his essay, de Armas argued that the famous tribe called the Caribes was a myth created in order to justify the enslavement of Aboriginal peoples in the
Americas (Alegría, 1990; de Armas, 1884; Sued-Badillo, 2003). de Armas supported this argument first through ‘demonstrating’ that the Aboriginal peoples only ate plants and small animals (frujívoros), second through arguing that the Kingdom of Spain passed a Royal Decree (Real Cédula de Gracia, 1503) ordering the conquistadores to not enslave the Aboriginal peoples unless they committed an unforgivable sin such as cannibalism, and third through exhibiting linguistic parallelisms with other known ancient groups in European history and literature that suggested that the name Caribe was plagiarised from other stories and myths. After elaborating on these arguments he concluded that:

No había dos razas en las Antillas sino una sola... La fábula de los Caribes fue al principio un error geográfico, luego una alusinación y después una calumnia. (de Armas, 1884, p. 34)\(^{31}\)

de Armas’ essay had been mostly ignored until the late 1970s (Alegría 1978; Roboiu, 2008; Sued-Badillo, 2003). Although it is located in the modern anthropological discursive space, this essay presented an explicit critical illustration of the monstrous anthropological conceptualisation: because it discussed the key points of the Caribes in relation to the capture and slavery of Aboriginal peoples, it contested the process in which the Colonial West imagined the Caribes as cannibals and it presented an argument of how this Aboriginal group was an imagined category, in an anthropocentric manner.

de Armas’ first argument stated that the stomachs of the conquistadores were accustomed to meat and cannibalism was a practice that historically was an extreme act for Europeans (mainly sailors) to satisfy the apparent need for flesh (de Armas, 1884). The Aboriginal peoples did not possess the material conditions to be

\(^{31}\) In the Antilles there was only one race and not two… The fable of the Caribes was in the beginning a geographical mistake, then a hallucination, and then slander.
accustomed to eating meat and therefore did not have the organic capacity to crave, consume, and digest meat. When setting up this argument, de Armas suggested that the only ones that could actually have practiced cannibalism were the Spanish conquistadores and not any type of Aboriginal people in the Antilles:

*Los únicos casos auténticos de antropofagia en la conquista, fueron cometidos por los mismos conquistadores; porque el estómago de éstos, mui diferente en condiciones digestivas al de los sóbrios i frujívoros indios, no pudo soportar algunas veces la carencia de carne... Los mismos infelices que injustamente acusados de antropófagos llevaba Colón a España... estuvieron a punto de ser devorados por la tripulación (13).* (de Armas, 1884, p. 15)

32 de Armas argued that the Spanish were the only ones that were capable of eating human flesh when meat was not available. Therefore, this convenient accusation arose from the behaviour of the accusers in relation to what the colonisers could interpret in what they observed, from their anthropocentric perspective. Based on a careful revision of the diaries of some men on the voyages, some historians (primarily critical historians) support this account of the authenticity of Aboriginal cannibalism and they have called for historical revisionism (Borja, 2002; Chicangana-Bayona, 2003). Notably, the underlying tone of horror and tragedy appeared to be present in the storyline of the conquistadores and the Aboriginal peoples: from the position of the colonisers through depicting Aboriginal peoples as monstrous cannibal creatures that terrorised other Aboriginal groups and potentially the colonisers or from

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32 The footnote in the essay refers to the diaries of Fernando Colón in which he describes how the men were about to eat the Aboriginal people that Columbus had captured to take as an offering to the Kingdom of Spain.

33 The only authentic cases of anthropophagia in the conquest were committed by the conquistadores; because their stomach, they had very different digestive conditions from the sober and frujívoros aboriginals, they could not manage the lack of meat... The same damned people who were accused of cannibalism that where on the voyage with Columbus to Spain... they were almost devoured by the men on the voyage.
other positions, like the arguments of de las Casas and de Armas, that depicted Aboriginal peoples as the victims of the carnages of the Spanish.

de Armas (1884) narrated how Columbus in 1493 captured 23 Aboriginal persons to sell as slaves: “seven from San Salvador, and 16 from Cuba” (de Armas, 1884, p. 24). Only ten survived the voyage, and he sold four in Seville and took the remaining six to the Catholic King of Spain. The King and Queen ordered Columbus to return the Aboriginal persons back to their lands. However, most died in the second voyage back to the Americas and he used the remaining two as interpreters, in effective disobedience to the order from the Kingdom of Spain. During the second voyage in 1493, Columbus sent a full ship of Aboriginal “slaves” (700 in total) to be sold in Spain and he justified this action by stating:

…lo han liberado de los antropófagos y ahora los pueblos indígenas podían estar en paz. (de las Casas, 1495, cited in de Armas, 1884, p. 26)\textsuperscript{34}

The Kingdom of Spain also forbade this. de Armas (1884) stated that Columbus proposed a slave trade, like that emerging from Africa commanded by the Portuguese. The Kingdom commanded the 700 aboard the second ship to be freed; however, this proved to be a futile action given that the Aboriginal peoples ended up being slaves in Europe where the Kingdom of Spain did not have immediate influence. In August 1503, Queen Isabel I signed a royal decree (\textit{Real Cédula}) that allowed licenses to sell African slaves and that, in the case of the Aboriginal peoples, only the \textit{Caribes} or other cannibal groups could be captured and sold as slaves:

…y contra los caribes y negros, de acá se pueden, con el nombre de la Santísima Trinidad, enviarlos todos como esclavos que se podrán vender 4,000... (1503, in Acosta 1589)\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} …we have freed them from the cannibals and now the aboriginal groups can be in peace.
With allusion to the *Real Cédula*, de Armas strongly suggested that the *Caribe* tribe was an invention to capture and enslave the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas. This royal decree is important because it institutes the historical process of capturing and enslaving Aboriginal peoples in the Caribbean through the historical process of cannibalism at least 30 years before Aboriginal slavery was solidified after the conquest of Mexico.

The *Caribes* were presented as a warrior tribe and horrifying group that capture other Aboriginal peoples without provocation. However, de Armas suggested the opposite, for which he declared that there was more historical justification that the creation of this monstrous Aboriginal imagery was for the purpose of justifying the beginnings of Aboriginal slavery. The complicit relationship between the monstrous cannibal imagery provides the grounds for instituting the process of horror and tragedy, which followed the process of capturing and slavery using a rationale that cannibals could be enslaved according to God and the Kingdom of Spain.

The essence of de Armas’ argument lies on the ‘fable’ part of his title. He concluded that the *Caribes* were nothing more than a myth, a story; something legendary that repeats itself in ancient Western culture’s history. He located this fable three times in Western culture’s history. The first time he located the story in Armenia, a tribe that Herodotus (the Greek historian, 485-425 BC) described in the ancient times of 400 BC (de Armas, 1884) called the *Calibes* or *Armeno-calibes*. The second location was in Homer’s *Iliad*, where it retells a story about the *Alibes* and the *Alizonas*, which indicates parallelism with the word *Amazonas* and *Caribes* (*Ilíada* II, 856 cited in de Armas, 1884). In the third historical location, the same word *calibe* appears in Spain:

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35 …and against the *Caribes y negros*, from now on they can, in the name of the Holy Trinity, send them all as slaves that can be sold 4,000…
…según Justino, había un pueblo de Calibes; por lo cual, por las diverjencias anteriormente notadas, puede creerse que ese nombre, que en griego significa hierro, se dió indistintamente a varios pueblos fuertes e industriales del antiguo mundo… (Jutino, lib. 44, cap. 3 in de Armas, 1884, p. 4)\textsuperscript{36}

From here, de Armas undermined the credibility of the existence of a group that had a suspiciously traceable history in ancient Western writings. Therefore, this completes the circle that returns us to the beginning of this chapter where the Colonial West frame of reference is located in Bosh’s *The Temptations of St. Anthony*. The narrative of the frame of the *Caribes* appears to have a pre-existing reference. As mentioned before, the fictionalisation of the Colonial West conceptualisation of aboriginality is not judged in its falseness or in its truthfulness; rather, it is judged in its presence or absence, or its positivity. The positivity of the narrative of the frame of the *Caribes* lies in a mythical Western group that may or may not have existed, but that is certainly located in a history of the Colonial West as a narrative that assists in the formation in ways to talk about peoples, i.e. as a language that can form a conceptualisation.

In this research, the argument that the *Caribes* was a fable or a myth in factual terms is inconsequential; the importance of this argument’s discussion lies on the processes that constituted the narrative the Colonial West that was used to interpret the Americas. Certainly, as early as in 1884, de Armas built a strong case to question the intention behind the story of the existence of the *Caribes*, yet other academics built a strong case in favour of the *Caribes* existence (Alegría, 1990; Rabiou, 2008). The information on both sides illustrates the assemblage of the processes that the

\textsuperscript{36} \ldots according to Justino a group of *Calibes*; because the aforementioned divergences, it can be believed that this name, that in Greek means steel, was given to many groups that were regarded as industrious and strong from the ancient world.
Colonial West used to construct the narrative frame that is the grounds in which colonisation launched its enterprise of conceptualising the object that it spoke of.

**Processes that Constitute the Conceptualisation of Aboriginality**

The four processes that constitute the monstrous anthropological conceptualisation are (1) terror, horror and tragedy, (2) capturing and enslavement, (3) similarity and anthropocentrism, and (4) conquest. The first process allows for certain actions to be justified, for example wars, enslavement, assassinations or any form of degradation, because that which is strange and monstrous holds a non-human quality and for this reason the rules of humanity are applied in a negative sense, i.e. the formation of the rules of non-humanity. These rules of non-humanity initiated the pathway from the first day that Christopher Columbus saw the Aboriginal groups and wrote that the Aboriginal groups he first encountered said other evil Aboriginal peoples who ate human flesh were attacking them. The cannibal Aboriginal person, i.e. the Caribes in the first years of colonisation, was the discursive means for a conceptualisation that would aid domination in colonisation.

The second process is the narrative frame of capturing and enslavement. Slavery and its links with blackness, which is the next important notion in the process of colonisation, are discussed further in the next chapter. Slavery in the 15th century became one of the most important representations of wealth since the discovery of gold. However, to understand that which is strange is in a sense to capture it. The Colonial West proved that it was not capable of genuinely understanding the civilisations of the Americas, much less their worldview. The historical process of capturing and enslaving from the Caribes and then the Aztecs, and later most other Aboriginal peoples, not only integrated the idea of Aboriginal cultures into the Colonial West understanding but also brought them into the space of Western
culture’s system of inequality, which started in the position of slavery if the Colonial West did not recognise their previous social status. To bring aboriginality into the Western Colonial narrative was to physically capture and enslave. This was the method of bringing aboriginality into the light of Western history, where a position in Western space could be provided. Slavery was not the only status provided in the capturing and enslavement process: titles were provided to caciques or Aboriginal leaders, nobility, and acknowledgements in the colonial endeavour to both Aboriginal men and women. In the early 16th century, it was institutionalised that Spanish and other Europeans should marry Aboriginal peoples, for example Hernan Cortes demanded that all colonisers in Mexico marry Aboriginal women, primarily to conquer using the mestizaje or mixed races (Alegría, 1990). The capturing process was manifested more explicitly in slavery, but it was not limited to this social status.

The third process is similarity, which is closely related to capturing yet it refers to similarity in the anthropocentric sense. In this process, the interpretation of similar representations to the signs and symbols of the Colonial West is read in the narrative that man is the centre of the universe. This process was enabled by the assumption that the Colonial West was the centre of the universe and the similarities were positioned from that framework. That is, the interpretation was from the assumed Western culture’s vantage point where everything serves a purpose in an anthropocentric universe, primarily because God created the world and men were created in God’s image. Therefore, God’s main creatures must have a central role in the universe. Yet, everything outside the centrality of God is positioned in the space commanded by the Devil. This negative space maintains the centrality of God and of men because the position of the Devil and that which is monstrous is in reference to this centrality. The “discovery of men” that colonisation inspired refers to the
discovery of the potential extension of the anthropocentric interpretations of a new and vast space, and for it to be captured. This means that the frameset of Western culture, which interpreted everything only in their terms, was extended to its fullest at the time of the colonisation of the Americas. As years went on, this anthropocentric similarity system formed a *logos* or an anthropology, because the readily available known references of the Colonial West were not sufficient. An extended language of anthropocentrism had to be created in order to make sense of the overwhelming diversity that the colonisers were encountering in the Americas. The process of anthropocentrism was the underlying position in which anthropology could emerge to conceptualise aboriginality.

The fourth process is the process of conquest, which is derived from the former three processes of the conceptualisation of aboriginality and the engine of colonisation. It is the core of monstrous anthropology, because it is the force that makes interpretation possible and skews it to monstrosity when domination is required. The process of conquest is the seed of colonisation and what makes this conceptualisation its instrument as the Colonial history solidified it. The history of colonisation finds its significant impact in the conquest of the American mainland at least 30 years after the first arrival of the colonisers, starting with the invasion of Mexico (Alegría, 1990; Sued-Badillo, 2008). However, the historical threshold in which the conceptualisation of aboriginality was formed started where the colonisers first arrived, in the Caribbean (mainly what is currently known as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico) from c. 1492 to 1525. The former three processes preceded later endeavours of conquest that confirmed and folded the conceptualisation of aboriginality. That is, the explicit invasion of the American mainland from 1521 with the “pacification of Mexico” (see following *Chapter IV*
Blackness for more details) added to the process of conquest, which sealed the first conceptualisation of aboriginality. Therefore, the processes of tragedy-capture-anthropocentrism-conquest form the first conceptualisation of monstrous anthropology.
Chapter IV

Blackness

This chapter provides a short description of the often unexplored history of Western blackness that built this conceptualising tool. The conceptualisation of Western aboriginality defined by monstrous anthropology and institutionalised by royal decree through slavery has a common thread with the conceptualisation of Western blackness. Both conceptualisations spiral in the current of the history of colonisation, cross over each other at times, find themselves moving side-by-side, and, at one point in the history of colonisation, they converged into a created (infinite) multiplicity provided, no longer by royal decree, but by the sophisticated grids of modern anthropology. The historical threshold of the interchangeability of blackness and slavery predicates the complicity of Western blackness and colonisation. This threshold is defined by the history that occurred in the years before slavery in the Americas turned into slavery fuelled by African peoples. In this space, the close relationship of slavery, the conceptualisation of aboriginality, and the conceptualisation of blackness are seen more evidently than in other accounts of the history of the Colonial West. It is argued that the historical proximity of the conceptualisation of blackness and of aboriginality (and its direct relationship with slavery) in the first colonial experience resulted in other colonial contexts such as in Australia having blackness and aboriginality function (and continue to function) interchangeably. This is not to say that this research states or suggests a history of the causes or roots of colonial contexts such as Australia. Such a claim could not be achieved in the scope and in the perspective that this research assumes. The only claim that this research makes is that the conceptualisation of blackness and of aboriginality are the grounds on which the Colonial West, in contexts such as Australia, built the means through which domination occurred.
The second chapter of the history of colonisation in the 15th and 16th centuries focused on the second stage of slavery and how the conceptualisation of blackness was entangled with slavery. The first stage of slavery was the enslavement of Aboriginal peoples in the Americas, which has been widely documented and persuasively argued (Alegría, 1978; Katz, 2003; Mann, 2006; Weber, 2007). The periods of Aboriginal and African slavery are closely linked, but they do not occur in a successive fashion. In chronological terms, both slaveries occur almost simultaneously in the 15th and 16th centuries. Grounded in the history of colonisation and specifically in the conceptualisation of Western aboriginality, the visible processes of slavery are found that function as the fuel for conquest. In these colonial grounds, it is also found that Aboriginal slavery, African slave trade, and Western blackness begin to be conceptualised as these conceptualisations are known today.

In the 16th century, and in the following centuries, it is very difficult to isolate blackness, slavery, and colonisation because they are entangled in a convoluted history that is not a linear narrative. Therefore, it is very tempting to follow the pre-drawn historical direct pathway of Western blackness that the Colonial West provided that flattens its history through equating blackness with slavery, and vice versa. Through providing a broader account of the history of Western blackness, the arbitrary nature of Western blackness will become more palpable and how the currents of the history of colonisation pushed it towards the direction that it took in order to assemble the tool or conceptualisation that functioned as part of the operation of colonisation.

37 By “blackness”, I do not refer the concept utilised to create the Black Identity that emerged in the civil rights movements around the world. In order to avoid confusion, “blackness” must be understood as it is accompanied by “Western” in order to identify this conceptualisation as predominantly constituted by the Colonial West.
Early colonial history interacted with Western blackness in a porous manner because, different to the conceptualisation of aboriginality, there was a relatively well-formed understanding of blackness and slavery in the 15th and 16th centuries. Slavery carried a non-black history that began its trans-Atlantic link with the Americas through its Aboriginal peoples. In contrast, blackness had no specific classificatory meaning in the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century, as many black peoples (as long as they were Christians) occupied important roles in Western culture and in the colonisation of the Americas. The example of a short history of one man (Juan Garrido) provides an account of blackness inside the Colonial West and as active participant in colonisation. After the second half of the 16th century, a formal slave trade was imposed in the Americas, which resulted in the African slave trade that lasted for more than 300 years. In the context of the slave trade, Western aboriginality, slavery, and blackness assembled the discursive tool or the colonial conceptualisation of blackness.

**Blackness and Slavery: Parallel Pathways**

This part of the research maps at least two pathways that blackness embarked on in the history of colonisation in the 15th and 16th centuries, and that resulted in the discursive formation of the conceptualisation of blackness. It is the intention of this work to avoid the history of Western blackness once it has transformed into the multiplicity of modern anthropology, i.e. into the social Darwinism predicated by the solidification of the different conceptualisations of races. As in *Chapter III Monstrous Anthropology*, this research stops in the modern anthropology period that was manifested in De Gobineau’s (1852) *The Inequality of Human Races* in which blackness has a central role in the hierarchy of races, being at the bottom of the hierarchy. In the Americas, the history of Western blackness is often told from the
perspective of modern anthropology in a progressive manner where the abolition of slavery is the climax of the narrative. This history is dominated by the United States account of Western blackness (Ocasio, 2011; Sued-Badillo, 2008). However, in this research, it is presented in an unexplored pathway to Western blackness, which starts long before the history of blackness that is told by the Colonial West (usually in the United States) when skin colour was not interchangeable with slavery.

On May 29, 1453, Constantinople, the last Greek and Roman bastion of the Christian West, fell into the hands of the Muslim Ottoman Empire (Alegría, 1990); it was known as the Basileuousa Polis or “the Queen of Cities” (Hochschild, 1998). Constantinople was strategically located between the “Golden Horn” and the Marmara Sea and it was the crossroads for Western commerce between Asia, Europe, and Africa. Europe did not have gold mines; therefore, when Constantinople fell, a shortage of the precious metal was quickly reported (Hochschild, 1998). Gold was the principal currency material; however, other products were used for exchange such as spices, silver, and other objects (Alegría, 1990). Almost intuitively anticipating this crisis in the 1440s, the Prince of Portugal, Enrique “El navegante”, initiated expeditions to find alternative routes to Africa (Alegria, 1990; Saco, 1879). When Constantinople fell, Portugal had already established political relationships with some African kingdoms. Towards the end of the 15th century, Portugal dominated most routes to Africa and, by extension, most commercial relationships between Europe and Africa. Europe exchanged firearms, gunpowder, horses, textiles, and other European products for African spices, gold, ivory, and slaves (Saco, 1879). Soon, all other European kingdoms had to recognise Portugal’s monopoly in order to participate in the trade for fair prices. The first kingdom to recognise Portugal’s monopoly was Spain in 1479, primarily due to the alliance that they had across...
lineages that lasted until 1580 (Saco, 1879). As the commercial trade grew, the only trade ports were the Port of Lisbon and the Port of Seville (Mann, 2006). Alvise Cadamoso, who was a Venetian trader, mentioned in his trade records what they exchanged: “…intercambiábamos buques caragados de paños, tela, trigos en abundancia y otros efectos por oro y negros.” (Mann, 2006, p. 171)\(^\text{38}\)

Slaves appeared to be a luxurious enterprise that was comparable to gold. In this context, slavery was not widely present and industries in Europe were not dependant on slave work like what would occur in the Americas for a brief period in the mining industry and later in the sugar cane industry from the late 16\(^\text{th}\) century onwards (Saco, 1879).

A black-skinned person was not something unseen in Europe, especially in Spain. In the 8\(^\text{th}\) century, Muslims from the north of Africa invaded most of the Kingdom of Spain. From the 13\(^\text{th}\) to the 15\(^\text{th}\) centuries, large segments of the population of Lisbon, Seville, and other cities were black (Alegría, 1990). This can be seen not only in the different records of trade, contracts, decrees, and other legal documents, but also in the emerging literature of the time; for example, in the Golden Age of Spanish literature during the 15\(^\text{th}\) and 16\(^\text{th}\) centuries, many characters in novels were described as black. Authors including Miguel de Cervantes in his works *El coloquio de los perros* and *El celoso extremeño*, and Lope de Vega in his *La Dorotea* and *Servir a señor discreto*, among others, described the black presence in everyday society (Alegría, 1990).

In Africa, Portugal established close bonds that guaranteed the monopoly of the commercial routes. In 1489, the Kingdom of Portugal established a very close relationship with the Kingdom of Congo, particularly with their ruler Nzinga Mbemba.

\(^{38}\) …boats full of fabrics, textiles, wheat in abundance, and other products for gold and blacks.
(Saco, 1879). In order to honour this friendship and to be accepted in the eyes of the Western kingdoms (particularly in the eyes of the Vatican), Nzinga Mbenba converted to Christianity in 1490 (Hochschild, 1998). He was given the Christian name Alfonso I. After this, he became the first king to bring Christianity to Africa. Soon, Nzinga had created a full Catholic infrastructure that responded to the Vatican in Rome. After the Kingdom of Congo was recognised as a Catholic kingdom by Pope Alexander VII (Rodrigo Borgia, a former bishop from Spain), Nzinga sent bishops from Congo to the Vatican; they would serve as representatives of the Kingdom of Congo. This was achieved as a result of the influence of Portugal over Spain, which is where the Pope was from at that time (and who was one of the most controversial Popes in the history of the Vatican), and of the Borgia family being one of the most influential families of Europe (Rolfe, 2010).

In this context, it was not rare to find black-skinned men arriving in the Americas in 1492-1493 that were not slaves. Sued-Badillo (2008) and Alegría (1990) identified at least 12 black-skinned men arriving towards the end of the 15th century out of the 90 sailors in three boats that arrived at the Caribbean in three boats: La Niña, La Pinta, and La Santa María (Sued-Badillo, 2003). They argued that there could be more black-skinned men given that it was not necessary to record the sailors skin colour as black. (However, this is how historians were able to identify some.) To identify black-skinned figures in history is a contemporary preoccupation. In the records of the 15th and 16th centuries, the term “black skin” was usually found as a descriptor next to the name or in the identification details that might distinguish a subject in the same way the descriptors of ‘handless’, buen mozo (handsome), el bello (the beautiful one), judío converso (converted Jew), or de Segovia (from Segovia, a province in Spain) were used to describe people. The jobs of the black men identified
by Sued-Badillo (2008) and Alegría (1990) varied from mining to merchants, from sailors to *conquistadores*, and from soldiers to scribes. The records demonstrate that black-skinned slaves were only introduced towards the end of the 15th century in the Americas, but records also demonstrated that the slaves were not exclusively black. Some records included slaves from other skin colours such as *pardos* (a form of brown). However, there were no records of white-skinned slaves introduced into the Americas (Sued-Badillo, 2008).

When the Colonial West arrived in the Americas, neither black skin nor a specific skin colour determined slavery. This is not to suggest that in the 15th and 16th centuries there was no inequality – it was a period distinguished by inequality – however, institutions39 such as the Church determined the inequality. For example, inequality was fiercely practiced on non-Christian peoples, recently converted Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Vikings, among other groups (Rolfe, 2010). In 1492, the Kingdom of Spain issued an edict that all Jews should be driven out of the kingdom and their territories (Rolfe, 2010); Christopher Columbus narrated that this happened “in the same month I was to undertake my expedition to the Indies” (July 30, 1492). Similarly, in that same year, 1492, the fall of Granada ended the Muslim domination over the Iberian Peninsula (Alegría, 1990). These non-Christian categories, which constituted their relationships with the main institutions of Europe (such as the Vatican), determined social statuses, the recognition of kingdoms by the Vatican, and recognition by other important kingdoms. This also sometimes determined the plausibility of invasions and it facilitated allegiances between kingdoms. Imperialism was a “game of thrones” that resulted in a hierarchy of

39 See Chapter III Monstrous Anthropology where *The Inequality of Human Races* is discussed as a book referring to the end of the period where inequality was determined by institutions and the beginning of the period where inequality was determined by race.
kingdoms confirmed by institutions such as the Catholic Church. If this hierarchy was not determined by skin colour during the period in which the first colonial experience occurred, then the formation of the conceptualisation of blackness was predicated by a set of previous historical processes interwoven with the discrete threads outside the modern racial categories and slavery justified by social Darwinism.

Slavery in the 14\textsuperscript{th} and 15\textsuperscript{th} centuries in Europe was primarily domestic and white: slaves were mostly women and the recorded preferences for slaves were the ones describes as “not so rare” (\textit{no tan raras}, in Sued-Badillo, 2008). Slavery in Europe was a luxury; therefore, there was no recorded time in the 14\textsuperscript{th} and 15\textsuperscript{th} centuries where slavery had significant numbers (Saco, 1879). Eastern Europe provided most of the slaves, but slavery was recorded across the periphery of the West (Sued-Badillo, 2008). For example, in the Kingdom of Italy (particularly in Rome), the preference was for Greek slaves even though the Vatican forbade it (Sued-Badillo, 2008). Christopher Columbus’ voyage records\textsuperscript{40} illustrated that when trade with Africa began in the mid-15\textsuperscript{th} century, more black-skinned slaves were introduced. Sued-Badillo (2008) and Alegría (1990) argued that these slaves were usually captured enemies, or the product of African Kingdoms’ internal conflicts and interests. Through slavery, these conflicts found a way to send people out of Africa, and some of those persons were key figures in African politics. Some records recount stories of captured African royalty with claims for important statutes including claims to African thrones (Alegría, 1990) that were sold as slaves for others to make those claims.

In Europe, slaves were used to having a degree of “freedom” in the contexts in which they would work (Alegría, 1978). Domestic slaves were allowed to have their

\textsuperscript{40} These records can be found in the Massachusetts Historical Society archives in the research notes of Alice Bache Gould (1868-1958).
own time after their working hours (Saco, 1879); other slaves would not see their owner for months at a time, and when they met it was just to divide the profits that the slave had made as a product of his or her work. These and other arrangements were characteristic of *ladino* (urban or city) slaves. The *ladino* slaves were the first slaves that arrived in the Americas (Alegria, 1990; Saco, 1879; Sued-Badiillo, 2008). For these slaves, the changes in working conditions were very dramatic when they moved from Europe to the Americas. From living in houses or flats, they had to sleep in the un-Westernised lands of the Americas; lands that were often tropical jungles. From primarily working in domestic or artisanal industries, the *ladinos* had to work in the precarious industries of mining, which involved a lot of heavy lifting and transporting heavy precious metals from the mountain rivers (where gold was found in the first places in the Caribbean) to the improvised ports in the coastlines, and using very rustic tools to find the gold and other precious metals. These severe working situations provided the conditions for the first *ladino*-led slave rebellion in 1514 (the first black slave rebellion in colonial times) in the island of San Juan, today Puerto Rico (Alegria, 1990; Sued-Badiillo, 2008).

**Juan Garrido, the Black Conquistador**

Juan Garrido de color negro vesino desta cibdad paresco ante Vuestra merced e digo que yo tengo nescesidad de hazer una provanca a perpetuad rey memoria de como e servydo a V.M. en la conquista e pasificaci6n desta Nueva España desde que pas6 a ella el Marqués del Valle yen su compañía me halle presentt! a todas las enfradas e conquista e pacificaciones que se an hecho syempre con el dicho Marques todo lo qual e hecho a mi costa syn me dar salaryo ny repartimiento de indios ni otra cosa s)lendo como soy casado e vecino desta cibdad que syempre e ressedido en ella y así mismo fue e pase a
An example of a history of blackness that is in complete opposition to slavery in the context of colonial times in the 15th and 16th centuries in the Americas is the history of the black conquistador Juan Garrido. The Probanza of Juan Garrido of 1538 is the first historical material of a black man in the Americas that includes interviews with witnesses answering questions about Juan Garrido. The story of Juan

41 I, Juan Garrido, black resident of this city, appear before Your Mercy and state that I am in need of making a probanza to the perpetuity of the king, a report on how I served Your Majesty in the conquest and pacification on this New Spain, from the time when the Marqués del Valle entered it; and in his company I was present at all the invasions and conquests and pacifications which were carried out, always with the said Marqués, all of which I did at my own expense without either salary or allotment of aboriginal people or anything else. As I am married and a resident of this city, where I have always lived; and also as I went with the Marqués del Valle to discover the islands which are in that part of the southern sea where there was much hunger and privation; and also as I went to discover and pacify the islands of San Juan de Buriquén de Puerto Rico; and also as I went on the pacification and conquest of the island of Cuba with the adelantado Diego Velazquez; in all these ways for thirty years have I served and continue to serve Your Majesty. For these reasons stated above do I petition Your Mercy. And also because I was the first to have the inspiration to sow wheat here in New Spain and to see if it took; I did this and experimented at my own expense. (Juan Garrido, 1538, Folio I)

42 This is the opening of Juan Garrido’s probanza, which is a document that was used to prove merit that would justify an allotment or a specific grant for money, lands or/and any other form of resources (Alegría, 1990; Gerhard, 1978).
Garrido is isolated from slavery and provides an individual historical account of blackness in the beginnings of the colonisation process that does not only demonstrate the arbitrary relationship between skin colour and inequality, but it also showcases the practice of colonisation in its individual form before the function of colour.

Other examples of black men could be cited, for example the history of Miguel Enriquez who was a rich merchant of the Americas (Lopez-Cantos, 1998). Furthermore, at least nine other black conquistadores have been identified in the 16th century in Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama43. However, Juan Garrido’s story is an illustrative example of blackness not being indistinguishably interchangeable with slavery in the 15th century and most of the 16th century; it is also an illustration of blackness on the other side of subjugation. This opposite of subjugation does not suggest a contradiction that nullifies the merits of any claim regarding the horrors of slavery or a distance from colonised peoples due to this apparent historical divergence. Quite the opposite, it illustrates a nonlinear relationship that positions the history of Juan Garrido all too close to the historical process of slavery, Western (conceptualisations of) blackness, and colonisation.44

What is known of Juan Garrido is predominantly derived from the historical document called “Probanza de Juan Garrido del 27 de septiembre de 1538”45, which is found in the Archives of the Indies. One of the first publications of Juan Garrido’s story was the 1978 article by Peter Gerhard entitled A Black Conquistador in Mexico,

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43 Restall (2001) lists most of the black conquistadores through accessing other sources in Latin America as well as in the Archive of the Indies in Seville. He names Sebastián Toral, Pedro Fulupo, Juan Bardales, Antonio Pérez, Juan Portugüez, Juan García, Miguel Ruiz, Juan Valiente, and Juan Beltrán as black conquistadores.

44 It must be mentioned that scholars are increasingly aware of black roles and their suspicious absence from the historical records, the current increase in the publication of colonisation accounts appears problematic, see for example Matthew Restal’s Maya Conquistador (2001).

45 See Appendix.
and then in 1990 in a book by Ricardo Alegria entitled *Juan Garrido: A black conquistador*. Both publications used the *probanza* from 1538 as their primary historical source. In the *probanza*, Garrido outlines his contributions to the colonisation of the Americas from 1501 to the 1530s, notably the contributions of the colonisation of San Juan, Florida, and Mexico, and also his contribution of being the first person to introduce wheat to the Americas. The *probanza* tells the story through stating ten questions in interview format that are then answered by seven well-respected witnesses. The first question asks if the witness knows Juan Garrido and the next nine questions are asked with the intention to confirm his contributions and to verify the living conditions of Juan Garrido at the time of the *probanza*. Each witness answers every question; if the witness has no knowledge of what is being asked, this is recorded. Each witness is presumably a distinguished person of the time; they include Alonso Escobar, El Bachiller Alonso Pérez, Rodrigo Salbatierra, Alonso Martin de Xerez, Juan Gonzalez de León, and Pedro de Vargas. In the content of the questions, Juan Garrido attempts to demonstrate that he was in the first colonisation process side-by-side with important colonisers including Juan Ponce de León, Diego Velázquez, and Hernan Cortés in the Great War against the Aztec Empire, which occurred inside and around the city of Tenochtitlan.

Juan Garrido was originally from Africa; however, the specific place and kingdom to which he belonged is not clear (Alegria, 1990). It is known that Garrido was converted to Christianity in Lisbon sometime before 1494. The first record of Garrido residing somewhere was in 1494 in Seville (Gerhard, 1978). Sometime between the years 1499 and 1501, Garrido crossed the Atlantic and arrived in the island called La Española (today, Haiti and the Dominican Republic). La Española was the most important island for the colonisers at that time, as Spain’s colonised
territory was primarily concentrated in the main islands of the Caribbean; the mainland of the Americas would not be formerly occupied for another 30 years. Juan Garrido came into contact with Nicolás de Ovando, who was the representative of the Kingdom of Spain in the “Indies” at the time. From 1501 to 1508, there is very little record about what Garrido did in La Española. Historians speculate that, like most colonisers at that time, he organised expeditions to find and mine gold in the rivers located in the heart of most islands of the Caribbean (Sued-Badillo, 2008). In 1508, Juan Ponce de Leon was appointed to officially occupy the island of San Juan, and Juan Garrido was part of the expedition to officially colonise the island. There he helped to “pacify” the island and protect it from the attacks from Aboriginal peoples, many of which were recorded to be attacks from the Caribes. Garrido participated in the defence, construction, and re-construction of different settlements in Puerto Rico. There, Garrido extracted a considerable quantity of gold as well. This is known because it was mandatory to give 20% of the gold found as a tax contribution to the Kingdom of Spain, and his name was on the royal tax records, which suggests that he had a mining group, which was typically composed of some colonisers and some Aboriginal peoples of the island of Puerto Rico.

In 1513, Juan Garrido went with Juan Ponce de Leon and a small expedition to find the “fountain of youth”. The Aboriginal peoples from the island of San Juan and the island of Cuba told a story to Juan Ponce de Leon that to the north of the Caribbean there was a place where the waters would make whoever bathed in them younger. It is unclear whether this story was told by the Aboriginal peoples as a way of interesting the colonisers in other lands so they would leave the Caribbean or whether it was another fictionalisation imagined by Ponce de Leon as a reason to expand the invasion to the north (Alegría, 1990). The small expedition sailed to the
north and did not find the fountain of youth or the land described by the Aboriginal peoples, but they found a vast land they later named *La Florida* (today, the US state of Florida). This was the first time that the Colonial West made contact with North America. Ponce de Leon, Garrido, and the rest of the expedition sailed back to San Juan. Ponce de Leon immediately asked the Kingdom of Spain to fund a large expedition to find this fountain of youth and to colonise the vast land of La Florida. The historical gossip stated that Ponce de Leon knew that the King of Spain recently married a much younger queen and that a fountain of youth would interest the King (Alegría, 1947). However, the story or rationale of the fountain of youth has been widely contested by many historians from very early on. In 1521, Ponce de Leon received the authorisation of the Kingdom of Spain and resources for a large expedition to find the fountain of youth. Garrido helped organise the expedition and went with Ponce de Leon as one of his principal soldiers.

On the way, they stopped in the islands of Guadalupe and Martinique where the *Caribes* lived, or so the records stated, and helped ‘pacify’ the islands in order to facilitate their settlement. These islands were very small, but it was where many ships would stop to replenish their water rations before heading to Europe and also when they arrived in the Americas from Europe. When the expedition arrived in La Florida, they were viciously attacked by the Aboriginal peoples, as if the Aboriginal peoples were expecting them. The expedition could not even leave their ships and go ashore.

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46 From the *cronista* Gonzalo Fernando de Oviedo in 1557.
47 Historians including Cancel (2000) and Sued-Badillo (2003) have persuasively argued that the Aboriginal peoples who where fighting against the Spanish colonisers sailed to these islands to temporarily stay and plan their attacks on the main islands. Cancel (2000) identified the reports of attacks on the main islands, analysed the attack practices of the Aboriginal peoples, and drew parallelisms with the aboriginal civilisations in the main lands. He also identified the Aboriginal peoples that the “*Caribes*” would ‘capture’, most of whom were Aboriginal peoples in slavery conditions.
In the battle, Ponce de Leon was badly injured and the expedition withdrew, failing to colonise the area at this time (Alegría, 1990). Ponce de Leon had sustained a deadly wound and Garrido took him to the island of Cuba, where Ponce de Leon wanted to die. Ponce de Leon died in July of that year and asked Garrido to sell his properties and give the money to his family.

In Cuba, Garrido was informed that Hernan Cortes was about to conquer the great city of Tenochtitlan. Cortes grouped all the Spanish forces he could and also looked for support of Aboriginal groups in the surrounding areas of Tenochtitlan. These Aboriginal peoples had been enemies of the Aztecs for many years, but did not have sufficient strength to fight them (Iglesia, 1942). Cortes promised them that they would take the city and give them their part; however, history proved that this was a lie. Garrido found Cortes in Veracruz in 1521 and quickly became a very important soldier in his ranks. The great battle started in that same year in August and lasted for more than two months. The Spanish side had close to 200,000 soldiers and the Aztecs had 300,000 (Iglesia, 1942). Garrido fought side-by-side with Cortes in many battles; he even participated in the great battle at Montezuma Temple, which was the foundation of the empire of Tenochtitlan (Alegría, 1990). After the great battle at Montezuma Temple, Tenochtitlan fell and the Spanish took Mexico. They re-named it Nueva España (New Spain). In Garrido’s probanza, he asked all witnesses:

4. Yten si saben etc que yo pase a esta nueva España en compañía del Marques del Valle don Hernando Cortes y estuve con el syempre hasta que se conquisto e pacifyco toda la tierra e me halle y estuve presente en la conquista de T ascala hasta tanto que se dieron de paz.

5. Yten si saben que despuesde pacificada la provincia de Tascala el dicho marques se vino a esta cibdad de Mexico y estando en ella los naturales de la
tierra heraron della al dicho Marques y españoles que con el estavan y le mataron mucha gentes.  

El Bachiller Alonso Perez answered:

A la quarta pregunta dixo este testigo que estando sobre esta en ... [roto]... el marques del Valle en la calzada de Acachinango como el dicho Juan Garrido de color negro andava syrbien en lo que le mandava velando e yendo a los lugares... [roto]... mandavan como lo otros conquistadores lo hazian e que esto vida este testigo y siempre lo tubo por conquistador al dicho Juan ... Juan Garrido fue desta ciudad con el marques del Valle a las yslas que descubrio e bolvio perdido a esta cibdad e que esto sabe.  

When the Colonial West colonised Mexico, it was expected that those who participated in this war were to be rewarded (Iglesia, 1942). However, new colonisers continued to arrive from Europe to participate in the invasion and the pilfering of the resources of the Americas. The first colonisers felt that they were entitled more recognition and lands than the new colonisers that arrived after the first wars against the Aboriginal peoples. Therefore, the Kingdom of Spain acknowledged the first colonisers through creating the title of conquistador that held a higher position in the

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48 4. And do you know that I arrived to this Nueva España side-by-side with the Marques del Valle don Hernando Cortes and I was with him until it was conquered and until everywhere was pacified, and I was present in the conquest of Tascala (Tenochtitlan) until peace was pronounced?  
5. And do you know that after the province of Tascala was pacified, I came with the aforementioned Marques to the city of Mexico with all the other Spanish soldiers that were with him in that battle where many others died? (Garrido, 1538, Folio 3)  
49 To the fourth question, this witness said that being on the (broken)... the Marques del Valle (Hernan Cortes) in the top of Acachinango like Juan Garrido of black colour said was serving through being ordered to fight and go to places (broken)... and he was sent like all the other conquistadores and this witness always regarded the aforementioned Juan Garrido as a conquistador... Juan Garrido was always distinguished along side with the Marques del Valle and because all the islands he helped discovered which is known by us all. (Perez in Garrido, 1538, Folio 8)
lands of the Americas (Alegría, 1947). Alonso Perez speaks to this recognition and testifies how Juan Garrido was recognised in the Americas with the title of *conquistador* giving evidence of the lands that Garrido held in Mexico City next to Hernan Cortes’ lands.

The last story that Garrido was known for in Mexico was that he was the first person to introduce wheat to the Americas. In the colonisation of the lands of the Americas, the Colonial West wanted to introduce the farming products that were the basis of the European diets, particularly products from Spain. Plants and animals were introduced in the Americas in order to test the fertility of the lands. The first grounds that were tested were those in the islands of the Caribbean; however, due to the tropical nature of these islands, the attempts to grow wheat were futile. Wheat was very important for the Colonial West given that it was the basis for products such as bread and flour, and it was used as a means of exchange. By the beginning of the 16th century, the colonisers had attempted to grow wheat numerous times, but they were unsuccessful. One day, Juan Garrido opened a bag of rice and he found three wheat seeds. He planted them in his lands in Coyoacan, Mexico City, and they grew successfully. It is recorded in the official history of Mexico that Juan Garrido was the first person to grow wheat in the Americas, and it is depicted in some historic representations including the murals of Diego Rivera in the *Palacio Nacional* in Mexico City.

This is highlighted in the beginning of the *probanza* as a personal achievement. The intention of the *probanza* in 1538 was to demonstrate to the Kingdom of Spain through respected witnesses that Garrido was a well-respected

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50 The title of *conquistador* included rights to lands of their choosing, as well as specific monetary and slave entitlements. This practice started after the great battle of Tenochtitlan and it was abolished in 1541 (Iglesia, 1947).
conquistador so he could request the entitlements that he deserved as a conquistador. Although he already had lands in Mexico City, he reported that he and his family “were in need” *(padece necesidad)*. The text suggests that he was not given a pension or monetary entitlements that he deserved, and it is explicitly stated that he was not given Aboriginal peoples (*indios*), which meant that he was not given slaves.

**Slavery**

The first period of slavery was the enslavement of the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas. It was almost unthinkable in the 15th century and in the first years of the 16th century to start a slave trade, as it was understood then, to the Americas (de Armas indicated that some proposed a slave trade from the Americas) primarily because slaves were so expensive. To enslave the Aboriginal peoples was as profitable as the gold that the Colonial West avidly wanted to extract not only because slavery provided the labour in this industry (and others), but also because slaves were as valuable as other highly regarded merchandise that were used as currency. Slavery had an intrinsic value in itself: due to the importance of labour, slaves were considered valuable assets. Furthermore, as mentioned above, slavery held the symbolic value of luxury. The great quantity of gold, silver, lands, potential slaves, and other goods valued by the Colonial West legitimised the representation of abundance of the Americas. The Colonial West wanted Aboriginal slavery to continue; in this context, de Armas’ argument of the invention of the cannibal *Caribes* as a means to justify the enslavement of Aboriginal peoples appears even more plausible. The first prohibition from the Kingdom of Spain (in 1493) of the enslavement of Aboriginal peoples was an obstacle to further capitalising what the Colonial West regarded as valuable ‘resources’. For almost 100 years, the Colonial

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51 It should be noted that when the Colonial West arrived in the Americas, they thought they had arrived in the Indies.
West benefited from the luxury of the slave labour of Aboriginal peoples, yet the representation of wealth that slavery brought with colonisation was not something that would only be enjoyed by colonisers in the Americas; the formal African slave trade would capitalise on the pre-existing understanding of slavery and it would transform into one of the most profitable industries in the history of Western culture.

In 1518–1523, Carlos V authorised the first license to sell a large amount of slaves from Africa to the Americas (Saco, 1879). The license was given to the Dutch Duke Lorenzo de Goredot (Sued-Badillo, 2003) for 4000 slaves. Then, this license was distributed to other traffickers in the Americas, mainly to the principal colonies in the Caribbean. For example, 1200 African slaves were sent to the island of San Juan (Alegria, 1990)\textsuperscript{52}. Many of the main conquistadores protested the introduction of this new market of slaves because they were forced to buy these very expensive slaves. In practice, the Kingdom of Spain was regulating slavery in the Americas and institutionalising African slavery. Therefore, black slavery was forced upon the colonisers and they were expected to pay the full value of slaves, between 100 pesos and 500 pesos\textsuperscript{53} per slave (Inikori, 1976). This market regulation and institutionalisation would benefit the interests of the Colonial West in Europe given that it created a means to attain more profit than the gold and other goods that the colonisers were supposed to send back to Europe. Some resistances to the Colonial West in the Americas that are mentioned by historians such as Sued-Badillo (2003) include hiding the Aboriginal peoples and stating to the authorities that they had died of disease or that they had escaped to other islands or other unexplored places in the

\textsuperscript{52} This is consistent with the later proportions that positioned the Caribbean second in the Atlantic slave trade (35%). The largest proportion went to Brazil with 40% (see National Center for History Report on \textit{Atlantic Slave Trade} of 2000).

\textsuperscript{53} One peso was usually made of gold or silver, and each peso was equivalent to 8 or 9 reales. It is demonstrated later that it is very difficult to give a present day account of the value of a peso during that time.
The introduction of African slavery occurred slowly but steadily in the Americas. There is relative consensus in the historian community that close to 13 million African slaves were enslaved in the Americas (Ianni, 1976; King, 1943; Mintz, 1981). As listed in Figure 6, from 1526 to 1575, more than 110,000 African slaves were trafficked and most were sent to the Americas (Ianni, 1976). It can also be seen that, in 1576, the African slave trade suddenly tripled in number compared with the figures in the previous years. From the end of the 16th century until almost the end of the 18th century, slave trade continued to consistently increase. Very few industries in Western capitalist history have registered an almost consistent incremental (at times exponential) growth for almost 300 years.
In 2002, Jean-Pierre Tardieu expanded on the idea proposed by Sidney Mintz (1981) that theorised that slavery became the model of profit and production that significantly influenced capitalism. Tardieu (2002) stated: “a black slave was worth because of his capacity to produce… early on slavery was constituted as a commodity” (p. 57). From the mid-16th century, the slaves in the Americas were used as collateral, were listed in the wills to be inherited, and could be used to buy most things (Tardieu, 2002). Monetary amounts in today’s currencies cannot determine the value of slaves in the 16th century because it is difficult to calculate and define one currency that has a universal value. That is, many forms of exchange currencies were valid: land, timber, spices, meats, jewellery, weapons, gold, silver in its natural form, and certain quantities of food like flour are some examples of objects that were used as means of exchange (Iani, 1976). The history of the symbolic use of the exchange value of certain currencies remains in flux. Although the material conditions of the Americas were regarded as abundant, it was a crude abundance where at times the Colonial West lacked the basic means of exchange, such as formal currencies (Mintz, 1981). Therefore, any merchandise that was regarded as valuable could be used as means of exchange, including slaves.

The value of one slave fluctuated according to their inherent physical and personal characteristics (what would be understood today as personality traits), where they were from (ladinos, directly from a specific Kingdom of Africa, or born in America), age, physical capacities, gender, and previous work experiences (Tardieu, 2002). However, there is some agreement that the price fluctuated between 200 and 500 pesos in the 16th century (after which the price increased further), which was a very high price. Sometimes, if the slave was a ladino with “good manners”, male, in a
productive age, and strong, the price could reach close to 700 pesos (Sempat-Assadouruan, 1969). In Mintz (1981), some records of prices are stated as follows:

March 7, 1597, in Cordoba de Tucuman (today Argentina) 6 Angolan slaves were sold for the total of 1125 and ½. 24 of July of 1598, Gasparde Quevedo bought in the name of the Attorney General of Santiago de Chile, 2 slaves with a golden chain which worth was estimated to be 450 pesos… (p. 111).

The record goes on detailing the slave trade of that wealthy trafficker and illustrating the volatility of the prices of slavery and the different means of currency exchange. It appears that the symbolic use of currencies was mixed with the symbolic meanings of what is exchanged. In the process of selling the representation of the wealthy merchant, the gold, pesos, and other currencies, and the exchange of such amounts of money and blackness appeared to blend into a mix in which wealth and blackness could be regarded as interchangeable. In this context, \textit{blackness}, which was represented by African slaves at the time, could mean wealth as much as gold, silver, pesos, and other goods would represent value.

Currencies and the different means of exchange used in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century were being redefined in every region in this “New World” that the Colonial West had named the Americas. The idea that the chaotic process of redefinition of use value, currencies, and means of exchange in the first colonial experience, and then it becoming an incubator of capitalism as we know it today, is not a new one (Mignolo, 1996). At least Quijano (2000), Mignolo (1996), Dussel (1993), Grosfoguel (2012), and Castro-Gómez (1996), who are the significant coloniality-decoloniality theorists, have explicitly stated that capitalism and Western civilisation were historically
formed through the process of colonisation that began in the Americas\textsuperscript{54}. However, this raises the question of which industry or industries in the colonial context enabled the mechanisms of capitalism to begin. Slavery and the African slave trade not only provided the productive force or labour to bestow the wealth for Europe to determine that its Western culture was the dominating culture, slavery and African slavery showcased one of the model industries for capitalism, as illustrated above with the figures of the African slave trade. The powerful presence of African slavery in the Americas had an impact on the way that the conceptualisation of blackness was formed. If the African slave trade was influential in the constitution of wealth, to the extent it represented wealth, it could therefore be argued that the symbolic value of wealth and its closeness with slavery, and thus its interchangeability with blackness, could have a function close to the core of the means of exchange and pure value. In the sense that gold arbitrarily has a pure value, as a result of a particular history that determined that it was a precious metal, blackness had a role in the constitution of the history of pure value closely related to the history of profit, the added value product of labour, and the representation of wealth, because African slaves were historically used as means of exchange. That is, the history of African slavery was constituted by the ‘golden blackness’ of the Colonial West through becoming a representation of more than use value (labour) to a representation of pure value.

I must disclose that it is morally wrong to put a value on human beings, even if that value determined today is about the past. Furthermore, I must affirm that slavery in all its forms and in all periods in the history of humanity is genocide. The most horrible genocide in the history of humanity is the trafficking of slaves from the 15\textsuperscript{th} century to the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. However, when navigating through the dark corners

\textsuperscript{54} See Chapter 1 Archaeology of Colonisation for an elaborate account of what they proposed.
of the history of the Colonial West, that is ultimately part of the history of humanity, it is necessary to continually re-present, visibilise, and illustrate all the dimensions of this barbarism.  

Los mulatos de Esmeraldas: Processes that constitute the conceptualisation of blackness

At the end of the 16th century, in 1599, Adrián Sánchez Galque painted the first recorded painting in the Americas entitled Los Mulatos de Esmeralda in Quito (Saco, 1879). It is not a coincidence that this was the first formal representation of the Americas and that it can be understood as an illustration of the first tools of colonisation, Western aboriginality, and blackness. This painting will be used to illustrate the processes that constituted the conceptualisation of blackness, considering

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55 I felt compelled to include this part in the text because I do not want my argument to be misunderstood: I am not arguing that peoples had or have determined prices. This chapter was particularly difficult for me to write given that I am also a descendant of African slaves.
its overlap with the processes that constituted the conceptualisation of aboriginality. The Western conceptualisation of blackness has a historical overlap with the conceptualisation with aboriginality due to the link with slavery: Aboriginal peoples were subjected to slavery in the Americas and the African slave trade would replace this. Therefore, considering the processes that constituted the conceptualisation of aboriginality, i.e. tragedy-capture-anthropocentrism-conquest, the conceptualisation of blackness is built in conversation with these processes in order to assemble the set of processes of colouring, cultural practice, social status, and value. *Los mulatos de Esmeralda* (1599) showcases one of the main products of colonisation: the discursive tools or conceptualisation of colonisation for the subjects it spoke of.

The conceptualisation of aboriginality, which is defined using monstrous anthropology, was assembled through a set of historical moments for which Aboriginal peoples were subjected to colonisation. That is, the conceptualisation of aboriginality in colonisation was built in the historical instances in which the colonisers spoke of aboriginality in order to dominate or colonise. As elaborated in the previous chapter, the processes that constitute this conceptualisation are tragedy or horror, which provided a narrative formation within the frame of the cannibal monstrosity form that took in the Americas; capture, which provided a subjugation narrative formation within the frame of forced labour and slavery towards Aboriginal peoples; anthropocentrism, which provided a stance formation within the narrative that Aboriginal peoples (cannibals and non-cannibals) would be understood from a Western framework only and not from a inferiority-superiority social Darwinist hierarchy; and conquest, in which rather than only extract all that was possible to make the Kingdom of Spain or Portugal more powerful, it enabled a narrative of occupation of the territories of the lands and the subjects that ignited the movement of
the colonisation. The discursive tool of the conceptualisation of blackness must be understood in the context of the assemblage of this tool of colonisation, and it must also be understood as a specific tool for the purposes of colonisation. *Los mulatos de Esmeraldas* uses the processes that constitute aboriginality, but it showcases more explicitly the processes that constitute blackness; therefore, it is used here to illustrate the processes that constitute the conceptualisation of blackness.

This oil painting represents the three *caciques* or leaders of Esmeraldas (today, Ecuador) that are descendants from African and Aboriginal peoples in the Americas. They were called *mulatos* or Zambos. Their power in that area (and in other places in the Americas such as La Española) was such that these *caciques* claimed that they represented over 100,000 people in that region (Saco, 1879). They declared the area to be *The Republic of Zambos*. The painting was an offering to the Kingdom of Spain that was sent alongside a report of the “pacification” of the area (Descalzi, 1996). *Los mulatos de Esmeraldas* is illustrative because it depicts, at least, four denotative elements that are very visible: colour, cultural practices, value, and social status.

Firstly, the painting presents the advent of colour becoming more than just the descriptor to, at times (alongside the name), identify people, but it demonstrated to the Kingdom of Spain who dominated the area and it verified their alliance. Skin colour, in reference to blackness, until the end of the 16th century would hold a descriptive quality and would not determine social statutes. Juan Garrido is the perfect example of how skin colour operated on the opposite side of colonisation, having an active role in the first colonial experience. The historical documents that speak of Juan Garrido provide evidence of his role in the colonisation process and no other narrative is deployed. However, black skin in this painting is deployed to confirm that The Republic of Zambos ruled Ecuador in 1599. *Cimarrones* were Aboriginal and African
slaves that escaped their slavery, and the offspring of peoples subjected to slavery, i.e. 
nmulatos, are in charge of a colonised land. The conceptualisation process through 
similarities within the process of anthropocentrism was no longer relevant, but the 
process of contrasting colour became the position of the framework of the narrative 
process. Colouring appears to begin the highlighting and contrasting\textsuperscript{57} processes. The 
process of contrasts defines the relevance of colour. When colouring, even if it is a 
piece of paper that is all one colour, it is visible only by its contrast. The piece of 
paper is regarded as though it was coloured due to the contrast of the former colour of 
the paper and the new colour. Furthermore, paintings are defined by the contrasting of 
colours, the limits of painted objects, and their colours; they can suggest texture, 
depth, and perspective. Colouring as a process of conceptualisation that implies a set 
of pre-existing colours that functions to refer to each other. \textit{Los mulatos de Esmeralda} 
presents blackness to communicate whom rules over this territory; it would not have 
been necessary to send a painting to communicate that a coloniser rules a given 
territory in the Americas in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century.

Cultural practices are illustrated symbolically with golden adjournments, 
weapons, clothing, and gestures of grace, which indicate a representation of cultural 
difference from the Colonial West. By the end of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, more than 150,000 
African peoples were brought to the Americas, mainly from the Yoruba peoples 
(where Nigeria is today) \cite{Sued-Badillo,2008}. As illustrated above, an exponential 
increase of the African slave trade was imposed on the Americas, primarily focusing 
on the Caribbean and Brazil. By 1599, a more elaborate conceptualisation of 
Aboriginal civilisations was achieved. Languages, rituals, weapons, appearances, and

\textsuperscript{57} Note that the word \textit{contrast} is used and not \textit{differentiation}. Differentiation is too 
open to describe this process given that there is a clear frame of reference that refers 

\textit{to a clear juxtaposition between one thing and the other.}
other elements were identified as “Aboriginal” or as “African” (or as *mulato*). The representation of the three *caciques* demonstrates that the conceptualisation of Western blackness and Western aboriginality was closed in the process of colonisation. The painting presents the contrast of a canvas of a group of Aboriginal and African *cimarron* men coloured by the cultural practices of the Colonial West. It communicates that the three *caciques* are Aboriginal men, from the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality, through illustrating their adornments and their bodies but also through illustrating the difference of Western aboriginality by wearing gold, Spanish clothing, polished spears with metal heads, and gesturing using Western gestures of ‘grace’, which indicates a performance of leadership as conceptualised at the time, which was very closely related to nobility. The highlighted contrasts between Western aboriginality and the Colonial West became relevant and made irrelevant the previous Western anthropocentrism attributions. The colonised would no longer be understood in Eurocentric or anthropocentric terms, but in contrasting terms that were visibly differentiated through cultural practice.

In this painting, value is presented most notably in the depiction of the type of clothing, in gold, and in other expensive objects such as the spears of each of the subjects. The colours of black, yellow (gold), white, and brown were used to indicate a spectrum of hierarchy that is illustrated in this painting; this hierarchy was defined through what is considered valuable in the Colonial West. The painting presents very bright and golden Aboriginal adornments that demonstrate wealth but also tradition that distinguished the Aboriginal peoples in the area of Ecuador. This colouring of value, with the very visible gold signifier, branded the conceptualisation of Western aboriginality and Western blackness as valuable. Adornments, indicating tradition, and the facial skin of the three men denote a positive relationship between pure value
and Western blackness and aboriginality. In the conceptualisation of aboriginality, slavery was signified as a luxury, and later in the imposition of the African slave trade, it became a means of exchange due to its value. If yellow (gold) represented pure value, it could be argued that at one point, black represented more than the use-value of labour of slavery: blackness also signified pure value. Colour and cultural practice in this painting – and the painting itself – operate in a process hinged in difference, but that is signified as a valuable resource and as a commodity.

Lastly, the titles of Don were given to the caciques and this highlighted their social status as non-slaves (Saco, 1879), and this needed to be illustrated in order to distinguish them from the African slaves. The visibility of blackness in the painting communicates that they were leaders with noble titles through communicating that it needed to demonstrate that they were not slaves. The title of Don was a feudal title given in the context of Spain that differentiated the Dons from the rest of the population, as all titles did in medieval times. This illustration of nobility denotatively communicates the granting of these titles, and it also shows the colouring process using these cultural devices and how it was processed through proposing a Colonial West social status device. This social status device was closer to a hierarchal system and moved away from a system of differentiation using titles. The social status device here was used to propose merit and acknowledgement of the power that they held in the area, and suggested a possible ‘promotion’, even to the mulatos from Aboriginal and African backgrounds. This colouring referred to the hierarchies that one group of peoples, with the primary colours of Western aboriginality and Western blackness. The way that the painting ‘presents’ the three mulato men, one depicted from one side, the other depicted the opposite side, and the man in the centre suggests an invitation to the viewer to inspect the subjects to confirm their social status. To colour
them using the colours of social status creates a spectrum of hierarchy in which its highest position is depicted before the eye of the Colonial West.

Juan Garrido received the title of *conquistador* as a result of his protagonist role in the first years of colonisation. The precondition for this title was to be a Christian, for which he was converted many years prior. That is, Garrido would be judged because he was not Christian born. Therefore, inequality was predicated through simply being converted to a religion. This is a similar discursive formation or process as capture, where it allowed for a dichotomous system for which the subject it spoke of would be Christian or not, and, if not, they could be enslaved. The conceptualisation of aboriginality had a capturing process for which it operated through framing a subject in a specific way in order that it could be captured, dominated, and (at times) enslaved. The social status process allows for a more complex form of capturing for which a given spectrum of inequality was assembled, in which the historical foundation includes slavery. Here, the interchangeability of Western blackness and slavery embedded in the foundation of the social status spectrum and linked with colour and cultural practice as difference and value as a process that highlights the historical involvement with wealth. In *Los mulatos de Esmeralda*, the social status granted to the *caciques* was referred to the reference to slavery, which indicates the end possible point of the social status spectrum.

After 100 years of exposure, of writing (diaries and books of “General Histories”), and of knowledge-making that aimed to capture Aboriginal cultures in the Americas in an understandable frame of analysis, and of over 150,000 African slaves sent to mostly to the Caribbean and South America by the end of the 16th century (Ianni, 1976), the Colonial West elaborated a language to aid the identification of the subject it spoke of: the language of cultural practice constituted by a necessary set of
symbols to identify aboriginality and blackness. The symbols of cultural practice are only relevant to non-Colonial Western peoples, as colonisers did not need to identify themselves as such. Lastly, these cultural practices, symbols, and colour, within the spectrum of social status that begins with an underlying position of slavery, are mediated by a process of value that includes not only use-value but also pure value. The conceptualisation of Western blackness moves further away from the anthropocentric stance of the conceptualisation of aboriginality, and this allows difference from the Colonial Western peoples and positions the ‘other’ in the space of commodities or resources. Slavery, before the African slave trade, represented wealth; therefore, this wealth denotation was transferred to blackness. The success of the industry of the African slave trade exacerbated the representation of wealth, primarily as a result of the high cost of slaves. At the same time, African slaves were used as commodities to be exchanged, inherited, and appraised. In the painting, the ‘coloured’ *mulatos* were well represented in Western blackness, but also represented as peoples of social status, as *Dons*. Here, Western blackness was being conceptualised as resources or assets of the Kingdom of Spain because an agreement was reached with them, and they accepted the titles and recognition of Spain to become a republic (Descalzi, 1996) in the Colonial West’s terms.

In the end, Oviedo was correct in writing in 1533 that “all this is better seen than written” (Fol. 91), when witnessing and representing the colonisation of the Americas in *Los Mulatos de Esmeralda* (1599). This painting illustrates the first blueprint of the tools of colonisation, fully drawn, coloured, and assembled. The Western conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness are the tools found in the painting, which also functions as a historical map of the processes that constituted these conceptualisations; the conceptualisations here are solidified and are ready to be
used for the purposes of colonisation. Notably, *Los Mulatos de Esmeralda* less implicitly depicts the processes that constitute the conceptualisation of Western blackness: colouring-cultural practice-social status-value. From a history of Western blackness, which is at times in opposition to slavery, as demonstrated with the example of Juan Garrido, colour began to become a relevant process to determine specific social positions. The subjects painted here served the function of demonstrating to the Kingdom of Spain that the freed *mulatos* slaves ruled what is today known as Ecuador. This is one of the first times that skin colour became relevant to social position, given that blackness and slavery were rapidly becoming interchangeable.

The conceptualisation of Western blackness carries the debt of the conceptualisation of aboriginality, linked through slavery and through the historicity of the first colonial experience in the 15th and 16th centuries. Rather than only mapping these conceptualisations using the clues from writings in diaries, chronicles, or history books, the conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness can be revealed through drawings and paintings. The conceptualisation of Western blackness finds its initial discursive solidification in the first painting of the Americas in 1599, *Los mulatos de Esmeralda*, displaying the links with the conceptualisation of aboriginality. These two discursive tools are the first instruments forged in the history of colonisation to be used to speak of peoples that were not from the Colonial West, well before social Darwinism predicated by a hierarchy of races in the dichotomous categorisation inferiority-superiority. This simplistic view of a hierarchy of races does not consider the founding experience of colonisation in the 15th and 16th centuries, where a hierarchy of races does not make sense, and it must have had a significant influence in
the forthcoming colonial experiences because its history created the tools used for domination.
Part 3: Command
Part 3: Command (1881-1939)

In Part 2: Origins (1492-1538), this archaeology unearthed the global origins of the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness, which are the tools used for the local administrative functionality of the command of colonisation in Queensland, Australia. First, the formation of the conceptualisation of aboriginality was constructed within a frame of aesthetics and not in a social Darwinist hierarchy; specifically, aboriginality was formed in a frame of monstrous aesthetics. This implies that its constituting rules of formation or processes are framed addressing an anthropocentric monstrosity and they were not formed originally addressing the social Darwinist perspective of an inequality of races. Second, the formation of the conceptualisation of blackness was not initially tied to slavery alone, as blackness and slavery were not initially interchangeable, but blackness was historically formed using aboriginality as a referent and tied historically through inheriting slavery from the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas.

The following part presents an illustration of how colonisation operated and functioned in the context of Queensland. Through excavating the device used for the colonisation of Australian Aboriginal peoples in Queensland, i.e. the Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act), this part describes the specific mechanism through which colonisation subjectified the subject it spoke of, utilising the previously assembled conceptualisation of blackness and aboriginality. Similar to Foucault’s non-discursive functional description of the Panopticon, the 1897 Act assumed the non-discursive function of a “blanket”: in colonisation, the 1897 Act functioned in a Blanket Approach form. The significant presence or positivity of the blanket flagged the form of content that the mechanism of colonisation used. The non-discursive form of the blanket provided the design of
the mechanism or the pure function of the 1897 Act; the history of the mechanism of the Act, as opposed to an interpretation of what it said, is presented as a complex machine to colonise. In order to answer the overarching question of how colonisation was operationalised, or how it was put to use, both the origins of the two main components of colonisation and the way the machine of colonisation functioned should be described.

It is important to consider that, in this part, “blanket” is not used simply as a metaphor or a symbolic transference to explain the operation of colonisation in the context of Queensland, but as a form of content that captures the mechanism of colonisation in Queensland through the 1897 Act. In a similar way, Foucault (1976) defined “panopticism” as a form of content constituted by its pure function, as opposed to a form of expression or discursive practice; the ‘Blanket Approach’ is defined as a form of content or an abstract machine that, referring to a given conceptualisation or discursive device, imposes a given identity practice on a given subjectivity. When explaining the link between Foucauldian archaeology and panopticism, Deleuze states:

When Foucault defines Panoptiscism, either he specifically see it as an optical or luminous arrangement that characterizes prison, or he views it abstractly as a machine that not only affects visible matter in general (a workshop, barracks, school or hospital as much as a prison) but also in general passes through every articulable function. So the abstract formula of Panopticism is not only ‘to see without being seen’ but also to impose a particular conduct on a particular human multiplicity. (Deleuze, 1985, pp. 33-34, emphasis in original)
Penal law feeds into the confirmation of the assemblage of the prison and the prison feeds into the forms of expression of the penal law. The discursive and non-discursive practices continually feed from each other, refer to each other, and are, at times, in explicit contact. Is this arrangement or relationship, in which part three of this research understands the blanket in the Blanket Approach as a non-discursive form of content that is defined by an abstract operation or machine that is fed by the discursive conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness, present in the 1897 Act? That is, the 1897 Act, constituted by the specific history it has with blankets, assumes the configuration of a Blanket Approach that includes in its contents a specific function or set of functions, which is similar to the pure function of panopticism “to see without being seen” and “to impose a particular conduct on a particular human multiplicity”. Therefore, the blanket is not used as a metaphor because, like the Panopticon, it is not only a device to represent a similar function of another object, but the Blanket Approach is also the form of content or the configuration of functions assembled as an abstract formula defined solely through the pure functions or non-discursively constituted functions.

If the description of the command of colonisation can be explained as a Blanket Approach, then how was this non-discursive practice configured historically in the context of Queensland, Australia, and how did it operate? This broad question categorises this part of the thesis. Through excavating the 1897 Act as a functional device, considering its precedents, the forms of expressions as practices, its relationship with blankets, and the specific formula of its functions, a functional analysis of the 1897 Act is performed and a specific machine for the colonisation of Aboriginal peoples in the 19th and 20th centuries in Queensland is described.
In the following chapter, the Blanket Approach is described through navigating the historicity of the 1897 Act from the previous policies that addressed the subject it spoke of, including the 1881 Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fishery Act and The Native Labourers Protection Act of 1884. Then, an analysis of the emergence of the 1897 Act is conducted that addresses its rationale and the strategies it used to function within the Queensland government of the time, such as the formulation of the 1897 Act within a nation-state as an imposition of a state on a group of nations without a social contract with them, or an imposition of a state without a nation. At the end of the Blanket Approach chapter, the triple function of the command of colonisation illustrated through the 1897 Act is described. The triple function of this non-discursive mechanism is totalisation, multiplicity, and the creation of desire.
Chapter V

The Blanket Approach

This chapter historically and functionally analyses the historicity of the Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act) in the way that it created the conditions of possibilities in which Australian Aboriginal peoples in Queensland could be spoken of. It is argued that the 1897 Act used a Blanket Approach mechanism that aimed to colonise Australian Aboriginal peoples. This chapter does not engage in an interpretative historical inquiry, such as the work of Rosalind Kidd in, for instance, The Way We Civilise (1997); nor does it engage in a critique of the legal effectiveness of the 1897 Act. This chapter analyses the local command of colonisation through the 1897 Act, i.e. the techno-political administrative function of the 1897 Act, through a mapping of its historicity. Though the pure administrative function of the 1897 Act is incommensurable, or any non-discursive practice such as panopticism (Deleuze, 1985; Foucault, 1976), its analysis can be described in a form of content that can communicate its operation.

In this research, the Blanket Approach is defined as a form of content for the functionality of the relief item, which is the “blanket” that on one hand refers to the phrase that alludes to a policy that provides a discrete and total solution to very complex problems. On the other hand, it means that it covered every subject like the blankets that were distributed in the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century. This mechanism operated using the triple function of totalisation, multiplicity, and the creation of desire. First, the process that determines everything, that which was listed in the Act and therefore it does not determine anything, that was first determined by the protectorates in the institution and constitution of the 1897 Act is called totalisation. Second, the process that delivers this totalisation to each individual person is called multiplicity. Third, the process of creating needs,
necessities, and desires, and through that imposing the enclosure and perpetual process of the process of colonisation, is called the creation of desire. These threads of processes were and are continually assembled in reference to the history of Western *aboriginality* and Western *blackness* discussed in the previous chapters.

**The Act**

Secretary of Agriculture: This Bill is intended to enable the colony to do something towards carrying out its duty to the Aboriginal nations of this country. The imperfect provisions made in that direction up to the present time have scarcely been successful and it is not to the credit of the white inhabitants of these countries that so little success has attended the efforts made to save the unfortunate Aboriginals. We protect infants, and their rights, we protect men from other countries… and it is time we took some steps towards treating the aboriginals of this country as they ought to be treated. (*Queensland Parliamentary Debates*, 1898, p. 1225)

The Queensland *Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897* (*1897 Act*) was the first comprehensive law of the Government of the colony of Queensland that aimed to control every aspect of Aboriginal affairs. However, the control of or ‘protection’ by the *1897 Act* was regarded to be unsuccessful in “treating Aboriginals as they ought to be treated” from the very early stages. This opening statement by the Secretary of Agriculture to the Parliament in 1898 argued that the *1897 Act* needed to be changed, and this was the tone that the Parliamentary Debates had to what would become the 1899 Amendment to the Act.\(^{58}\) Many Members of Parliament stated that the Aboriginal “problem” was far from being resolved. The *1897 Act* needed to undertake some changes in 1898, which were the first of many.

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\(^{58}\) See the *Parliamentary Debates of Queensland* 1899, pp. 1220-1401.
The *Act* provided for three broad topics: it addressed opium and alcohol; it created institutions for Australian Aboriginal peoples be subjected to (reserves or “protectorates”, and missions); and it restricted and subjected Australian Aboriginal life to the Colonial West definition of labour, marriage, education, health, “civility”, government, and the use and exclusion of objects (for example, possum blankets were banned and cotton/woollen blankets were imposed). Opium and alcohol were quickly controlled by the *1897 Act*. This did not mean that these were not allowed to be used, for example the use of alcohol was allowed, but that the protectors of the reserves defined their acceptable use. The missions and protectorates aimed to visibilise and accurately account for the population of Australian Aboriginal peoples. In her guide to the government records and archives, Frankland states:

Regional administrative control of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population of the State was achieved by dividing the State into Protectorates. Each Protectorate was administered by a local Protector of Aboriginals who was a police officer in all cases except for Thursday Island. The appointment of local Protectors began in 1898. Local Protectors had many responsibilities including the administration of Aboriginal employment, wages, and savings bank accounts. Local Protectors also played a significant role in the removal of Aboriginal people to reserves. By 1932 there were 95 Protectorates and widespread corruption had emerged within the administrative practices of the local Protectors. (Frankland, 1994, p. 4)\(^59\)

These protectors regulated and controlled marriages, removals, labour, employment and wages, education, and Aboriginal industries; they reported deaths,

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\(^{59}\) This research performs a historical-functional analysis of the *1897 Act*; for a more detailed history of the administrative aspects of Aboriginal Affairs, see Frankland (1994) and Kidd (1997), which are included in the references of this thesis.
specific diseases, crimes, etc., and defined what would constitute an Aboriginal person whom would be under the rule of the 1897 Act, not including people who would apply to be exempted from the Act. Very few cases would be granted exemptions (Frankland, 1994). The protectors were police officers that would be paid additional income to be the enforcers of the 1897 Act; therefore, they were responsible for the protectorates in any given region of Queensland. They reported at first to the Northern Chief Protector and the Southern Chief Protector, and then shortly after to only one Chief Protector who was responsible for all protectorates. One of their responsibilities was to directly report to the Home Secretary who then reported to Queensland Parliament.

It is important to clearly state that the 1897 Act did not control all aspects of Australian Aboriginal life, but that it aimed to cover Australian Aboriginal peoples with a defined set of elements that were important to the Colonial West. This means that every aspect, not just any aspect, of life was defined by the Colonial West and was not defined by Aboriginal Australia (note that the distinction I make between every-thing and any-thing is discussed below). Rather than being an inquiry regarding Australian Aboriginal peoples in Queensland in the 19th and 20th centuries, this chapter engages in a Foucauldian theoretical-historical archaeological inquiry of the

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60 Frankland states: “Section 33 of the 1897 Act made provision for the Minister ‘to issue any half-caste, who, in his opinion, ought not to be subject to the provisions of this Act, a certificate... that such a half-caste is exempt from the provisions of this Act...’. Certificates of exemption were sought by hundreds of Aboriginal people who wished to escape the oppressive conditions enforced upon them by the Act. In many cases, the Aboriginal person wishing to become exempt would write or request the local Protector or anyone else to write on his or her behalf to the Chief Protector requesting to be exempt. The request would often be accompanied by letters of reference which confirmed that the Aboriginal person seeking exemption was of good character and did not associate with other Aborigines.” (1994, p. 7)
1897 Act as a non-discursive device utilised to colonise Australian Aboriginal peoples in Queensland.

In this chapter, the functional analysis of how the 1897 Act commanded the colonisation of Aboriginal peoples in Queensland is demonstrated through navigating the historicity of the 1897 Act from its precedents through functionally analysing other laws that speak of the same subject. Then, the way in which the blanket functionally became the form of content for the machine of the Blanket Approach to function and how it functioned are analysed. However, before proceeding with the historicity of the Blanket Approach, two notions must be clarified: the distinction between every-thing and any-thing, and its relationship with totality, and also the role of opium in the mechanism of the 1897 Act.

Every-thing and Any-thing

In order to address the means through which the 1897 Act dominated the subject it spoke of, a brief review of what is usually the assertion made to describe the Act should be presented. The typical description of the 1897 Act reads more or less like the statement: the 1897 Act controlled every aspect of the Australian Aboriginal lives. There is much truth in this statement, and this research does not intend to contest it. However, it must be more closely analysed. In particular, a distinction is made between the words “every-thing” and “any-thing”. Levinas (1969) examined this distinction in his book Totality and Infinity. To state “every-thing” means a defined set or a total set of “things”, whereas “any-thing” means an infinite account of things. Thus, when it is stated that the 1897 Act controlled “every” aspect, or “every-thing”, it is very different to using the word “any-thing”. This is not to suggest that, potentially, in practice, the 1897 Act did not control matters that were not explicitly stated by the Act. In practice, the 1897 Act, particularly through Section 31, provided
for the powers to control more than what had been explicitly stated. In Section 31 Regulation 17, what appears to be open-ended power is given to the State to regulate “all other matters and things that may be necessary to give effect to this Act”. However, this speaks to a defined set of total matters existing. This total set is not prospective, but it is defined by the presence of what constitutes the Act; what is prospective is the ways in which the Act might need to give powers “to give effect to this Act”.

Levinas (1969) dedicates his book to distinguishing these two notions of totality and infinity, ethically favouring the latter. About totality and totalizers, he states:

It is this outwardly directed but self-centred totalistic thinking that organises men and things into power systems, and gives us control over nature and other people. Hence it has dominated the course of human history. From this point of view, on the neutral and impersonal. Being, for example is important. What is it? Is the most basic question that requires an answer in terms of a context, a system. The real is something that can be brought before the senses and the mind as an object. The acts of sensing, thinking, existing, as they are lived through, are discounted as subjective. A priority is, therefore, placed on objective thinking, and the objective. The group is more powerful, more inclusive, and, therefore, more important than the individual. To be free is to sacrifice the arbitrary inner self and to fit into a rationally grounded system.

(Levinas, 1969, p. 17)

In this elaboration, the word “every-thing” suggests a set of given things, which represent a total: everything is a totality enabled through a system. In contrast, “any-
thing” is an infinite amount of possibilities or infinity: infinity enables freedom. Its uncertainty does not allow the systematisation to capture it. Levinas states:

To the infinitizers on the other hand, this seems like a partial and biased doctrine. Systematic thinking, no doubt, has its place. It is required for the establishment of those power structures, which satisfy men. But when absolutised in this way and applied to free men, it constitutes violence, which is not merely found in temporary and accidental displays of armed force, but in the permanent tyranny of the neutral and impersonal over the active and personal. (Levinas, 1969, p. 18)

Infinity is freedom and to affirm wording that enables this infinity is to promote this active stance against the unnecessary violence of the systems enacted through the totalizers. To state everything is to point to a totality. The 1897 Act was a law that isolated, captured, and restricted the subject that it spoke of, while referring to its specific totalistic system of law. A totality is composed by a given set of elements, but the addition (or summation) of these elements is not the totality in itself. It can be said that these elements are subordinated by their totality.

Opium?

The Queensland Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act) was developed to control the distribution of opium and Australian Aboriginal people’s labour, but it also became a mechanism for social engineering through regulating every aspect of their lives (Kidd, 1997). Every (and not any) aspect of Australian Aboriginal lives was defined by the Australian Colonial West. Australian Aboriginal labour had a protagonist role in building Queensland, and this labour was paid with tobacco, alcohol, and opium charcoal, as well as food, liquor, clothes, and blankets, among other exchange items (Gillett, 2011). Opium in
the 1897 Act was used as a rhetorical device to institute a point of entry to regulate Australian Aboriginal populations. Opium was also used as a scapegoat to constitute an illustrative example of colonial domination in Australia (Gillett, 2011).

The use of opium in Australia was documented well before the institution of the 1897 Act, and it was usually associated with Chinese people, trade, and cultural practice. Before the 1897 Act, opium was legal and Australians consumed it in large quantities. The Government of the Colonies of Australia enjoyed very healthy revenue from the taxes that opium paid. Opium contributed an estimated $2.5 million annually to the government in today’s value (Berridge & Griffith, 1999). In the late 19th century, opium began to become more regulated and its use was registered by race; for example, the Annual Reports present tables of opium offences reporting the offenders name and their races such as ‘Chinese’, ‘Malay’, ‘White European’, etc.; however, it remained associated with questionable pay for labour and sex (Evans, 2007). The first formal attempt by the Queensland government to regulate it occurred in the context of the global movement against opium (Berridge & Griffith, 1999). In the 1890s, the global war on opium had replaced the abolitionist (abolition against slavery) movement because it was considered that slavery had been abolished. However, in the 1890s, the opium “problem” was disappearing in Australia (Gillett, 2011). According to both unofficial reports and official government reports, opium remained present but the latter reported a significant decrease (Evans, 2007). Gillett (2011) argued that for the younger generations of Chinese people in Australia, opium was considered passé or something that only older people would do, even though opium use in China was rising. The use of opium by Australian Aboriginal peoples was reported to be limited to opium charcoal, which is the opium residue after it was smoked (Kidd, 1997). The opium charcoal was consumed through diluting it in a
large quantity of water and then this water was consumed. The drinking of the opium charcoal was reported to be a distinctive social activity (Gillett, 2011). However, as early as 1902, the protectors under the 1897 Act were reporting the following:

"In the neighbourhood of towns where there are police stations the supply of opium, although not entirely stopped, is considerably checked.” - Protector Martin, Mackay, 1902

"The blacks in these districts are not much addicted to opium smoking, as it is confined mostly to the elder people, and the younger ones evidently perceive that opium has been killing their race, and avoid using it." - Protector MacNamara, Charter Towers, 1902

"I am glad to again report that the aboriginals here do not use opium or liquor." - Protector O'Connor, Boulia (Annual Reports, 1902)

These individual reports and others (Annual Reports 1901-1906) stated that the problem of opium use had disappeared or significantly decreased. Opium-related criminal convictions, primarily perpetrated by people of Chinese descent, were what were mostly reported in the Annual Reports under the 1897 Act. Thus, either opium was an already a decreasing problem, or the 1897 Act had an immediate effect in eliminating this problem, or perhaps it was never a problem at all.

In many of her works, Rosalind Kidd (2012; 2010; 2007; 1997) suggests that labour, as a topic of Parliamentary discussion and employment practices, was a key factor in the domination of Aboriginal Australia in the Queensland experience. Interestingly, this pressure came from a top down approach:

Nineteenth-Century governments in Queensland were forced to respond to local and international campaigns demanding official interventions to bring Aboriginal/European relations under orderly control. The variety of
recommendations, remedial programs and administrative responses suggests that the Aboriginal plight was a target for social change. Vigorous debate and practical adjustments in the legal domain and the field of “coloured” employment, and indeed the articulation of the Aboriginal dilemma through the prism of European reformatory rhetoric, run counter to the historical convention of a systemic racial exclusion. (Kidd, 1997, p. 35)

However, Kidd demonstrated that Australian Aboriginal labour was critical to the development of Queensland from the very early stages of the colony. From the beginnings of the settlement of Queensland, Australian Aboriginal peoples worked as guides, helped in the construction of huts, houses, and other structures, cleared densely vegetated areas for the construction of pathways and living spaces, supplied food such as fish and other animals, worked in domestic duties, and worked in various pastoral duties (Keen, 2004; Kidd, 2010). Kidd (2010) stated that in the early 1880s, more than 1000 Australian Aboriginal people had permanent employment in rural Queensland.

The usual payment for Australian Aboriginal labour was tobacco, opium charcoal, food, liquor, clothes, and blankets (Kidd, 2010). Very few Europeans agreed to work for such ‘payments’ in the characteristically harsh conditions of Queensland in the late 19th century. European labour expected to receive monetary wages for the same labour that Australian Aboriginal peoples would do for mercantile and consumable goods. These conditions increased the demand for Australian Aboriginal labour; one reason was that no one could afford the wages that the Europeans were demanding (Kidd, 2010). It is reported that in some cases Australian Aboriginal peoples preferred to work with Chinese employers because they offered better working conditions overall (Evans, Kay & Kathryn, 1993). European Australians
reportedly resented this preference, and it further nourished racism against the Chinese communities. One of the effects of the 1897 Act was that the protectors held a monopoly over Australian Aboriginal labour, largely because they were given the authority to determine whether or not an Australian Aboriginal person could work with an employer. Protectors, who were police officers, favoured the European employers and the records reveal an increase of Chinese convictions, predominantly with opium-related offences. The Parliamentary Debates of the late 19th century and early 20th century on matters such as the 1897 Act, as well as the Annual Reports, demonstrated clear disapproval of the Chinese communities. The Chinese were blamed for the general problem of opium addiction and in particular to the “degeneration” of Australian Aboriginal communities (Gillett, 2011). The 1897 Act was approved in the context of this generalised resentment against the Chinese communities (Gillett, 2011). After the approval of the 1897 Act in the context of Chinese resentment and the global war on opium, opium was banned in 1906 with an exception for medicinal use (Gillett, 2011), but the 1897 Act continued to be enacted for decades longer.

In the 1897 Act, opium was a rhetorical device that built the complex machinery of colonial domination not simply as an empty signifier but as a scapegoat that was specified in order to change the focus from the real function of the Act. Some historians (Evans, 2007; Gillett, 2011) have suggested that opium was merely an excuse to introduce the 1897 Act as a “Trojan horse”. However, even this history positions opium as central to the machinery of the 1897 Act. From this perspective, even if opium was the Trojan horse of the 1897 Act, it had to operate around the legal provisions of the substance in order to control Australian Aboriginal peoples. Furthermore, even if this account of history denies the “reality” of the problem of
opium addiction and simply argues that it was a lie, or at least a very selective interpretation of events that occurred in the whole of Queensland society, the focus remains on denying or confirming this historical account; that is, opium remains a positive (present) part of the machinery of the 1897 Act. Notably, all accounts of history have persuading and empirically sound arguments that place opium as the pretext for the institution of the 1897 Act. However, if opium was nothing more than a scapegoat, as some of these historians suggest, then it must be accepted that it had very little to do with the function of the mechanism of the 1897 Act. The historical conditions that made the mechanism of the 1897 Act in Queensland, and undeniably in the Western world, followed a different pattern.

**Precedents of the 1897 Act**

One of the first attempts that the Queensland government made to address the “Aboriginal problem” occurred in 1874, when the government appointed an Aboriginal Commission to “inquire what can be done to ameliorate the condition of aborigines and to make them useful” (Ross, 1992 cited in Kidd, 1997, p. 25). The commission concluded that “the aggressive conquest of aborigines in the Northern frontier districts be replaced by a policy of ‘conciliation’ through the distribution of rations and blankets” (Kidd, 1997, p. 26). The Aboriginal Commission was dissolved shortly after that year, but the distribution of rations and blankets was adopted as a Queensland government policy. Rations, tomahawks, tobacco, and blankets were distributed in different locations throughout Queensland. Blankets were used to provide early estimates of the population of Australian Aboriginal peoples in Queensland (Diamond, 1997). However, blankets also had an aggressive history in other parts of the world and other parts of Australia. Campbell (2002) discussed this history in his book *Invisible Invaders*, where he demonstrates how in the second half
of the 18th century, blankets were used to spread smallpox among the Native Americans in the United States. The use of blankets to spread diseases also occurred in Australia. Campbell states that:

Like Curr, Butlin claimed that smallpox in Aboriginals followed an introduction at Sydney, and attributed the outbreak to the surgeon’s supply of bottles of virus material. The one possibility that Butlin did not consider was that the bottles were never opened. His opinion differed from Curr’s in that he proposed a second introduction in 1829 that occurred through blankets being sent ashore from a ship at Sydney. (Campbell, 2002, p. 219)

The history of the arrival of diseases like smallpox is an object of historical debate. However, there is very little doubt that one of the first ways to manage the Aboriginal “problem” was through violent conquest, and that for some these ways included the purposeful spreading of diseases (Campbell, 2002).

The next time that the Queensland Parliament actively discussed Australian Aboriginal peoples was in relation to the 1881 Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fishery Act (1881 Act). This Act aimed to regulate the very profitable practice of pearl shelling and beche-de-mer that existed for decades before the Act. This business was primarily located in North Queensland and the Torres Strait Islands. The Government was concerned about the treatment of the labourers in that industry and decided to create a law to regulate it, primarily through taxes and specific fines to the boat owner offenders. In the 1881 Act, a “native labourer” was defined as “any Aboriginal native of Australia or New Guinea, or of the islands adjacent there to” (Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fishery Act, 1881). Although the Parliamentary Debates record many cases in which native labourers were treated cruelly, there is no single section of the 1881 Act that specifically addresses this concern. In Section 12, the Act states, “the
master is liable for expenses incurred in the maintenance of Polynesians and native labourers” (Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fishery Act, 1881). Then, in Section 13, the Act commanded that any death or desertion must be reported, and this section started with addressing the master: “any master or employer of such Polynesian or native labourer who fails to make any such report shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding ten pounds” (Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fishery Act, 1881, p. 121).

The arguments for the approval of the 1881 Act revolved around wanting to promote better working conditions and some Members of Parliament in Queensland quoted specific “horror” stories of masters of vessels, usually Malays or non-white peoples, leaving labourers far away from their ports (even stories of leaving labourers as far as Victoria) and other stories of simply not being appropriately paid after months of unpaid work. Interestingly, almost all Parliamentary Debates focused on the “native labourer” although the Act only mentioned them in Sections 13, 14, and 17 out of a total of 19 sections. It appears that this was the first time that the “native labourer” topic of the 1881 Act functioned as a vehicle to implement formal control in a specific area, which was in this case the pearl shelling and beche-de-mer industries. It was a very effective vehicle given that the entire conversation only focused on this topic, the native labourer or the Australian Aboriginal peoples, and not on the nature of the industry.

Three years after the 1881 Act, The Native Labourers Protection Act of 1884 (1884 Act) was passed. This law specifically intended to regulate the “improper employment” of Australian Aboriginal peoples defined by the same legal definition of native labourer used in the 1881 Act. Again, this topic primed a very intense debate framed with expressed feelings such as from the Member of the Queensland Parliament, Mr. Archer: “I see no reason why we don’t protect the aborigines as we
protect the Polynesians” (*Queensland Parliamentary Debates*, 1881, p. 129). From this point on, Queensland Parliament engaged in a discussion revolving around race relations:

Mr. Archer: I am perfectly in favour of what the Hon. Premier is trying to effect by this Bill: I wish that every native labourer on board ship, or any other place, should be properly treated – have fair play and the same protection as white man… the bill has my complete sympathy. I do not think I ever ill-used a man on account of the colour of his skin, and I do not want to see him ill-used… (*Queensland Parliamentary Debates*, 1881, p. 184)

This seemingly progressive account in 1884 of this Member of Parliament evoked a proportionately opposite effect in other Members, as seen in this statement:

Mr. Morehead: I think the sentimentalism in the way of protection of the black Aboriginal race of this colony is running rampant… I am perfectly certain the hon. The Minister for Lands could point out how he and others assisted in sweeping the blacks out of the western portion of the colony, and very properly, too no doubt. Where the white man appears the black disappears, as was said by a very great authority, John Arthur Roebuck, in speaking with reference to the New Zealand war. There is no doubt it should be so, and it is so. We may mitigate the severity of the process, but that is all, this is merely a measure of mitigation. I am sure the junior member for North Brisbane thinks the sooner the black races are swept the better. I am sure he detests them, and I think he would support a measure that would hurry their departure to another and possibly better sphere that they now occupy…” (*Queensland Parliamentary Debates*, 1881, p. 185)
Mr. Morehead and Mr. Archibald Meston were part of the group who would be responsible for pushing and designing the 1897 Act (Kidd, 1997; *Queensland Parliamentary Debates*, 1898). In 1881, it was one of the first times that Australian Aboriginal lives were formally discussed in Queensland Parliament. However, there was no discussion, or very little, about the approval or disapproval of the bill itself. The debate focused on the “nature” of Australian Aboriginal peoples. The debate revolved around the efforts needed to be undertaken to “save” this “dying” race, or if any effort from the Government to “save them” was an exercise in futility. For this debate around “saving a dying race” to happen, an entire imagery of the nature of Australian Aboriginal peoples was drawn from the current understandings based on pre-existing colonial imagery of aboriginality and blackness, at times explicitly citing the experiences of the United States, New Zealand, and other colonised countries. The context in which this imagery was drawn was in the main topic of the bill, which was labour.

The 1884 Act intended to regulate and protect the employment conditions of native labourers through instituting a bill that exclusively addressed them. The 1884 Act was officially repealed in 1939 when the 1897 Act assumed the functions of the 1884 Act de jure (or officially), because the 1897 Act had been regulating Australian Aboriginal labour since its de facto implementation (or in practice). Labour appeared to be the first vehicle for the representations of Australian Aboriginal peoples in Queensland Parliament. For example, one of the Members of Parliament painted a picture of Australian Aboriginal peoples in relation to labour in this way:

Mr. Black: “The Aboriginal native of Queensland, or of Africa, or of the South Sea Islands, did not work in his own country: he hunted; it was the
women who had to do the arduous work.” (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1884, p. 188)

In relation to the nature of aboriginality, this quote summarises well the position of many Members of Parliament:

Mr. Sim: “Of course we know that we are dealing with a race that occupies a very low position in the scale of humanity, but at the same time we must not forget that at one period in our own history our ancestors lived under very similar conditions, and in some respects very much worse conditions, than those under which the blacks of this country live, and that our race is a product of a process of civilisation which has extended over a period of very nearly 2000 years.” (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1884, p. 192)

These conceptualisations were a product of a social Darwinist perspective guided by the modern anthropological discourse discussed in the previous chapters. However, the content appeared to be entangled with the historicity of the conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality. Other Members of Parliament expressed enigmatic arguments such as that expressed in the following quote:

Mr. Jordan: “If those people could be civilised and taught the value of labour then the law could not operate.” (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1884, p. 197)

This comment that the Member made speaks to the use of law. The bill addresses a problem, but its positivity (presence) creates the space that the problem of labour lies on and therefore constitutes. The irony of the expression gestures to the contradictory function of this law, which aims to regulate labour, but its very existence depends on the verbalisation of this problem. Following this line, another Member expressed the following:
Mr. Norton: “…good thing that blacks are employed. This Bill, however, not only restricts their employment, but almost prohibits it, because, in order to engage them at all, they must be engaged in some seaport town.” (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1884, p. 189)

The Members of Parliament knew the power that a law would have to institute the positivity of, in this case, labour.

This positivity of labour, within the conditions of the possibilities of the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness, was not a bad thing or a good thing, but it announced an initial “capture” via these conceptualisations in Australia and the advent of other areas of capture that such laws implied to impose, such as education, wages control, regulation of criminality, etc. That is, this initial positivity set the grounds for the subsequent spaces of control and “protection”. From the regulation of labour of specific peoples, with specific conceptualising content, the grounds of protection would be able to expand in all directions that arise after this capturing. However, this capture or protection must always refer to the nature of aboriginality and blackness that has its roots in the Western conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness.

Kidd (2012, 2010, 1997) is right to emphasise the role that labour had in the history of how the Australian Colonial West managed Australian Aboriginal affairs. When the Australian Colonial West started discussions about labour and Australian Aboriginal affairs, they found very fertile grounds to grow the complex machinery of colonial domination. The seeds of the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness were nurtured in the aforementioned modern grounds of colonisation. In particular, the history of the conceptualisation of blackness echoed the labour elements in slavery. The naming of the word slavery was wilfully silent in the
Act, the 1884 Act, and the 1897 Act even though many labour practices were
effectively slave practices (Kidd, 2007; Lake, 1993; Reynolds, 1990). The
Parliamentary Debates around these Acts and the reports of the implementation of the
1897 Act addressed slavery through avoiding and manoeuvring its wording in order to
avoid the direct enunciation of slavery. However, this intentional tactic only caused the Act to refer to slavery at all times, which made it ever present when talking about
labour and other affairs. However, sometimes the word slave or slavery erupted in the
form of expressions like these:

“...she apparently had no blankets, and certainly no wages-the poor thing had
proved a hard-working willing slave.” (Annual Reports, 1899, p. 18)

In other moments, the word was mentioned along the lines of “not appearing
to promote slavery”. Historians like Kidd (2010) and Lake (1993) suggest that there
were existing slave conditions in Australia towards Australian Aboriginal peoples.
However, this research is interested in what constituted the grounds of labour and the
conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness for these conceptualisations to be a
foundation for the machinery of colonisation in modern times, yet having roots in a
colonial history constituted by slavery, both Aboriginal and African slavery. That is,
all sides and aspects of this debate contributed to the formation of the 1897 Act that
included the entangled foundational element of a history that was slavery inside the
conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness.

Slavery is constantly but silently addressed when discussing the 1884 Act
because it explicitly discusses labour. The abolition of slavery in other parts of the
world occurred decades prior to this point, and it was politically correct to condemn
and avoid such actions. The topic of the “nature” of Australian Aboriginal peoples
was widely discussed (the Parliamentary Debates had hundreds of pages), even
though the *1884 Act* had only 14 sections and was a relatively uncontroversial law. This was the first time that the Parliament of Queensland formerly discussed Australian Aboriginal people in the light of an *Act* loosely designed exclusively for them. However, strictly speaking, the *1884 Act* was not about Australian Aboriginal affairs: it was primarily directed to restrict the employment of ‘native labourers’ in ships in Queensland. It is illustrative that the *1884 Act* sparked a broad debate about Australian Aboriginal “nature” and labour. The Australian Aboriginal topic found a comfortable space in the regulation of labour to exacerbate further conversations to manage the “Aboriginal problem”. These previous laws also found a comfortable space for the implementation of the *1897 Act* because it continued the conversations of the Parliamentary Debates and the language of the previous laws.

**Language of the *1897 Act***

The 1880s and 1890s represented a threshold moment in which the Australian Colonial West gathered a language through which Australian Aboriginal affairs were officially and richly spoken of, discussed, and legislated. However, the language was not only the language of labour: labour was the grounds for these enunciations to occur. The language of Western aboriginality and blackness fed these enunciations. This language conversed with the language of the West and created the instituted intersections that weaved the fabric of the technology that functioned to reproduce the supremacy of the Colonial West in Queensland, Australia. Words like “protection”, “removals”, and “exceptions” pointed to the new processes that colonisation would institute. At this point, the *1881 Act* and the *1884 Act* were only vague attempts to manage the Australian Aboriginal “problem”.

Home Secretary: The Bill proposes to deal with the subjects I have enumerated in three ways. It first repeals one section of an act now in
existence in regards to the supply of liquor to blacks, and places it in this Bill so that it can be found under the heading of “aboriginals”. It says clearly and definitely that it is the duty of everyone in the community to see that the law in this respect shall be carried out... Then the laws regarding the supply of opium are amended so as to overcome what has been the great difficulty in the past- to catch the offender... We must make of 10,000 pounds a year...

Having dealt with these three matters, we have to make a provision for protecting these blacks and securing them in some suitable employment. The Bill makes provision, in conclusion, for regulations dealing with the thousand and one matters which must arise, but which I could not prophesy or narrate. The Bill is open; there is not one clause which, if argument and experience are brought before me, I shall not be prepared to modify on receiving substantial proof that the views advanced are better. (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1897, pp. 1540-1541)

With this statement, the Home Secretary concluded his opening statement to introduce the Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act of Queensland (1897 Act). Even with 33 sections, the 1897 Act did not detail the broad intention of the law. That is, the 1897 Act was everything but specific or concise. For example, the definition of an Aboriginal was circular. In Section 4, it addressed who was deemed as an Aboriginal as “an Aboriginal inhabitant of Queensland” or “a half-caste who, at the commencement of this Act, is living with an Aboriginal as wife, husband, or child” or “a half-caste who, otherwise than as wife, husband, or child, habitually lives or associates with Aboriginals, shall be deemed to be an Aboriginal within the meaning of this Act” (Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1897). However, the words “aboriginal” and “half-caste” were not clearly
defined. This sparked discussions in the Parliamentary Debates and justified future amendments. Section 9 introduced the way in which “Aboriginals” should be recruited into the designated reservations or protectorates, and removed from their current locations, without the “Aboriginals” being properly defined. The first eight sections of the 1897 Act described the powers of the Government in the control and administration of Australian Aboriginal peoples under the 1897 Act. In Section 12, it details at first that “any Aboriginal employed by any trustworthy person to continue to be employed by such person, in like manner, may permit any Aboriginal or half-caste not previously employed to be employed by a like person”, which made the power of employment of the 1897 Act open for interpretation to those responsible for enforcing this law.

Labour was addressed in Sections 12 to 16; Section 27 addressed liquor; Sections 19 to 25 addressed opium; and the punitive aspect of the 1897 Act was addressed from Section 26 to Section 30. This initial architecture of the 1897 Act appeared to address the main types of law in many given nation states, such as penal law, civil law, contractual law, and labour law; these types of laws were all addressed in the 1897 Act as though the Queensland government was imposing another government or autonomous state for a specific group of peoples. The part that would function as the constitution of the 1897 Act, which gives the order and the powers of the State from the people, was Section 31. Clearly, this “constitution” did not begin with the statement “We the people”, because there was no consultation with the Australian Aboriginal nations at the time. However, Section 31 gave the power to the Governor Council and to the 1897 Act to regulate the following:

(1) Prescribing the mode of removing aboriginals to a reserve, and from one reserve to another;
(2) Defining the duties of Protectors and Superintendents, and any other persons employed to carry the provisions of this Act into effect;

(3) Authorising entry upon a reserve by specified persons or classes of persons for specified objects, and defining those objects, and the conditions under which such, persons may visit or remain upon a reserve, and fixing the duration of their stay thereupon, and providing for the revocation of such authority in any case;

(4) Prescribing the mode of distribution and expenditure of moneys granted by Parliament for the benefit of aboriginals;

(5) Apportioning amongst, or for the benefit of, aboriginals or half-castes, living on a reserve, the net produce of the labour of such aboriginals or half-castes;

(6) Providing for the care, custody, and education of the children of aboriginals;

(7) Providing for the transfer of any half-caste child, being an orphan, or deserted by its parents, to an orphanage;

(8) Prescribing the conditions on which any Aboriginal or half-caste children may be apprenticed to, or placed in service with, suitable persons;

(9) Providing for the mode of supplying to any half-castes, who may be declared to be entitled thereto, any rations, blankets, or other necessaries, or any medical or other relief or assistance;

(10) Prescribing the conditions on which the Minister may authorise any half-caste to reside upon any reserve, and limiting the period of such residence, and the mode of dismissing or removing any such half-caste from such reserve;
(11) Providing for the control of all aboriginals and half-castes residing upon a reserve, and for the inspection of all aboriginals and half-castes, employed under the provisions of this Act or the Regulations;

(12) Maintaining discipline and good order, upon a reserve;

(13) Imposing the punishment of imprisonment, for any term not exceeding three months, upon any Aboriginal or half-caste who is guilty of a breach of the Regulations relating to the maintenance of discipline and good order upon a reserve;

(14) Imposing, and authorising a Protector to inflict summary punishment by way of imprisonment, not exceeding fourteen days, upon aboriginals or half-castes, living upon a reserve or within the District under his charge, who, in the judgment of the Protector, are guilty of any crime, serious misconduct, neglect of duty, gross insubordination, or wilful breach of the Regulations;

(15) Prohibiting any Aboriginal rites or customs that, in the opinion of the Minister, are injurious to the welfare of aboriginals living upon a reserve;

(16) Providing for the due carrying out of the provisions of this Act;

(17) Providing for all other matters and things that may be necessary to give effect to this Act. (Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1897, sec. 31)

These regulations covered all groups in the aforementioned sections of the 1897 Act, excluding those sections that focused on opium. One Member of Parliament in Queensland interpreted Section 31 as one that could potentially make the other sections of the Act inoperable because it gave too much power to the Governor Council (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1899). Theoretically, all sections of the 1897 Act could be nullified due to the powers that had been conferred to the Governor
Council. Section 31 was the section that the Home Secretary was alluding to when he discussed the “1001 matters that must arise” in relation to governing Australian Aboriginal lives (Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1898). In practice, Section 31 gave a “blank cheque” to the agents responsible for enforcing the 1897 Act, mainly to the protectors. Section 31 also provided the outline for the Annual Protectorate Reports to the Home Secretary and to Queensland Parliament. It also provided the recorded narratives for Aboriginal affairs that would be expressed in later debates, discussions, reports, and other manifestations of the implementation of the 1897 Act.

Section 31 was the core of the 1897 Act because it functioned as the generator of the reproductive power of the Act to capture the subject that it spoke of. That is, Section 31 functioned as the source of the power of the law for all other sections of the 1897 Act, in the same way that the social contract of a constitution functions as the source of the power and command of all laws created in a state.

On the other hand, Section 18 did not have consistency with the remainder of the sections of the 1897 Act. Section 18 makes the possession of a government-issued blanket by a non-Aboriginal illegal. This detailed section mentions:

Every blanket issued by an officer of the Government to any Aboriginal or half-caste shall be and remain the property of Her Majesty, and any person, other than an Aboriginal or half-caste, who has in his possession or custody any such blanket or portion thereof which shall reasonably appear to the justices, from the marks thereupon or otherwise, to have been so issued for the use of an Aboriginal or half-caste, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be liable, on conviction, to a penalty not exceeding ten pounds. (Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1897, sec. 18)
Furthermore, blankets are stated in Regulation 9 of Section 31. The Annual Reports list the persons convicted to have possession of blankets for Aboriginal people. It also reports the distribution of blankets with considerable detail. In the Parliamentary Debates, questions were raised about the unjustified portion of the budget for the 1897 Act dedicated for blankets and their distribution. The Queensland government would spend most of the funding on these blankets, between £2000 and almost £9000; this constituted more than half of the funding that accompanied the 1897 Act, which was approximately £10,000 per year (Annual Report, 1901; Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1899). This total is the equivalent of approximately $1 million in current times (Ryden, 2001).

Given the context of the poor design of the 1897 Act as a policy, it can be imagined that the importance given to blankets was just another of the many shortcomings of the 1897 Act. Another approach would question who benefited from the large quantities of blankets purchased for the “relief of Aboriginals”. Certainly there was profit to be made in supplying blankets to the Queensland Government. Even if all assumptions were true, the importance of blankets was not proportional to these speculative reasons. If the importance of the presence or positivity of blankets had no formal logical justification, then it had a non-formal relationship with the 1897 Act. These blankets are the manifestations of the “hidden foundation” (Foucault, 1974, p. 134) of the pure function of the mechanism of power in colonisation in Queensland, in the same way that the structure of the Panopticon was the manifestation of the pure function of power in many prisons. How does a non-linear logical relationship between the blankets and the 1897 Act look? A tangible object is not related to the intangible 1897 Act; thus, how is the intangibility of the blanket, i.e. its function, related to the intangible function of the 1897 Act as a comprehensive law
that functioned under the Western formulation of a nation-state without consultation with the peoples it governed?

**The 1897 Act as a State without a Nation**

The power of the State lies in the implementation of the law. The law, most of the time, is used to force a “peaceful” state on opposing forces (Dworkin, 1998). That is, this law is defined by stopping, voluntarily or involuntarily, the opposing force and by this opposing force being called “illegal”. For example, legislating the social practice of drug use brings the non-use or illegality of drugs into the plane of socialisation; through that, it also results in the social practice of drug use becoming visible (positive) and administered by the regulations of the state. Previously, drug use was not an institutional concern, but now it has become the responsibility of the government. Therefore, what is illegal becomes as much part of the law as compliance with the law itself because it is the state’s responsibility to manage it. Deleuze takes a more emphatic stance on the role of illegalities in law, as follows:

> Law is the management of that which is illegal, some laws that allows, makes it possible or creates a privilege for the dominating class, other laws are compensations to the dominated class that are tolerated by the dominating class, and lastly other laws that restrict, isolates and captures the object it speaks of as a mean for domination. (1985, pp. 55-56)

This research is interested in the latter type of law: the law that “restricts, isolates and captures the object it speaks of” (Deleuze, 1985, p. 56). The 1897 Act spoke of the conceptualisation of blackness and aboriginality “objects”, and these discursive tools captured the subjects that these conceptualisations spoke of. The 1897 Act functioned in this way as a means for domination. If this is true, then the question revolves around: what are the specific means through which this domination operated? How
did this operation function to restrict, isolate, and capture the object it spoke of, and the subject that this object speaks of?

**Totalisation**

The first component of the way that the 1897 Act operated is described in the elements of the specific matters that the Act regulated and therefore instituted; the sum of the areas that the Act controlled such as labour and crime, and later on health and education, and a more precise account of the Australian Aboriginal population provided the totalisation or configuration of its machinery. In this case, the Blanket Approach refers to the phrase used in policy analysis to name a policy that uses a simple and discrete approach to solve complex problems. However, if this phrase is used to describe the 1897 Act, it would not make sense to analyse the Act given that the policy would be regarded as a one-dimensional policy, or even as an error. If this is true, it can be thought almost immediately that the logical solution for this mistake would be to design a more tailored and complete policy. Then, the new and, by definition, evolved policy is deployed to oppose and move away from the former policy in order to address the problems that were not resolved. Then, the new policy has learned from its own mistakes. If the policy has moved away from the inferior version of the Blanket Approach policy, then it can be inferred that it has little to no direct relationship with the original policy. However, it would still hold some relationship with the instituting policy. The 1897 Act evolved and was amended in 1899, 1901, 1928, 1934, 1939, 1946, and 1965. The 1897 Act started with nine pages, and only one page was dedicated to regulations (Section 31); in the end, it had more than 100 pages for the Act itself and more than 200 pages for the regulations. Therefore, even if it is accepted that the 1897 Act was a simplistic policy, the instituting Act provided the structure that would inform the following versions of the
The totality of this Blanket Approach is the first operation in the pure function of the 1897 Act: the reference back to the structure of the constituting elements expressed in the Act.

The 1897 Act functioned as a blanket or a totality in four distinct ways. First, the 1897 Act aimed to cover or control the location of Australian Aboriginal peoples through removals and the institution of reservations controlled by either the Queensland government or managed by missions (Reynolds, 1990). The Western notion of location meant a capacity to move according to the will of institutions. The institutions dictated (and still dictate) ownership, town planning, definitions of communities, and where peoples were meant to be throughout the day. However, other worldview perspectives do not necessarily share this notion of location (Melia, 1998; Moreton-Robinson, 2003).

The first element in the 1897 Act was location and it functioned as an axis through which to institutionalise Australian Aboriginal presence or visibility, which was defined by specific numbers in specific places, and to make invisible those outside the accountability of the Act. Before the Act, the accountability of the Australian Aboriginal population depended on estimates informed by the number of distributed blankets, employees that were accountable for the records, and those few who lived on the periphery of the towns (Kidd, 1997). By 1910, the population control depended on the presence of Australian Aboriginal peoples that were under the authority of the agents of the 1897 Act, which were primarily the Protectors. In Queensland, by the beginning of the 20th century, just a few years after the implementation of the 1897 Act, the total number of Australian Aboriginal peoples in 27 locations (protectorates) was in total 12,724 “natives controlled by each Protector” (Annual Reports, 1910). The location and population were closely related to
controlling the Australian Aboriginal peoples. The “dying race” rhetoric was fuelled by the more accurate figures of the Australian Aboriginal population in the protectorates. This rhetoric was not something unseen in past experiences of colonisation; for example, in the 16th century, it began to be used as a reason for the sudden decline of Aboriginal peoples in parts of the Americas. However, historians such as Sued-Badillo (2003) argued that Aboriginal peoples might have been hidden so that they could be used as slaves when African slavery was imposed. Other Indigenous groups in the Americas (such as the Aztec and other nations around what is today Mexico) were institutionally forced to marry Europeans and their Aboriginal lineage was “erased”. This is not to say that disease was not widely reported, records demonstrate that it was, but it does raise the question of how many of those peoples in the history of colonialism escaped or were hidden. This question is not meant to be answered in this research; therefore, further research is needed to help illuminate this potentially obscured area of history.

The second element of the totalisation of the 1897 Act was the creation of the agents and institutions that would ensure that the Act was enforced. The protagonist agent in the Act was the figure of the Protector, who was a police officer with the exception of higher management Protectors such as the Northern Protector and then the Chief Protector. For example, Walter Roth was a well-published anthropologist and he served as the Northern Protector and Chief Protector in the first years of the Act (Ellinhaus, 2003). Other agents were also missionaries, teachers, nurses, medical doctors, and other relevant government and missionary employees. The Western government institutions that were quickly included in the protectorates were the police, labour management or human resources, schools, reformatories, and other
Western institutional activities such as agriculture, building, domestic chores, and more.

The setting in which the 1897 Act made Australian Aboriginal peoples visible had various institutional dimensions. The first dimension of the institutions of the protectorates was the penal institutions. This institution was formalised first because the Protectors were police officers. The penal institution deployed its power through the criminalisation of certain aspects of Australian Aboriginal practices and through the restriction of what non-Aboriginal peoples could do, for example, socialising with Australian Aboriginal peoples, opium and liquor use, and the possession of blankets by non-Aboriginal peoples were regarded as punishable offenses under the 1897 Act. All punishable offenses committed by Australian Aboriginal people in the protectorates and non-Aboriginal people were reported and classified as such. For example, it was recorded if the offenders were non-Aboriginal and usually the race if the person was not European or white Australian. It is important to highlight that the rest of the penal laws in the colony of Queensland did not apply to Australian Aboriginal peoples under the 1897 Act, primarily because they were not considered citizens under Australian law.

The second dimension of the element of institutionalisation was the restriction of employment and labour inside and outside the protectorates. A Protector was required to approve any employer who wanted to hire any Australian Aboriginal person under the 1897 Act. Permits for employment were approved and administered by the Protectors under the Act, and the Protectors had the power to agree to the terms of employment. In addition, the Australian Aboriginals’ labour wages were not paid to the worker, but rather they were sent to the protectorate. The last dimension was education, which was formalised later in the 1900s. This dimension came late, but it
became one of the most influential aspects of the protectorates. The education dimension was justified in 1906 by Acting Chief Protector Richard Howard when he advised the Parliament that by associating Australian Aboriginal peoples with only the “right kind of whites”, they would become more “quickly civilised” (Kidd, 1997).

These dimensions within the location of institutions operated as control towers to impose a specific Western worldview perspective. These institutions were prescribed by the Australian Colonial West nation-state, which was enacting a state without nation. That is, these institutions formed dimensions that were characteristic of the Western notion of state, but this state did not emerge from the nation it governed because the Australian nation-state imposed it. In hindsight, this totalisation can appear to be pure totalitarianism or imperialism, but to state this is to overlook the process that allowed this to occur. Colonisation in the 19th and 20th centuries is distinguished in order to prescribe a state that is (often) a product of a democratic nation-state. This operation usually involves an explicit imposition or sometimes a replacement of all important institutions, and their agents, of a given nation or nations (Mann, 2006).

The third element of the totalisation component of the 1897 Act, following location and institutions and its agents, is the restriction and creation of the production modes that allowed for the capitalisation of labour. Due to committed historians like Kidd (2006), we know that the 1897 Act provided the conditions through which the controlled wages of Australian Aboriginal peoples were stolen; wages had to be paid to the protectorate and they were kept in trusts and not paid in full to Australian Aboriginal peoples under the Act. The 1897 Act restricted the employment of Australian Aboriginal peoples, as mentioned earlier, through granting or denying permission to work. The 1897 Act also commanded that the protectors would control
the wages. These wages were directed to a trust fund. Some of the money was available to give Australian Aboriginal peoples “pocket money” from their wages. Another portion of the money was used for the operation of the protectorates. The regulation and control of the labour and wages in any given mode of production adds an important characterisation to the 1897 Act, some of which scholars have suggested as a form of slavery, in practice (Kidd, 2007; Lake, 1993; Reynolds, 1990).

Given the scope of this research, this capitalisation of Australian Aboriginal labour has common ground with the capitalisation of slavery in the 16th century and it has a close relationship with the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness. That is, the control of wages and labour, and the explicit intention of the 1897 Act to make protectorates sustainable and even profitable (Kidd, 2006) (e.g. Thursday Island see Annual Reports 1905) is the enslavement of labour. Aboriginal peoples were no longer owned, but the ownership was directed to the pure modes of production61, i.e. the productive forces and relations of production were considered property of the Queensland government. Instead of blackness representing a direct value and labour being the use-value of slavery, the enslavement of Australian Aboriginal labour was the capture of the modes of production and the re-signifying of them as pure value. This relocation of value and slavery, which was hidden in the processes of control and explicit monopolisation of Australian Aboriginal labour, could be possible given the previous location of value and use-value in the instauration of slavery in the conceptualisation of blackness, and more implicitly in the conceptualisation of aboriginality.

61 The modes of production in the Marxist sense are defined by the unity of producing necessary aspects of life, which is a step prior to the implementation of an added value system (Marx, 2002).
The fourth and last element of the totalisation component of the 1897 Act is the objects surrounding the Act, particularly the objects given as “relief” and then listed as part of the “welfare” of Australian Aboriginal peoples. At first, well before the 1897 Act, certain items were provided that were interpreted by Australian Aboriginal peoples as goods, such as tobacco, tomahawks, blankets, flour, fishhooks, liquor, rations, and other “necessary items to obtain food” (Annual Reports, 1900) according to the Queensland government. Objects are influential to evolving social practices in any given society, and Australian Aboriginal peoples are not an exception. This is not to say that objects determined the cultural practices, but that social practices occur around objects and they tend become part of everyday life. The key example that records register are the blankets because they became so important to Australian Aboriginal peoples that when the distribution stopped in 1905, the reports recorded that the Australian Aboriginal peoples preferred blankets over any other relief items (Annual Reports, 1906). Therefore, objects that link one group of peoples with another, and then form a specific relationship between them, are influential in the way that the relationship is formed. In the 1897 Act, which alluded to a set of objects that were primarily relief items, the objects informed the type of relationship between the Queensland government and Australian Aboriginal peoples; in this case, it was a relationship in which only Western objects for Western ways of living were privileged over others, and this indicates a relationship of domination. In general, Australian Aboriginal objects were not mentioned in the materials analysed, except for the anthropological reports.

The initial interpretations of Western objects by Australian Aboriginal peoples cannot be fully understood because even the anthropological materials do not aim to understand their interpretations. However, the research trend is to focus on objects
that have a specific use and effect, e.g. liquor. It is not difficult to see how this liquid can be integrated into everyday life, primarily due to its effect. Archaeology uses ‘objects’ to think about what might have occurred in a certain time through unravelling their functions. It is not difficult to imagine how rock paintings inform us of the culture of certain civilisations, or how distinct ceramic styles of different civilisations across time provides us with different information about that time. In an archaeology of colonisation, certain objects might inform us further about how their mechanisms functioned and, of particular interest here, how the 1897 Act functioned.

The object that this research focuses on is the blanket, which was a relief item provided prior to the 1897 Act to Australian Aboriginal peoples and then, in the Act, it was included explicitly in its language. This object serves as a form of content of how the 1897 Act functioned primarily in the space of labour, relief, and welfare. Blankets continue to be more consistently referred to in the Annual Reports, and even in the Parliamentary Reports, than seemingly more important topics such as crime, opium, and tobacco and alcohol consumption. The blankets were provided as an item of relief under the 1897 Act, but they had an independent section in the official documents such as the Annual Reports and in the law. The importance of blankets could be representative of the adverse conditions in Queensland because Australian Aboriginal peoples were removed from their lands and relocated to unfamiliar lands. Furthermore, the government used the blankets to survey Australian Aboriginal peoples, as mentioned previously; thus, they functioned in the accountability of the Australian Aboriginal population. It is the argument of this research that these reasons (among others) were not proportionate to the importance that the 1897 Act gave to the blankets, which were sometimes regarded as useless items. Even in the year after the
blankets were replaced by other relief items, the Annual Report (1906) reported the following:

Last year, on the recommendation of Dr. Roth, a change in the distribution was made so far as the Northern division of the State was concerned, in that tomahawks, knives, pipes, tobacco, print dresses, fishing lines, and fishing hooks were substituted to some extent for blankets, as it was thought then that these articles would be more acceptable than blankets to the recipients. This year, however, the substituted articles were not supplied to the same extent as last year, as the distributors reported that, in most cases, the aboriginals preferred the blankets. (*Annual Reports*, 1906, p. 9)

The reason why Australian Aboriginal peoples preferred the blankets to other items is not the objective of this research: what is relevant in this research is the importance of this item (the blankets) and what it could be communicating about the *1897 Act*. Why is this object found to be of such importance when unearthing the *1897 Act* machinery of colonisation?

Until this point, it has been discussed that the Blanket Approach of policy analysis implies a simplistic policy that attempts to address a complex phenomena or problem, which is a form of totalising the problem. However, the way in which a given totalisation is delivered through understanding the blankets as a form of content, which is described as a *Blanket Approach*, is very different. The state is no longer a kingdom that commands the subject by royal decree in the imperial sense of the form of government. Governments serve the delegated will of the “people” creating the nation (people)-state (government) formula. The nation-state form of governance constitutes the operation of every given state that is derived from that
logic or formula. That is, the explicit form of governance of the nation-state implies a conversation between the nation (people) and its representative, which is the state. The state obeys the initial command of the nation expressed in a social contract; this is the explicit and current Western formula of government. The 1897 Act functioned as a state designed by the nation-state of the colony of Queensland, and by extension the Colonial West, that commanded a nation (or a group of nations), but in a similar form of a normal state. A standard, or a totality, is designed and encrypted in law, enforced by agents and institutions, and delivered individually, just like the blankets. The totalisation operation of the Blanket Approach instituted a state without a nation with a specific set of areas of law that created legalities and illegalities (Deleuze, 1985; Dworkin, 1998) that it not only operated as an imperialistic imposition of a government (like a kingdom), which is a form of government that has been historically proven to be ineffective (Castro-Gómez, 2007), but also in the nation-state formula of production of the subject, which is a colonised subject in this case. Therefore, as a state, the 1897 Act covers simultaneously a set of nations and each individual that is under the Act: thus, how is the operation of totalisation delivered to the subjects that the Blanket Approach covers?

**Multiplicity**

By 1899, the registered employment permits for Australian Aboriginal peoples under the 1897 Act in Queensland accounted for 303 persons in Normanton, 80 in Townsville, 289 in Cooktown, 291 in Thursday Island, 54 in Charter Towers, 75 in Mackay, 151 in Coen and Cape Tribulation, and 92 in Cairns (Annual Reports, 1900). In 1916, the state of Queensland was divided into 64 protectorates, and the number of

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62 It is explicit because scholars including Foucault argue that this is not the modern formula of government, but the implicit function of government is best described by biopower and biopolitics (Castro-Gómez, 2007; Foucault, 2005).
registered employment permits increased to 3853 males and 823 females (Annual Reports, 1917). In 1937, 5480 Aboriginal people were in regular employment (3701 full bloods and 1779 half-castes, as was documented). The year of 1899 reported a total of 6126 blankets issued in the three police districts of Townsville, Cairns, and Normanton. The blankets were only distributed to “the blacks that were not in regular employment” (Annual Reports, 1900). The employment figures and blanket distribution assisted the state with the Australian Aboriginal population estimates. The population estimates of the Queensland government in 1903 reported Queensland as having the second largest Australian Aboriginal population with 25,000 people. New South Wales reported the largest population with 30,000 people and Victoria reported the smallest figure with 382 people (Annual Reports, 1904). For more than one hundred years before the 1897 Act, the population estimates had been being reported as problematic by Members of Parliament, commission reports, and other documentation of the Queensland government. The main problem was that the numbers were “only estimates” (Evans, 2007). From a Western perspective, it makes sense that in order to “solve a problem”, in this case the problem of Aboriginal affairs, the real number of those who the problem speaks of must be produced. For the first 40 years, the 1897 Act attempted to construct a complete picture of the Australian Aboriginal “problem” through, mainly, using accurate population numbers.

Multiplicity, which was coined by Riemann (Derbyshire, 2004) and then used more broadly by Husserl (2009) and Deleuze (1985), refers to the operation in between the total and the one, or its unit. Multiplicity uses numbers as a tool to consolidate the operation in which subjectivity is managed in between the spaces of totalisation and that of the subject, i.e. how the blanket of colonisation is distributed. That is, a given multiplicity is the pathway to providing a given narrative of a subject.
It is not the intention of this research to suggest that the numbers and figures pose a problem or are oppressive in themselves because they served an important descriptive function for what the numbers referred to. What is of interest in this research is the capacity of the numbers to simultaneously speak of each unit and of the total, because the numbers in themselves mean very little as numbers are aided by a given story or a total of stories. The totalisation of the Colonial West draws a picture of what it speaks of, the colonised subject, through elucidating a set of figures that tell a set of stories. However, these totalising stories have the capacity to reach each unit that the total speaks of. At the same time that it can speak of a total of 600 workers in a factory, this total speaks of each person through expressing that figure. The underlying story or narrative of the workers in the factory is constituted through the identification of the total number (600) and, through this, the narrative is distributed to each of the workers individually. Furthermore, it is indifferent to the problems of generalisations and individualisations given that it does not claim accuracy in deduction or in induction forms of reasoning. Therefore, it escapes the empire of the structure and of anthropocentrism. Discourses (are a) function to produce subjectivity. Following this line, Deleuze states:

The subject is dialectical, it has the characteristic capacity of ‘being’ in the first person experience, from which discourses start, but enunciative multiplicity is an anonymous primitive function that only allow the subject to live and be in the third person experience and its derived functions. (1985, p. 41)

Thus, multiplicity is not only the point in which discourses and subjects meet, but it also operates as the modulator of the intentional and non-intentional experiences (Deleuze, 1985). In this dynamic state, the subjectivity and the person that meet are
referred by and through the number. That is, multiplicity is the point in which the totality enters. In the function of the administration of the colonised subject, a given story is totalised, yet a second operation is required in order to reach to the subject and that is the function of multiplicity: the operation in which a given blanket of totalisation is distributed or “handed down”.

As the 1897 Act continued to operate, it reported more and more figures using the set of narratives from the Act; it reported figures of crime, school attendance, items of relief, labour and employment, and other topics informed by the anthropological discourse or knowledge of the nature of Australian Aboriginal peoples. The set group of stories or enunciations provided a productive capacity to create more stories that are self-referential to the first stories. These meta-stories (stories of stories) create their form from the first stories that were given in the provided picture. Multiplicity is a better method of telling the story of a number because it refers to the entry and exit points of the subject. The multiplicity of the figures of school attendance in the Protector Reports in Queensland in the early 1900s tells a different story to the multiplicity of the figures of school performance or the figures of the number of schools per population ratio. The multiplicity of the figures of removals and relocations tell a different story to that of the figures of property owners or available housing in remote and urban areas. This is not to posit that multiplicity is limited to a politics of numbers and figures; that is, multiplicity is not only the use of numerical data to support an argument. The illustrations of multiplicity tell a story that speaks to the nature of the operation of the multiplicities as a derived function of the total body of a command expressed, in this case, by a law. The productive and effective capacity of multiplicity lies in how the total picture of the story is delivered to each of the units of the whole.
One year prior to the significant amendment of the 1897 Act in 1939, opium was finally removed from the name of the Act, and the Annual Reports detailed the following numbers for each protectorate: the hospitalisations and diseases admitted for, school attendance, figures of diseases, mortality and fertility rates, marriages (including interracial marriages), specific figures of mostly Australian Aboriginal crime, vocational training figures, recreation and types of recreation, and the population of Australian Aboriginal peoples divided into full bloods and half-castes (Kidd, 1997). These figures and their accompanying narratives accounted for the 18,024 Australian Aboriginal peoples in the state of Queensland located in government settlements, church missions, the Torres Strait Islands, and country districts; the 1897 Act spoke of this total and therefore of each unit that comprised the aforementioned number. Therefore, the 1938 report illustrates the full deployment of the narrative of the 1897 Act as told through the language of numbers (Annual Reports, 1939).

The operation of multiplicity is not only concerned with explicit numbers, but also with the figure of the number, which illustrates the operation of multiplicity when it delivered the 1897 Act totalisation. The operation of the delivery of the totalisation of the 1897 Act was in-function of the derived function of the dispersion of subjectivity. This dispersion slowly but steadily fed back to the framework that the 1897 Act designed, which created a more complex picture and additional elements for its operation. The function or equation always presents more variables and considerations, but it is determined by the root function of a multiplicity of the 1897 Act. The 1897 Act multiplicity function of diseases operates individually through producing the question and the narrative within diseases in subjectivity to Australian

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63 See examples of the 1939 Annual Report, specifically the various tables with different topics in the 23-page report and pages 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, and 16-20.
Aboriginal peoples and not *from* them. Concretely, every person could be potentially subjected by the operation of this multiplicity regardless whether the answer of the question of disease is positive or negative. The multiplicity of a report on venereal diseases imposes a specific narrative or totalisation on the reports of the numbers of people suffering from them and those who are not. The function of the operation has been already or *a priori* deployed before the numbers were provided. Multiplicity can be seen being distributed in the same way as blankets were distributed individually. However, the distribution of such individual blankets of multiplicity is not sufficient to have a real effect at the micro-level of people. In order to appreciate the way that the command of the *1897 Act* affected people, the question of power must be asked. How did the Blanket Approach that totalised and distributed blankets of multiplicity in the *1897 Act* operate individually? What energised this operation to continue enabling the *1897 Act* machine to function?

**Creation of desire**

In 1900, the second year of the operation of the *1897 Act*, Dr Walter E. Roth, then the Northern Protector of Aboriginals in Queensland, stated in the Annual Report of that year:

Personally, I might be allowed to take the opportunity of expressing the opinion that this annual gift of blankets to aboriginals is in many cases a misplaced charity, that its promiscuous grant should not be looked upon as a matter of right, but regarded rather in the light of a medical adjunct and comfort for the aged, the young, and the sick. I am accordingly impressing upon local protectors of the more outlying districts the expediency of discouraging able-bodied aboriginals not yet accustomed to them from applying “to the Government” these articles. Of course, at the present time
blankets are distributed only to such blacks as are not in regular employment; and I certainly would not recommend any stoppage of the supply to those who have thus become regularly used to them. I recognise, furthermore that the promiscuous gift of blankets in past years has tended to the utter desuetude of the native-made opossum-skin and bark-cloth rugs...up in the Coen and Cape, districts of the Peninsula, it is of interest to note the concurrence of view of Sub-Inspector Garraway, the local protector, with that of Sergeant Whiteford... “The blacks up here would be nearly as well off without a blanket as with one; in fact, in most cases now, the blacks who do receive blankets either throw them away or get rid of them before they have had them a month.” (Annual Reports, 1901, p. 18)

This was the first reported argument against the distribution of blankets by the Northern Protector, Dr Roth. His recommendation was implemented in 1905 (the year that he was removed from the role) and as stated in an earlier quote: “the distributors reported that, in most cases, the aboriginals preferred the blankets” (Annual Reports, 1906, p. 9).

In order to understand the form of content of the Blanket Approach, the functioning of the object it refers to must be described in the context of the historicity of the 1897 Act. Blankets were part of the relief items of the 1897 Act, yet for decades before that Queensland and other colonies in Australia distributed blankets to Australian Aboriginal peoples (Evans, 2007). Under the 1897 Act, blankets were the most important relief item reported. A large part of the budget of this Act was allocated to the purchase of blankets that fluctuated between 6,000 and 10,000 blankets per year. A whole section of the Annual Reports was dedicated to the distribution of blankets and the report of unlawful possession of this relief item. To
think about blankets is to understand them as objects that cover the individual bodies of people and protect them from multiple effects. Blankets protect, cover, hide, enclose, and touch people. If a person does not have a blanket, they have to bear the cold; when a person has a blanket, they are protected. However, once a person is protected, their tolerance to the outside is reduced. This can be understood by the maxim of “the more you use it, the more you want it”. In the context of the 1897 Act, blankets were objects that were present everywhere and eventually became desired, as reported and mentioned previously, by Australian Aboriginal peoples.

The creation of desire for the blanket object illustrates the final mechanism of the operation of the 1897 Act. Walter Roth was right to not see any practical reason to continue to invest a large part of the budget (between £2,000 and £9,000 per year) on the distribution of blankets. Although the weather conditions in Queensland could have required Australian Aboriginal peoples at times to consider the use of blankets, this reasoning can be easily defeated when considering the long history of Australian Aboriginal civilisation. At times, the Chief Protector and the Members of Parliament reported that funding was required for reaching certain areas to implement the 1897 Act and the cost effectiveness of the distribution of blankets was questioned (see Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1899). Other than budget and policy ineptitude reasons from the Queensland government, other factors must have had a role in the importance of blankets. A modern capitalist strategy to make a product attractive is to create a need for it, assuming that there was no apparent use for it. Sometimes, the sole presence of the item eventually naturalises it into everyday life; once that occurs, its absence will be noted. The noticing of the absence is not only activated as a result of its everyday use or due to its pure function, but it is also activated as a result of the added value of the imagined sense of need. The imagined sense of need is desire.
Leaving the psychoanalytical debate aside, desire is something that is not fully located in the realm of the real: desire can be regarded as the driving force to and for the real produced in the imaginary realm and signified by the realm of the symbolic (Lacan, 1977). That is, objects can produce an added sense of value that is not ruled by its pure function but rather it is influenced by a sense of desire. The blanket distribution stopped being reported after 1917, but the instituted function illustrated by this relief item was a manifestation of the final function of the operation of the 1897 Act, i.e. the creation of desire.

The Blanket Approach operation of the 1897 Act had the final function of creating the desire for the blankets of a totalising Westernisation, delivered via multiplicity and developing a relationship with these blankets. The notion of desire in this research is conceptualised closer to the Foucauldian notion of power (Deleuze, 1985) because the psychoanalytical perspective of desire drives an individualistic focus, and this research attempts to resist the anthropological discourse dimension of colonisation. If Foucault stated that “power produced reality” (2007), then in the same gesture, Deleuze would state, “desire produces reality” (1985). In that sense, Deleuze (1995) equated Foucault’s notion of power with his notion of desire. In an interview, Deleuze narrates a conversation with Foucault:

The last time we saw each other he respectfully said that he couldn’t stand the word ‘desire’… He said something along the lines of, ‘I can’t avoid it thinking it means repression or something that has been repressed, perhaps that what I call desire you would call pleasure’. (Deleuze, 1995, p. 23)

However, for Deleuze, desire would mean not only the product of absence or lack of something, but the relationship between people and a given subjectivity or a given multiplicity. This understanding of desire highlights the tension, which
transcends simple violence (Deleuze, 1985), between the institution of totalisation, the multiplicity, and the person. Its contact point is not in the positivity of power, but on the specificity of the imagined subject (or what Deleuze (1995) refers to as a body without organs). This process operates subjectively on each person, but in a more or less copied function of a given multiplicity that refers back to an instituted totalisation. This operation can almost be represented as a mathematical expression or an algorithm. Totalisation can be regarded as the mathematical laws or their assumptions, the multiplicity the operation that performs the function of a given unit, and lastly the creation of desire is the reproductive capacity of creating a given result in a serial way, given a set of specific variables and/or values. The creation of the desire operation speaks to the reproductive capacity of the 1897 Act in the micro-level arena of peoples to produce a serialisation of identifications or identities.

MacCorquodale (1987) analysed 700 pieces of legislation across Australia in which he identified “no less than 67 identifiable classifications, descriptions, or definitions” (p. 9) of Australian Aboriginal peoples. In his research, he found no clear consistency with the assumption that these definitions were based on the biological notion of race. He states, “Australian legislation was predicated on the basis of white superiority, and white fear. Both ‘blood’ and economic factors predicated a statutory relegation of non-Caucasoids” (MacCorquodale, 1987, p. 24). Taking aside the biological racial debate, which is not the focus of this referred article either, these definitions predicate the possible combinations of the understanding of Australian Aboriginal peoples and it even suggests that it determines the content of the broad meaning of “race”. One of the pieces of legislation analysed by MacCorquodale is the 1897 Act, and particularly the definition provided in that law, which was described in Section 4. This definition was the focus of discussion in the Parliamentary Debates in
all years when the 1897 Act underwent changes (see for instance *Queensland Parliamentary Debates* from 1899, 1903, and 1909). As MacCorquodale found, the debates focus revolved around whiteness, economics, morals, inferiority, and sometimes Members of Parliament cited international experiences such as that with Maoris in New Zealand, Native Americans in the United States, and the colonial experience in India.

The imposed Western definitions of Australian Aboriginal peoples do not determine the identity of every single person. Rather, they are the product of the reproductive capacity of the Colonial West conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness. That is, the conceptualisation of aboriginality and blackness co-created the means through which the Colonial West drew the picture of the machine of the 1897 Act, because it was the colonial space of this discursive formation. The function of the creation of desire constituted the reproductive capacity of the Act. That is, the creation of desire is the function that serialises the content of the 1897 Act. It combines the serialising root of the function of a monstrous anthropology, blackness, slavery, the hierarchy of social Darwinism, and other specific historicity elements to the subject in question. The function is the command, the machine of colonisation, which is embodied in this context as the 1897 Act. This imposed relationship, which is instituted by a given totalisation and delivered in a given multiplicity, creates the by-product of a given imagined subject. In turn, this creates the desire that will be the void and drive of colonisation at large, which manifested in the subjugation of the colonised. As in the case of the blankets, there was no rational argument to justify the preference for them. However, eventually, the imposed object became desired because the creation of desire was instituted when the given relationship was established. The same as the Foucauldian notion of power relationships, desire is
relational and its violence is only a manifestation of the power relationship. The manifestation of the power or the process of the creation of desire it is not only expressed in brute force, but also in the case of the 1897 Act it is manifested in the disproportionate presence of the individual “blankets” of colonisation, forcing the subject to establish a relationship with it. The function of the creation of desire is the forced relationship with a subjectivity that is manifested in a created definition of identity that modulates, either positively or negatively, the subject it speaks of.

When Foucault argued that panopticism was the way that that power functions in the operation of “seeing without being seen”, his illustration of Bentham’s Panopticon could not be more precise (Foucault, 1976). Furthermore, this architectural design was (and remains) frequently present in the institutions through which power was evidently deployed in a panoptical operation. This research is far from claiming such ingenuity and preciseness as it cannot claim the readily availability of the physical structures in the aforementioned institutions of power like panopticism in schools, prisons, factories, etc. The non-discursive way in which the 1897 Act functioned cannot claim that it will physically have blankets in some of its institutions of power; therefore, the Blanket Approach operation today must be thought within a referent that does not refer to the physical but on, sometimes, the expression of a Blanket Approach. Non-discursive power, such as the Panopticon, is defined by its pure functions: panoptical power can exist without the physical structure. For example, a panoptical managerial power can exist through the management having the capacity to monitor every staff member’s computer in an office. In this research, to state that the 1897 Act operated as a Blanket Approach does not refer to the policy analysis phrase that expresses the simplicity of a law, nor does it refer to the physical blankets distributed by the Queensland government for close to
100 years. Instead, it refers to a wordplay that highlights the triple function of the 1897 Act of totalisation, of multiplicity, and of the creation of desire. That is, it refers to the pure function of a blanket as a total, as its potential productive capacity of being distributed individually and its potential reproductive capacity of being imposed. In this sense, a Blanket Approach finds its functional manifestation, at times, in the functional analysis of policy as being a totalising law that addresses a complex situation in the same way as the architectural manifestation of the Panopticon is found in the buildings of institutions that harbour and use Panoptical power, such as schools, factories, and prisons.
Part 4: Towards a Conclusion
Chapter VI

Blue-and-White Spode China: A Conceptualist Movement

Figure 7 Danie Mellor's *Bayi Minyjirral* (2013)*64*

In the last three chapters, the artefacts of colonisation have been unearthed from their global origins and their local command. Though this inquiry has been limited to the global formation of the conceptualising tools of *aboriginality* and *blackness*, and the administrative function of the *Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium* Act of 1897 in Queensland (*1897 Act*), this archaeology of colonisation has critically investigated this form of government to see it and talk about it in different ways. First, the formation of the conceptualisation of *aboriginality* occurred within a frame of aesthetics and not as part of a social

*64* Images from Danie Mellor’s art were retrieved from his website: [http://daniemellor.com/](http://daniemellor.com/).
Darwinist hierarchy; specifically, aboriginality was formed in a frame of monstrous aesthetics. This implies that its constituting rules of formation or processes are framed addressing an anthropocentric monstrosity and they were not formed originally addressing the social Darwinist perspective of an inequality of races. Second, the formation of the conceptualisation of blackness was not initially tied to slavery alone, because blackness and slavery were not initially interchangeable, and blackness was historically formed using aboriginality as a referent because it was tied historically through inheriting slavery from the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas. Third, both of these conceptualisations were used interchangeably in the command of colonisation in Queensland, Australia, through the 1897 Act; yet the administrative function of this Act used the form of content described here as the Blanket Approach. In sum the operationalisation of the governmental artefact of colonisation is constituted, at least, by the description of the global conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality, and the local administrative function of the 1897 Act described in the form of content of the Blanket Approach.

This chapter aims to propose how the integration of the global with the local can be considered in future research on colonisation. The proposed integration of the conceptualisations that provide colonisation with the content to depict the colonised and the manner in which the colonised will be drawn in a given administrative movement is framed in a technology of power (Foucault, 1990) or the form of power of the conceptualist movement. The specific form of power described here is framed initially via aesthetics and unearthed through an archaeology of colonisation. The theorisation of this form of power as a conceptualist movement falls outside the scope of the archaeological method, and I have drawn on another aesthetic response to colonisation: the blue-and-white Spode china technique that Aboriginal artist Danie
Mellor uses to paint the colonial transformations of the landscapes of histories in Australia. In this theorisation, as in Mellor’s art, colonial transformations of people and landscapes are explained in the context of the form of government of colonisation. The aesthetic framework, within which the formation of the subjectivity of the colonised has been modulated, highlights the way in which a form of power, like the conceptualist movement, can operate through using conceptual content and movement simultaneously to govern the colonised.

The conceptualist movement refers here to a type of technology (in the Foucauldian sense of technologies of power) or form of power that uses aesthetically constructed conceptualisations, such as blackness and aboriginality with their attached sets of processes – to help administer the colonised. A “movement” is similar to the administrative function or the pure function described as the Blanket Approach. Agamben’s (2005) notion of movement is related to the administrative capacity of a government to shape the subject it governs. Agamben distinguishes between the two notions of movement previously described in Schmitt (1933). The first notion is the well-known concept of political movement: “the decisive political concept when the democratic concept of the people, as a political body, is in demise. Democracy ends when movements emerge. Substantially there are no democratic movements” (Agamben, 2005, para. 9). The second notion relates to the “unpolitical sphere of the administration” (Agamben, 2005, para. 9), where the unpolitical or non-political character of people becomes described as a population and its biopolitical character becomes the configuration of such movement. “The people is now turned from constitutive political body into population: a demographical biological entity, and as such unpolitical. An entity to protect, to nurture.” (Agamben, 2005, para. 7) Then, in order to justify the rethinking of the concept of movement, Agamben (2005) adds “if
we think about the intrinsic politicisation of the biopolitical, which is already thoroughly political and needs not be politicised through the movement, then we have to rethink the notion of the movement too” (para. 7). The conceptualist movement draws from the non-political administrative dimension of movement to identify the object of the pure governance function of the of the state, and this administrative function is simultaneously framed in the aesthetic construction of conceptualised populations of people. With colonisation in mind, conceptualist here refers to the aesthetic construction of imageries that interact with and come to represent the subjectivity of the colonised in the minds and gaze of colonial agents. Furthermore, as Groys (2011) noted:

Every act of aestheticization has its author. We always can and should ask the questions: who aestheticizes— and to what purpose? The aesthetic field is not a space of peaceful contemplation— but a battlefield on which gazes clash and fight… this suggests the subjugation of life under a certain form. (para. 16)

The colonial conceptualist battlefield is constituted by the techno-political operation of colonisation, that is, the administrative movement to subjugate the colonised. Together, and simultaneously, the conceptualist movement becomes a form of power that aids the form of government of colonisation.

This chapter does not aim to explain the operation of the form of power of the conceptualist movement, as Foucauldian archaeology only maps the historicity of the origin and the command; it is not equipped to draw conclusions that would follow a formal logic or a linear cause and effect rationale. Furthermore, Foucault reached an explanation of the technology of the self within pastoral power (similar to what is theorised here as the conceptualist movement), after 25 years of research, and through
using the methodological tool of genealogy. A technology or form of power like the conceptualist movement could be best investigated using Foucauldian genealogy. However, when unearthing and analysing the colonisation artefact, the mechanism that operates closest to the colonised cannot be ignored; therefore, this chapter begins to describe the technology of colonisation utilising a frame of analysis informed by the discourse of aesthetics and its administrative function, without claiming this initial description as a fully formed analysis.

**Blue-and-White Spode China**

In this part, it is argued that the blue-and-white Spode china (blue-china) technique illustrates a conceptualist movement and how the integration of the first part of the conceptualisation of colonisation in the 15th and 16th centuries using the 19th and 20th centuries Blanket Approach mechanism can appear. Similar to Foucault’s analytical pathway in his archaeological inquiry into Western knowledge, where he demonstrates through Diego Velázquez’s *Las Meninas* how knowledge operated in the classical episteme through pure representation and an inability to gaze back into a knowing subject, the blue-china technique in Danie Mellor’s works demonstrates the twofold operation of colonisation and its incommensurable relationship with the “real”; in other words, Mellor’s blue-china technique is an aesthetic manifestation that exemplifies this form of power.

The blue-china technique illustrates the conceptualist movement that uses the global colonial history of the materials used to create blue pigments to paint the

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65 In *Technologies of the Self* (1990), Foucault states:

My objective for more than twenty-five years has been to sketch out a history of the different ways in our culture that humans develop knowledge about themselves: economics, biology, psychiatry, medicine, and penology. The main point is not to accept this knowledge at face value but to analyse these so-called sciences as vert specific “truth games” related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves. (p. 46)
history of the specific colonised territories in question in a given specific movement. Danie Mellor’s work paints landscapes of the places and events (imagined or real) in Australian history using the blue-china technique; see for example Figure 7 above. The complicit colonial history of blue was manufactured in a similar manner to that of how Western aboriginality and blackness was manufactured as a conceptualisation to transform the landscapes of history in a totalising and individualising process. In this sense, the transformation of the landscapes of the blue-china technique is similar to the Blanket Approach in delivering notions of colonisation. It can be said that, similarly, the conceptualist movement of colonisation drew and continues to draw the landscapes and subjectivities of the colonised.

In order to describe how Mellor’s blue-china technique is similar to the conceptualist movement operation, this part describes the content used for conceptualising colonisation, which is the colour blue, and the movement for the administration of colonisation, which is depicted in the transformation of the landscapes. Blue represents a marker in colonial history that had the function to depict frames of exotic images in porcelain objects such as dinnerware. Furthermore, blue paint was a rare colour until the 18th century when it was first accidentally manufactured synthetically. The second element of the blue-china technique, i.e. the transformation the landscapes, indicates a topological understanding of the conceptualisation of colonisation as a cartography of the shared history of the Colonial West and the original inhabitants of Australia. Mellor’s blue-china technique beautifully mimics the dinnerware porcelain that transformed the British Empire’s colonial endeavours into fine dining or collectable objects to be purchased or “consumed”. However, rather than capturing Oriental portraits and landscapes,

66 Through his research, Mellor (UQ Art Museum, 2014) found that there was no word that meant the colour blue in Aboriginal languages prior to colonisation.
Mellor’s blue-china technique captures the Colonial West’s mind to be observed by the viewer. The blue-china technique maps the Colonial West transformation of the landscapes, but it also maps the Colonial West’s perspective or worldview. In that sense, the object to be gazed upon or to be the focus of the study is not Australian Aboriginal peoples, but the mindset of the Colonial West.

The “real” aspects in Mellor’s work are painted in their distinctive colours to demonstrate that the blue-china cannot “talk about them”. Mellor states that the “real” existed tens of thousands of years before the arrival of the Colonial West and that it has a different and, perhaps, almost unreachable history and worldview. Although Mellor explicitly acknowledges that he is an artist and not an activist, he does state that his work is profoundly political (UQ Art Museum, 2014). The relationship between the blue-china technique and the “real” representations of the original inhabitants of Australia is shared, but with an inherent dissonance. This difference indicates the asymmetry of worldviews: one populates the surroundings of the paintings and the other exists surrounded by the blue-china but unattainable by it. In *Memento mori* (Figure 8), one of Mellor’s more explicitly theoretical paintings, the dead body of an Australian Aboriginal person is under a blanket painted using the blue-china, while the “real” is observed in the periphery of the painting that depicts the classic Western way to lecture and demonstrate medical and anatomical research. This painting, which has been carefully crafted and represented, illustrates that the ideas conceptualised by the Colonial West were distinctively from and for the Colonial West and cannot encompass the “real”. Furthermore, it suggests that the rituals and the history of the knowledge, cultural customs, techniques, paradigms, and mental schemas of the Colonial West have not been conceptualised as the subjects of colonisation have been conceptualised. The blue-china technique is an attempt to map
the conceptualisation of the Colonial West in order to have it become the subject of which it speaks. Because blue has particular significance in the Colonial West, the history of this colour must be briefly discussed.

Figure 8 Danie Mellor's Memento mori (2009)

The blue-china technique is predicated by the colonial conceptualisation of blue as a colour that is difficult to find, and that is historically synthetised by Colonial West knowledges. Blue takes a protagonist role in Western culture, whereas in other histories that was not the case. Mellor (UQ Art Museum, 2014) states:

I haven’t been able to find an Aboriginal language word for the colour blue. It’s almost like blue was not conceptualised, it was recognised through words for sky, for instance, or water. So it’s almost like the transformed landscape talks about that which was brought with Western culture – in a way talking about the symbolically manufactured, or the ‘change forever’. (p. 8)
Chinese blue porcelain is regarded as a classic representation of Chinese culture that began in the 10th century with the Yang dynasty (Zhu & Shao, 2009). In contrast, blue in Western culture has always been manufactured. For blue porcelain, this colour was obtained from cobalt blue. However, there are few naturally occurring materials that can provide blue pigments. The first source of blue in Western culture was lapis lazuli, which was only found in the north-eastern region of Afghanistan, in Badakhsan (Kiser, 2014). It has been used since the 4th millennia in Mesopotamian cultures (Kiser, 2014); however, the first time that it was used in its ultramarine colour (a vivid and intense shade of blue, which is the preferred shade of blue) in Western culture was in paintings from the 12th century. In order to produce the ultramarine colour, lapis lazuli could not simply be crushed but had to be extracted using specific chemical ingredients. Given that there was only one source of lapis lazuli, it was very difficult to find and only a few paintings could use it. The most common material for creating this shade of blue was ultramarine ash, but it had a lower quality of lapis lazuli (Kiser, 2014). The first time that blue was synthetised in an alchemy laboratory was in 1709 when Diesbash accidentally created a blue pigment (Kiser, 2014); the chemical compound was a mixture of potassium and iron sulphides. This synthetised blue pigment, which became known as Prussian blue, was the first time a blue pigment had been manufactured in large quantities. Prior to this, lapis lazuli had been very difficult to find and therefore blue was an exclusive colour that symbolised wealth and beauty.

The history of blue in Western culture is very long and interesting, but other civilisations also conceptualised blue, such as the Chinese civilisation in their porcelain. Given that the Chinese culture had blue and white porcelain that Western culture considered beautiful, particularly in the British Colonial West Empire, it was
targeted and acquired as a valuable exotic object. Later, blue and white porcelain was manufactured in other places, including Britain, and was used in teacups, decorative plates, and dinnerware sets. The images portrayed in the blue and white transfers communicated a “global language” of colonial conquest (UQ Art Museum, 2014). Portraits of exotic images from the Orient were embedded in the dinnerware from which meals were eaten: it can be said that the Oriental culture was “literally eaten” (UQ Art Museum, 2014). This was an analogous way of experiencing exotic cultures, albeit from afar. Mellor states, “blue and white talks about the idea of the exotic space” (UQ Art Museum, 2014, p. 9); in this case, blue represents the Colonial West’s synthetic manufacturing of the colonised cultures.

A second element of the blue-china technique is the way it transforms landscapes. This refers to the use of blue to draw a map of history, in opposition to portraying factual historical events; it refers to a totality of the vignette as opposed to the “real”. This can be seen in Mellor’s paintings using the blue-china technique, which Martin-Chew (10 August 2014) described as follows:

As an artist he brings together an unusual, innovative hybridization - not unlike the way Australia has been formed. Yet unlike many artists who draw on their Aboriginality as subject, his images also echo colonial histories and European antecedents. (para. 1)

The transformation of landscapes via the blue-china technique aims to map the worldview of the Colonial West history for the “real” and other spectators’ enjoyment as it is captured by our gaze upon it, as the Colonial West “looked” at the colonised since the beginning of the global colonial experience. The blue-china technique that encapsulated colonial imagery for the enjoyment of the Colonial West is similar to the way that the Colonial West encapsulated the image of the colonised through modern
sciences and interpretative history. The Colonial West captured the idea of aboriginality, of blackness, and of history, as well as many other ideas, and transformed them into familiar landscapes. The landscapes that Mellor paints speak to a cultural interaction between the Colonial West and Aboriginal culture in Australia. This interaction is not a balanced coexistence: it favours the blue-china that surrounds the real.

However, agency survives in two ways: first, the real is ever present and not captured by the blue-china or the frame at times and, second, the gaze of the real and of the spectator is being directed to look at the intricate landscape of colonisation. This mapping of colonisation seduces the spectator to closely examine the intricate web and to be confronted by the convolution of the history of coloniality (Grosfoguel, 2008b; Mignolo, 1996; Quijano, 1992) given that the transformation that this map describes appears to be imposed. The subject of Mellor’s paintings is the blue-china technique itself and, by extension, the subject of the paintings is the Colonial West. That is, the transformation of the landscapes is a cartography of the Colonial West worldview to be engaged with, to be understood, to be known, and, through that, to be captured, and perhaps conquered.
The blue-china technique demonstrates how the content of the synthetisation of blue, representing colonial conceptualisations, is used to transform, map, and capture the landscape of the history of the mind of the Colonial West in Australia. In a similar movement to the blue pigment, the conceptualisation (or manufacture) of Western aboriginality and blackness provides the content for the delivery of colonisation. Similar to the blue-china technique, the Blanket Approach provides a defined mind and historical landscape delivered simultaneously at a macro level and at a micro level. In this sense, space is re-understood as individual (in the mind) and simultaneously collective (historical), like a single drop of water that reflects and
contains an image of the skies. With the blue-china technique in mind, the two-fold process of colonisation is constituted by a non-linear relationship between the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality and of blackness, and the pure function of colonisation described by the Blanket Approach. That is, the twofold process of the colonisation machine finds its form in the correlation between the conceptualisation and the function, and this is integrated into the operation as a whole of a conceptualist movement.

**A Conceptualist Movement**

Mellor’s blue-china technique aesthetically reflects the discursive or conceptualist element of colonisation alongside its non-discursive or functional movement; in its operation, it carries the global historicity of colonisation and the local historicity that determines the manner in which it moves to create the conditions of possibility for the subjectivity of the colonised. Together, in a conceptualist movement, colonisation is aided not only through operating within the social Darwinism functional hierarchy or through only certain global conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality predicated by the single machinery of colonisation (for example, the World/System or the International Division of Labour), but it is also operated through both simultaneously.

The administrative movement of Western culture shaped not only the subjects it wanted to “make live”, but also the subjects it wanted to “let die” (Foucault in Castro Gómez, 2007); the biopolitical movement not only governed colonisers but it also governed and dominated the colonised. That is, the conceptualist movement can be thought as the operation in which a colonised subject was conceptualised and administered in the biopolitical sense of government. Its local dimension in the context of Queensland, Australia, took the form of the Blanket Approach, and its
global dimension was entangled with, at least, the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness, forged in the origins of colonisation. The blue-china technique allows us to “see” the conceptualist movement from a gaze that positions the viewer below the blanket of Westernisation; the conceptual colonial content, represented by blue, is historically threaded in colonising “patterns”.

Biopolitics is the notion that Foucault elaborated in order to explicate the governmental turn that the State took, sometime after the 16th century, from “letting live the desired subjects of the Kingdom and killing the undesired subjects to making live the desired subjects that serve the State and letting die the undesired subjects” (Castro-Gómez, 2007, p. 158, emphasis added). The conceptualist movement is located in the space of a biopolitical government where there is an administrative function of letting the undesired subjects die. Colonisation is often regarded solely as a form of domination and control; however, it is less often conceptualised as a form of government. Similarly, the biopolitical form of government is often theorised focussing on the ways that the State “makes live” its desired subjects, for example through regulating population health, births, deaths, mental health, and all other institutional governmental practices that subject individuals to a productive lifestyle according to the State (Foucault, 2005). The form of government that “lets die” the undesired subjects is often less theorised; however, colonisation through the conceptualist movement is a method that aids the operation of governing the undesired subjects, i.e. the colonised, that does not make these subjects live but rather has detrimental effects in their lives using similar indicators that biopolitics uses to make subjects live, i.e. health, births, deaths, education, employment, etc. Foucault did not theorise about colonisation because it was not the focus of his works (Castro-Gómez, 2007), yet the operationalisation of colonisation constituted by the racial
discursive devices, i.e. conceptualisations of aboriginality and of blackness, and the administrative movement applied to the colonised have a close relationship to the biopolitical nature of Western forms of government.

Colonisation is located in the biopolitical space of Western government that lets the colonised die using the twofold operation of the conceptualising movement: the colonised are not only subjected to the technology of the self or pastoral power (Foucault, 1990) but also to the form of power described as the conceptualist movement. Differing to the modulation of subjectivity deployed from a technology of the self, which is essentially inflicted through discourses making the subject talk through verbalisations67 (Deleuze 1985; Foucault, 1990), the conceptualist movement discursively projects a set of narratives, which are heavily reliant on appearances that are constituted by its colonial historicity. The conceptualisations of aboriginality and of blackness are imageries that locate the processes of the narratives of the subject it speaks of; these imageries become the colonisation set of “colours” in which its subjectivity is framed. The administrative movement predicated the direction and the pattern that the conceptualisation uses to “paint” subjectivity. The pure function of the way the colonised subjectivity is administered, and using any given conceptualisation, is determined through the interests of the State. Hierarchal rationales, such as social Darwinism and the discourse of anthropology at large, operate to configure the operation of the State’s government and not the other way in which, for example, racism is regarded to arise from people’s judgement. That is, the administrative movement of the discourse of anthropology pre-exists, i.e. it is a priori, embedded in

67 Foucault (1990) states when describing the technology of the self of pastoral power: “Throughout Christianity there is a correlation between disclosure of the self, dramatic or verbalised, and the renunciation of the self. My hypothesis from looking at these two techniques is that it’s the second one, verbalization, which becomes important.” (p. 49)
the social institutional functions that create the conditions in which certain job positions, e.g. academic job positions, are for one part of the population and not others.

Moreover, the conceptualist part of the conceptualist movement is not constituted by a simple definition but rather a set of processes that coalesce a determined set of definitions of, in this case, aboriginality and/or blackness. Rather than provide specific content, informed by aesthetics, these processes modulate the constitution of the object and subject in question, yet the local historicity of a given place ascertains its final constitution. For example, the process of a narrative of tragedy, of terror, and of horror modulates the way a person may conceptualise, and therefore define, their lives; yet their definitions will be made from the specific historical conditions of the place and group in question – Queensland, San Juan, Bogotá, Buenos Aires, New York, African Americans, Indigenous, Mexican Americans, etc. This does not mean that, if subjected to the conceptualisation of aboriginality, the person will be determined to live in a narrative of tragedy, but it does mean that this narrative will have a significant weight in their life in conjunction with their local historical conditions. That is, their particular life will be in conversation with any given conceptualisation process, and it can be in opposition to a given conceptualisation. A classic example is the stories of overcoming adversity that can only be conceptualised as “inspirational stories” in conversation with a given narrative that creates the genre of the story. If a person is of Aboriginal background and becomes a professor, it can be an “inspirational story” only due to the underlying conceptualising movement that creates the place where the story departs. The conceptualist movement’s power relies on its capacity to assemble a colonising fold on the subjectivity of the colonised that is created by the conditions of the possibilities
of the local institutions and its conceptualising global reverberations. The space of biopolitical government lets the colonised die, but it is an active form of government that achieves the administration of the colonised through imposing the additional technology of power, which seems to be a type of conceptualist movement.

The conceptualist movement is a product of the global history of colonisation, which is what authors including Quijano (1992), Dussel (1993), Mignolo (1996), and Grosfoguel (2008b), among others, understand as the global machinery of coloniality, and the local operation or administration of colonisation determined by its specific history, such as the case of the history of colonisation of Queensland, Australia. However, this simultaneous operation has a historicity informed by the framework of aesthetics. Similar to transferring exotic landscapes from China or from India into fine porcelain painted using the blue-china technique, the conceptualist movement operates through conceptualising the colonised using the pre-existing colours manufactured in colonial history to transfer the conceptualisation to a specific locality, tailored to the place in question, e.g. Queensland, Auckland, Puerto Rico, etc. Then, the twofold conceptualist movement is constituted through local histories and global histories that enact colonisation to the colonised subjects. The expression of the conceptualising movement in the historicity of colonisation through art further illustrates the importance of aesthetics as an analytical framework to understand the machinery of colonisation. Aesthetics can link global and local political practices that would be difficult for other analytical frameworks, such as the framework of anthropological discourse because this discourse is reliant on linear narratives expressed through speech or writing acts. Therefore, the conceptualist movement arises from the discourse of aesthetics that forms specific discursive devices that are
then used simultaneously with its local administrative function that modulates subjectivity.
Chapter VII

Conclusion

Figure 10 Babakiueria\(^{68}\)

\textit{Babakiueria} (1986)\(^{69}\) 5:01

Duranga Manika: Is it fair of us to expect white people to improve? Do they want to change?

Minister for White Affairs Wagwan\(^{70}\): Yes! And here in my department we're doing everything we can to help them. We've created

\(^{68}\) Source: (http://www.puntodevistafestival.com/resize.asp?x=290&y=200&imagen=Argazkiak/Pelis/20110105145340.jpg)

\(^{69}\) According to the Australian Screen Organisation (ASO), the synopsis of this ‘mockumentary’ is described as follows:

...a drama pretending to be an ethnographic documentary examining the customs of the white natives of ‘Babakiueria’, from the perspective of the country’s black colonisers. Babakiueria is named as a result of first contact between the colonisers and the natives. Arriving at a barbecue area, the settlers ask the locals, ‘What’s this place called?’. Presenter Duranga Manika (Michelle Torres) looks back at this moment and at white people’s place in contemporary Babakiuarian society. She also spends time with a ‘typical’ white family.

Furthermore, Matthews (n.d.) notes: “\textit{Babakiueria} uses role reversal to satirise and critique Australia’s treatment of its Indigenous peoples... The ruling Babakiuerians demonstrate a paternalistic, patronising attitude towards the 'natives'...”

\(^{70}\) The character of the Minister for White Affairs was based on Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, who was Premier of Queensland from 1968 to 1987. His government had several problems with Aboriginal nations across Queensland, one of which was
32 new jobs in the last year; we’ve built 7 new houses…

But what if they are happy the way they are?

It would be morally wrong for us to leave them like that. We’ve got to do everything we can to help these people take their place in society. And I think most white people are happy with what we are doing for them.

But has the government tried to find out what white people want?

Why? I mean we’re the government. It’s our job to make decisions of what these people want. And give it to them.

This archaeology of colonisation has demonstrated that the operationalisation of colonisation in Queensland, Australia, was constituted locally by the pure administrative function of the non-discursive operation of the Blanket Approach and that it was constituted globally from the first colonial experience in the Caribbean through the conceptualisations of aboriginality and of blackness. This two-fold process was aided by a conceptualist movement, which is the technology of power within the discourse of aesthetics. The conceptualisation (discursive device) of aboriginality was formed aesthetically starting in 1492 in the Caribbean as a monstrous anthropology. The processes (rules of formation) of the conceptualisation of aboriginality were constituted historically through the founding narratives of tragedy-capture-anthropocentrism-conquest. The conceptualisation of blackness followed a parallel yet opposing direction of history from aboriginality; moreover, at one point in history and as manifested in the imposition of African slavery, it linked with the historical direction of the conceptualisation of aboriginality as it adopted the slave labour conditions that Aboriginal peoples in the Americas suffered. The

expressed in court in the case Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen in which the courts found that the Premier had discriminated against Aboriginal people (Lunn, 1987).
processes of the conceptualisation of blackness were constituted historically over the foundations of aboriginality and through the narratives of colouring-cultural practice-social status-value. The conceptualisations of blackness and aboriginality were the objects that the *Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (1897 Act)* spoke of when implementing the operation of colonisation in Queensland, Australia. The way through which the administrative movement of the *1897 Act* operated was in the form of the pure function of the Blanket Approach, which is constituted in three operations: totalisation, multiplicity, and the creation of desire. The operation constituted by any given conceptualisation, such as aboriginality and blackness, and the operation constituted by an administrative movement such as the Blanket Approach form the two-fold operation of colonisation that is manifested in the technology or form of power described as the conceptualist movement. The conceptualist movement is the mode of power assembled through the colonisation form of government within the frame of an aesthetic discourse that modulates the subjectivity of the colonised. This transversal critique of colonisation does not focus on only the local operation of colonisation or on only the global operation of colonisation: rather, it demonstrates the operationalisation of colonisation in its micropolitical space and simultaneously in its macropolitical space.

In this part of the research, the concluding remarks are presented in small summaries of the previous parts of this work. These summaries are attempts to present the main claims of this research; however, they do not fully explicate these claims because this has been undertaken in the previous chapters.

**Literature on Colonisation**

The literature that theorises the *praxis* of colonisation discusses its complex operation as a machine operating in the macro space, primarily in the disciplines of
postcolonial studies and coloniality/decoloniality studies (Castro-Gómez, 2007; Dussel, 1993; Grosfoguel, 2008a; Mignolo, 1996; Quijano, 2000), while also discussing colonisation in the space of the micro or the local with notions such as race, identity, indigenous methodology, etc. where privilege is placed on the lived experiences, primarily including critical race theory, whiteness studies, decolonisation studies, and indigenous studies (Nakata, 2007; Nakata, Nakata, Keech & Bolt, 2012; Moreton-Robinson, 2003; Smith, 2000). Post-colonial and coloniality/decoloniality (Castro-Gómez, 2007) research focuses on the macropolitics of colonisation where a top-down operation is conceptualised as coloniality (Quijano, 1992) or the international division of labour (Spivak, 1988), among other global notions, and it ignores the micropolitics of colonisation arguing that it operates as an ideology (Spivak, 1988). This was expressed famously in Spivak’s article *Can the Subaltern Speak* (1988), where she states that poststructuralists like Foucault “ignore[s] the international division of labor… it is incapable of dealing with global capitalism: the subject-production of worker and unemployed within nation-state ideologies in its Center” (Spivak, 1988, p. 67). Research in critical race theory, whiteness studies, indigenous studies, and others focuses primarily on issues that revolve around notions of identity, corporality, lived experiences, and decolonisation, among other micropolitical notions that often take the macropolitical processes operating in colonisation for granted; therefore, the geo-political element of colonisation is often ignored. Post-colonial thinkers including Said (1978) and coloniality/decoloniality thinkers including Mignolo (1995), Grosfoguel (2012), and Castro Gómez (2007) accept their theoretical debt to Foucauldian notions such as biopower (Foucault, 2005) and similarly decolonial and decolonisation theorists from Australia including Moreton-Robinson (2003) and Nakata (2007) also explicitly use the Foucauldian
analytical tools to critique Western discourses. Although Foucault’s work can be regarded as being influential to both research streams in colonisation, he is often criticised for, from the macropolitical side of colonisation, focussing on the microphysics of power as it operates as an ideology and it shifts the focus to the real “problem”, which is the global machinery of colonisation. However, in the micropolitical stream of colonisation, Foucault was unable to articulate anything regarding identity, lived experiences, or any microphysical analytical tool because he theorised from Western and French worldview perspectives, and research in the micropolitical stream is often classified and validated using racial categories such as indigenous, black, Latin-American, African-American, etc. In this research, Foucauldian archaeology was used not as a starting point but as a methodological tool to unearth the fundamentally Western machinery and operationalisation of colonisation. This work began with the Caribbean and Latin American political-theoretical context in conversation with an Australian Aboriginal political-theoretical context in this way assuming a transversal approach, because a transversal understanding of the operation of colonisation considers the micropolitics and macropolitics that modulate the subjectivity of the colonised.

**Origins: Conceptualisation of Aboriginality**

The identified conceptualisations of colonisation are devised in this work as monstrous anthropology and Western blackness. These are the points of pressure that colonisation exerted that were specifically located in the Western conceptualisations of aboriginality and of blackness. That is, they were the objects of what colonisation spoke of. The four processes that constitute the monstrous anthropological conceptualisation are (1) terror, horror, and tragedy, (2) capturing and enslavement, (3) similarity and anthropocentrism, and (4) conquest. The narrative of tragedy was
framed in the first Western conceptualisation of aboriginality through an interpretation that was closely aligned with medieval monstrosity. This narrative of monstrosity is illustrated and located in an aesthetic of ugliness described in the beginning of *Chapter III Monstrous Anthropology*.

The first colonial encounter was predetermined by an expectation of the relatively known civilisation or culture of the Indies. When Christopher Columbus and the fleet of three boats realised that these cultures were completely unknown, they painted them in their minds with what they already knew. It had to be a story “worth telling” and previous conceptualisations of the Indies informed an underlying narrative along the lines of a different civilisation of creatures. The conceptualisation of un-Christian creatures determined the “side” and the narrative in which these creatures were framed. They were a civilisation of dark and irreligious creatures. The Spanish described the Aboriginal peoples as very generous at first, but the dangerous ones, i.e. the ones that were not welcoming from the perspective of the Colonial West, were described with more detail. They were described with monstrous features and characteristics to commit the most horrid nightmares of any being in the Colonial West: they ate human flesh (which was something commonly recorded in long voyages such as the those from Spain to the Americas). The narrative process of tragedy allowed for some Aboriginal peoples to be portrayed as “noble creatures” (because savagery was not yet a descriptor) and others as the cannibals. This process planted a seed that grew in many narratives of Aboriginal martyrs that only fought to continue to live “peacefully”, and it simultaneously grew narratives of senseless warrior ‘tribes’ that inexplicably cooked and sacrificed outsiders.

This seed of the narrative process at its core provided the method through which the Western conceptualisation of aboriginality would always be sensed as the
“other” belonging in a “dark” realm. The realm of the Colonial West is where “proper” life could be lived and, by extension, every other realm must have another narrative. People can “overcome” this narrative, but the very word “overcome” relates back – in opposition – to a pre-existing narrative of tragedy, of hardship, and mainly of “otherness”. This was not bad or negative for the Colonial West, at least, because in medieval times there was an appreciation of extreme situations because they assisted in creating seductive stories of the first conquistadores and colonisers being brave people who experienced fantastic adventures. What the process indicated was the location of the generator of these narratives of tragedy that the Colonial West wanted to engage with: this first narrative inaugurated the monstrous anthropological conceptualisation of aboriginality.

The second process, i.e. capture and enslavement, relies on the first peoples to be enslaved by the Colonial West being the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas. Slavery was the crudest form of capture; the process of capture meant bringing these peoples into the gaze, and therefore into the course of conceptualisation, of the Colonial West. The initial motivator of colonisation was extracting all possible “goods” from the Americas: Christopher Columbus took all that he could carry in the first voyages and Aboriginal peoples were not an exception. The Colonial West captured anything of value, and then they captured the lands, which was not the original intention. Anything that opposed the Colonial West was captured with incredible force through enslavement, or worse. However, this process did not only use the means of enslavement, but it also used luring techniques such as titles, mandatory mixing of races, and promises of safety (which were often broken by the Colonial West). Slowly, but surely, the capturing also meant the pacification and settlement-occupation of the Americas; it also meant the transformation of the way in
which the Americas were “seen”. The process of capture does not only refer to explicit enslavement, but it also refers to the control of worldview perspectives. Christianisation, pacification, and later “civilisation” were a few ways through which to achieve this. For example, the capturing process reframed the ancestral understanding of gold into the Colonial West worldview; it reframed human sacrifice into the Colonial West worldview of morals; and it allowed for one understanding of individuality and made indiscernible different appropriations of what the Colonial West referred to as individuality (Dussel, 1993; Grosfoguel, 2003). Colonisation and enslavement are intrinsically complicit because the latter historically constituted the former, from the capture of peoples to the arrest of worldview perspectives.

The process of anthropocentrism (anthropos referring to the Colonial West man or human) set the conditions for the capturing process to occur; thus, the process of capturing and anthropocentrism are intertwined. The anthropocentric process is defined by the Colonial West gaze located at the centre of the interpretation and everything else is understood via similarities. Different, and even monstrous, civilisations were conceptualised using the same instruments for cooking, similar political organisation, and similar cultural practices, among other practices that are distinctive of the Colonial West but had to be captured through this anthropocentric gaze. This anthropocentric perspective process had not yet been linked to a hierarchal inequality that would make see other civilisations in the binary of inferiority-superiority such as social Darwinism. This happened later when anthropocentrism became constituted as logos in philosophical anthropological discourse by Immanuel Kant (Foucault, 2009). The anthropocentric gaze “sees” that which is familiar to the Colonial West, interprets that which is unfamiliar to the Colonial West and it becomes reconfigured as familiar, and that which is uncaptured remains invisible to the eyes of
anthropocentrism. Thus, anthropocentrism is a location in which the visibilities are constantly captured from a position that is not subjective but is very clearly grounded as the centre of the gravitational space, as conceptualised by the Colonial West. The Colonial West is the centre of the world and then everything is interpreted in reference to what Western culture “knows” and anything outside of the “known” becomes invisible.

The last process is conquest and it is at the core of the chain of processes of the conceptualisation of aboriginality. The first colonial experience began as a mistake: Christopher Columbus and the Kingdom of Spain intended to find a new route to the Indies. The first year (1492) in the Americas was characterised by a desire to extract everything possible, which was inspired by the Imperial imperative to strengthen the Kingdom against possible invaders (Foucault, 2005). However, Imperialism turned into colonisation as a result of this will to conquer or to completely own (culturally, physically, epistemologically, etc.) the places it conquered. The Spanish, Portuguese, and French conquistadores and colonisers searched for everything that was of value according to the Colonial West. The “pacification” of the Aztec Empire marked a transition between the extraction of goods for the Spanish and other Kingdoms, and the expansion of the Colonial West into a never-ending movement of complete conquest for the sake of conquest. The horrific first war against the Aztec Empire explicitly unfolded the monstrous anthropology chain through illustrating tragedy, capture, and enslavement, which were the gravitational centre of the “winning” Colonial West and pure conquest. The will of colonisation was energised through the process of conquest in the context of the conceptualisation of aboriginality.
Origins: Conceptualisation of Blackness

The four processes that constituted the Western conceptualisation of blackness are (1) colouring, (2) cultural practice, (3) social status or class, and (4) value. Blackness was not interchangeable with slavery until the end of the 16th century; prior to this, skin colour only functioned, sometimes, as a descriptor for the identification of certain peoples. Institutions in power, such as the Catholic Church and the Kingdoms, determined inequality, for which slavery was the crudest example. The most extreme example that this research could find was Juan Garrido: he was the first documented black conquistador. The significance of his story is founded in the complete contrasting concept of a black-skinned man who actively participated in the colonisation of the Americas, including the enslavement of Aboriginal peoples. After the introduction of African slavery in the late 16th century, which was resisted by the colonisers in America, skin colour became more relevant to determine the inequality base of colonisation. Slavery was no longer only Aboriginal because African peoples were captured by this new Western conceptualisation of blackness. Therefore, colouring became the process through which inequality was transformed, though it did not yet determine inequality by itself. Colouring can be defined as the contrasting process from a set of base colours for comparison. Concretely, black cannot be understood without another base colour through which black can make sense, such as black and white, or black and brown, etc. The process of colouring draws the symbols that might indicate slavery, or it might indicate nobility, such as the first painting of the Americas, Los mulatos de Esmeralda (1599). The process of colouring in Western blackness served as a symbolic descriptor that began to draw a picture of subjectivity.

The second process is cultural practice that goes one step further from the process of anthropocentrism as it removes people from similarities of the Colonial West to the location of the “other”. The location remains situated in an
anthropocentric gravitational force, but now the “other” has a set of cultural content. Therefore, the “other” is no longer fully invisible, but it has become visible in the Colonial West recognised content of visibilities. The “other” became akin to planets that were illuminated by the “sun” of the Colonial West. After over 100 years of accumulating information about Aboriginal peoples, and also of African slaves\(^7\), the cultural practices process aided the colouring process through identifying distinct “cultural” artefacts, kinship practices, facial modifications, and so on. This process allowed a symbolic distinction of that which is seen as “cultural” and located in the “planet of the other”. No longer could an African man dress distinctly as a *conquistador*, or as a catholic bishop in the Vatican, or purely as a *Don*; the cultural practice process allowed for the introduction of recognised symbolisms that located the person as a “cultural other”. Cultural practices were to be “worn” as family crests in order to demonstrate where the peoples came from, whereas the Colonial West did not need to “demonstrate” anything because they were the eyes that gazed and were therefore not subjected to the gaze of otherness.

The third process in the conceptualisation of blackness is social status. The Colonial West thought that Aboriginal peoples had Kingdoms, nobility, and even Empires similar to theirs. For example, the first overarching ruler that the Spanish encountered, and assassinated, was the ruler (*cacica*) Anacaona (Sued-Badillo, 1975). For the Spanish, it was not surprising that one of the most important rulers of the *Tainos* was a woman, given that the Spanish were also ruled by a woman, Queen Isabela La Católica. After some time, Aboriginal peoples, *mulatos*, and other nations were given specific Colonial West titles. Furthermore, slavery was an already widely

\(^7\) It should be remembered that the first black slaves to arrive in the beginning of the 16\(^{th}\) century were *ladino* slaves who spoke Spanish and were more or less acculturated in the Colonial West given that they lived in Spain, Portugal, France, and other Kingdoms.
visible practice towards Aboriginal peoples at first and then towards African peoples. Slavery was the lowest social status position, but it was also the way that the social status process was introduced. That is, slavery was the hook that pulled non-Colonial Western peoples into the social status process of the Colonial West. No longer could a parallel or similar system of interpretation of social status be possible: the social status process absorbed the possible non-Western social categorisations. In this way, a hierarchy was set for an alienated group of peoples that could never be at the “top” end of the social ladder because, by definition, the “other” could never be fully Western. The social status processes are defined by the social category ordered in a hierarchy determined by and from the history of the Colonial West. Therefore, the social status process absorbed the “other”, but as a second-class citizen in the social status hierarchal space.

The last process of the conceptualisation of blackness is value. Given that slavery had great importance in the first 300 years of colonisation, labour and the intrinsic value of slaves were critical in the historical constitution of colonisation and therefore in the assemblage of the conceptualisation of blackness. A critical process that remained at the heart of colonisation, and particularly in Western blackness, was value and, most prominently, pure value. As argued previously, slavery was distinctively associated with wealth because slavery was expensive: it was a marker of affluence and abundance, and it was even regarded as a currency to be exchanged for other item(s) or left as assets in wills (Tardieu, 2002). African slavery is often understood along the lines of use-value, which is defined by its capacity to produce other goods. For less than 100 years, it was used to extract gold and silver; moreover, when African slavery was forced upon the Americas, its use-value was associated with sugar, wood, cotton, and tobacco. However, slavery was also defined by its pure
value given that it was a marker of wealth and the slave trade was a wealthy industry. African slave trade was one of the few industries (if not the only industry) to consistently increase its profit for 300 years, in which some years had exponential increases. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to state that the slave trade was a hallmark industry or a best scenario example from capitalist logic. The value process of Western blackness binds the processes of colouring, cultural practices, and social status into a conceptualisation that is defined through the association of importance for capitalism. From this historical context, Western blackness finds a comfortable zone in labour through which it is capitalised, given the “inherent” nature of the process of value in this conceptualisation.

**Command: Blanket Approach**

The *Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897* (1897 Act), of the colony of Queensland, is a local model of the modern form of government of colonisation. It functioned as an engineered Western government formulation of a nation-state, but without a nation. The pure colonising function of the 1897 Act was to implement a state that came from a nation-state formulation. The 1897 Act followed the same structure as the constitution of the government of a state determined by its laws of crime, family, labour, welfare, etc. Therefore, the 1897 Act illustrates the local modern operation of the machinery of colonisation, i.e. a nation-state that produced a state-state formulation. This state-state formulation was not a frivolous repetition, but rather it was a method of illustrating how the conceptualisation of a state was determined by the Colonial West conceptualisation of, at least, aboriginality and blackness, and how it had no relationship between the Australian Aboriginal civilisation in Queensland and the 1897 Act. In this sense, the 1897 Act is a pure function of government because it is pure government for the
colonised without conversation with the Australian Aboriginal civilisation in Queensland. The 1897 Act can simply be described as a “colonisation Act”; however, the complexity of the processes operating within the force of colonisation must be named in order to describe the real effects of the government of the colonised. In order to conceptualise the approach operating in the 1897 Act from its origins in the conceptualisation of tragedy-capture-anthropocentrism-conquest and colouring-cultural practice-social status-value is to turn the gaze back onto the Colonial West strategies of government and its mindset.

The Blanket Approach is a wordplay that describes the pure function of the state-state of the 1897 Act. This wordplay refers to the totalisation of the function of the 1897 Act, as well as to the multiplicity that distributed this totalisation individually and, more or less, tailored subjectively. The Blanket Approach is not a conceptualisation, but the pure function of the local exemplification of the modern machinery of colonisation. Through the state-state formulation, from the nation-state formulation, the Blanket Approach mechanism totalised a specific, finite, and policy inspired system that applied to every-thing (not any-thing) defined by the Colonial West. It spoke primarily of the objects of the conceptualisations of aboriginality and of blackness. Through the distribution of this imposed conceptualisation, the mechanism of multiplicity functioned to serialise individual people. This colonised-imposed subjectivity was not similar to the non-colonised subjectivity that was determined by the nation-state formulation that is problematic due to the specific history of Western civilisation that, for example, through biopolitics (Agamben, 2005; Foucault, 2005) the State “makes live” the desired subject. The subjectivity in colonisation is determined by the double negative of the presence of peoples given
that the state-state formulation does not provide easy access to the structures of the Colonial West state because they are undesired subjects.

The third mechanism of the function of the Blanket Approach is the creation of desire. This mechanism is the most organic part of the function that has close conceptual links with, for example, the notion of *fetiche*, the added experience in the consumption process understood in Marxism, the pleasure principle understood in psychoanalysis, which is a driving force in each individual, and power relations understood by Foucault, which is one of the constituting links of human relationships. However, the function of the creation of desire is closer to the power relations in Foucault (1976) and Deleuze (1995) that refer specifically to the relationship with the “blanket” of Westernisation or the subjectivity object. The force of the Blanket Approach of the 1897 Act is constituted through the significant presence of the blanket of Westernisation, and this imposition eventually forms a particular relationship determined by each person, but it is predicated by the root function of the Blanket Approach. In the creation of desire, a person can love or hate the subjectivity object or the blanket of Westernisation; they can show it or hide it; they can use it or not; regardless, it will be significantly present given the reproductive capacity of its implementation. The creation of desire can be seen in the notion of identity and it can create either a positive desire or a negative desire. The creation of desire is an open process that operates in the lucid space of identity formation. Its power relies on the presence of a readily available subjectivity object and also the difficulty of critique and re-evaluation of what appears to be ever present and therefore experienced as our “nature”.
**Conceptualist Movement**

The proposed constitution of the two-fold operation of colonisation is simultaneously enacted by the conceptualist movement, yet this notion is an attempt to theorise a different way to understand a technology of power in the form of government of colonisation. If “every politics is simultaneously a *macropolitics* and a *micropolitics*” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 213), then the conceptualist movement is the synthetisation of the device that aids colonisation, and that simultaneously considers both the geopolitics (Western colonial history of the world) and local politics (biopolitics) in Queensland, Australia. Within the local biopolitical formulation of the Western state, colonisation is the form of government that administers the subjects that the State “lets die” (Foucault, 2005) in an administrative movement that serves the aforementioned purpose using conceptualist tools to conceptualise the colonised. The conceptualist movement operates utilising the globally forged colonial conceptualising tools of, at least, aboriginality and blackness with the administrative movement of the Blanket Approach to form the technology of power that modulates the subjectivity of the colonised. Different to the technology of the self or pastoral power (Foucault, 1990), the conceptualist movement operates from the discourse of aesthetics because it relies heavily on appearances that find meanings in conceptualist tools. While the pastoral power’s technology of the self relies on anthropological discourse, the conceptualising movement relies on aesthetic discourse, as explained in *Chapter III Monstrous Anthropology*. Following this line of thought, the subjectivity of the colonised is then affected discursively and non-discursively through the form of government of colonisation, discursively through the given conceptual tools, such as the conceptualisations of aboriginality and blackness, and non-discursively through the administrative movement of a given state that governs using colonisation as its form of government, i.e. the Blanket Approach.
Similar to Mellor’s artistic technique of the blue-and-white Spode china, the conceptualist movement transforms the landscapes of the real surrounding it with a colonially synthesised blue, drawing and painting a Westernised surrounding that appears to be everywhere. In this sense, the conceptualist movement utilises the colonially synthesised conceptualisations to transform the landscapes of the colonised in the administrative movement dictated by a given state.

**Limitations**

The limitations of this research first revolve around the theoretical and historical implications; however, more importantly, because the analysis is limited by the problem of colonisation, the solutions and agency can appear elusive. Moreover, the theoretical and methodological boundaries of this archaeology of colonisation avoid the trap of anthropological discourse and redirect the research into the conditions of possibilities for subjectivity to be produced (Foucault, 1974). Furthermore, I, as a Puerto Rican male, US born, produced by a specific set of historical narratives, and a colonised subject, do not feel that I am able to make any suggestion of solutions. Therefore, a “decolonisation of being” (Castro-Gómez, 2007, p. 171) would be appropriate in the sense as explained by Castro-Gómez (2007) that critiques the space of subjectivity that enables colonisation to be produced in complicity with the colonised subject.

Secondly, the fluidity of the interpretation of history in this research can be regarded as academically problematic. Historical inaccuracies such as conceptualising protectorates as reservations in the context of the implementation of the *Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1897 (1897 Act)* or the debate of the discipline of history of the first “black” person to arrive in the Americas can disrupt the underlying argument of navigating the processes that assemble the
discursive and non-discursive practices. This research is more concerned with the processes that enable these subjectifying practices in colonisation rather than the historical “facts”; that is, this work engages more with the form rather than the claims of ontological nature of its content. Conversely, the historical accuracy of these claims can be elusive because this research does not have the intention to be located in the discipline of history that, as mentioned in *Chapter II Theory, Methodology and Method*, has a valuable function.

Thirdly, the translational potential of this research to, for example policy or any other pragmatic departure, also remains elusive. For similar reasons, this research cannot propose any informed solutions, because at best it only analyses the problem in the same way that the mathematician needs to understand any given formula or operation before solving it, or a civil engineer needs to understand the nature of the materials and their relationships with a given structure before building: this archaeology only attempts to understand the operationalisation of colonisation, but not provide a “solution” for it. The discipline of history often states that we need not repeat the mistakes of the past, yet this research cannot make that claim because the problem of colonisation does not only depend on the will of individuals or the implementation or abolishment of explicit government laws. Therefore, it is difficult to claim any specific translational endeavour that would be explicitly supported by this work.

Many other limitations can be listed and further explicated, such as the use and interpretation of this research’s methodology (Foucauldian archaeology), or the relevance of this research today considering that some materials date from more than 500 years ago. However, although they are ethically and theoretically important to consider, these, and other limitations, are outside the scope of the overarching
research question, which was: How has colonisation been globally and locally operationalised? The navigation of this research has drawn a historical map of the discursive and non-discursive spaces in which they operated in an effort to turn the gaze back onto the machinery of colonisation, in opposition to continuing to research and continuing to (re)produce the object colonisation speaks of.

In summary, this archaeology of colonisation used a transversal approach to understand the micropolitics and macropolitics of the fundamentally political operationalisation of colonisation. Through unearthing the global origins of colonisation and its local command or administration, a critique of colonisation could be conducted. This critique found fertile grounds in aesthetics from its initial conceptualisation in 1492 to 1538, to the way in which the administrative operation was locally enacted in Queensland, Australia (1881-1939) and formed the technology of the form of government of colonisation, i.e. the conceptualist movement. Western aboriginality and blackness are discursive devices that were formed initially in the framework of Western aesthetics that was widely used to administer the subject that colonisation spoke of in Queensland, Australia. The Blanket Approach was the pure administrative function that threaded specific conceptualising yarns. It can be said that the proposed notion of the conceptualist movement aided in forming the subjectivity of the subject it speaks through administering the subject in a given hierarchy that serves the purposes of the state and conceptualising it with the discursive devices that can enable this form of government. That is, the conceptualist movement drew a picture of subjectivity and it coloured it with the readily available colours that made the colonised discernible. Colonisation is more than a historical moment in time that is defined in one word such as invasion: it is a way to see the
world locally and globally, a government not only of speech or writing, but a government of images and movements.
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APPENDIX A: Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1897
Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium. Bill.

the purpose of supporting and continuing any proceeding taken, or of prosecuting or punishing any person for any offence committed before the commencement of this Act.

3. The following terms shall, in this Act (unless the context otherwise indicates), bear the several meanings set against them respectively:—

"Reserve"—Any reserve heretofore or hereafter granted in trust, or reserved from sale or lease by the Governor in Council, for the benefit of the aboriginal inhabitants of the Colony, under the provisions of any law in force in Queensland relating to Crown lands;

"Minister"—The Home Secretary or other Minister of the Crown administering this Act;

"Protector"—A Protector of Aboriginals appointed under the provisions of this Act;

"Superintendent"—A Superintendent appointed under the provisions of this Act for any Reserve;

"District"—A District proclaimed under the provisions of this Act;

"Regulations"—Regulations made under this Act;

"Prescribed"—Prescribed by this Act or the Regulations under it;

"Liquor"—Liquor as defined by "The Licensing Act of 1885," and any Act amending the same;

"Opium"—Opium, whether in the form of gum or liquid, and every substance, whether solid or liquid, which contains opium, not being a substance compounded exclusively for medicinal purposes, and every substance which is or contains the ash of opium, or charcoal of opium;

"Half-caste"—Any person being the offspring of an aboriginal mother and other than an aboriginal father; Provided that the term "half-caste," wherever it occurs in this Act elsewhere than in the next following section, shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed to exclude every half-caste who, under the provisions of the said section, is deemed to be an aboriginal.

4. Every person who is—

(a) An aboriginal inhabitant of Queensland; or

(b) A half-caste who, at the commencement of this Act, is living with an aboriginal as wife, husband, or child; or

(c) A half-caste who, otherwise than as wife, husband, or child, habitually lives or associates with aboriginals; shall be deemed to be an aboriginal within the meaning of this Act.

5. The Governor in Council may, by Proclamation, declare any portion or portions of the Colony to be a District, or Districts, for the purposes of this Act.

6. The Governor in Council may from time to time appoint, for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this Act into effect, fit and proper persons, to be severally called "Protector of Aboriginals," who shall, within the Districts respectively assigned to them, have and exercise the powers and duties prescribed.
7. The Governor in Council may appoint such and so many Superintendents for the reserves, situated within such districts as aforesaid, as may he necessary for carrying the provisions of this Act into effect.

8. Every reserve shall he subject to the provisions of this Act and the Regulations.

9. It shall be lawful for the Minister to cause every aboriginal within any District, not being an aboriginal excepted from the provisions of this section, to be removed to, and kept within the limits of, any reserve situated within such District, in such manner, and subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed. The Minister may, subject to the said conditions, cause any aboriginal to be removed from one reserve to another.

10. Every aboriginal who is—
   (a) Lawfully employed by any person under the provisions of this Act or the Regulations, or under any other law in force in Queensland;
   (b) The holder of a permit to be absent from a reserve; or
   (c) A female lawfully married to, and residing with, a husband who is not himself an aboriginal;
   (d) Or for whom in the opinion of the Minister satisfactory provision is otherwise made;

shall be excepted from the provisions of the last preceding section.

11. It shall not be lawful for any person other than an aboriginal, not being a Superintendent or a person acting under his direction, and not being a person authorised under the Regulations, to enter or remain or be within the limits of a reserve upon which aboriginals are residing, for any purpose whatever.

   Any person, without lawful excuse, entering or remaining or being upon such reserve as aforesaid, shall, for every such offence, be liable on conviction to a penalty not exceeding fifty pounds, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding three months, and the proof of such lawful excuse shall be on the person charged.

12. A Protector may permit any aboriginal or half-caste who, before the commencement of this Act, was employed by any trustworthy person, to continue to be so employed by such person, and, in like manner, may permit any aboriginal or half-caste not previously employed to be employed by a like person.

13. Every permit, so granted as aforesaid, shall remain in force for twelve months only, but may at any time, before the expiration of such period, be renewed for any period not exceeding twelve calendar months, to commence from the expiration of the previous period of twelve months, and so, from time to time, so long as such aboriginal or half-caste is willing to continue to be employed by such person. Any such permission as aforesaid may be revoked at any time by a Protector by writing under his hand, and thereupon, if such related to an aboriginal, such aboriginal may be removed, by order of the Protector under and subject to the conditions prescribed, to a reserve, or, at the discretion of the Protector, the aboriginal or half-caste to whom such license related may be permitted, in like manner, to enter the employment of some other such trustworthy
Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Bill.

14. Any person who, except under the provisions of any Act or Regulations thereunder in force in Queensland, employs an aboriginal or a female half-caste, otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the Regulations, or suffers or permits an aboriginal or a female half-caste to be in or upon any house or premises in his occupation or under his control, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be liable, on conviction, to a penalty not exceeding fifty pounds and not less than ten pounds, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months.

15. Every person desirous of employing an aboriginal or female half-caste under the provisions of this Act, shall forthwith, upon permission being granted by a Protector, enter into an agreement with such aboriginal or female half-caste, in the presence of any justice of the peace or member of the Police Force, for any period not exceeding twelve months. Every such agreement shall contain particulars of the names of the parties thereto, the nature of the service to be rendered by such aboriginal or female half-caste, the period during which such employment is to continue, the wages or other remuneration to be paid or given by the employer for such service, the nature of the accommodation to be provided for such aboriginal or female half-caste, and the conditions on which the agreement may be determined by either party. Every such agreement shall be in duplicate and be attested by such justice or member of the Police Force, who shall forthwith forward one of the said agreements to the nearest Protector.

16. Every aboriginal or female half-caste employed by any person, under the provisions of this Act, shall be under the supervision of a Protector, or such other person as may be authorised in that behalf by the Regulations; and every employer of such aboriginal or female half-caste shall permit any Protector, or such other person as aforesaid, to have access to such aboriginal or female half-caste at all reasonable times, for the purpose of making such inspection and inquiries as he may deem necessary.

17. Any person who, without the authority of a Protector, by writing under his hand, removes, or causes to be removed, an aboriginal or female half-caste from one District to another District, or to any place beyond the Colony, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be liable, on conviction, to a penalty not exceeding one hundred pounds, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months.

18. Every blanket issued by an officer of the Government to any aboriginal or half-caste shall be and remain the property of Her Majesty, and any person, other than an aboriginal or half-caste, who has in his possession or custody any such blanket or portion thereof which shall reasonably appear to the justices, from the marks thereupon or otherwise, to have been so issued for the use of an aboriginal or half-caste, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be liable, on conviction, to a penalty not exceeding ten pounds.
19. Any person who supplies, or causes or permits to be supplied, any liquor to an aboriginal or a half-caste, except for bond fide medicinal purposes, proof of which shall be on the person accused, shall, for every such offence, be liable to a penalty not exceeding fifty pounds, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding three months, and in every case to the costs of the conviction. In the case of a licensed victualler or wine-seller who is convicted of such offence, the penalty, by this section provided, shall be substituted for the penalty provided in respect of such offence by the sixty-seventh section of "The Licensing Act of 1865."

20. Any person who supplies, or causes or permits to be supplied, any opium to an aboriginal or a half-caste, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be liable, on conviction, for the first offence, to a penalty not exceeding one hundred pounds and not less than twenty pounds, one-half of which shall be paid to the person giving the information which leads to such conviction, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding three months, and for the second and every subsequent offence to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months, and in every case to the costs of the conviction.

21. Notwithstanding anything in "The Sale and Use of Poisons Act, 1891," to the contrary contained, it shall not be lawful for any person, not being a legally qualified medical practitioner, or a pharmaceutical chemist, or a wholesale dealer in drugs, to sell, or in any manner dispose of, deliver, or supply, opium to any other person, or to have or keep in his possession any opium for any purpose whatever; and it shall not be lawful for any legally qualified medical practitioner or pharmaceutical chemist, residing or carrying on business at a greater distance, by the nearest practicable road, than one hundred miles from Brisbane, Rockhampton, or Townsville, to have or keep in or upon any premises in his occupation or under his control, at any one time, any greater quantity of opium than two pounds weight avoirdupois:

Provided that it shall not be unlawful for a common carrier to have in his possession opium, for the purpose of conveying the same, for delivery to the person to whom it has been lawfully consigned.

22. Any person who unlawfully has in his possession any opium, or unlawfully sells, or in any manner disposes of, delivers, or supplies opium to any person other than an aboriginal or a half-caste, shall, for every such offence, be liable, on conviction, to a penalty not exceeding fifty pounds, one-half of which shall be paid to the person giving the information which leads to such conviction. Any legally qualified medical practitioner or pharmaceutical chemist, residing or carrying on business at a greater distance, by the nearest practicable road, than one hundred miles from Brisbane, Rockhampton, or Townsville as aforesaid, who has or keeps, in or upon any premises in his occupation or under his control, any greater quantity of opium than two pounds weight avoirdupois, shall, be liable, on conviction, for the first offence, to a penalty not exceeding fifty pounds and not less than ten pounds, and for the second, and every subsequent, offence to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months.

23. Upon complaint made or laid on oath, before any justice of the peace, by any person, that he believes that opium is kept or concealed in any house, building, or place, contrary to any of the provisions of this Act, whether by a person authorised under the
provisions of "The Sale and Use of Poisons Act, 1891," to sell or deal in poisons or not, such justice may grant a warrant, to any member of the Police Force, to enter and search such house, building, or place, between the hours of six in the morning and twelve at night, and, if admission is refused, to break into the same, and to seize and detain all opium found therein contrary to the provisions of this Act.

24. Any member of the Police Force, and any person acting under the direction and in the presence of a justice of the peace, may detain any person, found travelling, whom such member of the Police Force or such justice of the peace may suspect to have in his possession any opium contrary to the provisions of this Act, and may search such person, and may open and search any pack, swag, or other receptacle carried or conveyed by such person, and may seize any such opium as aforesaid found in the possession of such person, and may forthwith arrest such person without warrant, and detain him in custody until he can be brought before justices to be dealt with according to law.

25. If, upon the hearing of a complaint against any person, in whose possession opium has been found in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act, the justices, before whom such complaint is heard, convict such person of the offence stated in such complaint, they shall, in addition to any penalty imposed upon the offender, order that all the opium so found in his possession be forfeited to the Crown, and the same shall be forfeited accordingly.

26. In every prosecution for an offence against any of the provisions of this Act relating to an aboriginal or a half-caste, the averment in the complaint, that any person named therein is an aboriginal or a half-caste, shall be sufficient evidence of the fact unless the contrary is proved.

27. All actions and proceedings against any person for the recovery of any wages due to an aboriginal or a half-caste, who is, or has been, employed by such person under the provisions of this Act, or for any breach of an agreement entered into by such person under the provisions of this Act, may be instituted and carried on by, or in the name of, a Protector, or by, or in the name of, any other person authorised by the Minister by writing under his hand.

28. Every complaint for an offence against the provisions of this Act or the Regulations, other than the provisions contained in the twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth sections hereof, may be made or laid by a Protector or Superintendent, or by a member of the Police Force, and the prosecution may be conducted by the person by whom the complaint is so made or laid. Every complaint for an offence against any of the provisions of this Act, contained in the sections hereinbefore in this section mentioned, shall be made or laid by a member of the Police Force or a justice of the peace only.

29. Any person who shall be convicted of an offence against this Act or the Regulations, shall, unless hereinbefore or in the Regulations otherwise provided, be liable to a penalty not exceeding ten pounds.

30. All offences against this Act, or the Regulations, not herein otherwise specially provided for, may be prosecuted in a summary way before any two justices.
31. The Governor in Council may from time to time, by Proclamation, make Regulations for all or any of the matters following, that is to say,—

(1) Prescribing the mode of removing aboriginals to a reserve, and from one reserve to another;
(2) Defining the duties ofProtectors and Superintendents, and any other persons employed to carry the provisions of this Act into effect;
(3) Authorising entry upon a reserve by specified persons or classes of persons for specified objects, and defining those objects, and the conditions under which such persons may visit or remain upon a reserve, and fixing the duration of their stay thereupon, and providing for the revocation of such authority in any case;
(4) Prescribing the mode of distribution and expenditure of moneys granted by Parliament for the benefit of aboriginals;
(5) Apportioning amongst, or for the benefit of, aboriginals or half-castes, living on a reserve, the net produce of the labour of such aboriginals or half-castes;
(6) Providing for the care, custody, and education of the children of aboriginals;
(7) Providing for the transfer of any half-caste child, being an orphan, or deserted by its parents, to an orphanage;
(8) Prescribing the conditions on which any aboriginal or half-caste children may be apprenticed to, or placed in service with, suitable persons;
(9) Providing for the mode of supplying to any half-castes, who may be declared to be entitled thereto, any rations, blankets, or other necessaries, or any medical or other relief or assistance;
(10) Prescribing the conditions on which the Minister may authorise any half-caste to reside upon any reserve, and limiting the period of such residence, and the mode of dismissing or removing any such half-caste from such reserve;
(11) Providing for the control of all aboriginals and half-castes residing upon a reserve, and for the inspection of all aboriginals and half-castes, employed under the provisions of this Act or the Regulations;
(12) Maintaining discipline and good order, upon a reserve;
(13) Imposing the punishment of imprisonment, for any term not exceeding three months, upon any aboriginal or half-caste who is guilty of a breach of the Regulations relating to the maintenance of discipline and good order upon a reserve;
(14) Imposing, and authorising a Protector to inflict summary punishment by way of imprisonment, not exceeding fourteen days, upon aboriginals or half-castes, living upon a reserve or within the District under his charge, who, in the judgment of the Protector, are guilty of any crime, serious misconduct, neglect of duty, gross insubordination, or wilful breach of the Regulations;
(15) Prohibiting any aboriginal rites or customs that, in the opinion of the Minister, are injurious to the welfare of aboriginals living upon a reserve;
Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Bill.

(16) Providing for the due carrying out of the provisions of this Act;
(17) Providing for all other matters and things that may be necessary to
give effect to this Act.

32. Such Regulations, not being contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall have the force of law.

33. It shall be lawful for the Minister to issue to any half-caste, who, in his opinion, ought not to be subject to the provisions of this Act, a certificate, in writing under his hand, that such half-caste is exempt from the provisions of this Act and the Regulations, and from and after the issue of such certificate, such half-caste shall be so exempt accordingly.

THE SCHEDULE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Act.</th>
<th>Title of Act.</th>
<th>Extent of Repeal.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55 Vic. No. 31 ...</td>
<td>&quot;An Act for Regulating the Sale and Use of Poisons.&quot;</td>
<td>Section 13.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59 Vic. No. 29 ...</td>
<td>&quot;An Act to Amend the Laws relating to the Sale of Intoxicating Liquor&quot;</td>
<td>So much of Section 13 as is contained in the words, &quot;aboriginal native of Australia or half-caste of that race, or to any&quot; ; and in the further words, &quot;of Australia or.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hereby certify that this PUBLIC BILL has finally passed the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly of Queensland.

[H W Radford]
Clerk of the Parliaments

Legislative Council Chamber,
Brisbane, [9 December 1987]

In the name and on behalf of the Queen, I assent to this Act.

[Transmitted from the Legislative Council for enrolment according to Law]

[H W Radford]
[Clerk of the Parliament]

[Legislative Council Offices,]
[Brisbane, 15th December, 1897]

[Recorded and enrolled in the Office of the Registrar of Titles of Queensland at Brisbane this sixteenth day of December One thousand eight hundred and ninety seven.]

[J O Browne]
[Registrar of Titles]
APPENDIX B: Sample of Queensland Parliamentary Debates (pictures) (Queensland Parliamentary Debates for the approval of the Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1897 and the debates for its amendments in 1899, 1901, 1928, 1934, 1939, 1946, and 1965 can be found in the Queensland State Archives)
Mr. KROGH: Whenever any attempt had been made to convert the blacks they had no right to act. The situation they had to act was that the blacks had no idea what religion was, and the attempt was only to instil into them some idea of the different religions. The blacks would have no idea as to what the religion was, and the attempt was to give them some idea of the different religions.

Mr. SMITH: The suggestions of the hon. member for Burkes were well worthy of the consideration, and the House Secretary had already adopted one of them when he said that if he could get more matters to undertake the duty he would appoint them. The whole question was one of expense. The hon. gentleman was taking advantage of the machinery he had at hand, namely, the police, and there was no question that the decision of the force was in favor of a very kindly feeling towards the aboriginals, and would see that it was treated them in a kindly spirit. His thought was, as a starting point, they might accept the police as the guardians of the aboriginals, and subsequently find that in the hon. member for Burkes might be developed.

Mr. HOOLAN: Hon. members might think he was in jest, but he was going to divide the Committee on an amendment embodying his views. Although he was not very religious himself, he did not wish to deprive the blacks of all the benefits which religion conferred. He recognized that the religion bodies had a great deal of good; far more than he did as a politician. Assuming that the black man had a soul, what did the hon. gentleman (Mr. HOOLAN) want to do was to remove him from the surroundings of the white, a distinguished gentleman, a distinguished man. Therefore there was nothing to save it was not their body or their souls.

Mr. KROGH: The religion people in the Assembly to say that the blacks and the half-castes had not got a soul, and the question would not be put to the Committee was to do away with saving souls.

Mr. SMITH: Is this acting or real? Mr. HOOLAN: It was real. He took up no religious position himself, nor did he wish to force his views on others; but he would ask those hon. members who bowed their heads when and if they voted against the amendment to state why they were not willing to act on the matter, intended to move in a direction if they were willing to act on the amendment of a religious body to give them the opportunity of acting.

Mr. SMITH: Was the amendment to give to the religious bodies the opportunity of acting? Mr. KROGH: No, it was to give the religious bodies the opportunity of acting if they were willing to act on the matter. It was not to force them to act on the matter.

The Acting Chairman: I must ask the hon. member to confine himself to the clause, but his remarks are very far from the question.

Mr. HOOLAN: He was maintaining that no protection to the blacks would be of any use, and he would not adhere to the proposition. The religious benefit would be to the blacks. He would support the clause; it was a great benefit to the blacks. The religious benefit would be to the blacks. He would support the clause; it was a great benefit to the blacks. He would support the clause; it was a great benefit to the blacks.

The Home Secretary: The whole question was one of expense. The hon. gentleman was taking advantage of the machinery he had at hand, namely, the police, and there was no question that the decision of the force was in favor of a very kindly feeling towards the aboriginals, and would see that it was treated them in a kindly spirit. His thought was, as a starting point, they might accept the police as the guardians of the aboriginals, and subsequently find that in the hon. member for Burkes might be developed.

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Abercromby Protection and Sale of Opium Bill.

The legal evidence point of view, that careful and drastic measures are required to be passed by the legislature dealing with the subject—measure and provision which certainly would not be necessary if the annexation had been publicly accepted by the people whose necessity would be unhesitatingly accepted in a court of law, who could stand up for themselves, as to speak. The sympathetic administration finds itself constantly hampered for want of the very drastic legislation which the hon. member himself condemns. If he had been the Secretary, as I have been for two or three years, he would have known that that is so, and that if he had been in this House of Assembly, in order to avoid administration in its sympathetic shape to do the best for the aborigines. The hon. member also objected to clause 8 of this bill in reference to permission to marry, and he quoted with evident satisfaction the fact that a woman who arrives at the age of twenty-one years is her own mistress and can do what she chooses, not only in respect to marriage, but in all other matters. Now that is not so. Now that the man belongs to a party which has constantly brought forward arguments in favour of legislation which would protect women and children—full grown women of this white race, not merely full grown women of the black race, who are unable to protect themselves—women of the white race of the age of twenty-one years, when, it was thought, might be imposed upon by their employers.

Mr. Tritter: Not in connection with marriage.

The Home Secretary: No; but in all other matters. Now that is not so. Now that the man belongs to a party which has constantly brought forward arguments in favour of legislation which would protect women and children—full grown women of this white race, not merely full grown women of the black race, who are unable to protect themselves—women of the white race of the age of twenty-one years, when, it was thought, might be imposed upon by their employers.

Mr. Tritter: Not in connection with marriage.

The Home Secretary: The House will observe that this clause provides that if a woman arrives at the age of twenty-one years, she is her own mistress and can do what she chooses, not only in respect to marriage, but in all other matters. Now that is not so. Now that the man belongs to a party which has constantly brought forward arguments in favour of legislation which would protect women and children—full grown women of this white race, not merely full grown women of the black race, who are unable to protect themselves—women of the white race of the age of twenty-one years, when, it was thought, might be imposed upon by their employers.

Mr. Tritter: Not in connection with marriage.

The Home Secretary: Not in connection with marriage.

Mr. Tritter: Yes. Of course, if this clause were passed, it would be in the event of his going away, there would be liable for the support of his children, that the man would be absolutely liable to be followed by the care of aboriginals, or of any person non-aboriginal who would not think of coming to them, and who were absolutely helpless and unable to protect themselves or children against the rights. The permission that this clause would be more generally in the Bill would never be refused in the case of a man who desired to follow an aboriginal, or a half-caste woman, provided he was a respectable man and would be respected by the aborigines and non-aboriginals or some other class or any class with regard to aboriginals. In matters of that sort it is to be linked to the sympathetic administration of this drastic legislation, and you must not go beyond that. Otherwise the sympathetic administration of the drastic legislation, otherwise the legislation will become purgatory altogether.

Mr. Tritter: It has already been pointed out that the House of Assembly, in order to avoid administration in its sympathetic shape, will do the best for the aborigines. The hon. member also objected to clause 8 of this bill in reference to permission to marry, and he quoted with evident satisfaction the fact that a woman who arrives at the age of twenty-one years is her own mistress and can do what she chooses, not only in respect to marriage, but in all other matters. Now that is not so. Now that the man belongs to a party which has constantly brought forward arguments in favour of legislation which would protect women and children—full grown women of this white race, not merely full grown women of the black race, who are unable to protect themselves—women of the white race of the age of twenty-one years, when, it was thought, might be imposed upon by their employers.

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APPENDIX C: Sample of Annual Report
(All Annual Reports can be found at the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies at:


1900.
QUEENSLAND.

REPORT OF THE NORTHERN PROTECTOR OF ABORIGINALS
FOR 1899.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command.

TO THE UNDER SECRETARY, HOME SECRETARY'S DEPARTMENT.

Office of the Northern Protector,
Cocktown, 1st July, 1900.

Sr,—Owing to the large amount of police work required in connection with the Northern blacks, my operations were originally carried on under the direction of the Commissioner of Police, but about last October, in view of his ever-increasing duties, Mr. W. E. Pacy-Owen found himself reluctantly compelled to relinquish his supervision. The administration of the Act in the Northern districts of the colony has accordingly devolved upon the Northern Protector of Aborigines, acting directly under the instructions of the Minister, and I now have the honour to hand you my annual report on the results of its operation as follows:

According to the returns furnished me by the various officers in charge, the following permits were entered in the local registers during the twelve months ending 30th June, 1900:—Narraport, 360; agreements Townsville, 50; Cooktown, 280; Thursday Island (the number of transfers at the shipping office), 241; Charters Towers, 24; Mackay, 55; Cooee, 112; Charters, 92.

Sub-Insp't Gurney, in the Coen and surrounding districts, reports that there are many blacks who do not like being put under agreement, and many employers who are object to this being made compulsory. A great deal has been left to the fact and judgment of the local protectors in this respect, and with excellent results, especially in dealing with "casuals" (e.g., cutting a little firewood, &c.) as compared with "permanent" employment; in the latter case agreements are insisted upon. The protectors do not wish to hamper the legitimate employment of aborigines, but rather to put down abuses, and with this object in view I trust that the powers already conferred on them, and which are never unnecessarily exercised, will not be allowed to be ignored in any future legislative measures. I am well aware that all the different tribes of aboriginals in the northern portions of the colony—from Cape York to Mackay, from the east coast to the Northern Territory border—cannot be ruled on one and the same broad and uniform principle, and that a system of subdivision must be left to be arranged by the Northern Protector, according to local exigencies.

All blacks from the Northern Territory of South Australia, who for the time being are within Queensland territory, are considered to be "aboriginals" within the meaning of our Act.

For many reasons I am strongly adverse to any Chinese and other coloured alien employing aborigines, especially when the blacks can obtain equally good employment elsewhere. On the other hand, I cannot conscientiously, or on the racial account only, refuse any such respectable and law-abiding citizen the right to employment, or prevent the general public from finding every inducement that will help matters in the hands of the protector. Hence, according to the regulations, I am doing my best to assist as many aborigines as may apply, and at the same time prevent any abuses of which I have had experience in the past.

It has been realised in many cases that the binding down of an aboriginal to a twelve months' length of continuous service, especially where the labour necessitates prolonged physical exertion, is unsatisfactory, service. The cutting down of the period to six months at the Thursday Island Shipping Office has resulted in a very marked increase in the return of permits, and I hope it will prove a real economy in the future, having in view the conditions of the natives, and the fact that our protectorate is not such as to afford an aborigine an agreement limiting the service to even nine months gives the boy an opportunity of going away for his annual "walk about," whereas he returns content and refreshed for the following season's work.

When the Act first came into force up here in the North great care was taken that no "trouble or the question complaint should arise concerning the amount of wages to be paid to the employer. On behalf of the wages, aboriginals," I looked rather to the comforts of a home, coupled with necessary treatment, than to necessary endowments. Facts, however, have since prompted me to believe that the trust, implied by the execution of these intentions, has been abused by not a few of the employers who have obtained

C. A. 108—1900.

aboriginal labour without return of any money-payment whatsoever. The attractions of a store and the prospect of a little cash to spend in it prove no small source of encouragement to a black, and I certainly am of opinion that in this respect the Queensland nates should be put on an equal level with the lazaras, and a minimum wage legally fixed. For boys signing articles at Thursday Island, a minimum wage of 10s. a month has been insisted on for some time past. At the shipping office here, the Hon. John Douglas has for long authorised that the boys' wages, when paid, should be handed over in their presence to the care of the police, with a view to seeing that they were spent to the best advantage.

No women, and no children under puberty, have been allowed to be carried on the boats, and on this point my instructions have been very emphatic.

In addition to the work carried on by the Mission and stations in the way of distributing rations to those aborigines unable to provide for themselves, the Government have established various food-relieving centres in different parts of the Northern districts of the colony. These centres, with the amount of regular monthly expenditure authorized at each, may be tabulated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>Expenditure per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atherton</td>
<td>40 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boggy Creek (Butcher's Hill)</td>
<td>5 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowen and Dent Island</td>
<td>4 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordwell</td>
<td>2 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coen</td>
<td>5 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daintree</td>
<td>2 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irvinebank and Yipper Creek</td>
<td>5 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurnoda</td>
<td>8 6 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macdowall</td>
<td>3 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have given instructions that these amounts are not to be exceeded without my knowledge and authority. All such aboriginal relief is now distributed under the personal supervision of the police, or, as at Macdonnell, Moreton, and Daintree, by the post and telegraph officials. Since the passing of the Act, and previous to this superintendence by Government officials, two cases have come to my knowledge where the trust imposed on private individuals in the distribution of rations to blacks was grossly perverted.

The officers now responsible have been impressed with the importance of rendering assistance only to those aborigines who, owing to extreme old age, or youth, infirmity, disease, and other good causes, are precluded from obtaining food for themselves. The supply of rations in cases of sickness is referred to elsewhere.

In a few cases relief in some form or another may be supplied for consolatory and other purposes, and the amount per month has been allowed to the Cocktown Eight-Mile patrol for the purchase of beads and tobacco, as, again, during the past month the local police have been looking after the interests of the blacks in the neighbourhood of Cocktown—the same aborigines who, for reasons stated elsewhere, it has been recently deemed advisable to permanently keep out of the township.

With regard to the distributions at one or two of the above-mentioned food-relieving centres, I may mention a few items of interest. At Moreton I found a very good system whereby, in the absence of dates, the savages up there manage to come in regularly on one and the same occasion; they are taught to put in an appearance when the moon is at the full. The telegraph officer in charge here, Mr. D. A. Lindeman, writes to me (7-5-00) as follows:—"Everything is progressing satisfactorily with the aborigines. The monthly hulk in the wet season, and flour in the dry months, is a great treat, and also tends towards establishing friendly relations between the different tribes. Some of the blacks who meet each other here and spend a friendly evening together, eating, singing, and smoking most amicably, would have fought and eaten each other on sight a few years ago. Treeahawks and fishing-lissors, supplied by Government, enable them to greatly increase their natural food supplies, and I think that the aboriginals about here are in a much better condition today than they were even three years ago." At Macdonnell, the next telegraph station, another sixty miles further north, there are about 150 blacks, who keep fairly well to themselves, although the natives from both west and east coast facilitate their way there, and sometimes cause trouble. The nature of the country around being all desert, no large game is procurable, and fish is not available in the vicinity. It thus happened that these blacks were often starved, and owing to the tribal disturbances consequent on any breaches in the nature of trespass, &c., dared not go down to either coast. No wonder, then, that Mr. H. Hackett, who is now able to report on the "beneficial results" which have followed on the inauguration of a food-distributing centre here.

The advance of white settlement in the more salubrious districts will gradually necessitate an increased expenditure on rations, a fact with the importance of which I am becoming more and more impressed. As each new block of country becomes taken up, the blacks are forcibly huddled from off their water supplies and hunting grounds both in it and in its immediate neighbourhood. According to their own laws of tradition, they are prevented seeking fresh pastures, except at the risk of fighting: they have learnt by sad experience that the sparing of cattle is a risky matter; and they will thus, unless we allow them to starve, ultimately come to be a charge upon the State. Sub-Inspector Hargrave, while warning the blacks about killing cattle on the Lower Palmer, &c., last year, was thus forced to promise them relief when they came in and asked for it.

According to regulations, I am regularly furnished with a monthly return of all these distributions of Government relief to aboriginals. I have recommended an alteration in the present method of payment of the corresponding vouchers.

For the first time, all blankets have this year been distributed throughout the northern districts of the colony by the police only; the few exceptions were in the case of two or three of the Mission stations.

In reply to a circular despatched at the end of last August, the various inspectors of police, as protectors, forwarded me returns of their blanket requirements for the present year; they were each asked to furnish me with the names of the different centres in their respective districts at which they proposed
making a distribution, the lowest estimate of blankets required at each such centre, and the approximate dates on which they proposed that such distributions should be made. The following list of requirements came to hand —

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Townsville (X) Police District</th>
<th>Cairns (Y) Police District</th>
<th>Normanton (Z) Police District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Townsville (L 40-00)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayr</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barwon</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charleville</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eton</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingham</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirani</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebo</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walkerston</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penrith</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravenswood</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These returns, making a grand total of 6,125 blankets required, were then sent on to the Home Secretary, and his instructions carried out by the Government Storekeeper. That this method of procedure proved practicable and satisfactory may be gauged from the fact that only one complaint reached me as to their non-arrival up to date.

It will be noted that the dates of distribution recommended by the protectors did not correspond; this was necessitated by varying conditions of climate and was antagonistic to the idea of issuing them—indeed, independently of the local seasons—all on the same occasion, the Queen’s Birthday. Personally, I might be allowed to take the opportunity of expressing the opinion that this annual gift of blankets to aborigines is in many cases a misplaced charity, that its prominence grant should not be looked upon as a matter of right, but regarded rather in the light of a medical adjunct and comfort for the aged, the young, and the sick. I am accordingly impressed upon the local protectors of the measure carried, the expediency of discouraging the able-bodied aboriginals not yet accustomed to them from applying to “the Queen to hand” for these articles. Of course, at the present time blankets are distributed only to such blacks as are not in regular employment; and I certainly would not recommend any stoppage of the supply to those who have thus become regularly used to them. I recognize, furthermore, that the prominence of blankets in past years has tended to the utter disregard of the native-made opossum-skin and bark-cloth rug. During the past seven or eight years I have not come across a single specimen of the former, and but with only a few of the latter. Again, up in the Con, &c., districts of the Peninsula, it is of interest to note the concurrence of view of Sub-Inspector Gurnsey, the local protector, with that of the Protector Whiteford, who, in this matter of blankets, expresses himself as follows —“I see blacks up here would be nearly well off without a blanket as with one; in fact, in most cases now, the black who does not have one either throws them away or get rid of them before the end of a month.”

I would recommend that in the future the Government Storekeeper be instructed to supply an aboriginal blanket which will be immediately distinguishable in colour from any others supplied to remaining Government departments, and easily recognisable from those in ordinary use among the general public; further, the lettering of the Government blank, the “Q.G.” should be indelibly stamped thereon, and not woven or threaded in as at present.

As Cairns, two individuals were charged with being in illegal possession of blacks’ blankets.

On the eastern coast of the Peninsula, from its northern extremity to a long way down—certainly as far as the Thursday Island recruiters would care to go—the aboriginals are, speaking only as a matter of comparison, able to take care of themselves. I do not imply that they are on as high a scale of civilization as the Torres Strait Islanders, but have been so long used to the presence of the boats, they know what drink is; they recognize and appreciate the monetary value of their women; they suffer markedly with venereal disease; they have picked up the vices of their visitors, with the result that they are rapidly diminishing in numbers; and, from a practical point of view, too much “protection” on my part, though checking abuses, will probably not prove of much permanent benefit to them.

On the western coast of the Peninsula I recognize three distinct recruiting areas, each requiring separate notice:—The 1st, from the Cape to Port Macquarie; the 2nd, from Port Macquarie to Albion Bay (Dyypoon Point); the 3rd, from Albion Bay to the mouth of the Archer River.

The present condition of the first may be discussed for the reason that the same remarks as have already been referred to the aboriginals of the east coast apply with equal force to the blacks on this portion of coast line.

With regard to the third, I may mention that the natives here are mostly “myals” not too safe to travel amongst, and that in the absence of contact with civilising influences they can neither understand nor speak English; consequently no recruits are obtainable here except by stratagem. It simply means that if uncivilised people remove boys from here, the next to come will run greater chances of meeting with outrage. Being, therefore, only too anxious to take every precaution to prevent such occurrences, I have taken the safest means at my disposal to remove all those cases which I know from experience to be likely to give rise to reprisals. The recruiting in this particular area has accordingly been practically put a stop to.
APPENDIX D: Sample of La Fábula de los Caribes, Juan Ignacio de Armas (1884)

LA FABULA DE LOS CARIBES

POR

JUAN IGNACIO DE ARMAS,

INDIVIDUO CORRESPONDIENTE

DE LA REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA

(Léido en la Sociedad Antropológica de la Habana)

HABANA.

IMPRENTA EL FÉNIX, DE FRANCISCO S. IBÁÑEZ,
SAN RAFAEL 366,
1884.
LA FABULA DE LOS CARIBES

I

En las inmediaciones del Thermodon, famoso río asiático, que todavía se conoce con el nombre de Thermeh, vivían, al decir de los geógrafos e historiadores antiguos, dos pueblos extraordinarios, que la exaltada imaginación de los descubridores de América vió reproducirse, primero en las Antillas y luego en diversos puntos de este continente: las Amazonas y los Calibes.

Las Amazonas fueron una ilusión de los autores. Nunca existieron tan extraños seres en ninguna parte del globo, aunque en nuestra América la propensión demasiado general a creer en todo lo maravilloso, la sensible persistencia con que a veces se defienden y propalan los más absurdos errores, haya conservado como verídica hasta fines del pasado siglo, la fábula del grupo de mujeres, que a las orillas de un río caudaloso vivían en república, privadas de todo trato con hombres.

De los Calibes, por el contrario, puede admitirse que eran un pueblo real y efectivo de la antigüedad, aunque en ellos no concurrieran muchas de las circunstancias que se les atribuyen, i aunque haya algunas discrepancias respecto al verdadero país que ocupaban. Herodoto los menciona entre las naciones asiáticas que fueron sujuzgadas por Creso (I, 28.), i después vuelve a situarlos muchísimo más allá del río Halis, que separaba los dominios de dicho rey, de los dominios de Ciro; Jenofonte, que
durante la famosa retirada de los Diez Mil, atravesó el país de los Calibes, dice que éstos eran pocos en número, i los coloca mas hacia el Este que otros escritores (Anabasis, V, 5, 2); pero en otro lugar del mismo libro (IV, 7, 10) los menciona en la Armenia, i como si fueran mucho mas numerosos i guerreros. Plinio (III, 4) distingue a los Calibes de los Armenocalibes, i pone a éstos a treinta millas de la Grande Armenia. Estrabon (p. 549 i siguientes), Pomponio Mela (lib. I, cap. 19), i otros geógrafos cuentan entre sus ciudades a Amiso i a Sínope, aún subsistentes, de las cuales la segunda fué patria de Diógenes el Cínico; de manera que sus limites, o por lo menos, los limites de la fracciòn mas grande és importan- te de los llamados Calibes, estaban comprendidos entre el promontorio de Jason al Oeste, el Thermodon al Este, el Ponto Euxino al Norte i el centro del Asia Menor al Sur.

Hai que agregar que Homero (Ilíada, II, 856) habla de los Alibes i de los Alizonas, i que Estrabon, en las mismas páginas que he citado, entra en una extensa i juicio- sa disquisicion para probar que los primeros no eran otros que los Calibes.

Por último, en España, según Justino (lib. 44, cap. 3), había un pueblo de Calibes; por lo cual, i por las divergencias anteriormente notadas, puede creerse que ese nombre, que en griego significa hierro, se dió indistinta- mente a varios pueblos fuertes e industriales del antiguo mundo, trabajadores del hierro. En efecto, los de España, según el autor que acabo de citar, poseían abundancia de ese metal i vivían en las riberes de un rio, especialmente famoso por el buen templo que a las armas daban sus auras; i los del Asia Menor, fuera de la pesca de que nos habla Estrabon, no tenían otra industria que la manufactura del hierro, cuyo metal fueron ellos los primeros en sacar de las entrañas de la tierra, si es cierto lo que dicen unos bellísimos versos de la primera Jeórfica de Virgilio. De aquí han creído algunos que por ellos llama- ron los griegos chalyb al hierro; pero parece seguro lo contrario, esto es, que para ellos i para otros pueblos fuertes i guerreros, se escogió por nombre el mismo que se le daba en Grecia al más útil i fuerte de los metales.
APPENDIX E: Sample of Probanza de Juan Garrido (1538)
From Juan Garrido, Ricardo Alegría (1990)

PROBANZA DE JUAN GARRIDO - 1538
Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla,
Audiencia de México, Leg. 204.

Probanza de Juan Garrido.

En la grand cibdad de Mexico desta Nueba España veynte e syete
días del mes de setiembre año del señor de mill e quinientos e treynta
e ocho años antel señor Fernando Perez de Bocanegra alcalde en
esta dicha cibdad por su Magestad e en presencia de mi Martín de
Castro escriuano publico della parescio Juan Garrido de color negro
vecino de ta dicha cibdad e presento un escripto de pedimiento con
un ynterrogatorio de preguntas que es este que se sigue. --

Muy Noble señor

Juan Garrido de color negro vesino desta cibdad paresco ante
Vuestra merced e digo que yo tengo nescesidad de hazer una
provanca a perpetuad rey memoria de como e servydo a V.M. en la
conquista e pacificacion desta Nueba España desde que pasó a ella el
Marqués del Valle y en su compañia me halle presente a todas las
entradas e conquista e pacificacione que se an hecho syempre con
el dicho Marques todo lo qual e hecho a mi costa syn me dar salario
ny repartimiento de indios ni otra cosa syendo como soy casado e
vecino desta cibdad que syempre e ressedido en ella y asi mismo fue
e pase a descobrir con el Marques del Valle las islas que estan desa
parte de la mar del sur donde pase muchas hambres e nescesidades
y asi mismo fue a descobrir e pacificar a las Islas de San Juan de
Burguén de Puerto Rico y asi mismo fue en la pacificacion y con-
quista de la Isla de Cuba con el adelantado Diego Velazques en todo
lo qual a treynta años que yo e servydo e syervo a S.M. por ende a
vuestra merced pido que avyda yntformacion de lo susodicho e de
como yo lue el primero que hizo la yspiriciencie en esta Nueba España
para sembar trigo e ver si se dava en ella lo qual hizo y espirimente
todo a mi costa y asi hecha la dicha yntformacion vuestra merced me
la mande dar symada y sellada en la qual ponga su auitoridad e decreto
judicial para que yo la presente ante S.M. o ante quien e con derecho
deva para que le coste de mis servicuos e de las pocas mercedes que
sus governadores me a hecho aviendo servido como e servido y
sobre todo pido cumplimiento de justicia.

Otro si pido que a los testigos que presentare sean examinados
por estas preguntas.