Collective action by outsiders to group conflict and inequality

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Abstract

Every day, people around the world struggle and strive as they challenge injustice and inequality through collective action. They petition, they protest, and they call for changes in public policy to secure rights and status for themselves and for the groups to which they belong. From revolutions in the Arab Spring, to reactionary demonstrations by the US Tea Party, to worldwide protests of Russia’s annexing of Crimea, the twenty-first century has seen people on the march. Most existing social psychological research into collective action has focused on understanding the motives for collective action by people who are directly involved in a context of group conflict or inequality (“insiders”). But will external observers (“outsiders”) also take collective action when they encounter an external conflict? Who will they support in that conflict? Do their motives for intervening through collective action differ from those of insiders? In this thesis I aim to answer these questions.

Chapter 1 establishes the need to consider outsiders as potential collective actors. I review the existing collective action literature and discuss its historical and current focus on insiders. I then introduce outsiders, hypothesise how they may differ from insiders, and argue for the importance of understanding how outsiders respond when they encounter group conflict.

Chapter 2 includes two studies that sought to determine (1) whether outsiders are willing to take collective action on behalf of an external conflict, and (2) whether outsiders and insiders’ motives for action differ. I used the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) to measure appraisals of income inequality in the United States by residents of both the US (insiders) and India (outsiders). SIMCA is a well-established framework for explaining insider collective action, and specifies that group identification, perceived injustice, and perceived group efficacy are each unique motives for collective action. In both studies, outsiders were willing to take collective action. In addition, both outsiders’ and insiders’ motives for action could be captured using the SIMCA framework. Outsiders perceived the conflict as less self-relevant than insiders, and reported less identification with the disadvantaged group than insiders; a personal connection with the group conflict or inequality is thus necessary for outsiders to take collective action. To understand and predict outsider collective action, I must then investigate how outsiders come to see an instance of group conflict as self-relevant.

Chapter 3 explores how ideological orientations shape outsiders’ appraisals of a group conflict, and whether outsiders may also choose to support a relatively advantaged group in conflict. In two studies, I investigated how Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1996) shape US residents’ appraisals of separate conflicts between disadvantaged citizens and an advantaged
government in Greece and in Russia (Study 1), and appraisals of a similar conflict in a fictional
country (Study 2). Path analyses revealed that SDO and RWA shaped proximal antecedents of
collective action, including group identification and felt anger towards an opposition group. In a
model assessing support for an advantaged group, SDO and RWA were positively associated with
advantaged group identification and anger at a disadvantaged group. In a model assessing support
for a disadvantaged group, SDO and RWA were negatively associated with disadvantaged group
identification and anger at an advantaged group. In line with SIMCA, identification and anger in
turn predicted outsiders’ intentions to take action on behalf of the disadvantaged group and,
separately, the advantaged group. This chapter highlights the important role of stable, context-
independent ideological orientations in shaping outsiders’ appraisals of a specific instance of group
conflict or inequality.

Chapter 4 investigates how personal values about change and the status quo shape outsiders’
proximal appraisals of group conflict, and their subsequent collective action. From a foundation of
Schwartz’ (1994) universal human values work, I used a mixed-method approach in three studies to
(1) explore and define the constructs of valuing change and valuing status quo, (2) develop reliable
and valid measures of these constructs, and (3) assess their role in shaping outsiders’ willingness to
take collective action. Study 3 demonstrated that change values—but not status quo values—
influence the contextual appraisals that outsiders (US residents) make when they encounter a
hypothetical group conflict for the first time. Valuing change leads to appraisals of the conflict that
are supportive of a disadvantaged group, and increases subsequent collective action intentions on
behalf of that group. In addition, valuing change leads to appraisals that are not supportive of an
advantaged group in conflict, and decreases subsequent collective action intentions on behalf of that
group.

In the final chapter, I reflect on the key findings of the thesis. Outsiders are indeed willing to
take collective action in support of groups in external conflict. This suggests that collective actors
are not only those directly engaged in group conflict, but any individual who may appraise the
conflict as relevant. Outsiders are willing to support either the advantaged or the disadvantaged
group in external conflicts, suggesting that collective action work in general must recognise that
third parties will not always sympathise with a disadvantaged group. Finally, outsiders’ pre-existing
ideologies and values shaped their contextual appraisals of novel conflicts and subsequent collective
action. As a whole, this thesis demonstrates the need for the development of theories and
frameworks of collective action that integrate pre-existing and contextual motives for collective
action, and that can accommodate actors both within and outside a context of group conflict.
Declaration by author

This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis.

I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award.

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Publications during candidature

Journal publications


Manuscripts under review or in preparation


Book chapters


Conference publications and presentations


Publications included in this thesis


A version of this manuscript is included as Chapter 3.

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<tr>
<td>Alexander Saeri</td>
<td>Designed studies (70%)</td>
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<td>Interpreted data (70%)</td>
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<td>Winnifred Louis</td>
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Contributions by others to the thesis

My advisors, Aarti Iyer and Winnifred Louis, each contributed to the key ideas in this thesis. Both advisors also gave comments and suggestions on the written text. Lydia Hayward contributed to the interpretation of the results for Chapter 4, Study 1.
Statement of parts of the thesis submitted to qualify for the award of another degree

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The past century was one of extraordinary social change and political upheaval. Whether as participants in mass demonstrations, such as the 25,000 women who marched in New York City to demand the right to vote in 1915 (“25,340 March in Suffrage Parade”, 1915), or as an individual refusing to tolerate unjust restriction of his or her freedoms, as in the man from the iconic “Tank Man” photograph from the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests (Barron, 1989; Witty, 2009), the past 100 years have seen members of disadvantaged groups challenging injustice and fighting for their right to be considered equal members of civil society.

Collective action encompasses any behaviour where an individual acts on a group’s behalf to improve the status, social power, or conditions of a group as a whole (Wright, 2009; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Social psychological research has historically focused on understanding why a person might challenge, rather than accept, their own unjust disadvantage. But the Chinese students who protested and died in Tiananmen Square did not do so in a vacuum that contained only them and the target of their protests, the authoritarian Chinese government. Instead, photographs and news media of the event spread internationally and drew widespread anger and condemnation from world leaders, non-governmental organisations, and individuals. Similarly, news of riots and demonstrations that followed the self-immolation of a persecuted fruit-seller in Tunisia received international support when spread through social media services such as Facebook and Twitter (Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari & Mazaid, 2011). Lastly, millions of individuals around the world participate in international movements for social justice (e.g., Amnesty International), economic justice (e.g., Oxfam), and environmental justice (e.g., Greenpeace; Moghadam, 2009), despite their lack of personal involvement or personal disadvantage in these domains.

It is clear, then, that individuals who are psychologically and geographically removed from a context of group conflict or inequality can and do engage in these conflicts and advocate for one side or the other. But when and how are these outsiders mobilized to take such collective action, for instance by participating in a protest, signing a petition, or donating money to a cause? On what basis do outsiders choose to support one group over another in a context of group conflict and inequality? In this thesis I aim to answer these questions.

In this introductory chapter I review the development of theory and research in collective action, which has sought to identify the motives for engaging in collective action. This work has focused on each group that may be party to a context of group conflict or inequality: members of a disadvantaged or victimised group, members of an advantaged or perpetrator group, and third parties or audiences who are situated within the context of the conflict. I then introduce outsiders,
argue that they may also take collective action when they encounter an external group conflict or inequality, and theorise how their appraisals and reactions to group conflict might differ from appraisals and reactions of people with a pre-existing connection to the conflict. Specifically, I argue that outsiders have the potential to support either (or both) the disadvantaged and advantaged groups within a conflict, and that outsider appraisals and collective action may be shaped by pre-existing attitudes and beliefs that are stable across contexts of group conflict, including ideological orientations and personal values. Finally, I present an overview of the subsequent chapters in this thesis.

**Collective action as a response to group conflict and inequality**

When an individual suffers a personal injustice or grievance, they may take action to improve their personal circumstances. However, when the injustice or grievance affects not just an individual but an entire group of people, then the injustice and grievance is no longer merely personal: it is collective. Such collective injustice or disadvantage can take many forms, including sexual, racial or other unjust discrimination, a breakdown or erosion of effective political representation through corruption, or acts of physical violence perpetrated against that group. Collective action encompasses behaviours that aim to improve the conditions of a group as a whole (Wright et al., 1990), specifically contrasted with behaviour that improves only an individual’s position (Wright, 2009).

The social psychological investigation of collective action has concentrated on understanding its antecedent conditions: when and why do individuals challenge the status quo and agitate for social change? Work on these questions was founded in two traditions: a focus on injustice and anger, in relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976; Walker & Smith, 2002), and a focus on cost-benefit analysis and the perception of efficacy, in resource mobilization theory (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994; Olson, 1965). The relative deprivation approach specifies that objective disadvantage is insufficient to mobilize one to protest. Instead, it is relative disadvantage—the recognition that others have more power, status, or resources than you—and the belief that the discrepancy is undeserved or unjust that motivates individuals to take action. In contrast, the resource mobilization approach describes collective action as resulting from individuals’ recognition that they had the material and social resources to enact social change, and that to engage in collective action would result in some kind of social or status reward. The concept of *collective* disadvantage is emphasised in subsequent development of each theory (Klandermans, 1984; Walker & Mann, 1987). In relative deprivation theory, for example, the intergroup comparison and appraisal that one’s group is unfairly disadvantaged is a more powerful predictor of political protest and other collective actions than an interpersonal comparison and appraisal that one’s self is unfairly disadvantaged (Smith, Pettigrew,
Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012). This recognition of the intergroup context as an important influence on individual’s mental states and behaviour was mirrored in the development of two other conceptual frameworks that have also been applied to understand collective action: social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and later, intergroup emotion theory (Smith, 1993; Iyer & Leach, 2008).

Social Identity Theory (SIT) describes how the social context can influence individuals’ beliefs and behaviour through the metaphor of a social identity, in addition to the more traditional conceptualisation of a personal identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A social identity is the part of a person’s self-concept that is founded in their membership of a social group, the comparisons that person makes between their group and other groups, and the emotional significance, or identification, of their group membership (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012; Tajfel, 1974). According to SIT, members of a disadvantaged group may seek to achieve a more positive or more distinct social identity compared to other, more advantaged groups (Ellemers, Barreto, & Spears, 1999; Tajfel, 1978). The permeability of group boundaries, the stability of group status, and the legitimacy of group status are each socio-structural elements of the intergroup context that determine the specific strategies that group members may employ to manage their identity. According to the SIT framework, collective action will be used as a strategy when group boundaries are impermeable and when the intergroup (status) context is seen as both unstable and illegitimate (Ellemers, 1993; Wright et al., 1990). This theory and the later self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherel, 1987) together comprise the social identity approach, which proposes that one’s social identification is an important predictor of attitudes and behaviour in a context where group memberships are salient, such as in intergroup conflict (Wright, 2010). Subsequent empirical work has established the importance of social identity and identification as a predictor of collective action behaviour (Stürmer & Simon, 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

Intergroup emotion theory specifies how emotions can be experienced not only as an individual, but also as a member of a group in a social context (Mackie, Smith, & Ray, 2008; Smith, 1993). The specific group-based emotion that an individual feels when encountering information about some intergroup conflict will drive their behavioural reaction, with each emotion embedding a behavioural response. For example, the emotion of group-based anger in response to disadvantage or injustice has emerged as a potent predictor of collective action among members of a disadvantaged group (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). This emphasis on anger as a motivating emotion is consistent with existing work in Relative Deprivation Theory, which stressed the affective (rather than cognitive) component of relative deprivation as most important in determining whether an individual would take collective action (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007; Walker & Smith, 2002).
Who takes collective action, and why?

In the past decade, researchers have worked to integrate the diverse approaches of relative deprivation, resource mobilization, social identity, and intergroup emotion in explaining intergroup conflict appraisals and collective action behaviour. The result has been a number of collective action frameworks derived from empirical research (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2004), meta-analytical reviews (van Zomeren et al., 2008) and theoretical work (e.g., Klandermans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). These frameworks, and the collective action literature as a whole, can be usefully organised by the perspective of each group in conflict.

The disadvantaged group member as an actor lies at the centre of most theory and empirical work on collective action in the past 30 years (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). The prototypical collective actor is a member of the disadvantaged group (i.e., a group that holds less status, power, and fewer resources) taking action against a relatively advantaged group (that holds more status, power, and resources; Wright et al. 1990) in order to improve conditions for their own group. More recent work has broadened this focus to include other key parties to a context of group conflict: members of the advantaged or perpetrator group (e.g., Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; 2007; Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008), and third party audiences or majorities as potential allies (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) and collective actors (Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008; Thomas et al., 2015). Below, I briefly review existing work on collective action by disadvantaged, advantaged, and third-party group members. Then, I identify the common assumptions across the collective literature about who can take collective action, whom they will support, and the scope of possible motives for action. Finally, I introduce outsiders: people who are wholly external to a context of group conflict, and explain how including outsiders as potential collective actors challenges these assumptions.

Members of the disadvantaged group

As a whole, collective action research has tended to focus on exploring the motives for action among members of a directly disadvantaged group that has been victimised by an inequality or injustice (Wright, 2009). The aggregate of this work has identified three common motives for taking collective action: strength of identification with the disadvantaged group, group-based anger directed towards the advantaged or perpetrator group, and perceived efficacy of the disadvantaged group as a whole to challenge its low-status position and achieve social change. Both resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Olson, 1965), which identified perceived efficacy as a motive for action, and relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976; Walker & Smith, 2002), which specified perceived injustice and anger as motives for action, were proposed specifically to explain why some disadvantaged individuals engaged in protest, and others did not. Integrative frameworks
also tend to focus on the disadvantaged group: the dual-pathway model of collective action (Stürmer & Simon, 2004) specified that group identification and perceived group efficacy form conceptually distinct pathways to collective action among disadvantaged group members. The Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008) was constructed from a meta-analysis of 67 studies of collective action among disadvantaged group members, and isolated three unique predictors of willingness to take collective action: group identification, perceived injustice and anger, and the perception of group efficacy. Van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears (2012) also proposed a dynamic dual-pathway model of approach coping with collective disadvantage in which an initial appraisal of the group conflict or inequality as self-relevant (conceptually similar to self-categorisation and group identification) leads to collective action through a process of emotion-focused coping (group-based anger) and problem-focused coping (group efficacy).

**Members of an advantaged group**

People who occupy a position of privilege or high-status in a context of intergroup conflict or inequality may choose to take collective action in support of their own group’s interest (e.g., to reinforce their advantage), or in support of the disadvantaged group’s interest (e.g., in recompense for previous harm or injustice perpetrated towards the disadvantaged group; Iyer & Leach, 2009). Intergroup emotion theory proposes that individuals can experience emotions not just about their personal goals and circumstances, but also about their group’s goals and circumstances (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993). Further elaboration of this theory has argued that emotions can be experienced towards other groups, such as group-based anger towards an opposing group, as well as towards one’s own group, such as group-based guilt felt about the perpetration of injustice (Iyer & Leach, 2008). Such group-based emotions arise from appraisals of (il)legitimacy of the current intergroup context, as well as perceived responsibility for harm suffered by the disadvantaged group. These emotions play a key role in predicting the political positions that advantaged group members will support in a context of intergroup conflict and inequality. For example, Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen (2007) found that (advantaged) non-Aboriginal Australians’ group-based anger towards (disadvantaged) Aboriginal Australians was associated with willingness to take collective action to prevent Australian Government redress for historical disadvantage and injustice perpetrated towards that group. In contrast, advantaged non-Aboriginal Australians’ group-based anger and guilt towards themselves as a group was associated with willingness to take action in support of disadvantaged Aboriginal Australians (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006). Other work has found that self-directed anger and shame was associated with US and British citizens’ support of armed forces withdrawal from Iraq following the 2003 invasion and occupation by these countries (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007). Self-directed guilt and shame have also been found to positively
predict (advantaged) Bosnian Serbs’ attitudes towards reparation for Bosnian Muslim victims of the Bosnian War (Brown & Cehajic, 2007). Finally, heterosexual students who engaged in perspective-taking when reading about a hate crime against homosexual students felt more group-based guilt and were more likely to attend a pro-gay demonstration (Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008).

**Sympathisers, bystanders, and other third parties**

In general, collective action research has investigated how members of the disadvantaged group may come to challenge their circumstances. Other work has examined their opposition: the relatively advantaged group, and found that these individuals may act selfishly or altruistically. However, one does not need to be directly victimised by an injustice in order to protest that injustice (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Stuart et al., 2013). For example, consumers may take collective action on behalf of clothing factory workers in their country, despite being neither factory workers nor directly advantaged by the workers’ unfair employment conditions (Subašić, Schmitt, & Reynolds, 2011). Australian citizens may protest against their government on behalf of disadvantaged asylum seekers (Davidson, 2014), even though they would not instrumentally benefit from changes to government immigration policy. Individuals with pre-existing sympathies for the goals of a social movement may be identified, recruited, and transformed into active movement participants by existing activists (Klandermans, 1984; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Simon and Klandermans (2001) describe the importance of engaging with and recruiting as allies the “silent majority” within a conflict context.

Subašić and colleagues (2008) drew on self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987) to propose a political solidarity model of collective action, in which members of a “majority” who are less-involved in conflict will take action on behalf of a disadvantaged group to the extent that members of a majority psychologically categorise themselves as (1) sharing a social identity with the disadvantaged group, and (2) not sharing a social identity with the perpetrating authority group (see also, Passini & Morselli, 2013). Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, and Muntele (2007) proposed that individuals can adopt a social identity on the basis of shared beliefs (e.g., that battery farming of chickens is morally wrong), rather than a pre-existing social category (e.g., ethnicity, religion). These opinion-based groups have been shown to motivate collective action on animal welfare (Thomas, McGarty, & Louis, 2014) and in support of international development (e.g., the provision of clean water to developing nations, Thomas & McGarty, 2009).

Despite some theoretical support for collective action potential among third parties, empirical studies that directly examine third party collective action are relatively scarce. Among those studies that have been conducted, identification, moral outrage (anger), and perceptions of efficacy emerged as common motives for action among third parties. Subašić and colleagues (2011)
found support for the political solidarity model of collective action in a worker rights context. Members of a less-involved majority group (Canadian citizens) reported stronger collective action intentions to protect disadvantaged employees of a clothing manufacturer from victimisation by their corporate employer when they expressed solidarity with the victimised employees (e.g., described themselves and the employees as sharing similar beliefs and values). Saab, Tausch, Spears, and Cheung (2014) investigated bystander collective action intentions by British citizens in the context of ongoing intergroup conflict between Israel and Palestine, and by Hong Kong citizens in the context of a commemorative vigil for the victims of the Tiananmen Square massacre in mainland China. In each case, the individuals taking collective action were not personally advantaged or disadvantaged by the group conflict (e.g., they were not Israeli or Palestinian). Bystanders’ collective action intentions were predicted by their belief that participating would strengthen their connection with the protest movement, their belief that engaging in action would lead to social change, their sympathy for the (Palestinian and mainland Chinese) victims of injustice, and their moral outrage (measured as anger) towards the actions of the perpetrator groups.

Collective action beyond the conflict context

Research into collective action can seem a dizzying array of disparate theories, frameworks, and actors. But taken in sum, three common predictors of collective action emerge: psychological attachment (e.g., group identification) to a group engaged in conflict, the experience of an emotion (especially anger) on behalf of that group, and the belief that the group, by taking action, may achieve its goals. Research into advantaged and third-party actors has revealed that collective action may be taken in support of another group, in addition to one’s own group. Taken together, this body of work has provided a strong foundation for new research into the psychological trajectory of collective action: from antecedents to consequences (Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011; Louis, 2009; Tausch & Becker, 2013), the recognition and exploration of collective action as a dynamic process (Becker, Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2011; Blackwood & Louis, 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2012), and differentiating between different types of collective action (e.g., radical, normative; Becker & Barreto, 2014; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009; Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh, & Siddiqui, 2011).

These advances notwithstanding, the aggregate approaches to collective action research also have a common blind spot: they all investigate collective actors who are intrinsically linked with the context of conflict or inequality. As a whole, collective action research embeds assumptions about who will take collective action, whom people are expected to support with their action, and what can mobilize people to act. Regardless of the myriad differences between their individual and collective experiences, all disadvantaged, advantaged, and third-party group members are psychologically and structurally located within the intergroup context (Wright, 2009; 2010). Thus it
is an assumption that only individuals who have a pre-existing connection with the intergroup conflict may take collective action. It is also typically assumed that individuals, once mobilized, will take action in support of a disadvantaged group or with the goal of greater social justice and more equal rights (Klandermans, 1984; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Wright, 2009). Finally, the current scope of potential motives for collective action are appraisals that are bound to a specific context of conflict, such as collective identification with a specific group in conflict (e.g., identification with disadvantaged Dutch Muslims). This narrow focus does not include more stable, relatively context-independent motives for intergroup and political behaviour (e.g., political ideologies; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009).

Not all collective action work is subject to these assumptions. Members of high-status group may act to defend their status against an agitating low-status group (Ellemers, Doosje, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1992; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002), rather than merely failing to support the low-status group. Moral convictions, as stable and inviolable attitudes about a specific intergroup conflict, have been found to predict collective action intentions (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011). But each of these embedded assumptions is challenged by outsider collective action. In this thesis, then, I seek to investigate whether outsiders, who are psychologically and structurally external to a context of group conflict, can be motivated to take collective action, who they might support with their action, and what motivates them to act.

**Outsiders and collective action**

Outsiders are distinct from sympathisers, bystanders, and other third parties in that they are individuals who are external to a context of group conflict. There is already ample anecdotal evidence that outsiders do take collective action to address an external inequality or injustice. The social media campaign KONY2012 aimed to raise international awareness of the cult and militia leader Joseph Kony who had, among other international crimes, forcibly recruited child soldiers for his personal army (Cohen, 2012). Within a week, more than 70 million people around the world had watched a documentary video about Joseph Kony, which also called on viewers to petition their elected representatives for international action and to donate money to the campaign (Cohen, 2012). When outsiders encountered information about Joseph Kony for the first time, which of them chose to take further action, and why? In another example, petitions for (“Stop the Killing in Syria”) and against (“No US Military Intervention in Syria!”) intervention by the United States in the Syrian civil war each have tens of thousands of signatures. Why did some US residents sign the pro-intervention and others sign an anti-intervention petition? Why did they get involved at all as outsiders, when the conflict is external to them?
Despite the progress that has been made in understanding why individuals take collective action, only three published papers have examined how people who are structurally and psychologically separate to a context of group conflict and equality—outsiders—come to take collective action. Glasford and Pratto (2014) found outsiders’ willingness to intervene in an external group conflict was negatively related to the perceived social power of an advantaged perpetrator: the more power the advantaged group had, the less willing outsiders were to take collective action. Glasford and Caraballo (2015) found that increased psychological distance led to a reduction in outsiders’ willingness to take collective on behalf of a disadvantaged group member. Finally, Kamans, van Zomeren, Gordijn, and Postmes (2014) found that outsiders perceived violence as more legitimate from a disadvantaged group when the reason for violence was out of fear (rather than anger), and more legitimate from an advantaged group when the reason for violence was out of anger (rather than fear). These empirical papers represent important work in the novel field of outsider collective action, and illustrate how aspects of a conflict context can influence outsiders’ willingness to intervene. However, they do not engage fully with existing theories of collective action motives among insiders. In this thesis, I directly compare insiders and outsiders’ appraisals of a conflict context, and assess whether insiders and outsiders share similar psychological pathways to action.

We cannot simply presume that outsiders and insiders will have similar responses to intergroup conflict and inequality. Crucially, outsiders lack the psychological attachment to a context of conflict that underpins the common predictors of group identification, group-based anger, and perceived group efficacy from existing work (van Zomeren et al., 2008). If outsiders lack a pre-existing basis for self-categorisation or group identification, how do they come to see a group’s struggles as their own? If outsiders lack access to the history of conflict and action between the belligerent groups, then how do they come to perceive which group is the appropriate target for moral outrage and anger, and which group has the power to achieve its goals? More broadly, which group might an outsider choose to support when they encounter a context of intergroup conflict? I investigate these broad questions in this thesis.

**Thesis overview and aims**

Collective action research in social psychology describes individuals’ pathways to collective action—so long as those individuals have a pre-existing connection with the context of group conflict or inequality. Much less is known about how individuals who exist outside the context of group inequality and conflict might come to take collective action. Understanding how outsiders respond to conflict is necessary to derive more comprehensive theories and frameworks of collective action and identify motives for collective action that may apply beyond or before a specific context of conflict.
I have three aims for this thesis. The first aim is to determine whether outsiders and insiders did indeed differ in their motives for collective action. I address this aim in Chapter 2, which presents two studies that directly compare insiders’ and outsiders’ responses to the same intergroup inequality. More specifically, I compare the two groups’ appraisals of anger, identification, and perceived efficacy, which have been identified as common predictors of collective action for insiders.

The second aim for the thesis is to investigate whether outsiders might support either party that is engaged in intergroup conflict. In both Chapters 3 and 4, I measure outsiders’ appraisals in support of either group—advantaged or disadvantaged—in an external conflict. I also measure outsiders’ intentions to take collective action in support of either group. This comprehensive approach allows for the possibility that outsiders may choose to support only one group, or in conflict, both groups, or neither group.

The final aim for the thesis is to explore psychological variables that could shape outsiders’ appraisals when they first encounter group conflict. In Chapters 3 and 4, I test the extent to which stable, context-independent beliefs can shape proximal appraisals of a conflict (i.e., identification, anger, and efficacy), and if these appraisals subsequently motivate collective action. Specifically, in Chapter 3 I present two studies that assess whether personal ideological orientations (Social Dominance Orientation, Right-wing Authoritarianism) influence outsiders’ appraisals of group conflict across two contexts in Greece and in Russia (Study 1), and in a truly novel (fictional) conflict (Study 2). In Chapter 4, I use a mixed-method approach across three studies to explore the content (Study 1) and conceptual distinctiveness (Study 2) of personal values about change and the status quo, and investigate how outsiders may use these values as a lens through which to appraise a novel (fictional) conflict (Study 3).

In the final chapter (Chapter 5), I review the key findings of the present thesis and discuss the implications of these findings for theories and frameworks of collective action. I also discuss challenges and limitations of the present work, and suggest future avenues for research.
Chapter 2: Comparing insiders’ and outsiders’ motives for collective action

This chapter investigated the first aim of the thesis: do outsiders and insiders differ their motives to take collective action? Outsiders are those individuals who are psychologically and structurally external from a context of group conflict, and may have no pre-existing experience with the groups in conflict, or the issue under conflict itself. Collective action research emphasises the importance of context-specific appraisals in mobilizing those within the conflict (“insiders”) to act (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright, 2010). I also explored the role of self-relevance as a primary appraisal (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012) and a necessary precondition for any response to conflict (Iyer & Leach, 2008) in this chapter.

In two studies, I directly compared insiders and outsiders’ appraisals of income inequality in the United States of America, and found that each group was similarly motivated to act, but that outsiders perceived the issue of income inequality as less relevant than insiders. This suggests that it is crucial to develop a clearer conceptual understanding of the content of outsiders’ self-relevance appraisals, and how this appraisal shapes more proximal predictors of collective action, to fully understand and motivate outsider collective action.

This chapter was adapted from a manuscript under review as at September 2015:

Abstract
Will outsiders take collective action when they encounter an external group conflict? Are outsiders motivated to take action in the same way as those with a pre-existing connection to the conflict (“insiders”)? In two studies, we directly compared outsiders’ (Indians) and insiders’ (Americans) responses to the issue of income inequality in the United States. We measured outsiders and insiders’ primary appraisals of the issue as self-relevant (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012), the strength of their secondary appraisals: identification with the group subject to the unjust inequality (Americans), anger in response to the injustice, and the perceived efficacy of collective action, and their willingness to take action. In both Study 1 (N = 124) and Study 2 (N = 142), outsiders (vs. insiders) identified less strongly with Americans and perceived the issue as less self-relevant. An indirect effect of group membership via self-relevance on anger and perceived efficacy emerged, such that outsiders felt less angry about income inequality and perceived less efficacy in challenging income inequality because they believed the issue was less relevant. Moderated regression analyses revealed that outsiders and insiders shared similar motives for action. In Study 1, anger and efficacy were positively associated with intentions to take collective action for both outsiders and insiders. In Study 2, anger, efficacy, and identification with Americans affected by income inequality were positively associated with collective action intentions. In both studies, anger was positively associated with the likelihood of signing a petition against income inequality for both outsiders and insiders. Unexpectedly, after controlling for secondary appraisals of identification, anger, and efficacy, outsiders were more likely to sign the petition than insiders in both studies. The findings suggest that outsiders are willing and ready to take collective action in response to external conflicts.

Keywords: collective action, group conflict, identity, appraisals
Comparing insiders’ and outsiders’ motives for collective action

In social psychology, collective action research is largely characterised by a focus on the immediate antecedents of political behaviour by disadvantaged group members to improve the status of their group (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright 2009). As a result, there are now well-specified empirical and theoretical models that describe the conditions in which members of disadvantaged groups will take collective action (van Zomeren et al. 2008; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). There is also a growing body of work investigating motives for action among advantaged group members (e.g., Iyer & Leach, 2009; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007) and members of third parties not directly involved the conflict (e.g., Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). However, each of these groups of potential actors has a pre-existing connection with a specific context of group conflict or inequality. That is, these actors are physically situated in the conflict context or are likely to have contact with the groups involved in the conflict. In contrast, there is very little work that has investigated the potential for collective action among outsiders: individuals who lack this type of pre-existing connection to a conflict (for exceptions, see Glasford & Caraballo, 2015; Glasford & Pratto, 2014). In this paper, we investigate whether outsiders are willing to take collective action in an external conflict, and whether outsider collective action is motivated by different factors than is collective action by disadvantaged group members currently engaged in that same conflict (“insiders”).

Who are outsiders?

Outsiders are those individuals who are psychologically and structurally external to a context of group conflict. Unlike third party “audiences” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) or “majorities” (Subašić et al., 2008) who are situated in a conflict context but who are not directly involved in the conflict, outsiders have no pre-existing relationship with the conflict or any of the groups engaged in the conflict. In fact, outsiders may be completely unaware of a group conflict in a way that is highly unlikely for insiders within the conflict context, which includes members of the advantaged, disadvantaged, or third-party groups. To date, the vast majority of collective action theory and research has sought to understand when and how insiders might take collective action (Louis, 2009; Wright, 2009). But individuals who are distinguished by their physical and psychological separation from the intergroup conflict would lack involvement and knowledge about the conflict context. These outsiders may therefore attend to different details of a conflict context, may have a different psychological experience, and ultimately may differ in their willingness to act compared to members of groups who are insiders to the conflict. Thus, the extent to which existing frameworks of collective action accurately capture outsiders’ experiences is an open theoretical and empirical question. In this paper, we directly compare insiders and outsiders’ responses to an
intergroup conflict, and their willingness to take collective action in support of either group involved in the conflict.

**Insiders and outsiders’ motives for collective action**

To date, there has been little empirical work investigating the motives for outsider collective action. In addition, the work that does exist has not assessed whether outsiders might be mobilized to collective action in the same way as are insiders. We briefly review the work on predictors of insider and outsider collective action below, before arguing for the need to directly compare these two groups’ motives for action.

There is a substantial body of work investigating collective action by different groups involved in a conflict context, including members of the disadvantaged group, members of an advantaged group, or members of a third party audience or majority. In general, members of disadvantaged groups are spurred to act by the strength of their psychological ties (i.e., identification) with their group; their felt anger in response to the perceived injustice perpetrated upon their group; and when they perceive that their group can be efficacious in achieving its goals for the conflict (van Zomeren et al. 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). The role of emotions in motivating collective action has also been investigated in advantaged group members. Advantaged group members may act in their own self-interest by angrily rejecting a disadvantaged group desire for equality because they perceive the intergroup inequality to be legitimate (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007). In contrast, relatively advantaged group members may act altruistically (i.e., in support of the disadvantaged group) when they feel anger and guilt at their group’s past actions (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008). Subašić and colleagues (2008) theorised that members of a third party audience or “majority” would take action in “political solidarity” with disadvantaged group members when third party members saw themselves as part of a superordinate group, united against a common foe (i.e., the advantaged group). In this model, the process of solidarity was one of self-categorisation and group identification (Subašić et al., 2008). Finally, one of the few studies that has examined motives for collective action by individuals outside the context found that British citizens demonstrating against Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory were motivated to act by perceived efficacy of their protest, moral outrage, and sympathy (Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2014). In summary, three key motives of collective action emerge for insiders in general: psychological attachment (identification) with a target group, the experience of group-based emotion (especially anger) and perceived group efficacy.

It may seem plausible that outsiders will be motivated to take collective action through the same psychological processes as insiders, considering the weight of evidence for identification, anger, and efficacy as shared predictors of collective action. However, each of these predictors is
based in, and bound to, a specific context of conflict. For example, identification with a group ebbs and flows as individuals engage (or do not engage) in collective action (Blackwood & Louis, 2012). The perceived efficacy of a group’s ability to achieve its goals is at least partly based on knowledge of the group’s history and past successful actions in the conflict (Hornsey et al., 2006). How then do outsiders make these context-specific appraisals? On what basis does an outsider perceive an instance of group inequality as just or unjust—and thus feel anger or no anger—if such an appraisal requires information that is embedded within a conflict context? One key variable that may affect outsiders’ responses to group conflict is the self-relevance of the conflict (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; van Zomeren et al. 2012).

**Self-relevance of conflict as a precursor for collective action**

Self-relevance is considered a necessary precondition for any reaction when encountering a new situation, including collective action (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Lazarus, 1991). In their dynamic dual pathway model, van Zomeren and colleagues (2012) proposed that individuals who confront a context of group conflict or inequality first appraise the extent to which the conflict context is relevant to them (e.g., their moral values, their goals, or their social identity). Only after the context is appraised as self-relevant will individuals engage in secondary appraisals of the conflict, which focus on perceived illegitimacy and perceived efficacy of the group to pursue their goals in the conflict.

Iyer and Leach (2008) also highlight the role of self-relevance in determining when emotions (such as anger at an oppositional group) will be felt at the group level, rather than the individual level. In this work, self-relevance is directly linked to self-categorisation (Turner et al., 1987) and social identity. Subašić and colleagues (2008) draw on self-categorisation theory in proposing a model for how third parties, or less-involved “majorities” within a conflict context, may choose to take collective action in solidarity with one of the belligerent groups.

Throughout these works, self-relevance as a primary, initial appraisal of a conflict context is associated with increased anger in response to collective disadvantage (Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel, & Fischer, 2007), increased identification with a disadvantaged group (Iyer & Leach, 2008), and increased subsequent willingness to engage in collective action (Subašić, Schmitt, & Reynolds, 2011). We may expect, then, that the degree to which an outsider engages in a primary appraisal of conflict as self-relevant will substantially influence their context-specific secondary appraisals, and their subsequent collective action.

**The current research**

We have two aims for the present research. First, we aim to determine if outsiders are indeed willing to take collective action on behalf of a disadvantaged group in an external conflict. We conceptualise the disadvantaged group member as a prototypical insider in this paper, since the
majority of collective action work to date has focused on this specific group (van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009; Wright, 2009). Due to outsiders’ structural and psychological exclusion from the conflict, and their lack of chronic awareness of the conflict, we hypothesise that outsiders’ appraisals of a novel group conflict will be less strong than those of insiders. Specifically, we predict that outsiders will report less anger in response to an unjust inequality, weaker identification with the group in conflict, reduced perceived efficacy, reduced intentions to take collective action, and will be less likely to engage in collective action behaviour. We also hypothesise that self-relevance of the conflict will mediate the effect of group membership on each of the other appraisals (i.e., identification, anger, and efficacy) and collective action intentions and behaviour.

Second, we aim to understand whether outsiders and insiders share the same motives for action. The lack of pre-existing connection to a context of conflict suggests that the established, contextually-bound predictors of collective action (identification, anger, and efficacy) may be less effective at motivating outsiders to take collective action, compared to insiders. Therefore, we tentatively predict that group membership may moderate the relationships between predictor of collective action, and collective action intentions and behaviour. We conduct two studies to pursue these aims. Study 1 investigates insiders’ (US residents) and outsiders’ (Indians) responses to income inequality in the United States. Study 2 was conducted to replicate the pattern of results found in Study 1, and further explores the role of identification as a context-specific predictor.

Study 1

Participants and Design

The study used a two-level (group membership: insider vs. outsider) quasi-experimental design. Residents of the U.S. (i.e., insiders) and India (i.e., outsiders) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The study was advertised as investigating responses to “a current group conflict.” The data for this study were collected in 2015. A total of 469 participants accessed the study, but 142 did not provide any information at all and were thus excluded. A further 14 participants completed less than 50% of the questionnaire, and 15 participants indicated at the end of the questionnaire that we should not use their data in analyses; this left 298 participants with usable data. A Little’s χ² test (Little, 1988) was conducted to determine whether the remaining missing values were Missing Completely at Random. The test was non-significant, χ² (759, N = 298) = 737.64, p = .704, indicating that the missing values should be classified as missing completely at random. Expectation-maximisation was used to estimate the 60 missing values (0.614% of total dataset). Although participants were recruited specifically from the USA and India, 100 participants reported their country of residence as different from the country from which they were recruited. For example, some participants reported that they currently resided in the USA, but their MTurk account had been set up when they were residents of India. These participants were
dropped from the sample, leaving 198 participants. A further 74 participants incorrectly answered at least one of the two questions were used to check whether participants understood the study materials. Demographic details of the final sample of 124 participants are reported in Table 1.

**Procedure and Materials**

After consenting to complete the questionnaire, all participants watched a brief video about income inequality in the United States; this video that had been produced by Vox Media, a news analysis website (Vox, 2014). The video presented a chart of income growth in the United States, demonstrating that income growth since 1980 has been concentrated in the top 10% of Americans by wealth. The video also noted growing income disparities during the U.S. economic recovery since the 2008/2009 financial crisis: income for the bottom 90% of Americans has fallen, while income growth for the top 10% of Americans continues unabated. The video concludes that the discrepancy between the top 10% and the bottom 90% in income growth may explain why a majority of Americans feel that the economy is still in recession (i.e., because they have not experienced the expected income growth from the recovering economy). The video was accompanied by written excerpts from news stories that reinforced the issue of increasing income inequality, especially between the wealthiest and the poorest American households.

After watching the video and reading the news excerpts, all participants answered two questions testing their comprehension of the materials. Participants then completed a series of measures assessing their responses to income inequality in the United States, before being debriefed and compensated for their time.

**Measures**

Unless otherwise specified, participants provided responses to all measures using a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

**Perceived relevance of the conflict context.** One item was used to measure participants’ judgements of the self-relevance of income inequality in America, “The issue of income inequality in America is relevant to me”.

**Group identification.** We used a single item to measure identification with the disadvantaged group (Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2013). We selected Americans as a whole as the target group, since the issue of income inequality affects most Americans, a point reinforced explicitly in the study materials. The item was: “I identify with Americans.”

**Felt anger.** We adapted three items (van Zomeren et al., 2004) to measure felt anger in response to income inequality: angry, outraged, and furious. Responses to these three items ($\alpha = .93$) ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
Perceived group efficacy. We used three items ($\alpha = .95$) to measure perceived efficacy of the group in challenging income inequality in America (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004). For example, “If we work together, we can reduce income inequality in America.”

Collective action intentions. Three items ($\alpha = .96$) assessed intentions to take collective action in response to income inequality. An example item was “I am willing to take action to reduce income inequality in America.”

Collective action behaviour. Participants were asked, “Would you like to sign a petition to challenge income inequality in America?”, and given examples of the types of causes (e.g., raising the minimum wage) that they could support. If the participant selected “Yes”, they were given a link to a website (www.inequality.org/petitions) that presented a number of petitions against income inequality in America. Clicking on this link opened the site in a new web browser window. If the participant selected “No”, they were taken to the next part of the questionnaire. We did not maintain a record of whether participants chose to actually sign a petition, as accessing their names on the petition would violate their anonymity. Instead, we recorded whether a participant responded “Yes” or “No” to the petition interest item in our questionnaire. Responses were coded as 0 = “No”, 1 = “Yes”.

Results

Mean differences. Descriptive statistics, including means and standard deviations of focal variables for insiders and outsiders, are presented in Table 2. To assess mean differences in our five continuous dependent variables (i.e., self-relevance, group identification, felt anger, perceived efficacy, and collective action intentions), we conducted a series of independent-groups t-tests. To assess mean differences in our categorical outcome variable (i.e., collective action behaviour), we conducted a chi-square test for independence.

Insiders identified significantly more strongly with Americans than did outsiders, $t(122) = 5.73, p < .001, 95\%CI \[1.034, 2.126\], d = 1.03. Insiders also perceived the issue of income inequality as significantly more self-relevant than outsiders, $t(122) = 3.22, p = .002, [0.293, 1.231], d = 0.58$. However, there was no significant difference between insiders and outsiders in the intensity of the anger they felt, the group efficacy they perceived, or their intentions to take action, $ts < 0.54, ps > .587, d = 0.10$. There was also no significant difference in collective action behaviour, $\chi^2 (1, N = 123) = 2.38, p = .123$. 
Table 1

*Study 1 demographic information for insiders (US residents) and outsiders (Indian residents) to a group conflict.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall (N = 124)</th>
<th>Insiders (n = 63)</th>
<th>Outsiders (n = 61)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age in years, M (SD)</td>
<td>37.11 (11.98)</td>
<td>39.6 (12.93)</td>
<td>34.49 (10.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex, N (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>36 (29%)</td>
<td>18 (29%)</td>
<td>18 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>85 (69%)</td>
<td>44 (70%)</td>
<td>41 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White / European American</td>
<td>49 (40%)</td>
<td>49 (78%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black / African American</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian / Indian</td>
<td>61 (49%)</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
<td>56 (92%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic / Latino</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-race / Other</td>
<td>9 (7%)</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest achieved education, N (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not complete high school</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school diploma</td>
<td>16 (13%)</td>
<td>14 (22%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate’s degree</td>
<td>11 (9%)</td>
<td>9 (14%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>68 (55%)</td>
<td>30 (48%)</td>
<td>38 (62%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s degree</td>
<td>23 (19%)</td>
<td>6 (10%)</td>
<td>17 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate degree</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Three participants did not report their age, sex, or educational attainment.
Table 2

*Study 1 descriptive statistics and test of mean differences for insiders and outsiders to a group conflict.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Insiders</th>
<th>Outsiders</th>
<th>Test of mean difference</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived relevance of conflict</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action intentions</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$n$ “Yes”</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>$n$ “Yes”</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective action behaviour</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* All variables measured on a scale from 1-7, except collective action behaviour, which was dichotomous.
The mediating role of self-relevance. We conducted bootstrapping (5,000 resamples) to test the indirect effect of group membership via self-relevance on context-specific appraisals of group identification, felt anger, and perceived efficacy, and for the outcome variables of collective action intentions and behaviour.

Bootstrap analyses revealed a stable indirect effect of group membership via self-relevance on anger, $B = -0.23$, $SE_{boot} = 0.13$, 95% CI$_{boot}$ [-0.56, -0.04], and perceived efficacy, $B = -0.31$, $SE_{boot} = 0.14$, [-0.65, -0.10], but not identification with Americans, $B = -0.05$, $SE_{boot} = 0.10$, [-0.27, 0.13]. Outsiders perceived income inequality as less self-relevant, and this reduced self-relevance was associated with lower anger and lower perceived efficacy. The direct effect of group membership on identification remained significant when self-relevance was statistically controlled, $B = -1.53$, $SE = 0.29$, $t(121) = 5.33$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-2.10, -0.96].

Further analyses revealed a stable indirect effect of group membership via perceived self-relevance on collective action intentions, $B = -0.47$, $SE_{boot} = 0.16$, [-0.82, -0.20] and collective action behaviour (signing the petition), $B = -0.31$, $SE_{boot} = 0.19$, [-0.82, -0.06]. As with context-specific appraisals, outsiders perceived the issue of income inequality as less relevant than insiders, and this reduced relevance was associated with both weaker intentions to take action and reduced likelihood of collective action behaviour.

Motives for outsider and insider collective action.

Collective Action Intentions. We tested whether outsiders’ motives for action differed from insiders’ motives for action by conducting a hierarchical moderated multiple regression. At Block 1, we regressed collective action intentions on group identification, anger, perceived efficacy, and group membership. At Block 2, we included three two-way interactions to determine whether collective action intentions were differentially predicted for insiders and outsiders: Group Membership x Group Identification, Group Membership x Anger, and Group Membership x Perceived Efficacy. Group Membership was dummy coded$^1$ as insiders = 0, outsiders = 1.

The predictors entered at Block 1 accounted for a significant 52% of the variance in collective action intentions, $F(4, 119) = 32.36, p < .001$. Two of the predictors were significantly and positively associated with collective action intentions: anger, $B = 0.24$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = 0.124$, and perceived group efficacy, $B = 0.60$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = 0.328$. Group identification and group membership did not predict collective action intentions.

The interactions entered at Block 2 did not account for a significant amount of variance over and above Block 1, $F_{ch}(3, 116), p = .757$. In addition, none of the three interactions were significant, indicating that predictors of collective action intentions were the same for both insiders and outsiders.
**Collective Action Behaviour.** We conducted hierarchical logistic regression with collective action behaviour as the outcome variable. At Block 1, group identification, anger, and perceived efficacy, and group membership were entered. At Block 2, intentions to take collective action was entered, as a more proximal predictor of behaviour. At Block 3, the three Membership x Predictor interactions were entered.

The predictors entered at Block 1 accounted for a significant 9-12% of the variance in collective action behaviour, $\chi^2(4, N = 124) = 11.39, p = .023$. Anger was positively associated with collective action behaviour, $B = 0.27, SE = 0.12, p = .024$, Odds Ratio = 1.31, 95%CI [1.04, 1.65], as was group identification with Americans, $B = 0.28, SE = 0.14, p = .048$, Odds Ratio = 1.33, [1.00, 1.76]. In addition, outsiders were significantly more likely to take collective action than insiders, $B = 1.09, SE = 0.47, p = .020$, Odds Ratio = 2.97, [1.18, 7.46]. Perceived efficacy was not associated with collective action behaviour, $B = 0.3, SE = 0.13, p = .824$, Odds Ratio = 1.03, [0.80, 1.33].

Intentions to take collective action were entered at Block 2, but did not account for significant variance in collective action behaviour over and above the predictors entered in the previous step, $\chi^2(1, N = 124) = 1.16, p = .283$. Intentions to take collective action were not associated with collective action behaviour, $B = 0.20, SE = 0.19, p = .288$, Odds Ratio = 1.22, [0.85, 1.76].

Three interactions between membership and the context-specific predictors were entered at Block 3: Group Membership x Group Identification, Group Membership x Anger, and Group Membership x Perceived Efficacy, but did not account for significant additional variance in collective action behaviour, $\chi^2(3, N = 124) = 4.56, p = .207$. As a whole, the results of this analysis indicate that outsiders and insiders are motivated to take action through similar psychological processes.

**Discussion**

We had two aims in Study 1. The first aim was to investigate the relative strength of outsiders and insiders’ reactions to group conflict. The second aim was to explore the motives that predicted outsider collective action, and whether they differed to the motives for insiders.

We hypothesised that outsiders’ reactions to an external group conflict would be less strong than members of the disadvantaged group (insiders), and that outsiders would be less willing to take collective action than insiders. We found partial support for this set of hypotheses. Outsiders saw the issue of income inequality as less relevant to themselves, and identified less strongly with the group affected by income inequality. However, instead of the hypothesised direct effect of group membership on appraisals of anger, perceived efficacy, and intentions to take collective action, we found an indirect effect via self-relevance. Outsiders judged income inequality as less self-relevant,
which led to reduced intensity of felt anger and less perceived efficacy than insiders. In addition, self-relevance also mediated the relationship between group membership and collective action intentions and behaviour. As a whole, these findings provide partial support for the prediction that outsiders feel less anger, perceive less efficacy, and identify less strongly with the group in conflict compared to anger in response to income inequality in America and perceived group efficacy in challenging that inequality emerged as independent predictors of collective action intentions to fight income inequality in America for both insiders and outsiders. The results for collective action behaviour were more complex. Anger again emerged as a significant predictor, but perceived efficacy was non-significant. Group identification was a significant and positive predictor of collective action behaviour, despite not predicting collective action intentions. Increased identification with Americans was associated with increased likelihood of signing the petition. However, there were two unexpected results: the non-significant effect of collective action intentions on collective action behaviour, and the finding that outsiders were more likely to sign a petition challenging income inequality than insiders.

The lack of relationship between collective action intentions and behaviour is unexpected because classic models of deliberate or planned behaviour in psychology explicitly specify that intentions mediate any relationship from attitudes and appraisals to behaviour (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). The use of intentions as a proxy for behaviour is common in collective action research (for a meta-analysis, see van Zomeren et al., 2008). In addition, previous work has shown that intentions to take collective action predict collective action behaviour as much as two years later (De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999). In a review of the intention-behaviour relationship, Sheeran (2002) suggests that a lack of perceived control in enacting a behaviour (e.g., no opportunity, insufficient resources to perform the behaviour) could lead to an intention-behaviour “gap”. However, participants were explicitly given the opportunity to take action immediately after expressing their intention. Considering the lack of established literature on outsider collective action, we are reluctant to speculate on the specific implications of this non-significant intentions-behaviour relationship without replicating the finding. We conducted Study 2 in an attempt to replicate and extend the results of Study 1.

The second unexpected finding in Study 1 was that outsiders were almost three times as likely to sign a petition challenging income inequality in America than members of the disadvantaged insider group (Americans) themselves after controlling for group identification, anger, and perceived efficacy. This significant difference in behaviour between insiders and outsiders was not observed at the bivariate level. Although outsiders perceived the conflict as less relevant, and felt less identified, less angry, and perceived less efficacy to intervene, they were still willing to take collective action in support of an external group. If this finding can be replicated,
there are substantial implications for the potential importance of collective action by outsiders to group conflict. We seek to confirm these results in a second study.

Although group identification with Americans was positively associated with collective action behaviour, it did not predict intentions to take collective action for either insiders or outsiders. This is an unexpected result, considering that group identification has been found to predict collective action in many other studies, as well as being a core component of current models of collective action, at least for insiders (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2008). The strength of a person’s identification with the disadvantaged group should mobilize them to take action in pursuit of that group’s goals. In addition, the significant difference in mean level of identification such that outsiders identified less strongly with Americans than insiders suggests that the questionnaire item itself appropriately measured the strength of participants’ group identification (Postmes et al., 2013). One possible explanation for this unexpected result may lie in the specific group identity targeted by the item: Americans.

Typically, collective action research focuses on members of the disadvantaged, low-status, or victimised group (van Zomeren et al., 2008; Wright, 2010). The target group for identification among most collective actors is thus their own (disadvantaged) group. In the context of income inequality in America, the disadvantaged group could be defined as the American people, who suffer from the effects of income inequality. However, it is possible that the item, with the target group “Americans”, instead reflected participants’ identification with Americans as a whole. This broader, superordinate identity would include both the Americans who are directly disadvantaged by income inequality, those Americans who are present within the context of income inequality (i.e., a “majority”, Subašić et al. 2008) and those Americans who are advantaged by or perpetuate the current state of income inequality in America. Identification with a group leads to collective action through a process of internalising and expressing group norms about the conflict or inequality (Stürmer & Simon, 2004). But if the group is Americans as a whole, then the normative response to income inequality may be unclear or conflicted, stifling participants’ intentions to take collective action. In order to clarify the role of group identification on collective action intentions and action, we replicated and extended Study 1 by measuring both identification with Americans as a whole, as well as those Americans who were disadvantaged by the issue of income inequality.

**Study 2**

We conducted a second study to replicate the pattern of results in the first study, and to clarify the extent to which the target group of identification helps determine the strength of this predictor of collective action. Specifically, in Study 2 we measure both identification with the specific disadvantaged group—Americans who are disadvantaged by the issue of income inequality—as well as with the broader group of Americans as a whole, as in Study 1.
Participants and Design

We used the same two-level (group membership: insider vs. outsider) quasi-experimental design as in Study 1. Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) users who were residents of the United States (insiders) or India (outsiders) were recruited as participants for the current study. The data for this study were collected in 2015. A total of 532 participants accessed the study, but 199 did not provide any data. A further 15 participants provided less than 50% of their data, and 9 participants indicated at the end of the questionnaire that we should not use their data in analyses. This preliminary screening left 309 participants. We assessed the remaining missing data for patterns using Little’s $\chi^2$ test to determine whether the data were Missing Completely at Random. The test was non-significant, $\chi^2 (566, N = 309) = 498.56, p = .981$, indicating that the data were missing completely at random. Therefore, we replaced the 87 remaining missing values (0.78% of dataset) using Expectation Maximisation estimation. As in Study 1, 85 participants reported a country of residence that did not match the country they were recruited from using MTurk. These participants were dropped from the sample, leaving 224 participants. Finally, 82 participants incorrectly answered at least one of the two comprehension check questions. Outsiders ($n = 70$ of 127 total) failed the comprehension check significantly more frequently than insiders ($n = 12$ of 97 total), $\chi^2 (1, N = 224) = 43.304, p < .001$. Demographic information for the final sample of 142 participants are presented in Table 3.

Procedure, Materials, and Measures

The procedure and materials for Study 2 were identical to that of Study 1. Anger, perceived efficacy, collective action intentions, and collective action behaviour were measured in the same way as Study 1. We refined our measurement of identification by including two distinct targets: the superordinate group and the disadvantaged group.

Identification with Americans. We now explicitly assess identification with Americans as a national group: “I identify with Americans as a whole”.

Identification with the disadvantaged group. We developed a new item to measure identification with the disadvantaged group specifically: “I identify with the Americans who have been disadvantaged by the current state of income inequality”.

Results

Mean differences. Descriptive statistics for the focal variables are presented in Table 4. A series of independent t-tests revealed significant differences between insiders and outsiders in felt anger, $t(140) = 2.11, p = .037$, 95%CI [0.04, 1.25], $d = 0.36$, self-relevance, $t(140) = 2.10, p = .037$, [0.03, 0.83], $d = 0.36$, and identification with Americans as a whole, $t(140) = 3.33, p = .001$, $d = 0.57$. Insiders felt more anger, perceived the issue as more self-relevant, and identified more with Americans as a whole, compared to outsiders. In contrast, outsiders were significantly more likely
to engage in collective action behaviour (40%) compared with insiders (20%), \( \chi^2 (1, N = 141) = 6.76, p = .009 \). No significant differences were found for perceived efficacy, intentions or identification with the disadvantaged group of Americans affected by income inequality, \( ts < 1.66, ps > .098 \).

**Testing the mediating role of self-relevance.** We assessed the indirect effect of group membership via self-relevance on appraisals of the group conflict (identification with Americans, identification with the disadvantaged group, anger, and efficacy) and collective action intentions and behaviour using bootstrapping with 5,000 resamples. Indirect effects for all analyses are presented in Table 5. To summarise, perceived self-relevance mediated the effect of group membership on felt anger, perceived efficacy, collective action intentions, and behaviour. Outsiders perceived the conflict as less self-relevant, which led to reduced anger and less efficacy; this pattern is consistent with the results of Study 1. There was no indirect effect of group membership via self-relevance on identification with Americans, or identification with the disadvantaged group, however.

The pattern of results for collective action intentions and behaviour was more complex, as they included significant indirect and direct effects. Outsiders perceived the conflict as less self-relevant, and lower self-relevance was associated with reduced collective action intentions and behaviour. These indirect effects are consistent with the results for the other appraisals. However, a significant effect of group membership on both collective action intentions and behaviour was also found. When controlling for the effect of self-relevance, outsiders (vs. insiders) reported more positive intentions to take collective action (\( B = 0.78, SE = 0.20, p < .001, 95\% CI [0.38, 1.18] \)), and were also more likely to enact collective action behaviour (\( B = 1.65, SE = 0.46, p < .001, [0.74, 2.55] \)).
Table 3

*Study 2 demographic information for insiders (US residents) and outsiders (Indian residents) to a group conflict.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall (N = 141)</th>
<th>Insiders (n = 85)</th>
<th>Outsiders (n = 57)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age in years, M (SD)</td>
<td>34.46 (10.10)</td>
<td>36.55 (10.80)</td>
<td>31.37 (8.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex, N (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>58 (41%)</td>
<td>42 (49%)</td>
<td>16 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>83 (59%)</td>
<td>42 (49%)</td>
<td>41 (72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White / European American</td>
<td>76 (54%)</td>
<td>76 (89%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black / African American</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian / Indian</td>
<td>55 (39%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>53 (93%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic / Latino</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-race / Other</td>
<td>4 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest achieved education, N (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not complete high school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school diploma</td>
<td>22 (16%)</td>
<td>19 (22%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate's degree</td>
<td>18 (13%)</td>
<td>17 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>73 (51%)</td>
<td>41 (48%)</td>
<td>32 (56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's degree</td>
<td>25 (18%)</td>
<td>5 (6%)</td>
<td>20 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate degree</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* One participant did not report their age, sex, race, or educational attainment. Three additional participants did not report their self-identified race, and one did not report their educational attainment.
Table 4

Study 2 descriptive statistics and test of mean differences for insiders and outsiders to a group conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Insiders</th>
<th>Outsiders</th>
<th>Test of mean difference</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with Americans</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with disadvantaged</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group</td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived relevance of conflict</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action intentions</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective action behaviour</th>
<th>n “Yes”</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n “Yes”</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* All variables measured on a scale from 1-7, except collective action behaviour, which was dichotomous.
Table 5
Study 2 indirect effects of group membership (insider, outsider) via self-relevance on appraisals of group conflict and collective action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Bootstrapped SE</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification with Americans</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with disadvantaged group</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action intentions&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action behaviour&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-1.08</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Group membership was coded such that 0 = insiders, 1 = outsiders.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>a</sup>The direct effect of group membership on collective action intentions and behaviour was also significant and positive.
Are insiders and outsiders similarly motivated to take collective action? We conducted a series of hierarchical moderated multiple regression analyses to test whether identification, anger, and efficacy predicted both insiders and outsiders collective action intentions and behaviour. In an extension to Study 1, we conducted separate analyses for each target group of identification: one set of analyses included identification with Americans as a whole (as in Study 1); another set included identification with the disadvantaged group of Americans affected by the issue of income inequality. We conducted separate analyses for two reasons. First, this allowed for a direct replication attempt of the Study 1 finding that identification with Americans as a whole was not significantly associated with collective action intentions and behaviour. Second, a disadvantaged group identity (i.e., Americans who are affected by the issue of income inequality) would be contained with the wider, superordinate identity (i.e., Americans as a whole). Thus including both variables as simultaneous predictors could lead to instability in the model.

Predicting collective action intentions. At Block 1, collective action intentions were regressed against target group identification, felt anger, perceived efficacy, and group membership. At Block 2, three two-way interactions were added: Group Membership x Target Group Identification, Group Membership x Anger, and Group Membership x Efficacy. Table 6 includes the linear regression coefficients for all variables predicting collective action intentions.

Model including identification with Americans as a whole. At Block 1, the model including proximal predictors of collective action (identification with Americans, anger, and efficacy) and group membership accounted for a significant 59% of the variance in collective action intentions, $F(4, 137) = 49.26, p < .001$. Felt anger and perceived efficacy were each positively associated with collective action intentions, and outsiders reported more positive intentions to act than insiders. The addition of the three two-way interactions at Block 2 did not account for significant additional variance, $F_{ch}(3, 134) = 0.99, p = .398, R_{ch}^2 < .01$.

Model including identification with the disadvantaged group. At Block 1, the model including established predictors of collective action and group membership accounted for a significant 59% of the variance in collective action intentions, $F(4, 137) = 51.75, p < .001$. Identification with the disadvantaged group, anger, and efficacy were each positively associated with collective action intentions. In addition, outsiders were reported more positive intentions to act than insiders. The addition of the three two-way interactions at Block 2 did not account for significant additional variance in intentions, $F_{ch}(3, 134) = 0.98, p = .405, R_{ch}^2 < .01$. 
Table 6

*Study 2 hierarchical moderated multiple regression analysis of intentions to take collective action: Block ($R^2_{ch}$) and coefficients ($\beta$).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Target of identification</th>
<th>Identification with Americans as a whole</th>
<th>Identification with disadvantaged Americans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Block 1</td>
<td>Block 2</td>
<td>Block 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target group identification</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.41***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group membership</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership x Identification</td>
<td></td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership x Anger</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership x Efficacy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-.02</td>
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$R^2_{ch}$

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<th>Block 2</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>.59***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.60***</td>
<td>.01</td>
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$R^2$

<table>
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<th>Block 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.59***</td>
<td>.60***</td>
<td>.60***</td>
<td>.61***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Predictor variables, except group membership, were centred before analysis. Group membership was coded as 0 = insiders, 1 = outsiders.*

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 
**Predicting collective action behaviour.** At Block 1, collective action behaviour was regressed against target group identification, felt anger, perceived efficacy, and group membership. At Block 2, intentions to take collective action was added as a predictor. At Block 3, three two-way interactions were added: Group Membership x Target Group Identification, Group Membership x Anger, and Group Membership x Efficacy. Table 7 includes the logistic regression coefficients for all variables predicting collective action behaviour.

**Model including identification with Americans as a whole.** At Block 1, the logistic regression model including target group identification, anger, perceived efficacy, and group membership accounted for a significant 12-18% of the variance in collective action behaviour, $\chi^2(4, N = 142) = 18.46, p = .001$. As seen in Table 7, felt anger and group membership were each associated with collective action behaviour: angrier participants were more likely to sign a petition challenging income inequality. Outsiders were also more likely to sign a petition than insiders. Neither identification with Americans as a whole nor perceived efficacy emerged as significant predictors of collective action behaviour. At Block 2, the addition of collective action intentions accounted for significant additional variance in the model, $\chi^2_{ch}(1, N = 142) = 14.66, p < .001$, accounting for an additional 9-12% of the variance in collective action behaviour. Participants who reported stronger intentions to take action were more likely to sign a petition. The inclusion of the three two-way interactions at Block 3 did not account for additional variance in collective action behaviour, $\chi^2_{ch}(3, N = 142) = 2.31, p = .510$.

**Model including identification with the disadvantaged group.** The Block 1 model including collective action predictors and group membership accounted for a significant 12-17% of the variance in collective action behaviour, $\chi^2(4, N = 142) = 17.84, p = .001$. Anger and group membership were each associated with collective action behaviour. However, identification with the disadvantaged group and perceived efficacy were not significantly associated with behaviour. At Block 2, the addition of collective action intentions accounted for significant additional variance in the model, $\chi^2_{ch}(1, N = 142) = 14.80, p < .001$, accounting for an additional 9-12% of the variance in collective action behaviour. Participants who reported stronger intentions to take action were more likely to sign a petition. Entering the three two-way interactions at Block 3 did not account for significant additional variance in collective action behaviour, $\chi^2_{ch}(3, N = 142) = 1.41, p = .702$. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Identification with disadvantaged Americans</th>
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<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>0.39**</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
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<td>Group membership</td>
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<td>Collective action intentions</td>
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<td>Membership x Identification</td>
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<td>Membership x Anger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Membership x Efficacy</td>
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<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Predictor variables, except group membership, were centred before analysis.

Group membership was coded as 0 = insiders, 1 = outsiders

* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
Discussion

In Study 2, we aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 and to clarify the role of group identification in predicting collective action. In general, we predicted that outsiders’ appraisals of a group conflict would be less strong (i.e., less oriented towards collective action) than insiders. In line with Study 1, we predicted that outsiders and insiders would be motivated to take action on the basis of the strength of these appraisals (identification, anger, and efficacy). We successfully replicated the overall pattern of mean differences in strength of insiders and outsiders’ appraisals from Study 1. In both studies, outsiders felt that income inequality in America was less relevant to themselves and identified less with Americans as a whole. We also replicated the indirect effect of group membership via self-relevance appraisals on felt anger and perceived efficacy: outsiders reported less conflict self-relevance, which was in turn associated with reduced anger and efficacy, compared with insiders.

We also found a number of novel results in Study 2. Outsiders felt less angry about income inequality than insiders, regardless of the perceived self-relevance of the issue. There was no difference between insiders and outsiders in their level of identification with the disadvantaged group of Americans affected by income inequality, a new measure developed for Study 2. Bootstrapped indirect effects of group membership via self-relevance on collective action and intentions revealed a possible suppression effect. Outsiders perceived the issue of income inequality as less relevant to themselves, and judgements of reduced self-relevance were associated with weaker intentions to take collective action, and reduced likelihood to sign a petition. But when statistically controlling for self-relevance judgements, outsiders reported more positive intentions to take collective action than insiders, and were more likely to sign a petition than insiders.

In Study 1, both outsiders and insiders’ collective action intentions were associated with felt anger and perceived efficacy, but not strength of group identification. In Study 2, we sought to clarify the role of group identification by also measuring identification with the disadvantaged group: Americans who are disadvantaged by income inequality. We found that identification with the disadvantaged group uniquely predicted both outsiders and insiders’ willingness to take collective action. This result (i.e., a significant effect of group identification) is consistent with the majority of collective action research (e.g., van Zomeren, 2008) and suggests that the lack of association between identification and collective action intentions in Study 1 was due to lack of clarity of the relevant social identity. It must be noted, however, that despite the significant relationship between identification with the disadvantaged group and intentions to take collective action, there was no relationship between identification and collective action behaviour. We return to the distinction and nuance of target groups in the General Discussion. Overall, however, the
results of Study 2 suggest that insiders and outsiders can both be motivated to take collective action through similar psychological pathways of identification, anger, and efficacy.

**General Discussion**

We had two aims for this paper. First, we sought to understand whether outsiders and insiders differed in the strength of their reactions to a specific context of group conflict and inequality: income inequality in America. Second, we aimed to explore outsiders’ motives for taking collective action: were they motivated in the same way as members of a disadvantaged group directly involved in conflict (insiders)?

To address the first aim, we investigated the strength of outsiders’ and insiders’ appraisals of identification, anger, and perceived efficacy in reaction to income inequality in America. In two studies, we found that outsiders do indeed react less strongly when encountering group conflict. Outsiders tended to identify less with the disadvantaged group compared with insiders, and perceive the conflict as being less self-relevant. This reduced self-relevance also mediated perceptions of felt anger and perceived group efficacy, two key predictors of collective action. These findings imply that outsiders, due to their exclusion and distance from the conflict context, are less willing to psychologically engage with that conflict.

The results for collective action intentions and behaviour were more complex. Briefly, the pattern of effects at the bivariate level (e.g., a t-test comparing intentions to take collective action between insiders and outsiders) differed from the pattern of effects at the linear and logistic regression level (e.g., the Group Membership [0 = insiders, 1 = outsiders] variable included as a predictor of collective action intentions simultaneously with identification, anger, and efficacy). Some effects that were non-significant at the bivariate analyses (i.e., Group Membership on collective action behaviour in Study 1, Group Membership on collective action intentions in Study 2) were significant in the regression analyses. One possible explanation is that the effect of Group Membership on intentions and behaviour was subject to statistical suppression (Friedman & Wall, 2005; Lynn, 2003), in which the ratio of shared variance to non-shared (i.e., “error”) variance in the Group Membership-intentions or Group Membership-behaviour relationships was improved by the inclusion of additional predictor variables (e.g., identification, anger, or efficacy). The suppression effect was not stable across the studies, however. To summarise, in simultaneous analyses with other predictor variables, outsiders were more likely to take collective action than insiders in both studies, and in Study 2, outsiders also reported stronger intentions to take collective action than did insiders.

It may seem farfetched that outsiders would have any interest in conflict or inequalities occurring in other countries. However, in both Study 1 and Study 2, outsiders were willing to engage in at least a token collective act of protest (i.e., signing an online petition). This is consistent
with anecdotal evidence showing that outsiders already take symbolic or supportive collective action in conflict contexts they have only just learned about (e.g., the KONY2012 campaign; Cohen, 2012). We also recognise that the specific sample of participants—US and Indian Amazon Mechanical Turk users—were not representative of their respective countries. For example, both groups tended to be educated, with a modal educational attainment of a Bachelor’s degree across the two studies. This may limit the generalizability of the results if more educated outsiders are also more likely to encounter external conflicts, or have more resources to deploy in taking collective action on behalf of another group engaged in conflict. Future research could investigate the existing social context for outsiders so as to identify contextual factors that may influence outsiders’ ability and motivation to intervene in others’ conflicts through collective action.

In the current studies, outsiders (compared to insiders) perceived a conflict as less unfair and believed they had less ability to make a difference, yet were more willing to take collective action. One possible explanation for these unexpected results is that outsiders may have perceived the act of signing a petition to be a symbolic, rather than instrumental, challenge against the issue of income inequality. Collective action may occur when an individual believes that it will allow them to express their values publicly (Hornsey et al., 2006), separately from the belief that it will effect social change. Indeed, a type of expressive efficacy belief was found to predict collective action among outsiders to British conflict in Israel and Palestine (Saab et al., 2014). We may expect, then, that variables which capture potential expressive and symbolic motives for collective action would be particularly effective at explaining outsider collective action. It might also be the case however that outsiders’ comparative agency here highlights that insiders to a conflict may face more barriers, as well as reasons to act. For example, Americans considering income inequality in their own country may experience attributional uncertainty and blame themselves for disadvantage (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002), or they may experience reluctance to compromise ingroup political leaders or norms (Tyler, 2006), or even experience fear of harmful consequences of taking action, such as being stigmatised (Barreto & Ellemers, 2010; Stangor, Swim, Van Allen, & Sechrist, 2002). There may also be differences in the perceived barriers and facilitators of collective action between non-activist insiders as examined in the current studies, and committed insider activists (Blackwood & Louis, 2012). But outsiders face none of these barriers, and may simply act to challenge an injustice when it is made salient. Despite the complexity of these results, the finding that outsiders are willing to take collective action—and do take collective action—indicates that they are an important group for future research. If outsiders are more easily mobilized to take expressive or symbolic collective action than insiders, then they represent a potential untapped resource for disadvantaged groups seeking to raise awareness of their plight.
We achieved the second aim of comparing outsiders’ and insiders’ motives for taking collective action by directly testing whether group membership (i.e., insider vs. outsider) moderated the effect of identification, anger, and efficacy appraisals on collective action intentions and behaviour. In both studies, outsiders’ and insiders’ intentions to take collective action were motivated by their anger at the inequality, and the degree to which they believed taking action would achieve the group’s goals. In Study 2, both groups were also motivated to act on the basis of their identification with the specific disadvantaged group of Americans affected by income inequality, but not the wider group of Americans as a whole. These findings imply that current frameworks of insider collective action, which also include identification, anger, and efficacy as key predictors, can be fruitfully adapted to investigate outsider collective action (Thomas et al., 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2008).

In sum, the findings of the present paper suggest that, to the extent that outsiders perceive a conflict as self-relevant, they may be mobilized to take collective action similarly to insiders. This direct comparison between motives for insider and outsider collective action is a key theoretical contribution of this paper. However, the present work is only a first step in understanding how outsiders encounter, appraise, and respond to external group conflict and inequality. Although the results of this paper suggest that outsiders are able and willing to make appraisals of different strengths about their identification with, anger towards, and perceived efficacy in response to a novel and external conflict, it does not answer the issue of how outsiders arrive at these judgements.

One unanswered question in this research concerns the basis on which individuals are judging an instance of group conflict or inequality to be relevant, or irrelevant. In the dynamic dual pathway model of collective action, individuals must perceive a conflict as self-relevant before they will engage in emotion- or problem-focused coping with their disadvantage by taking collective action (van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears. 2012). In this model, self-relevance is determined by the relevance of a conflict or threat to the psychological self (e.g., one’s social identity, or one’s morality) as well as a goal that that self holds (e.g., to act morally, to be respected and valued). Iyer and Leach (2008) also describe self-relevance as an appraisal of a situation’s importance to one’s goals and identity. How then do outsiders determine the self-relevance of a conflict context when they first encounter it? One avenue of research would be to investigate pre-existing beliefs and attitudes that shape how people view and act upon their social world. Future work could directly investigate, for example, the role of outsiders’ moral beliefs, ideologies, and values as determinants of outsiders’ appraisals of contexts of conflict and inequality, and their willingness to take collective action.
Footnotes

1 We used dummy coding for Group Membership (0 = insider, 1 = outsider) rather than effect coding (e.g., -1 = insider, +1 = outsider; Aiken & West, 1991) to simplify interpretation of Odds Ratios for the logistic regression. The pattern of all effects reported in the paper where Group Membership is included as a predictor are consistent regardless of the type of coding used. In the current paper, the outcome variable for Logistic Regression was signing an online petition against income inequality. Thus, the reported Odds Ratios describe the relative likelihood that an individual would sign the online petition (vs. not sign the petition) for each 1 unit change in the predictor variables. If the effect coding for Group Membership were used, the Odds Ratio would need to be squared to appropriately interpret the relative likelihood of petition signing for outsiders compared to insiders.

2 For all logistic regressions reported in this paper, the lower number is a Cox and Snell $R^2$ estimate (1989), and the higher number is a Nagelkerke $R^2$ estimate (1991).

3 In order to be comprehensive, we did conduct analyses that included identification with both target groups (i.e., identification with Americans as a whole and identification with Americans who were disadvantaged by the issue of income inequality). In this model, identification with the disadvantaged group of Americans remained a significant predictor, and identification with Americans as a whole remained a non-significant predictor. The pattern of results for the other appraisals did not change.
Chapter 3: Ideology and outsider collective action

In this chapter, I pursued the second and third aims of the thesis. The second aim of the thesis was to investigate whether outsiders might be willing to support each group within a conflict. In two studies, I measured outsiders’ identification with, anger on behalf of, and the perceived efficacy of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups engaged in conflict. I also measured outsiders’ willingness to take collective action on behalf of each group in conflict. Due to the focus of previous collective action research on individuals who are already members of groups in conflict, it is usually assumed that these individuals will take action to advance their own group’s goals (e.g., a disadvantaged group member will act to advance the goals of the disadvantaged group), engage in some other type of identity management strategy, or do nothing. The work in this chapter offers a more inclusive approach by recognising the possibility that outsiders may support either group in conflict.

The third aim for the thesis was to explore the psychological variables that could shape outsiders’ appraisals when they first encounter group conflict. In Chapter 2, the primary appraisal of self-relevance influenced outsiders’ more proximal appraisals about an external group conflict or inequality. In this chapter, I sought to unpack the content of outsiders’ self-relevance appraisals by investigating personal ideological orientations of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, & Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981). Ideologies are sets of beliefs that structure how an individual perceives, judges, and acts upon their social world (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). A self-relevance appraisal is an interpretation of an event as “relevant to a particular aspect of one’s ego… and as relevant to a particular goal” (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). The conceptual fit between the role of ideology and the primary appraisal of self-relevance led me to examine how SDO and RWA may shape outsiders’ more proximal appraisals of a novel group conflict.

This chapter was adapted from a manuscript that is in press at Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy as at September 2015.

Abstract

Members of groups in conflict may take collective action: actions to improve conditions for their group as a whole. The psychological antecedents of collective action for groups that are party to conflict and inequality are well-established. Comparatively little is known about how uninvolved outsiders respond to an external intergroup conflict. We investigate how personal ideological orientations of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) shape outsiders’ willingness to take collective action in support of groups engaged in external conflict. In Study 1, US residents read about conflicts between disadvantaged citizens and an advantaged government in Greece and Russia. In Study 2, US residents read about a similar conflict in a fictional country, Silaria. Path analyses revealed that SDO and RWA shaped psychological appraisals of the conflict contexts, which predicted intentions to take collective action on behalf of either group. SDO and RWA were positively associated with advantaged group identification and anger at a disadvantaged group, and negatively associated with disadvantaged group identification and anger at an advantaged group. Group identification and anger predicted subsequent collective action intentions on behalf of either group. The sensitivity of outsiders’ appraisals to ideological orientations suggests strategies for both advantaged and disadvantaged groups to recruit outsiders as allies in group conflict.

Keywords: Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, collective action, social identity
Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation predict outsiders’ responses to an external group conflict: Implications for identification, anger, and collective action

The global reach of social and broadcast media enables more people than ever before to encounter information about group conflict and inequality occurring outside their own social context. Advances in technology provide individuals with the opportunity to support groups engaged in external conflicts. Yet surprisingly little empirical work has investigated how uninvolved outsiders appraise external intergroup inequality or conflict, and how they choose which group to support. Theories of collective action have described outsiders as possessing great potential influence on the outcome of a group conflict, realised by intervention on behalf of one group or another (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008; Wright, 2009). But these same theories specify psychological antecedents of collective action that are bound to a specific instance of group inequality or conflict (e.g., perceived injustice of unequal rights in Russia), and the specific social actors within that conflict (e.g., identification with anti-austerity protestors in Greece). Outsiders are psychologically and structurally positioned outside the context of conflict. How then do they come to make the contextually-bound appraisals that lead to collective action?

Within a given context, group members may take collective action in order to improve conditions for their group as a whole (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Collective action may be motivated by the perceived injustice of the inequality or conflict, perceived efficacy of the group in achieving its goals, and strength of identification with the group (for a meta-analysis, see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). In this set of studies we investigate how individual, stable and global ideological orientations towards status hierarchies and intergroup relations influence these appraisals of group conflict and inequality across different contexts. Specifically, we examine how Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981; 1996) shape outsiders’ willingness to perceive injustice, perceive group efficacy, identify with, and take collective action on behalf of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups in a conflict. In doing so, we extend collective action theory by examining individual and relatively context-independent motives for collective action, in contrast to the collective and relatively context-specific motives that comprise current theoretical frameworks of collective action (van Zomeren, 2013; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012).

Groups engaged in conflict or that desire social change often appeal to third parties for support and solidarity in achieving their goals (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008). Both powerful and marginalized groups would be able to strategically target their persuasive messages to outsiders if they understood the psychological process by which outsiders come to support a group in conflict.
Ideological orientations structure appraisals of group conflict and inequality

Ideologies are sets of beliefs that give structure and meaning to the social world. Ideological appraisals of new social situations make salient discrepancies between the world “as it is” and the world “as it should be”, and motivate individuals to rectify that discrepancy (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). As such, ideologies about intergroup conflict or inequality will influence how individuals appraise such conflicts when they encounter them for the first time. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981; 1996) are stable ideological orientations that characterize people’s general views about status hierarchies and intergroup relations. SDO describes individuals’ acceptance of group-based status hierarchy, in which some groups are more advantaged than others. RWA characterises individuals’ beliefs about the need for submission and obedience to authority, conformity to traditional norms and values, and aggression towards those who fail or refuse to submit or conform to that authority. A great deal of work has shown that SDO and RWA predict attitudes that are relevant to intergroup conflict and injustice, such as prejudice towards outgroups (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008), willingness to discriminate against outgroups (Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007), and opposition to policies that seek to create social equality (Federico & Sidanius, 2002).

According to the Dual Process Model (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a), SDO and RWA predict prejudice and discrimination towards different groups and in different contexts as an expression of different motivational goals. This is of relevance to our work because collective action can arise in challenge to prejudice and discrimination (Wright et al., 1990). RWA is grounded in the belief that the world is a dangerous and threatening place and is thus motivated by the desire for personal and collective security, stability, and order. In contrast, SDO is grounded in the belief that the world is a competitive “jungle” where the worthy are rewarded and is thus motivated by the desire for group dominance and power over other, weaker groups. As a result, SDO is more likely to predict negativity towards socially subordinate groups such as the unemployed and disabled, and immigrants framed as economically threatening, while RWA is more likely to predict negativity towards socially deviant groups, such as drug dealers and terrorists, and immigrants framed as socially threatening (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; 2010b).

SDO and RWA are linked with the general concept of political ideology, which is often conceptualized and measured along a liberalism-conservatism continuum (Jost et al., 2009) and typically consisting of at least two dimensions (e.g., an economic dimension and a social dimension; for a review, see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). In a nationally representative New Zealand sample, SDO positively predicted support for conservative economic policy, and RWA positively predicted support for conservative social policy (Perry & Sibley, 2013). For conciseness, we refer to
the two dimensions of political ideology as economic conservatism (aligned with SDO), and social conservatism (aligned with RWA). We must stress, however, that the content of each dimension of political ideology is less clearly specified than the content of the ideological orientations SDO and RWA. In the current set of studies we distinguish between an individual’s self-identification as a political conservative and that same individual’s endorsement of the ideological belief that groups’ unequal power relations should be maintained (i.e., SDO) and social deviants should be treated with hostility and authorities with respect (i.e., RWA).

Our focus on personal ideological orientations may appear to represent a radical departure from the extant literature on collective action, which emphasises group-focused predictors such as group identification, group efficacy, and group-directed anger (van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, the dynamic dual-pathway model (van Zomeren et al., 2012) of collective action provides conceptual space for individual beliefs and ideals—to which ideology is related—to help shape individuals’ decisions to participate in collective action. Other research has also considered how willingness to take collective action may be shaped by personal moral convictions, which are defined as strong and inviolable attitudes about specific moral issues (e.g., discrimination against Dutch Muslims, van Zomeren, 2013; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011:). Because moral convictions are held about specific issues, however, their predictive utility in shaping collective action is likely to be limited to contexts that focus on that particular issue. In contrast, general ideological orientations such as SDO and RWA are more likely to shape interpretations of a wide range of group conflicts. SDO and RWA have been found to predict generalized intentions to reduce global inequality (Reese, Proch, & Cohrs, 2014), and only one study to our knowledge has investigated whether SDO and RWA can mobilize individuals to take collective action (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006). In this set of studies, we seek to extend current social psychological models of collective action by investigating how SDO and RWA as stable, personal ideological orientations might shape more proximal appraisals of conflict contexts and subsequent collective action. To do so most effectively, we turn to a novel group in collective action research: outsiders.

The role of uninvolved outsiders

The present research investigates motives of collective action for outsiders: people who are geographically or psychologically separate from the conflict, without pre-existing opinions about or goals for that conflict. The bulk of collective action research investigates disadvantaged groups taking action against advantaged groups (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2008), how advantaged group members may take collective action in their own interests (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007) or in solidarity with the disadvantaged group (Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008; Wright, 2009). Third parties to group conflict—variously referred to as the “majority” (Subašić et al., 2008),
“silent majority” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), or the “population” (Passini & Morselli, 2013) — are theorised to be important potential actors in conflict. Third parties may support either group engaged in conflict, typically by categorizing themselves with one of the groups, identifying with that group, and acting on that groups’ behalf (Subašić et al., 2008).

In contrast, outsiders lack information about a context of group conflict. As such, their psychological experiences of, and responses to, the conflict may be quite different from those outsiders who in our model are truly external to the conflict—not part of the nation, political entity or society in which the conflict is occurring. It is for this reason that outsiders are an ideal population in which to examine stable, individual, and context-independent motives for collective action. Precisely because of outsiders’ structural and psychological separation from the conflict context, their specific judgements about the conflict (e.g., the injustice suffered by each group, their identification with each group) are likely to be influenced by their pre-existing personal ideological orientations. Furthermore, we acknowledge that outsiders may choose to take collective action in support of either group within a context of conflict. We propose that outsiders’ ideological orientations will shape their interpretations of a particular intergroup conflict, which in turn will predict their willingness to take collective action on behalf of one party or the other in the conflict. This point may seem intuitive. Yet little scholarly research has examined reactions of outsiders to conflict (Wright, 2009). As we elaborate in the next section, such research helps to illuminate the psychological antecedents of group formation, offering a new perspective on the interaction of individual differences and group processes. Existing theoretical models focus on the range of intentions—from weak to strong—to engage in collective action for a particular group: they do not consider individuals’ opportunities to support either side of an existing conflict. Accordingly, the present research adds a new perspective on individuals’ possible responses to conflict.

The role of SDO and RWA in shaping interpretations of conflict

We examine how outsiders’ SDO and RWA influence their appraisals of specific external conflicts between an advantaged group (e.g., the government) and a disadvantaged group (e.g., citizen protesters who are demanding higher wages). Importantly, outsiders may choose to support either the advantaged or disadvantaged groups within a context of conflict. The degree to which such individuals endorse or reject ideologies of group-based hierarchy and authority will change how they appraise key information about a context of conflict. Specifically, we propose that SDO and RWA will predict proximal motives of collective action in support of each group: felt anger (about injustice), perceived efficacy of each group to create change, and level of identification with each group.

Individuals’ SDO and RWA will positively predict appraisals of group conflict aligned with a dominant, authoritarian advantaged group. Recent work on opinion-based groups and collective
action (e.g., Subašić, Schmitt, & Reynolds, 2011; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009) is part of a new wave of social identity work that explores how social identities can emerge from shared beliefs and attitudes, rather than being bound to social categories. Therefore outsiders with a particular ideological orientation may perceive that a particular group in an external conflict holds similar beliefs and values, which may then serve as a basis for an emergent psychological shared group membership (see also, Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). For instance, individuals who endorse SDO and RWA ideologies may identify with a dominant and authoritarian group because they recognize that such a group likely shares the belief that subordinate groups should be dominated and force is necessary and appropriate to keep deviants in line. Similarly, the more individuals endorse SDO and RWA, the more they will see disadvantaged groups who struggle and strive for equality to be trying to secure resources or status that they do not properly deserve, or threatening the authority of the dominant and advantaged group, evoking anger at the disadvantaged group. More tentatively, we suggest that endorsing such ideologies motivate individuals to perceive others who share these ideologies (i.e., the advantaged group) as possessing the power to achieve its goals. As such, we predict that SDO and RWA should also positively predict the perceived efficacy of the advantaged group. Each of these appraisals would, in turn, lead to increased willingness to take collective action in support of the advantaged group, consistent with current frameworks of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Just as endorsing ideologies of dominance and authority should lead individuals to support the advantaged group in a conflict, rejecting these ideologies should lead individuals to appraise group conflict and inequality in support of the disadvantaged group. Thus SDO and RWA will negatively predict anger at the advantaged group, identification with the disadvantaged group, and perceived efficacy of the disadvantaged group. These appraisals, in turn, would lead to increased willingness to take collective action in support of the disadvantaged group.

The present research

We investigated the role of personal ideological orientations in shaping outsiders’ willingness to take collective action to support either party in an external conflict. In two studies, participants read a description of real (Study 1) or fictional (Study 2) group conflicts to which they were clearly outsiders. Study 1 examined the relationships between ideological orientations, group identification, perceived efficacy, felt anger, and collective action intentions in a cross-sectional design. Study 2 used a two-stage design to test the role of ideological orientations as pre-existing antecedents of outsiders’ responses to external group conflict.

We hypothesised that SDO and RWA would be positively associated with appraisals in support of the advantaged group: advantaged group identification, felt anger towards a disadvantaged group, and perceived efficacy of an advantaged group. We also expect, in line with
the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008), that appraisals in support of an advantaged group would each be significantly and positively associated with intentions to take action on behalf of the advantaged group. Broadly, we expected the direction of the effects of ideological orientation on contextual appraisals to be reversed for appraisals in support of disadvantaged groups. We hypothesised that SDO and RWA would be negatively associated with appraisals in support of a disadvantaged group: disadvantaged group identification, felt anger towards an opposing advantaged group, and perceived efficacy of a disadvantaged group. We also expected that appraisals in support of a disadvantaged group would each be significantly and positively associated with intentions to take action on behalf of the disadvantaged group.

Study 1

Method

Participants and Procedure. We sought to recruit 200 US residents to complete the study using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants received USD$0.50 as compensation. The data for this study were collected in 2012. One hundred and eighty one MTurk users initially accessed the online questionnaire, of which 170 answered at least one question. Eight participants were then excluded: four who had more than 50% missing data, three who failed to complete any item on at least one scale (e.g., left the whole SDO scale blank), and one who failed to follow instructions. The remaining missing data were not missing completely at random (MCAR) as Little’s MCAR test was significant, \( \chi^2 (2332, N = 162) = 2493.74, p = .010 \) (Little, 1988; Little & Rubin, 2014). However, no variable was missing more than 5% of its cases and no pattern in attrition was observed after conducting a series of separate variance t-tests. As such, the missing cases were classified as missing at random and were replaced using expectation maximisation (EM) estimation (Mazza & Enders, 2014).

The final sample of 162 participants ranged in age from 18 to 73 years (M = 35.55, SD = 13.03), and included 93 (57%) women and 69 (43%) men. Most (n = 123, 76%) participants listed their race as White / European American. Other participants were African American (n = 15, 9%), Asian (n = 10, 6%), Hispanic/Latino (n = 4, 2%), Native American / American Indian (n = 4, 2%), described themselves as mixed-race (n = 5, 3%), or did not report their race (n = 1). Two percent of participants reported that they did not complete high school, 35% that their highest qualification was a high school diploma, 20% held an associate’s degree, and 43% reported that they held a bachelor’s degree or higher. Participants read about two external group conflicts occurring in other countries. After reading about each group conflict, participants completed a series of measures assessing their responses to the conflict and their ideological orientation.

Materials. Participants read two descriptions of external group conflict, one occurring in Greece and one occurring in Russia. In both contexts, the actors in the conflict were the government
(advantaged group) and citizen protestors (disadvantaged group). The Greek conflict focused on the government’s introduction of strict austerity measures that would cut minimum wages and public services. Greek citizens were described as opposing the unpopular measures by engaging in protests that included throwing rocks at police and setting fire to buildings, and the government as seeking to break up these protests using police action and tear gas.

The Russian conflict was described as sparked by recent government elections that were perceived to be fraudulent. Citizens participated in unsanctioned demonstrations to protest the elections and demand the resignation of the President, while the government responded with heavy fines and arrests to punish the protesters.

**Measures.** All responses, except where indicated, were provided on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).

**Social dominance orientation (SDO).** The 16-item SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994) was used to assess participants’ social dominance orientation. The 16 items were averaged such that higher scores indicated higher levels of support for intergroup status hierarchies (α = .93).

**Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA).** Drawing on a recent factor analytic study (Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010), a sub-set of the original 30-item RWA measure were selected for inclusion in the present study. Three items measured aggression (e.g., “What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path”); three items assessed conformity (e.g., “There is no ‘ONE right way’ to live life; everybody has to create their own way”, reversed); and three items assessed submission (e.g., “Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn”). The nine items were averaged such that higher scores indicated higher levels of support for authoritarianism (α = .86).

**Collective action intentions.** One item (adapted from van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004) assessed intentions to take collective action to support each party (government or protesters) in each context. For example, in the Greek context, participants indicated their willingness to “take action to support the Greek government,” and their willingness to “take action to support the Greek protestors” (1 = not willing at all, 7 = extremely willing). These items were then reworded for the Russian context.

**Group identification.** Two items (adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995) assessed group identification with the government and protestors in each context, for instance: “I identify with the Greek government,” and “I feel strong ties with the Russian protestors.” The relevant items were averaged to form reliable measures of identification with the Greek government (r = .87), Greek protestors (r = .81), Russian government (r = .84), and Russian protestors (r = .92; all ps < .001).
**Anger towards different groups.** Two items assessed the extent to which participants felt anger and outrage (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007) towards the government and protestors in each context (1 = not at all, 6 = extremely). The two items were averaged to form a reliable measure of anger towards the Greek government \( (r = .75) \), Greek protestors \( (r = .82) \), Russian government \( (r = .86) \), and Russian protestors \( (r = .84; \ all \ ps < .001) \).

**Perceived efficacy.** One item (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004) assessed the degree to which participants believed each target group in each context had the power to achieve its goals, e.g., “The Greek government is able to achieve its goals without help from outside Greece.” The item was reworded for each target group and context.

**Results**

**Preliminary Analyses.** Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all variables are presented in Table 1. Overall, participants’ mean scores fell significantly below the mid-point on SDO \( (t[162] = -17.08, \ p < .001) \) and RWA \( (t[161] = -8.07, \ p < .001) \). Univariate tests of skew and kurtosis suggest that the skew \( (|0.03| \ to \ |1.87|, \ SE = 0.19) \) and kurtosis \( (|0.02| \ to \ |2.60|, \ SE = 0.38) \) of the data were sufficiently low to avoid bias in path analysis statistics (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996). Inspection of the bivariate correlations revealed that as expected, the predictor variables identification, anger and efficacy tended to covary within each target group and within each conflict context. In addition, the predictor variables tended to covary with the outcome variable, intentions to take collective action in support of each target group within each conflict context.
Table 1

**Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for Study 1.**

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**Russian context**

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<td>4 Anger</td>
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<td>-.11</td>
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**Protestors**

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<td>.14†</td>
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**Protestors**

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<td>.03</td>
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*Note.* All variables measured on a 1-7 scale, except Anger, which was measured on a 1-6 scale. † $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 
Path analysis. To investigate the hypothesised relationships between ideological orientations, identification, anger, perceived efficacy, and collective action intentions, we conducted separate path analyses for each context (i.e., Russia and Greece) and to predict collective action in support of each target group (i.e., government and protestors) using AMOS 21.0 (Arbuckle, 2012). We chose to test the structural model in path analysis with Structural Equation Modelling software rather than multiple regression for three reasons. First, path analysis allows for simultaneous parameter estimation in a model that contains multiple intercorrelated predictors. Second, this method allows us to assess whether the relationships in the hypothesized model are similar across conflict contexts and across groups. Third, path analysis in SEM allows us to compare the fit of the hypothesized model to plausible alternatives.

Separate models were tested to predict collective action intentions in support of each target group (i.e., the government or protestors). The hypothesized model specified SDO and RWA as exogenous predictors of identification with the target group (i.e., government or protesters), anger at the opposition group (i.e., protesters or government), and perceived efficacy of target group. Group identification, anger, and perceived efficacy were specified as predictors of collective action intentions to support the target group. Current theoretical frameworks of collective action suggest that group identification is associated with both anger and perceived group efficacy (Thomas et al., 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Thus, group identification and anger were allowed to covary, as were group identification and group efficacy. The exogenous predictors were allowed to covary, but were not expected to predict the outcome variable directly. Thus, the relationships between ideological orientations (SDO and RWA) and collective action intentions were constrained to be zero.

Multiple group comparisons across contexts. We used a multiple group comparisons approach to assess whether the relationships in the hypothesized model were equivalent in the two conflict contexts. The multiple group comparisons included fully saturated models (i.e., where every direct effect and correlation was allowed to be estimated), so that every estimated parameter could be compared across contexts. Separate analyses were conducted for the two hypothesized models, which predicted collective action intentions in support of each target group (i.e., government or protesters).

Predicting collective action to support the government. A fully unconstrained model, where all direct effects and correlations were estimated independently in the two contexts, had perfect fit: $\chi^2 (0, N = 162) = 0.00, p < .001, \text{CFI} = 1.00, \text{AGFI} = 1.00, \text{RMSEA} = 0.00, \text{SRMR} = 0.00$. A model where all direct effects and correlations were constrained to be equal in the two contexts met thresholds for good fit: $\chi^2 (14, N = 162) = 18.93, p = .168, \text{CFI} = 0.99, \text{AGFI} = 0.94, \text{RMSEA} = 0.04, \text{SRMR} = 0.04$. There was no significant loss of fit in the constrained model compared to the...
unconstrained model, $\Delta \chi^2 (14, N = 162) = 18.93, p = .168$. The pattern of relationships in predicting collective action supporting the government was thus equivalent across the Russian and Greek contexts.

**Predicting collective action to support the protesters.** As with the government multiple group comparison, the unconstrained model necessarily had perfect fit: $\chi^2 (0, N = 162) = 0.00, p < .001$, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = 0.00. The model constraining the direct effects and correlations to be equal across contexts met thresholds for excellent fit: $\chi^2 (14, N = 162) = 5.74, p = .973$, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = 0.03. Again, there was no significant loss of fit when comparing the unconstrained and constrained models, $\Delta \chi^2 (14, N = 162) = 5.74, p = .973$. This indicates that the pattern of relationships in predicting collective action supporting the protestors was equivalent across the Russian and Greek contexts.
Figure 1
Study 1 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the government, aggregated across Russian and Greek contexts.

Note. Bold paths and shaded coefficients indicate significant pathways.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 
Study 1 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the protestors, aggregated across Russian and Greek contexts.

*Note.* Bold paths and shaded coefficients indicate significant pathways.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 

---

**Figure 2**

[Diagram of Study 1's hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the protestors, aggregated across Russian and Greek contexts.]

- Social dominance orientation
- Right-wing authoritarianism
- Anger at government
- Identification with protestors
- Perceived efficacy of protestors
- Collective action intentions to support protestors

Coefficients indicated: $-.28^{***}$, $-.28^{***}$, $-.19^*$, $.12$, $.01$, $.19^*$, $.19^{**}$, $.43^{***}$, $.03$, $.55^{***}$, $.13^{†}$.
Test of hypothesized models. As noted above, multiple group comparisons indicated that the pattern of relationships was similar in the Russian and Greek contexts. Thus, participants’ responses across the two contexts were averaged for each measure, and two hypothesized models were tested: one predicting collective action to support the government, and one predicting collective action to support protesters.

Predicting collective action to support the government. The hypothesized model met thresholds for mediocre fit (Byrne, 2010): $\chi^2 (3, \ N = 162) = 8.44, \ p = .038, \ CFI = 0.97, \ AGFI = 0.88, \ RMSEA = 0.11, \ SRMR = 0.04$, and explained 53% of the variance in collective action intentions to support the government. Parameter estimates for this model are presented in Figure 1. Both SDO and RWA were associated with higher identification with the government and anger towards the protestors, but not perceived efficacy of government. Identification and anger, in turn, each positively predicted collective action intentions to support the government. Perceived efficacy of the government marginally positively predicted intentions to support the government.

We tested an alternative model that allowed a direct path between ideology and collective action intentions. This model met thresholds for mediocre fit: $\chi^2 (1, \ N = 162) = 4.62, \ p = .032, \ CFI = 0.98, \ AGFI = 0.80, \ RMSEA = 0.15, \ SRMR = 0.04$, and did not improve fit over the more parsimonious hypothesized model: $\Delta \chi^2 (2, \ N = 162) = 3.82, \ p = .148$. This indicates that the specification of additional direct paths did not improve the explanatory power of the hypothesized model, which was thus retained.

Predicting collective action to support the protestors. The hypothesized model met thresholds for good fit: $\chi^2 (3, \ N = 162) = 5.82, \ p = .121, \ CFI = 0.98, \ AGFI = 0.92, \ RMSEA = 0.08, \ SRMR = 0.03$, and explained 40% of the variance in collective action intentions to support a protestor group. Parameter estimates for the hypothesized model are presented in Figure 2. Only SDO negatively predicted group identification with protestors and felt anger towards the government. SDO and RWA each predicted perceived efficacy of protestors, however their effects were in opposite directions: SDO negatively predicted efficacy, whereas RWA positively predicted efficacy. Group identification with protestors significantly and positively predicted intentions to take collective action in support of the protestors. Anger towards the government marginally and positively predicted collective action intentions. Perceived efficacy of the protestors did not significantly predict collective action intentions.

Once again, an alternative model allowing direct paths between ideological orientations and collective action intentions was tested. This model met thresholds for good fit: $\chi^2 (1, \ N = 162) = 2.05, \ p = .152, \ CFI = 0.99, \ AGFI = 0.91, \ RMSEA = 0.08, \ SRMR = 0.03$. However, it did not provide a significant improvement in fit over the more parsimonious hypothesized model: $\Delta \chi^2 (2, \ N$
This provides additional support for the hypothesized model, which was retained.

**Discussion**

Across contexts, we found that personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA predicted outsiders’ appraisals of injustice, efficacy, and identification with each group in a conflict, and shaped individuals’ willingness to take collective action in support of each group. The more participants endorsed SDO and RWA, the more they identified with the advantaged (government) group and the less they identified with the disadvantaged (protestor) group. Similarly, the more participants endorsed SDO and RWA, the more anger they felt towards the disadvantaged group, and the less anger they felt towards the advantaged group. Importantly, this pattern of relationships was consistent across the two contexts of Greece and Russia. Multiple-group comparisons of the Greek and Russian path models showed that the stable ideological orientations of SDO and RWA influenced contextual-focused appraisals of conflict across multiple contexts. This result extends previous work on individual differences and collective action (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2011) by showing that pre-existing and stable personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA can shape individuals’ responses to different contexts of conflict.

Across contexts and across targets, collective action to support a target group was predicted by identification with this group and anger towards the opposing group, but not perceived efficacy of the target group. This latter non-significant effect is surprising, since perceived group efficacy is well-established as a key predictor of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008). At face value, outsiders would plausibly take a more objective cost-benefit approach when deciding to engage in collective action compared with individuals who are part of a conflict. The conflict is appraised as less self-relevant for outsiders and so we might expect that the decision to take action would rely on the individual’s expectation of positive outcomes (van Zomeren et al., 2012). However, the data suggest that the role of efficacy is less motivating in this context, perhaps because outsiders are not invested in concrete outcomes of the conflict. Instead, outsiders may have been motivated to act by injustice and identity concerns, possibly to achieve symbolic outcomes (Hornsey et al., 2006).

Study 1 is an important empirical demonstration of outsiders’ responses to group conflict and inequality, and the antecedents of their collective action. However, we note three limitations. First, the cross-sectional design does not allow us to infer that SDO and RWA directly influence outsiders’ responses to an external conflict. Second, ideology’s role in shaping action intentions was not consistent: while both SDO and RWA played a distal role in predicting intentions to support advantaged groups, only SDO was a distal predictor in shaping action intentions on behalf of disadvantaged groups. Finally, we did not control for the effect of political ideology (i.e.,
We conducted a second study to provide a more rigorous test of the role of SDO and RWA in shaping appraisals of external conflict, replicate the general pattern of results found in Study 1, further clarify the role of RWA for action in support of disadvantaged groups, and further investigate the role of perceived group efficacy. Study 2 used a two-stage design. At Time 1, we measured participants’ personal ideological orientations (SDO and RWA). We also measured two dimensions of general political ideology: economic and social conservatism. At Time 2, two days later, participants read about a fictional group conflict and completed the dependent measures used in Study 1. The advantage of a two-stage design is that it allows us to demonstrate the role of pre-existing ideological orientations in shaping outsiders’ later appraisals of group conflict. The fictional conflict also reflects a truly novel context about which participants have no existing knowledge.

Study 2

Method

Participants. We sought to recruit 200 U.S. residents to complete a two-part study through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were offered USD$1.00 as compensation. The data for this study were collected in 2013.

Time 1. In total 220 participants accessed the study website, but only 200 participants answered at least one question. One participant did not follow instructions and was excluded. The remaining 199 participants provided responses to all measured scales. The remaining missing data were not missing completely at random (MCAR) as Little’s MCAR test was significant, $\chi^2(653, N = 199) = 819.86, p < .001$. However, no pattern was observed after conducting a series of separate variances t-tests, and no variable was missing more than 5% of its cases. The missing cases were therefore considered missing at random and replaced using expectation maximisation (EM) estimation.

Time 2. After two days, participants were invited to participate in Part 2 of the study. A total of 179 people accessed the study website, and 163 answered at least one question. The remaining data were classified as missing at random, as Little’s MCAR test was significant, $\chi^2(289, N = 163) = 360.43, p = .003$, no variable was missing more than 5% of its cases, and inspection of separate variance t-tests revealed no pattern of missing data across the dataset. The missing cases were replaced using EM estimation. A non-identifying code was used to match participants’ responses from Part 1 and Part 2. In total, 154 participants were successfully matched. This final sample ($N = 154$) ranged in age from 18 to 65 years ($M = 29.17, SD = 9.61$), included 61 (40%) women and 93 (60%) men, and 107 (70%) of participants reported their race as White / European American. Other
participants reported their race as Asian American (n = 28, 18%), Hispanic / Latino (n = 14, 9%),
African American (n = 3, 2%), and Middle Eastern (n = 1). One percent of participants reported that
they did not finish high school, 34% reported that their highest educational qualification was a high
school diploma, 12% held an associate’s degree, and 51% held a bachelor’s degree or higher. Most
participants described their stance as liberal or centrist on social (75% liberal, 14% centrist) and
economic (47% liberal, 25% centrist) issues.

**Materials and Measures.** All responses, except where indicated, were provided on a seven-
point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

**Time 1.** As in Study 1, participants completed an adapted version of the 16-item SDO scale
(Ho et al., 2012; α = .91). Due to the inconsistent findings for authoritarianism in Study 1, we
elected to use the full 30-item scale to measure RWA in this study (Altemeyer, 1996; α = .95). We
also measured political conservatism on separate social and economic dimensions, with one item
per dimension: “In terms of social [economic] issues, how would you describe your political
attitudes and beliefs?” 1, *very liberal*, to 7, *very conservative.*

**Time 2.** Participants read about a group conflict between the government and citizens of a
fictional country, Silaria. Participants were instructed to imagine how they would think and feel if
the conflict were real when reading the manipulation, and when completing each set of measures
about the conflict.

**Fictional conflict scenario.** The fictional Silarian conflict was sparked by unsafe working
conditions for citizens, and unequal pay for citizens and government officials. Citizens were
described as protesting in the capital city by marching on the government parliament and stopping
business from taking place in the capital. The government was described as considering a law that
would allow for indefinite detention of citizens it deemed to be threatening the peace, and having
used the military and police to arrest citizen protestor “ringleaders.” Immediately after reading the
scenario, participants were asked a series of questions to check their comprehension of the study
materials. All participants answered the questions correctly.

**Group identification.** Three items (adapted from Leach et al., 2008) measured group
identification with the government, and separately, the citizens. For example, “I identify with the
Silarian government.” The three items were averaged to form a reliable scale of group identification
with the government (α = .91) and citizens (α = .89).

**Anger towards different groups.** Three items measured anger (adapted from Iyer et al., 2007)
towards each group in the conflict. As in Study 1, participants were asked to indicate the extent to
which they felt angered and outraged towards the government and, separately, the citizens. In the
current study we also asked participants the degree to which they felt furious towards each group.
The three items were averaged to form a reliable scale for government (α = .87) and citizens (α = .87).

**Perceived efficacy.** Three items (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004) measured the degree to which participants believed each group had the ability to achieve its goals in the conflict. For example, participants indicated their agreement with “I think that the Silarian citizens have the power to achieve their goals,” and “if they work together, the Silarian government can achieve its goals.” The three items were averaged to form a reliable scale of perceived efficacy for government (α = .86) and citizens (α = .92).

**Collective action intentions.** Three items (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004) assessed intentions to take collective action in support of the government, and separately, the citizens. Participants indicated their agreement with items such as “I am willing to take action on behalf of the Silarian government,” “I believe I would take action on behalf of the Silarian government,” and “I intend to take action on behalf of the Silarian citizens.” The three items were averaged to form a reliable scale for intentions to support the government (α = .94) and citizens (α = .95).

**Results**

**Preliminary analyses.** As in Study 1, participants’ mean scores fell significantly below the mid-point (4) on SDO, $t(153) = -12.43$, $p < .001$, RWA, $t(153) = -15.00$, $p < .001$, economic conservatism, $t(153) = -2.764$, $p = .006$, and social conservatism, $t(153) = -10.96$, $p < .001$. Descriptive statistics and correlations between focal variables are presented in Table 2. Univariate tests of skew and kurtosis revealed that two variables were skewed: anger at citizens (Skew = 2.43) and intentions to support the government (Skew = 2.35). All other variables fell within acceptable ranges with skew of $[0.28]$ to $[1.87]$ ($SE = 0.20$) and kurtosis of $[0.25]$ to $[5.27]$ ($SE = 0.39$; Curran, West, & Finch, 1996). As expected, identification, anger and efficacy tended to covary within each target group; in general, these variables were also associated with the outcome variable of intentions to take collective action in support of each group.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>2.70 (1.08)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>2.95 (1.05)</td>
<td>.48***</td>
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<td>Political ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Social dimension</td>
<td>2.71 (1.47)</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.64***</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Economic dimension</td>
<td>3.64 (1.60)</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.43***</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Identification with government</td>
<td>1.95 (1.29)</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.14†</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Anger at citizens</td>
<td>1.41 (0.84)</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.64***</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Efficacy of government</td>
<td>4.54 (1.36)</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Intentions to act in support of government</td>
<td>1.54 (1.10)</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.77***</td>
<td>.75***</td>
<td>-.04</td>
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<td>Citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Identification with citizens</td>
<td>5.58 (1.14)</td>
<td>-.31***</td>
<td>-.34***</td>
<td>-.30***</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Anger at government</td>
<td>4.48 (1.20)</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>-.15†</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>-.28***</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Efficacy of citizens</td>
<td>4.97 (1.23)</td>
<td>-.16†</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.13†</td>
<td>-.40***</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Intentions to act in support of citizens</td>
<td>4.46 (1.69)</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.15†</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.05</td>
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Note. All variables measured on a 1-7 scale, except Anger, which was measured on a 1-6 scale. † p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
Figure 3
Study 2 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the government.

Note. Bold paths and shaded coefficients indicate significant pathways.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 
Figure 4
Study 2 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the citizens.

Note. Bold paths and shaded coefficients indicate significant pathways.

$^\dagger p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 
**Path analysis.** As in Study 1, we assessed the hypothesized relationships between ideological orientation and collective action variables using path analysis conducted in AMOS 21.0. Separate models were specified to predict collective action supporting the government, and collective action supporting citizens. The hypothesized models from Study 1 were adapted for this purpose. SDO and RWA were specified as exogenous predictors. Group identification with the target group, anger towards the opposing group, and perceived efficacy of the target group were specified as endogenous predictors. Intentions to take collective action in support of the target group were specified as the outcome variable.

We hypothesised that SDO and RWA would each uniquely and directly predict the endogenous predictors, which in turn would each uniquely and directly predict the outcome variable. We further hypothesized that all the exogenous predictors would covary, and that they would not directly predict the outcome variable. Building on the results of Study 1, we predicted that group identification and anger would covary, and that group identification and efficacy would covary.

**Predicting collective action to support the government.** The hypothesised model met thresholds for excellent fit, $\chi^2(3, N=154) = 2.73, p = .436$, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = 0.01, and accounted for 71% of the variance in participants’ intentions to take collective action in support of the Silarian government. SDO and RWA each uniquely and significantly positively predicted group identification with the government, and anger at citizens. In turn, group identification and anger each uniquely and significantly positively predicted collective action intentions. Parameter estimates for this model are presented in Figure 3.

We tested an alternative model that included the direct effects of SDO and RWA on collective action intentions to test their distal, rather than simultaneous, role in predicting responses to group conflict. This model met the criteria for excellent fit, $\chi^2(1, N=154) = 0.00, p = .950$, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = 0.00, but did not fit the data significantly better than the hypothesized model, $\Delta \chi^2 = 2.72 (2, N = 154), p = .257$. The more parsimonious hypothesized model was thus retained.

**Predicting collective action to support the citizens.** The hypothesized model met most criteria for good fit: $\chi^2(3, N=154) = 8.62, p = .035$, CFI = 0.97, AGFI = 0.87, RMSEA = 0.11, SRMR = 0.05, and accounted for 33% of the variance in participants’ intentions to take collective action in support of the Silarian citizens. Similar to the findings for government support, SDO and RWA each uniquely and significantly negatively predicted group identification with citizens, and anger at the government. In turn, group identification and anger each uniquely and significantly positively predicted intentions to take collective action in support of the citizens. A marginal
negative effect of SDO on the perceived efficacy of citizens was also found, though efficacy itself did not predict intentions. Parameter estimates for this model are presented in Figure 4.

As with government, an alternative model that included the direct effects of ideological orientations on collective action intentions was tested. This model did not meet thresholds for good fit, $\chi^2 (2, N = 154) = 4.81, p = .003$, CFI = 0.98, AGFI = 0.79, RMSEA = 0.16, SRMR = 0.05, and did not fit the data significantly better than the hypothesized model, $\Delta \chi^2 (2, N = 154) = 3.81, p = .149$. As such, the more parsimonious hypothesized model was retained.

Discussion

Study 2 replicated the major findings of the first study. Outsiders’ ideological orientations influenced their judgements about a specific conflict context, which in turn were associated with intentions to take collective action. SDO and RWA were positively associated with government group identification and anger at citizens, which in turn were associated with increased collective action intentions in support of the government. In contrast, SDO and RWA were negatively associated with citizen group identification and anger at the government, which in turn were associated with increased collective action intentions in support of citizens.

Overall, the results of Study 2 suggest that both SDO and RWA can shape outsiders’ collective action in support of both the advantaged and disadvantaged group. However, the effect of RWA was less stable than that of SDO. One possibility is that because RWA includes an element of valuing conformity, the association between RWA and collective action in novel contexts will be more unstable, as individuals attempt to discern what other group members and group authorities feel about the novel context. Future work should seek to determine more conclusively whether RWA plays a differential effect in predicting outsider appraisals of disadvantaged groups in conflict. Alternatively, SDO and RWA may differentially shape appraisals of group conflicts across contexts, depending on how the nature of the conflict is perceived by outsiders. We return to this point in the general discussion. In sum, the two-stage design of Study 2 provided further evidence that personal ideological orientations play a meaningful role in shaping outsiders’ responses to group conflict.

General Discussion

We investigated how personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA shaped outsiders’ appraisals of group conflict. In two studies, we found that SDO and RWA positively predicted support for advantaged groups and negatively predicted support for disadvantaged groups across contexts. Endorsement or rejection of these ideologies predicted outsiders’ identification with each group in a conflict, and their felt anger at the opposing group. This, in turn, predicted intentions to take collective action in support of the target group. The finding that SDO and RWA shaped individuals’ appraisals of disparate conflict contexts (e.g., Greece, Russia, and a fictional group
conflict) is compelling evidence that individuals’ ideological orientations have real implications for the groups they will come to support in any external group conflict. In addition, these findings contribute to the growing body of work extending contextually-focused models of collective action with more stable, general beliefs.

We focused on uninvolved outsiders in the current research as their distance from a context of group conflict made them an ideal population for examining more stable predictors of collective action. Extant frameworks of collective action have theorized about the potential for third parties to intervene in group conflict, typically conceptualizing these groups as audiences to a context of conflict (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2010). The results of the present research are thus an important first step in understanding how and when outsiders may choose to intervene in others’ conflicts.

**Implications for collective action theory**

Most frameworks of collective action focus on group-relevant motives (e.g., group identity) that are bound to a specific context of conflict or inequality (van Zomeren et al., 2008; Thomas et al., 2009). This group-focused analysis reflects the important and multifaceted role of social identity in intergroup conflict. But many individuals who could take collective action are less likely to engage in group-focused appraisals predicated on an existing and salient shared group identity if that shared identity does not exist or the individual lacks information about the content of that identity. Non-activists within a group, or members of a third party within or outside the conflict context may fall into this category. Thus the key theoretical contribution of this work is that stable, context-independent variables can shape less-involved individuals’ willingness to take collective action by affecting proximal and contextual appraisals.

Our findings are aligned with and extend recent work describing how personally-held moral convictions about conflicts and inequality can motivate collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2011; van Zomeren, 2013). Moral convictions, like ideologies, are described as affecting appraisals of injustice, identification, and efficacy about a context and provide an explanation for why individuals may choose to intervene on behalf of another group. Van Zomeren and colleagues (2011) describe moral convictions as transcending group boundaries, and thus as more context-independent than other antecedents of collective action. We expand on this growing body of work by showing how ideological orientations can affect appraisals not only across groups within a context, but across contexts. This is especially important for understanding how less-involved individuals (e.g., non-activists or third parties) may appraise and respond to group conflict and inequality. Future work could also investigate whether ideological orientations shape appraisals and subsequent collective action for members of groups already engaged in conflict.
Although we have here followed the majority of collective action work in describing groups in a context of conflict as either “advantaged” or “disadvantaged”, it is important to recognise such labels are themselves contested (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996) and that collective action may occur in an intergroup context but without intergroup conflict (e.g., Tewari, Khan, Hopkins, Srinivasan, & Reicher, 2012). The extent to which an individual’s ideological orientations are shared with different groups in conflict can structure the boundaries and define the content of a social identity of solidarity with one or more groups, possibly across two or more conflicts. Such an identity is not bound by social category (e.g., “protestors”, “women”) but is instead defined by a shared ideology (Thomas et al., 2009; Thomas et al., 2010). Because ideologies are prescriptive, identifying with a group defined by an ideology carries with it a compulsion to act. Thus, further investigation of individual, context-independent variables such as ideological orientations and moral convictions will lead to more powerful and comprehensive models of collective action for new intergroup contexts.

We simultaneously assessed individuals’ collective action antecedents and intentions for both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. To our knowledge, little research has empirically considered the possibility that individuals may support either the advantaged or disadvantaged group in a given context. Previous work has instead focused on disadvantaged group members’ collective action to assist their own group (van Zomeren et al., 2008), advantaged group members’ collective action in support of the disadvantaged group (Iyer et al., 2007) or advantaged members’ collective action to assist their own group (Ellemers, Doosje, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1992). We suggest that future collective action work investigates support for each group that is party to conflict or inequality. By measuring responses only in support of the hypothesized group, researchers risk failing to capture participants’ ambivalence about taking action, or participants’ support for other groups.

Implications for policy and practice

The current work provides insight into why groups that subscribe to differing ideologies may disagree on when and how to intervene in conflicts within or between foreign countries. Members of groups who endorse SDO and RWA (e.g., US Republicans, Ho et al., 2012) may be more likely to support an advantaged authoritarian government group. Such individuals may perceive agitating or protesting disadvantaged citizen groups as attempting to usurp established and legitimate differences in power and status among groups. In contrast, members of groups that reject SDO and RWA may be more likely to support a disadvantaged protesting group against what they perceive to be unjust persecution or withholding of resources or status.

Our findings corroborate previous theorizing about third parties’ potential to intervene in group conflict (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Such individuals, including outsiders, may be
recruited to action by groups engaged in conflict. Our findings suggest that these groups’ recruitment efforts will be most successful when they emphasise the shared ideological orientation between outsiders and groups in conflict so as to foster a shared identity and a sense of injustice. As an example, the Occupy movement seeks to create an inclusive shared identity with the slogan “We are the 99 percent” and to recruit like-minded outsiders by explicitly communicating an ideological orientation: “We no longer want the wealthiest to hold all the power… to write the rules governing an unbalanced and inequitable global economy” (Occupy Together, 2013).

More broadly, the present research provides an interesting theoretical lens for understanding how policies and systems of government may spread. Peoples or governments of a nation who recognise similar specific attitudes in other nations (e.g., rejection of refugees, support for climate change action) may use this initial similarity to forge the foundations of a richer shared identity. Such an identity would facilitate the transnational dissemination and adoption of novel views and norms, including policy. However, the salience of differences among the multiple groups or nations within a movement has the potential to paralyse as well as energise activists (see also McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 2012; 2013). How far the processes relevant to single-group, single-issue models of collective action also serve to predict and explain multiple-group or international social movements remains to be explored in further research.

Limitations and future directions

In both studies, we did not find that outsiders’ perceptions of a group’s efficacy in achieving its goals predicted their subsequent intentions to take collective action on behalf of that group. Although perceived group efficacy is a robust independent predictor of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008), this same work has indicated that the type of intergroup conflict can moderate the effect of efficacy. Others have argued that efficacy does not predict collective action independently of group identification (Stürmer & Simon, 2004), or that efficacy is not separate to group identification but “encapsulated” within the social identity of a group member (Thomas et al., 2009). In the present data, perceived group efficacy appears not to be a key or even salient determinant of outsiders’ collective action. Instead, outsiders who appraise the conflict as self-relevant are mobilized to take action via identification and emotion pathways (van Zomeren et al., 2012). Understanding the variables that moderate the role of efficacy (if any) for outsiders thus remains as an interesting direction for future research.

In this work we defined outsiders as individuals who are entirely separate from a group conflict. This rarefied definition was convenient for the purposes of the current research, since it allowed us to investigate how stable ideological orientations shape appraisals of conflicts when individuals encounter those conflicts for the first time. However, this physical and psychological boundary is not always so clear-cut. For instance, extant work has conceptualized “audiences” as
those who are not directly involved in a group conflict, but who still physically exist within the context of the conflict (e.g., Subašić et al., 2008). And, of course, even members of disadvantaged groups must overcome physical and psychological barriers before they engage in collective action (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Future work should explore how complexities of (physical or psychological) distance may moderate third parties’ responses to group conflicts in which they are not directly involved.

Two more general limitations of the current work are founded in the level of analysis that we chose for SDO and RWA. First, we must acknowledge that SDO and RWA may differentially influence appraisals of group conflict depending on the nature of the conflict or inequality. Second, we also recognise that personal ideological orientations are more complex than the straightforward unidimensional conceptualisation we have used here.

The Dual Process Model (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b) specifies that SDO and RWA differentially predict (negative) attitudes and behaviour towards outgroups depending on the type of perceived threat that the group represents. We would extend this reasoning to suggest that SDO and RWA may differentially predict conflict appraisals depending on the type of group conflict that an individual is encountering. In the current set of studies, we examined the unique effects of each ideological orientation on appraisals supporting both disadvantaged and advantaged groups in a variety of conflict contexts. However, we did not control or account for the variability in how a given conflict may be perceived. This lack of control may provide an explanation for why SDO more consistently predicted contextual appraisals compared to RWA, especially in Study 2. This conflict context made salient an economic and competitive threat to authority by portraying citizens protesting for increased wages, possibly enhancing the predictive power of SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b). In contrast, a context that instead made salient a social and security threat to authority may have instead enhanced the predictive power of RWA. Future work is necessary to test the Dual Process Model more formally with collective action as an outcome variable. Of particular interest would be to explore how SDO and RWA might influence appraisals when the group most aligned to a given ideological orientation is not also in a position of advantage, such as members of the US Tea Party who advocate for strong military and traditional family values (Tea Party, 2015).

SDO and RWA are each more internally nuanced than examined in the present studies. SDO has been shown to have two distinct factors: dominance and (anti-)egalitarianism (Ho et al., 2012). Similarly, recent factor analytic work has revealed three distinct components to RWA: aggression towards deviants, conformity to conventional norms, and submission to authority (Mavor et al., 2010). Future research could explore how the individual factors of SDO and RWA may play differing roles in shaping outsiders’ responses to group conflict.
In set of studies we propose generally that outsiders to conflict may come to take collective action. However, participants in each study were sampled from a paid participant pool of Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) users. Data from MTurk has been found to be as reliable as that obtained from undergraduate university students (Burhmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). However, MTurk users are less attentive than student samples (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013). Experienced users who have participated in many—even thousands—of studies are clearly less naïve than the ideal participant, which can influence responses (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2013). This attentiveness issue has been shown to be ameliorated by comprehension checks (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013), which all Study 2 participants successfully completed. Nevertheless, it is important that future work replicate these results in other cultural contexts to strengthen our argument that outsiders more generally may choose to intervene in external group conflicts.

**Conclusion**

We extend current frameworks of collective action by investigating stable, context-independent predictors: personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA. We show that these orientations influence uninvolved outsiders’ interpretations of a group conflict, including their identification with, and anger towards, the parties involved. Further, we show that uninvolved outsiders are willing to respond with collective action when they encounter group conflict, and that they are capable of supporting either the advantaged group or the disadvantaged group. It is clear, then, that outsiders are not passive observers to external conflict, but in fact ideologically motivated actors who can mobilize to take collective action.
Footnotes

1 These data were part of a larger study that included measures of beliefs about society and identification as an American. We also measured perceptions of the conflict for each context. Details are available from the corresponding author on request.

2 We conducted a path analysis of the hypothesized model after reducing the skew of anger at citizens and intentions to take action in support of the government variables using a non-linear log_{10} transformation. This model with transformed variables, \( \chi^2 (3, N = 154) = 6.58, p = 0.254, CFI = 0.99, \) AGFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.02, did not differ substantively in fit from the model with untransformed variables. In addition, there was no difference in the pattern of significance across the model paths. We report the results of path analyses using untransformed variables in the main text.

3 The pattern of correlations between SDO, RWA, and the focal variables were maintained after controlling for the effect of both economic and social conservatism.

4 Although the RMSEA value here does not meet the criteria for good (< 0.05) fit, it has been argued that for samples smaller than 250 cases, RMSEA tends to be inflated (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Chapter 4: Values and outsider collective action

In this chapter, I investigated personal universal values (Schwartz, 1992; 1994). A person’s values are a set of core beliefs that guide thought and action across situations. Values also provide a set of standards that, when transgressed upon, compel action to defend those standards. Some work has investigated how values can lead to political action and protest (e.g., environmental action, Stern & Dietz, 1994), but no work has yet integrated the values literature with social psychological theory and research on proximal, context-specific motives for collective action. In doing so, the present chapter built upon Chapter 2, by further investigating how outsiders bridge the self-relevance gap. In addition, this chapter prosecutes the second and third aims of the thesis and extends work from Chapter 3, by expanding the scope of possible context-independent variables that may shape outsiders’ appraisals of novel group conflicts and testing whether these variables can predict support for either group in conflict.

I applied a mixed-method approach across three studies to explore the content, conceptual distinctiveness, and predictive validity of change and status quo values. In Study 1, I conducted a qualitative thematic analysis of participant responses to the question “what does valuing change [the status quo] mean to you?”. From this analysis, I constructed a set of items to measure endorsement of change as a value, and separately, status quo as a value. In Study 2, I conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis to test the validity of these change and status quo measures I had constructed. Specifically, I tested the conceptual and statistical distinctiveness of each measure against the other, and also against personal ideological orientations of Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, & Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981), System Justification (Kay & Jost, 2003), and political conservatism (Feldman, 2013). Having confirmed the distinctiveness of change and status quo values, I conducted a third study in which I tested their validity in predicting context-specific appraisals of a novel conflict context.

This chapter was adapted from a manuscript in preparation for submission to the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology in September 2015:

Abstract

In three studies, we build on Schwartz’s (1992, 1994) work on universal values to explore the content and structure of individuals’ change and status quo values, to distinguish these values from other political ideologies and orientations, and to investigate the role of these values in shaping appraisals of intergroup conflict and collective action. In Study 1, we investigated the themes that underpin beliefs about change and the status quo. In Study 2, we created and validated separate measures to assess endorsement of change and status quo values, and show that they are distinct from related ideologies such as Social Dominance Orientation and Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Study 3 demonstrated that change values—but not status quo values—influence the contextual appraisals that outsiders make when they encounter a hypothetical group conflict for the first time. Endorsing change leads to appraisals of the conflict that are supportive of a low-status citizen protestor group, and increases collective action intentions on behalf of this group. In addition, endorsing change leads to appraisals that are not supportive of a high-status government group in conflict, and decreases collective action intentions on behalf of this group.

Keywords: values, group conflict, collective action
Personal values about change and status quo underpin outsiders’ appraisals of intergroup conflict

Each of us holds values that are central to our self-concept. These values are expressed in our attitudes and behaviours, and help to shape our responses to new situations. In a psychological sense, values are goals that transcend any single situation and help form the personal lens through which we see and react to the world, thus serving as “guiding principles in the life of a person” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 21). A person who values power, for example, believes that power is a goal in and of itself, and desires to gain power. Endorsing power as a personal value can thus shape that person’s beliefs and actions across a range of situations and contexts: they will act upon their world so as to achieve power, while simultaneously constructing a worldview that justifies those actions (Schwartz, 1994). Values can also serve as standards against which situations and behaviours are judged. If a person perceives that their values have been violated or betrayed, they will be motivated to take action to defend their worldview and restore the world to rights.

Collective action, where an individual takes action in support of a group’s goals and interests, seems an obvious situation in which values would be both salient and powerful. We might expect that a person would take collective action to the extent that the group’s goals were aligned with a personal value (e.g., the desire for security), or when the group was suffering as a result of some transgression against a personal value (e.g., where a terrorist act had been committed against the group, violating that group’s security). Previous empirical work has shown that altruistic values can motivate pro-environmental action, and that international harmony and equality values can motivate political protest (e.g., Stern et al., 1999; Braithwaite, 1994). But social psychological investigations of collective action have largely ignored personal values and other stable individual differences to instead focus on how appraisals of the specific social context—especially, the strength of one’s connection with the acting or transgressed-upon group—can influence one’s likelihood to take action (Wright, 2010; van Zomeren, 2013). According to social psychological theory, individuals are mobilized to act by their social identification with the relevant group, felt anger or perceived injustice at the actions of an opposing group, and perceived efficacy of the relevant group (van Wright, 2010; van Zomeren, 2013). The focus on contextually-bound appraisals is appropriate when investigating collective action in response to a specific instance of intergroup conflict. Most collective action work aligns with this paradigm, and tends to study antecedents of collective action for members of disadvantaged groups that challenge more advantaged groups on the basis of their unjust disadvantage (for a meta-analysis, see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

We seek to expand the view of collective action research to consider actors beyond members of the belligerent groups, and how they come to make appraisals of injustice, identification, and
efficacy. Theories of collective action argue that third parties within the conflict context and outsiders beyond the conflict context may intervene through collective action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008, Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009), though there is much less empirical work for this position (for exceptions, see Saeri, Iyer, & Louis, in press; Subašić, Schmitt, & Reynolds, 2011). The psychological pathway by which third parties and outsiders come to appraise a conflict and take collective action is also relatively unexplored (but see Saeri et al., in press). New research suggest that stable, personal beliefs including moral convictions, Social Dominance Orientation, and Right-wing Authoritarianism can shape appraisals of intergroup conflict and subsequent collective action (Saeri et al., in press; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011). In this work, we investigate how personal values might shape an outsider’s appraisals of an external group conflict and lead to collective action.

**Personal values and collective action**

The diverse investigations of the relationship between values and political behaviour have conceptualised and operationalised personal values in many different ways. In his seminal 1994 work, Schwartz defined ten values that he described as universal across humanity: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, and security. Although different cultures and individuals might espouse different specific values within this set, all cultures recognise and engage with the ten values. The values can be organised into a theoretical structure, in which some values are similar in their goals (e.g., power, achievement), and some values are in opposition (e.g., conformity, self-direction; Schwartz, 1992; 1994; Schwartz, Caprara, & Cecchione, 2010). Schwartz describes two key dimensions of opposition that form “second-order values”: Openness to Change (stimulation, self-direction) vs. Stability (conformity, tradition, security) and Self-enhancement (power, achievement, hedonism) vs. Self-transcendence (universalism, benevolence).

Research that has examined the process by which these values may motivate political action tends to select one of these dimensions, or propose novel dimensions that fit conceptually with the existing theoretical structure. Braithwaite (1994) argued that Schwartz’s value structure could be reframed as a two-dimensional model of political values, and found that people who endorsed the value of self-transcendence (relabelled as equity) more strongly supported left-wing policies and were likely to take political action to support such policies compared with whose people who endorsed the value of stability (relabelled as law and order). Stern and colleagues adapted the self-transcendence dimension as environmental altruism to investigate what led individuals to engage in pro-environmental behaviour. In this work, values form the first of three steps for action, via beliefs and personal norms (Stern & Dietz, 1994; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999). Endorsing
a personal value leads to the belief that one has a personal responsibility to uphold those values. That belief then prescribes a personal norm of action (Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). Specifically, valuing environmental altruism (i.e., self-transcendence) led to increased support for the environmental movement (Stern et al., 1994). Schwartz and colleagues (2010) used universal personal values—relabelled as “basic” values, and with the Stability cluster relabelled as “Conservatism”—to organize explicitly political values (e.g., law and order, equality).

It is clear that personal values influence political thinking and action. But the dizzying breadth of scholarship on this topic obscures how—or even which—personal values might connect to the social contextual appraisals of group conflict and to collective action. In this paper we directly examine the content and structure of Schwarz’ primary second-order value dimension: Openness to Change, and Status Quo (which Schwartz labels “conservation”) in the interests of establishing a “ground truth” from which to investigate this question. We choose to relabel the Conservation value as Status Quo, in order to avoid confusion with the political ideology of conservatism and the environmental ideology of conservationism.

We chose to focus on change and status quo orientations in this paper for two reasons. Schwartz (1992; 1994) proposed that change and conservation (status quo) formed the first dimension of differentiation among all ten universal human values. Thus this dimension is a logical place to start in any investigation of the role played by values in shaping responses to a new context. Understanding how change and status quo influence appraisals of group conflict and shape collective action is a first step in integrating the rich theoretical and empirical work on values with the well-established collective action literature. Second, both change and status quo values align with the goals expressed by social movements and political actions today. For instance, Hong Kong citizens engaged in collective action in 2014 to retain the status quo, preserving autonomy over the upcoming 2017 elections (Kaiman, 2014). In contrast, Canadians protested for a change in Canada’s drug laws, with the goal of legalising marijuana (The Canadian Press, 2014). To the extent that change and status quo are emphasised in social movements’ slogans and speeches, movement organizers must expect that such values can mobilize action. We investigate this expectation in the current work.

**Developments in collective action research**

The social context within which group conflict takes place influences when and how individuals will be mobilized to take action. Embedded in the context are the content and meaning of group membership, status and power differences between groups, and the history of their interaction and conflict. Typically, collective action research focuses on antecedents of collective action that are bound to the context. For example, it is social identification with a disadvantaged group—the belief that the group under threat is important and central to one’s self-concept—that
forms the core motive to act. When individuals experience anger as in response to a collective injustice, or perceive that their group has the power (efficacy) to achieve its goals, they are also more willing to act (van Zomeren et al., 2008; Thomas et al., 2009). These context-centred appraisals are the focus of most current models of collective action (e.g., Thomas et al., 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Recent work has expanded on this paradigm in two directions: by investigating new actors, and exploring new pathways to action.

**Beyond advantaged and disadvantaged groups: A focus on outsiders**

Not all potential collective actors are embedded within the conflict context, where context-specific appraisals are most relevant. Individuals who are external to a conflict have been rarely mentioned in the collective action literature. Where such individuals or groups are discussed, they are different from our conceptualization of outsiders. For instance, some models conceptualize collective action as taking place in a three-party context, which includes the advantaged group, the disadvantaged group, and a numerically larger and uninvolved audience that is still part of the context. Such “majority” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008) audiences are proposed to potentially influence the conflict by endorsing one of the two conflicting groups, typically by categorizing themselves with one of the groups and thus identifying with them. However, this audience is already part of the intergroup context and thus has at least a minimal connection to, and understanding of, the groups involved in the conflict. As such, their psychological experiences of, and responses to, the conflict may be quite different from those outsiders who in our model are truly external to the conflict—not part of the nation, political entity or society in which the conflict is occurring. Little published work has investigated how outsiders may choose to intervene on behalf of one of the belligerent groups (Glasford & Carabello, 2015; Saeri et al., in press).

We believe that personal values can help explain why outsiders would come to support one group or another in conflict. Opinion-based groups are those where individuals feel psychologically connected by a shared belief, rather than a demographic or social characteristic, and may engage in collective action to support or defend that belief (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007). Values are universal (i.e., every human endorses each value to varying degrees; Schwartz, 1994), values specify goals that transcend a specific situation, and values compel individuals to act in pursuit of that goal. Thus universal personal values such as change or the status quo may provide the shared psychological basis for a value-based group that, as a fact of its creation, is mobilized to take collective action in order to realise that shared value. In this paper, we argue that personal values can shape appraisals of novel external conflicts much like they shape appraisals of other new situations. Indeed, outsiders are an ideal population in which to investigate the potential role of values in collective action. A lack of information about the conflict context would lead outsiders to
use their pre-existing personal values as an interpretive lens when encountering a novel group conflict for the first time.

**Extending the pathways to action**

Core to most models of collective action are context-specific appraisals (e.g., identification, injustice, and efficacy) that directly predict collective action intentions and behaviour. However, recent work has begun to investigate how more stable, personal beliefs may shape these more proximal appraisals. Van Zomeren and colleagues (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011) have shown that personal moral convictions about group conflict (e.g., believing that mainland Chinese deserve greater political freedom) can indirectly predict collective action intentions by fostering identification with the affected group. Saeri et al. (in press) have shown that personal political ideologies of Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and Right-wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) can shape proximal appraisals both sympathetic to a disadvantaged group (e.g., Russian protestors against government corruption) and sympathetic to an advantaged group (e.g., the Russian government with a goal of quelling protests). In each of these cases, appraisals about the social context that predict collective action—generally considered as independent variables in collective action models and research—are considered as outcome variables, influenced by stable personal beliefs. We argue that personal values of change and status quo may play a similar but unique role in explaining the appraisals that individuals make about a context of conflict. The more proximal context-specific variables may then be conceptualised as mediators of the belief-collective action relationship, as described in van Zomeren (2013).

Conceptualising these stable, personal beliefs as predictors thus helps to explain why an individual may identify strongly or weakly with a group engaged in conflict, or why an individual feels that a group’s (dis)advantage is just or unjust. This is especially important among individuals not directly involved in the conflict or who have no pre-existing group membership (Saeri et al., in press). In this paper we seek to contribute to the literature on more stable, distal predictors of appraisals and subsequent collective action by investigating the role of personal values of change and status quo. Values mobilize individuals to act in order to achieve the goal that forms the core of the value: an individual who values change should not merely prefer change, but take action in order to realise that change. They would view intergroup conflicts through a lens that is sensitive to promotion or prevention of change. As the opposite on the value dimension, we would expect that an individual would prefer the status quo, and act in order to reinforce or restore a status quo under threat. In this way, personal values can have collective consequences. Because Schwartz’ basic values have been shown to be associated with political values (Schwartz et al., 2010), demonstrating the utility of social change and status quo values in research must distinguish
between the values and political ideologies such as right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance.

**Overview of present research**

In this paper we investigate the extent to which endorsing change the status quo as values can shape appraisals of group conflict and subsequent collective action to support the parties involved in the conflict. To advance this aim, we consider three questions. First, what is the content of people’s change and status quo values? Second, how are change and status quo values different from each other and from established political ideologies and orientations? Finally, can change and status quo values uniquely and significantly predict outsiders’ appraisals of a novel group conflict? Study 1 explores the first question with a mixed-method investigation of what change and status quo values mean to individuals, in the absence of a political or conflict context. Study 2 examines the second question with a cross-sectional survey in which we validate new measures of change and status quo values derived from key themes identified in Study 1. Specifically, we use Exploratory Factor Analysis to differentiate the values of status quo and change from related political ideologies such as Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996), System Justification (Kay & Jost, 2003), and political conservatism. Study 3 investigates the final question with a two-stage study. Change and status quo values are measured at Time 1; at Time 2, participants encounter a novel group conflict and make context-specific appraisals (e.g., group identification, felt anger, perceived group efficacy) in support of both the high-status (relatively advantaged) and low-status (relatively disadvantaged) groups in that conflict, including their willingness to take collective action in support of each group.

**Study 1**

We first sought to investigate the content and structure of individuals’ change and status quo values. To date, much work on values has used the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992) or the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz et al., 2001). Both ask participants to endorse specified items that are designed to reflect each of the universal values. However, in the present study we wished to obtain a comprehensive illustration of how people think about values, rather than responses to pre-specified items. To do so, we conducted a mixed-method study in which participants reflected upon what change and status quo as values meant to them personally, and rated their endorsement and perceived importance of each value. Thematic analysis was used to discover the content of each value. Participants’ endorsement and importance ratings were used to investigate whether the two values were associated, and in what direction.

**Method**

**Participants and Procedure.** Fifty-four US residents were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid $0.50 to participate in the study, which was administered...
online. Participants ranged in age from 19 to 64 (M = 33.64, SD = 11.81) years. Twenty-two (41%) were female; four did not disclose their sex. The majority of participants (n = 39, 72%) described themselves as White / European American, three were African American (6%), three were Asian American (6%), two were Hispanic / Latino, one was Native American / American Indian. Six did not disclose their race. The data for this study were collected in 2013.

**Measures.** Participants were asked to indicate whether they thought that “change” and, separately, “the status quo” were important in their lives. Participants who responded “yes” were asked “What does valuing [change/status quo] mean to you? Think as broadly as possible about [change/status quo] as an ideal in as many aspects of your life as you can.” Participants who responded “no” were also asked to elaborate on this position, e.g., “What does not valuing [change/status quo] mean to you?” Participants then rated the importance of change and status quo in their lives (1: not at all; 9: a great deal).

**Results**

**Association between change and status quo values.** In total, 38 (70%) participants indicated that they valued change. In contrast, 19 (35%) participants indicated that they valued the status quo. Most (n = 41) participants believed that valuing change and valuing the status quo were mutually exclusive. Further, participants who rated change as more important tended to rate status quo as less important, and vice versa, \( r(51) = -0.58, p < .001 \). Together, these results indicate that change and status quo are distinct and opposing values, broadly supporting Schwartz’ (1994) theoretical structure, which places change and status quo in opposition.

**Thematic analyses.** We conducted thematic qualitative analyses of the open-ended responses to the questions “what does change [status quo] mean to you?”, guided by the process described in Braun and Clarke (2006). There were two coders: the first author, and a graduate student who was naïve to the values literature and the premises of the study. The coders worked independently to read through all responses and identify underlying themes. Each participant’s response was then coded as reflecting one or more themes. When the themes identified in each response differed between coders, the discrepancy was discussed. We distinguished between frequently recurring themes and less frequent themes. Below we present the key themes identified by the coders for each value.

**Themes identified in responses to valuing the status quo question.** Predictability and security were identified as recurrent themes in participants’ responses to the question, “what does the status quo mean to you?”. Two less frequent themes also emerged: fear of disruption caused by change, and the importance of respecting tradition.
**Predictability.** Some participants stated that their desire for a predictable life was one of the reasons they valued the status quo. Knowing what to expect next, and feeling comforted by routine were often referenced. For example:

“Status quo to me means sticking to the way things are. Sticking to a sort of routine and not straying too far from the norm. I prefer to keep things close to routine.”

**Security.** Participants noted that the status quo was safer than the alternative. Embracing the status quo meant that people could be certain that they would not lose what they had worked for. For example:

“I think in life I strive to maintain the status quo. I like the security that it brings, and it makes me feel better.”

“I have worked for decades to gather what little I have, and I am satisfied with it. I maintain a small business, and a lovely family home. Holding what I have is dear to me.”

**Fear of change.** A number of participants explicitly described changes to their current life as disruptive and unwanted, and made reference of how change would threaten their predictability and security. For example:

“I value the status quo because I spent my early years very disorganized and my life was very fluid. I had a lot of problems succeeding in things I tried, and it was hard to gain a foothold of success. Since I’ve gotten a routine I like to stick to, I’ve been able to advance in life in my career, family, etc.”

“I don't like change very much at all. I really like things to stay how they are. I realize it's not possible, but in my ideal world, I'd like things not to change.”

**Respect for tradition.** A few participants described valuing the status quo as a way of respecting the existing order of the world and the work of those who came before them. For example:

“I value the status quo because it represents the past and what has work [sic] in the past.”

“I do think that some things are better left they [sic] way they are. For example, the US has a rich and admirable history of great heroes who have made this country great. We have holidays to honor great events like the Fourth of July. These traditions of celebrating holidays, respecting our military for defending our country serve as a respect for the privileges we are given by being US citizens.”

**Themes identified in responses to valuing change question.** Growth, novelty, and avoidance of stagnation were each identified as major, recurring themes in participants’ responses to the change value open-ended question. The need to adapt to the inevitability of change was identified as a less frequent theme.
Growth. Participants frequently described change as important for improvement in themselves and in the world around them. Embracing change was seen as necessary to progress as a person. For example:

“Change reflects that I am growing and learning from experiences, but more importantly, that I am applying what I have learned and experienced to improve the quality of my life and my decisions.”

“I think we should always be striving to grow and evolve as people. We should also work to change our surroundings to make them better whenever possible.”

“I think change is important in life because it the only way you can progress as a person.”

Novelty. Distinct from self-improvement, the theme of novelty focused on change being valued simply because it heralded the arrival of new experiences or situations. For example:

“Change can bring on new ideas, new places to be, new ways of looking at things.”

Avoidance of stagnation. Contrasting directly with the status quo theme of fear of change, this theme explicitly described how adhering to the status quo would lead to a failure to flourish. Participants referred to life as too safe and easy in the absence of change. For example:

“Change is important to me because without change life would be extremely static and boring... If we didn't have change then I would get extremely bored of doing the same things for 70 years, so change is very important to me.”

Adapting to inevitability. A few participants described change as inescapable, and said that change would happen whether they wanted it or not, thus it was better to embrace change rather than reject it. For example:

“Change is a constant in the universe. I would rather value it than fight against it.”

“Being able to change and adapt is essential for various things in life. It is being able to recognize your own flaws and alter your behavior to accommodate. Being able to recognize and adapt to change is important.”

Discussion

In this first study we sought to uncover the content and structure of change and status quo values in individuals. Our results align with elements of existing work on universal values, including the general oppositional structure of change “vs.” status quo, conceptualised by Schwartz (1994) as second-order values. When we asked participants to describe what valuing change and the status quo meant to them, their responses included themes that were broadly similar to the first-order values described by Schwartz (1994; 2010).

In Schwartz’ work, change is described as a second-order value that encapsulates the first-order values of self-determination and stimulation. In this study, participants described the following themes underlying their valuing of change: growth, novelty, avoidance of stagnation, and
adapting to inevitability. We see the closest alignment between our results and Schwartz’ values as follows: novelty and avoidance of stagnation themes are analogous to stimulation as a value, and growth and adapting to inevitability are analogous to self-determination as a value. In Schwartz’ work, the second-order stability (or conservation) value encapsulates tradition, conformity, and security. In the present study, valuing the status quo was underpinned by beliefs about predictability, security, fear of change, and respect for tradition. The theme that we labelled as predictability aligns with Schwartz’ basic value of conformity in that both endorse the following of existing social expectations and/or norms (Schwartz, 1994). The themes we labelled with security and fear of change align with the basic value of security in that both endorse safety and stability of relationships and the social order; and the respect for tradition theme aligns with the basic value of tradition in that both endorse respect and commitment to established or historical tradition (Schwartz, 1994). Participants’ unprompted responses to our questions about the content of change and status quo values were thus consistent with established findings for the full suite of ten universal human values (e.g., the Schwartz Value Survey; Schwartz, 1992). Since the aim of the current research is to investigate the distinct roles of change and status quo values in shaping appraisals of group conflict, and not assess all ten lower-order universal values, we chose to build from the results of Study 1 in creating quantitative measures of how strongly outsiders endorse change and status quo as values. These measures are investigated in more detail in Studies 2 and 3.

The change and status quo values are often described in previous work as the opposite anchors of a dimension (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2010). This implies that those who endorse the value of change are likely to reject the value of the status quo, and vice versa. Strong evidence to support this argument would thus be a perception that these values were exclusive, and a negative correlation between endorsing change and endorsing status quo values. The majority of people described these values as exclusive, and we did see a strong negative correlation between the two values.

In this study we have identified key themes that describe the content of change and status quo values. We also found some preliminary evidence that suggests these two values are independent, rather than opposite anchors of a single value dimension. In Study 2, we seek to confirm that these values are conceptually distinct from each other, as well as from established political attitudes that may be salient in the context of intergroup conflict.

**Study 2**

In this study we aimed to construct a quantitative measure of the degree to which a person values change and values the status quo. This is a necessary intermediate step in being able to test our general claim that personal values can shape context-bound appraisals of group conflict and inequality. Recent work in collective action has found that personal ideological orientations such as
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1996) are associated with context-bound antecedents of collective action, such as anger towards disadvantaged groups and identification with advantaged groups (Saeri et al., in press). It is possible that there is conceptual overlap between these ideologies and personal values of change and/or status quo. This is especially so for RWA, which is theorised to include as an element the desire for security and stability, which is also reflected in the themes identified for valuing the status quo in Study 1 (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). SDO and RWA are related to the general ideological orientation of political conservatism (Feldman, 2013) and system justification (Kay & Jost, 2003), and recent values work have explicitly linked Schwartz’ (1994) values with political beliefs and ideologies (Schwartz et al., 2010). Therefore it is important in Study 2 to determine whether change and status quo values are distinct from endorsing particular political ideologies and attitudes, including SDO, RWA, and system justification.

Method

Participants. We recruited 100 U.S. residents from Amazon Mechanical Turk as participants in this study, with a payment of $0.50 for their time. Participants were aged 18 to 69 years (M = 34.26, SD = 11.91) and 58% were male. The majority (73%) were White or European American; 15% were Asian American, 7% were Hispanic or Latino, and 4% were African American. All participants had completed their high school diploma; 45% had attained a Bachelor’s degree. The data for this study were collected in 2013.

Measures. Except where specified, all responses were provided on a 1-7 response scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”

Endorsement of the Status Quo as a value. We developed self-report items that drew on the four status quo themes identified in Study 1 (predictability, security, avoiding change, and respecting tradition). The content of each item was adapted from prototypical participant responses to a theme in Study 1. For example, the full response of a Study 1 participant, “I think in life I strive to maintain the status quo. I like the security that it brings, and it makes me feel better,” was adapted as the item “I like the security that comes with things staying the same”. This item reflected the security theme. In total, 11 items were developed in order to represent the themes identified in Study 1 (see Table 1).

Endorsement of Change as a value. We developed items based on each of the themes identified in Study 1 (growth, novelty, avoidance of stagnation, and adaptation to inevitability). We adapted responses from Study 1 to reflect each theme. Example items include, “I value change because it leads to progress” (growth theme), “Change is a constant in the universe, so it’s best to embrace it” (inevitability theme), “Without change, society would fall into an entirely predictable
routine” (avoidance of stagnation theme). A total of 9 items were developed to assess participants’ change values (see Table 1).

**Social Dominance Orientation.** We adapted a recent revision of the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) measure to assess participants’ preference for social dominance (Ho et al., 2012). This 16-item measure includes both positively- and negatively-worded items. An example of a positively worded item is: “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups”. An example of a negatively worded item is “We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed”. After recoding, the items were averaged to create a single measure of SDO.

**Right-wing Authoritarianism.** We selected nine items from the original 30 item Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1996) measure for brevity. The nine items included have been used in previous work (e.g., Saeri et al., in press) and are the three highest-loading items for each subscale of submission, aggression, and conventionalism (Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010). One example item is: “The real keys to the ‘good life’ are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and narrow”. All nine items were averaged to create a single measure of RWA.

**System justification.** We adapted five items from a published measure of System Justification (Kay & Jost, 2003) to measure beliefs that the world as a whole was just and fair, rather than just the society that a person lives in. An example item was “In general, you find societies in the world to be fair”. The five items were averaged to create a single measure of System Justification.

**Political conservatism.** We used two items to measure political conservatism on social and economic issues. Participants indicated the degree to which they thought of themselves as “very conservative” (1) to “very liberal” (7) on each set of issues.

**Results**

**Exploratory Factor Analysis.** In this study, we sought to demonstrate that personal values of change and status quo are statistically distinct from each other, and also distinct from other established, politically-focused ideological orientations. To do so, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis. We included the 51 items that make up the following measures: endorsement of change as a value, endorsement of status quo as a value, SDO, RWA, System Justification, and political conservatism. We used maximum likelihood extraction with oblimin rotation, and retained all factors with Eigenvalues above 1. In total, 11 factors were retained, explaining 77% of the variance. Inspection of the scree plot revealed a discontinuity at the sixth factor, which indicates that after the sixth extracted factor, additional factors each accounted for a less meaningful proportion of the variance among items. A comprehensive list of factor loadings is presented in Table 1.
Table 1

Exploratory Factor Analysis for all measured items in Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
<th>Component 3</th>
<th>Component 4</th>
<th>Component 5</th>
<th>Component 6</th>
<th>Component 7</th>
<th>Component 8</th>
<th>Component 9</th>
<th>Component 10</th>
<th>Component 11</th>
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<td><strong>Social Dominance Orientation</strong></td>
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<td>Having some groups on top really benefits everybody</td>
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<td>It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other</td>
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<td>An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on</td>
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<td>Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups</td>
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<td>Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top</td>
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<td>No one group should dominate in society</td>
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<td>Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place</td>
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<td>Group dominance is a poor principle</td>
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<td>We should not push for group equality</td>
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<td>We shouldn't try to guarantee that every group has the same quality of</td>
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<td>It is unjust to try to make groups equal</td>
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<td>Group equality should not be our primary goal</td>
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<td>We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed</td>
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<td>We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups</td>
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<td>No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure that</td>
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<td>all groups have the same chance in life</td>
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<td>Group equality should be our ideal</td>
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<td><strong>Right-Wing Authoritarianism</strong></td>
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<td>What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will</td>
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<td>crush evil, and take us back to our true path</td>
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<td>Once our government leaders give us the &quot;go ahead,&quot; it will be the</td>
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<td>duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is</td>
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<td>poisoning our country from within</td>
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<td>The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest</td>
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<td>methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and</td>
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<td>got us back to our true path</td>
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<td>There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse</td>
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<td>Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and</td>
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<td>sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone</td>
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<td>There is no &quot;ONE right way&quot; to live life; everybody has to create</td>
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<td>their own way</td>
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<td>Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues</td>
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<td>The real keys to the &quot;good life&quot; are obedience, discipline, and</td>
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<td>sticking to the straight and narrow</td>
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<td>It may be considered old fashioned by some, but having a normal,</td>
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<td>proper appearance is still the marker of a gentleman and, especially,a lady</td>
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<td><strong>Status Quo values (themes)</strong></td>
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<td>I prefer to stay with what is familiar (Security)</td>
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<td>I feel safer to stay with what is familiar (Security)</td>
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<td>I like the security that comes with maintaining the status quo (</td>
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<td>I like the security that comes with things staying the same (Security)</td>
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<td>I really like things to stay how they are (Avoid Change)</td>
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<td>I really like the status quo (Avoid Change)</td>
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<td>In my ideal world, I'd like things not to change (Avoid Change)</td>
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<td>I feel more comfortable to have things the same than things constantly changing (Routine)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I like routine in the world (Routine)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintaining the status quo can preserve important positive qualities and traditions (Respect for tradition)</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to respect the status quo (Respect for tradition)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Change values (themes)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being open to change can bring new and better opportunities in life (Novelty)</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change opens the door to new possibilities (Novelty)</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I value change because it leads to progress (Growth)</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People and societies must embrace change in order to grow and become better (Growth)</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society’s potential for growth and positive change is limited when we maintain the status quo (Growth)</td>
<td>-.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change is a constant in the universe, so it’s best to embrace it (Adapting to inevitability)</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change is inevitable, and thus we should try and make the most of the opportunities that it presents (Adapting to inevitability)</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If everything remained the same all the time, life would become stagnant and stale (Avoiding stagnation)</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without change, society would fall into an entirely predictable routine (Avoiding stagnation)</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**System justification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In general, you find societies in the world to be fair</td>
<td>-.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, the political systems of societies in the world operate as they should</td>
<td>-.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For societies in the world, most policies serve the greater good</td>
<td>-.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness in societies in the world</td>
<td>-.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political conservatism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic conservatism</td>
<td>-.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social conservatism</td>
<td>-.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Factor loadings < .30 are not displayed. Bolded items were retained in Study 3 measures of change and status quo values.
The majority of the status quo values items (9 of 11) loaded highly (> .72) onto a single factor. The majority of the change items (6 of 9) also loaded highly (> .69) onto a different single factor. The highly-loading items can thus be used as a reliable measure of change values and, separately, status quo values. The remaining items either displayed cross-factor loadings, loaded onto another factor, or did not load highly onto any factor. As a whole, these results indicate discriminant validity, in that the items measuring change and status quo values represent distinct constructs, consistent with the findings from Study 1. In addition, the two factors identified for change and status quo values were also distinct from the factors that captured items from the other political ideology and attitude measures.

Inspection of the factor loadings for the other items revealed that many loaded across multiple factors, including half (8) of the SDO items and a third (3) of the RWA items. Although a clear factor structure did not emerge for measures of SDO and RWA, the internal structure of these constructs has been explored at length elsewhere, with SDO comprising two components (Ho et al., 2012), and RWA comprising three components (Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010). In summary, endorsing change status quo as values were found to be statistically distinct from political ideologies and attitudes. The results of the factor analysis suggest that the items we created could be used to form a reliable and valid measure of change and status quo values.

**Change and Status Quo measure validity.** We created composite measures for each construct, including change and status quo values. Measures for change and status quo were created from their highly- and singly-loading items (see bolded items in Table 1). Measures for SDO and RWA were created by averaging all their items, as in previous work investigating ideological orientations (e.g., Sibley & Duckitt, 2010b). Means, standard deviations, measure reliability, and bivariate correlations are presented in Table 2. The reliability of the newly-constructed measures of Change and Status Quo in Study 2 was high for each measure (α > .90). SDO and RWA were significantly and positively associated with status quo values. The more a participant endorsed social dominance and right-wing authoritarianism as ideologies, the more they valued the status quo. In contrast, SDO was significantly negatively associated with endorsement of change as a value. The more a participant endorsed social dominance, the less they valued change. Status quo values, but not change values, were significantly and positively associated with political conservatism.
Table 2

Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for Study 2 variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Reliability(^a)</th>
<th>Correlations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 SDO</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 RWA</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Status quo values</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Change values</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 System Justification</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Political conservatism</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.44***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. † \( p < .10 \). * \( p < .05 \). ** \( p < .01 \). *** \( p < .001 \)

\( ^a \) all values are Cronbach’s Alpha, except Political Conservatism, which is \( r \) due to a two-item measure.
Discussion

Our aim for this study was to create reliable and valid measures for change values and status quo values. The results showed discriminant validity for change and status quo values, in that the values were statistically distinct from each other, as well as distinct from other political ideological orientations such as SDO and RWA. The factor structure revealed clear and distinct factors of change values and status quo values. Items that strongly loaded on these factors can be used to create reliable measures of each value. In addition, the finding that items assessing status quo and change values did not load onto a single factor supports our assertion that change and status quo do not fall on opposite ends of a single value dimension. The finding that these values are also empirically distinct from other personally-held ideological beliefs about the proper order of the world lends support to their potential unique role in predicting appraisals of conflict and subsequent collective action.

Despite the clear distinction revealed between values and the other constructs measured in Study 2, we observed that endorsement of each value was correlated with endorsement or rejection of different ideological orientations. Endorsing unequal (SDO) or aggressively authoritarian (RWA) social systems have been shown to predict social attitudes (e.g., prejudice, discrimination), and also shape collective appraisals of group conflict (e.g., identification, felt injustice; for a review see Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007). Recent work has also shown that endorsing these ideologies can shape appraisals of a group conflict context, and influence outsiders’ willingness to take collective action on behalf of each group engaged in conflict (Saeri et al., in press). Taken as a whole, the results of Study 2 suggest that the values of change and status quo are linked with, but are distinct from, ideological worldviews about social power, group inequality, and the proper order of societies. This, then, suggests that personal values can shape individuals’ specific interpretations and appraisals of novel group conflict and inequality. We directly tested the predictive validity of change and status quo values in Study 3.

Study 3

In Study 3, we sought to examine directly how endorsing change values and, separately, status quo values, might uniquely affect appraisals of a group conflict. Personal universal values are described as stable over time (Schwartz, 1992). But much of collective action research examines instantaneous appraisals of a group conflict situation. In that context, causal pathways between personal values and contextual appraisals are difficult to disentangle. We thus use a two-stage design for Study 3 to assist in the inference of causation. In the first stage (Time 1), we measured individuals’ change and status quo values, and their political ideological orientations. At the second stage (Time 2), we measured contextual appraisals of a novel and fictional instance of group conflict and subsequent willingness to take collective action. We predicted that Time 1 change and
status quo values would predict Time 2 appraisals, and that Time 2 appraisals would be associated with Time 2 willingness to take collective action. We measured context-specific appraisals of group identification, felt anger at the opposing group, and perceived group efficacy for each group engaged in a fictional conflict: a (high-status) government, and a (low-status) protestor group.

**Method**

**Participants, Design, and Procedure.** We initially recruited 221 US residents from Amazon Mechanical Turk to participate in a two-stage study. All participants who completed the Time 1 measures \((N = 205)\) were invited to complete the Time 2 part of the study; the final sample thus included 159 participants who completed both questionnaires (Time 2 response rate = 78%). All participants who completed both stages of the study, and who successfully answered comprehension checks at Time 2 were retained for analysis. Participants were paid USD$0.20 to complete Time 1, and USD$0.80 to complete Time 2. The final sample \((N = 148)\) included participants aged between 18 and 71 \((M = 36.42, SD = 12.23)\) included 75 (50.7%) women. The majority of participants \((n = 120, 81\%)\) were White or European American. 13 participants were Asian American, five (3%) were African American, eight (5%) were Hispanic or Latino/a, one was Middle Eastern, and one reported that they were Native/African American. One participant had not completed high school; 44 had completed high school only, 30 had completed an associate’s degree, 55 had completed a bachelor’s degree, and 18 reported that they had completed a master’s degree or higher. The data for this study were collected in 2014.

**Materials and Measures.**

**Time 1.** Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk to complete an online questionnaire measuring change values, status quo values, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), and political conservatism. RWA \((\alpha = .90)\) and political conservatism \((r = .69, p < .001)\) were measured identically to Study 2. We also used a shorter version of the SDO with 4 items scored from 1, extremely oppose, to 10, extremely favor \((\alpha = 84;\) Pratto et al., 2013).

To create measures of change and the status quo, we retained the Study 2 items that loaded strongly and uniquely on to the single relevant factor (see bolded items in Table 1). In total, we retained six items that measured endorsement of change as a value, and nine items that measured endorsement of the status quo as a value. For each construct, the items were averaged to create reliable measures of change values \((\alpha = .89)\) and status quo values \((\alpha = .95)\), where higher scores indicated more endorsement of that personal value.

At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked to create and record a unique code (which contained no personally identifying information) to allow us to match their responses on the Time 1 and Time 2 questionnaires.
**Time 2.** Two days after completing the Time 1 questionnaire, we invited participants to complete the second part of the study. If they agreed to complete this second questionnaire, participants read about a hypothetical intergroup conflict in the fictional country of Silaria. In this scenario, participants read that the Silarian citizens had brought the capital city to a halt with protests over unsafe working conditions. The scenario depicted the Silarian government as considering a law that would allow for detention of citizen protestors, and employing the military and police to arrest some protestors described by the government as “ringleaders”.

After reading about the conflict, participants were asked to describe key details of the scenario to check for comprehension. They then completed a series of measures assessing their responses to the conflict, with the explicit instruction to respond as though the scenario were real. The measures assessed levels of group identification, felt anger, perceived efficacy, and intentions to participate in collective action on behalf of each group in the conflict.

*Identification with each group.* We used three items to assess the strength of identification participants felt with members of each group in conflict. The items were adapted from Leach et al. (2008) and were averaged to form a reliable measure of identification with the citizens (α = .89) and government (α = .91). An example item was “I feel a bond with the Silarian [citizens / government]”.

*Felt anger towards opposing group.* We used three items to measure anger felt towards members of the “opposition” group in conflict. Felt anger is the affective component of perceived injustice, which is a well-established predictor of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008). In the current study, those people who support the citizens would feel anger towards the opposing group: government, and vice versa. The items were adapted from previous intergroup emotion work (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007) and were averaged to form a reliable measure of anger towards citizens (α = .87) and government (α = .87). An example item was “I feel outraged at the Silarian [citizens / government]”.

*Perceived efficacy of each group.* We used three items to measure perceived efficacy of each group in the conflict, adapted from previous work (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). The items were averaged to form a reliable measure of the apparent efficacy of citizens (α = .92) and government (α = .86). An example item was “If they work together, the Silarian [citizens / government] can achieve [their / its] goals.”

*Intentions to take collective action.* We used three items to measure participants’ willingness to take action on behalf of each group in the conflict. The items were averaged to form a reliable
measure of intentions to act in support of citizens (α = .95) and government (α = .94). An example item was: “I am willing to take action on behalf of the Silarian [citizens / government]”.

Results and Discussion

**Analytic strategy.** Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for the focal variables are presented in Table 3. We conducted a series of regressions to investigate the effect of personal values on context-specific appraisals of a group conflict—including group identification, felt anger, and perceived group efficacy—and the effect of these appraisals as proximal predictors of collective action intentions. In order to more fully understand the psychological processes that may lead to support for the government, compared to the processes that lead to support for citizen protestors, we conducted separate analyses to predict collective action intentions to support each target group. When predicting collective action to support the government, we examined how change and status quo values predicted identification with the government, anger felt towards the opposing protesters, and perceived efficacy of the government, and how these context-specific appraisals were each associated with willingness to take collective action in support of the government. When predicting collective action to support the citizen protestors, we examined how change and status quo values predicted identification with the citizen protestors, anger felt towards the government, and perceived efficacy of the protestors, and how these context specific appraisals were each associated with willingness to take action in support of the protestors.

We regressed each appraisal for each target group on the focal variables of status quo values and change values, and the covariates of SDO, RWA, and political conservatism. Results of analyses including the covariates are reported here for a conservative test of the unique effects of status quo and change values on appraisals of group conflict and collective action. The effects reported are robust to inclusion or exclusion of political conservatism, SDO and RWA in the analyses.

To summarise, six sets of regression were conducted: one for each context-specific appraisal (identification, anger, and efficacy) x one for each target group (government and protestors). In addition, we used bootstrapping with 5,000 resamples and 95% confidence intervals to investigate the indirect effects of status quo and change values on intentions to take collective action in support of each group via context-specific appraisals.

**Predicting action to support citizen protestors.** The coefficients of each Time 1 variable’s relationship with each Time 2 outcome variable are presented in Table 4. Overall, we found that Time 2 identification with the citizen protestors was significantly and positively predicted by Time 1 endorsement of change values, and significantly and negatively predicted by Time 1 Social Dominance Orientation and political conservatism. We observed the same pattern of results for Time 2 felt anger towards the government (i.e., the group opposing the citizens): Endorsing change
was associated with more anger towards the government, while higher levels of SDO and increased political conservatism was associated with less anger. Endorsing change—but no other Time 1 variable—was associated with increased perceived group efficacy of the citizen protestors at Time 2. The more a participant endorsed change, the more efficacious they believed the citizens could be in achieving their goals. In contrast, status quo values did not significantly predict any of the appraisals sympathetic to the low-status citizen protestors.

We then tested a full model including all Time 1 variables and Time 2 appraisals as simultaneous predictors of Time 2 collective action intentions. Each Time 2 appraisal significantly and positively predicted intentions to take collective action on behalf of the citizen protestors: identification, \( B = 0.3516, SE = 0.1267, p = .006, 95\%CI [0.1011, 0.6021] \); felt anger, \( B = 0.3654, SE = 0.0973, p < .001, [0.1730, 0.5578] \); and perceived group efficacy, \( B = 0.2319, SE = 0.0876, p = .009, [0.0586, 0.4051] \). Bootstrapping analyses revealed stable indirect effects of endorsing change on intentions to take collective action via each of the three appraisals: identification, \( B = 0.1101, SE_{\text{boot}} = 0.0554, 95\%CI_{\text{boot}} [0.0299, 0.2684] \), felt anger, \( B = 0.1109, SE_{\text{boot}} = 0.0579, [0.0258, 0.2624] \), and perceived group efficacy, \( B = 0.0745, SE_{\text{boot}} = 0.0427, [0.0133, 0.1930] \). There were no indirect effects of endorsing the status quo on collective action intentions.

**Predicting action to support the government.** The coefficients for each relationship between the Time 1 variables and the Time 2 appraisals are detailed in Table 5. To summarize, a significant and negative association was found between endorsing change and identification with the government. The more strongly a participant endorsed change as a value in their lives, the weaker they identified with the government group. Endorsing change also negatively predicted felt anger towards the citizen protestors, while social dominance orientation significantly \( (p = .047, 95\%CI [0.0009, 0.1216]) \) and positively predicted felt anger towards the citizen protestors. No Time 1 variables significantly predicted perceived efficacy of the government to achieve its goals.

Next, we tested a full model with all Time 1 variables and Time 2 appraisals as simultaneous predictors of Time 2 collective action intentions. In this model, identification with the government \( (B = 0.2126, SE = 0.0586, p < .001, [0.0967, 0.3285]) \), anger towards the citizen protestors \( (B = 0.5320, SE = 0.0908, p < .001, [0.3525, 0.7116]) \), and right-wing authoritarianism \( (B = 0.1829, SE = 0.0296, p < .001, [0.0929, 0.2729]) \) significantly and positively predicted intentions to take collective action in support of the government. In addition, bootstrap analyses revealed a stable indirect effect of endorsing change on intentions to take action via identification \( (B = -0.0454, SE_{\text{boot}} = 0.0249, 95\%CI_{\text{boot}} [-0.1146, -0.0103]) \) and anger \( (B = -0.1005, SE_{\text{boot}} = 0.0510, [-0.2319, -0.0243]) \). No direct or indirect effects were found for endorsing the status quo.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for Study 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Change values</td>
<td>5.59 (0.91)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Status Quo values</td>
<td>4.02 (1.28)</td>
<td>-0.44***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 SDO</td>
<td>2.88 (1.87)</td>
<td>-0.38***</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 RWA</td>
<td>2.93 (1.28)</td>
<td>-0.30***</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>0.30***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Political conservatism</td>
<td>3.38 (1.56)</td>
<td>-0.36***</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.43***</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Identification with government</td>
<td>1.67 (0.96)</td>
<td>-0.25**</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Anger at citizens</td>
<td>1.31 (0.64)</td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
<td>0.14†</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Efficacy of government</td>
<td>4.17 (1.43)</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Intentions to act in support of government</td>
<td>1.37 (0.81)</td>
<td>-0.28**</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Identification with citizens</td>
<td>5.64 (1.03)</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>-0.14†</td>
<td>-0.41***</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
<td>-0.39***</td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
<td>-0.27**</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.31***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Anger at government</td>
<td>4.58 (1.25)</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.37***</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.28**</td>
<td>-0.33***</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.22**</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Efficacy of citizens</td>
<td>4.98 (1.22)</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.16†</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
<td>-0.38***</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.28**</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Intentions to act in support of citizens</td>
<td>4.79 (1.55)</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.32***</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.29***</td>
<td>-0.16*</td>
<td>-0.23**</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. All variables measured on a 1-7 scale, except Anger, which was measured on a 1-6 scale. † p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
Table 4

Regression coefficients for Time 2 predictors supporting the low-status citizen protestors on each Time 1 predictor in Study 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time 1 predictors</th>
<th>Identification with protestors</th>
<th>Anger at government</th>
<th>Perceived efficacy of protestors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
<td>$p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change values</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status quo values</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political conservatism</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5

Regression coefficients for Time 2 predictors supporting the high-status government on each Time 1 predictor in Study 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time 1 predictors</th>
<th>Identification with government</th>
<th>Anger at protestors</th>
<th>Perceived efficacy of government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change values</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status quo values</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political conservatism</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>.797</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a The lower confidence bound for this coefficient is 0.0009.
General Discussion

We began this paper with the central aim of discovering how values can shape appraisals of group conflict and subsequent collective action. In three studies, we defined and distinguished the content and structure of change and status quo values, and demonstrated that change values but not status quo values can affect outsiders’ appraisals of group conflict and willingness to take collective action. In Study 1, we found that change as a value included themes of growth, novelty, avoidance of stagnation, and adapting to inevitability. Themes underlying participants’ values of the status quo included security, predictability, and conformity. In addition, the values were mostly seen as exclusive: valuing the status quo was incompatible with valuing change. In terms of both value content and structure, our findings here broadly reflect Schwartz’ (1992) work on universal values. In Study 2, we confirmed that endorsing change the status quo as values were statistically distinct from each other and from other personally-focused variables with the potential for conceptual overlap, including SDO, RWA, and political conservatism. SDO and RWA in particular have recently been found to shape appraisals of group conflict and subsequent collective action.

In Study 3, we extended the social identity model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008) by examining how universal personal values might shape appraisals of a novel conflict context. These appraisals included group identification, felt anger at an opposition group, and perceived efficacy of a group. We found that endorsing change as a value not only influenced appraisals relevant to the low-status citizen group in the conflict, but also changed appraisals relevant to the high-status government group. The degree to which a person endorsed change as a value in their life led to more positive appraisals in support of the citizen group, and increased collective action intentions on behalf of the citizens. Conversely, endorsing change led to more negative appraisals of the government, and decreased collective actions on behalf of the government. Importantly, and in extension of Study 2, the relationship between endorsing change as a value and the appraisals of group identification, anger, and perceived group efficacy were maintained after statistically controlling for the political and ideological variables of Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and political conservatism.

In contrast to the significant effects of change values on appraisals, status quo values did not predict either appraisals supporting a low-status citizen protestor group or appraisals supporting a high-status government group. But in Study 2, change and status quo were both associated with variables that have previously shown to predict collective action (Saeri et al., in press). In Study 1, change and status quo values were both described as similarly rich in content, and were each endorsed as important in participants’ lives. If endorsing change was shown to predict conflict appraisals, then so too should endorsing the status quo. So why then did endorsing status quo not
lead to support for the group that sought to maintain the status quo (the government), or a rejection of support for the group that sought to destroy the status quo (the citizen protestors)?

Values are both personal goals that guide thought and action across situations, and a lens through which we see and act upon the world at large (Schwartz, 1994). A person who values the status quo seeks for the world as a whole to remain stable, routine, and secure, and also desires that same stability, routine, and security in their personal life. A conflict may arise, however, between these two domains of the personal and societal. If a threat to the status quo of the wider, societal domain arises, a person is motivated by their values to defend that status quo. But to act in this manner runs counter to their desire for maintaining the status quo in their personal domain. This cross-domain conflict in the expression of status quo values may lead to a lack of collective action. The extent to which the status quo threat is perceived as irrelevant to the self would potentially amplify this demobilizing effect of cross-domain conflict.

In Study 3, participants read about a fictional conflict occurring in a society that was not their own. Although the conflict involved a threat to the stability, routine, and security of the foreign society, the apparent irrelevance of the conflict may have led participants to maintain the status quo in their personal domain (i.e., choose not to act, choose not to psychologically engage with the high-status government group). It is important to note that this cross-domain conflict may not be present for change values: acting to create change is consistent with both personal and societal desires for change. Thus, if a person values change, they will enact their value (change) in order to achieve the progress and novelty that they seek in the world even if that means intervening in a novel group conflict with an uncertain outcome.

This reasoning may explain why, in Study 3, we observed a significant effect of change values on context-specific appraisals of group conflict, but no significant effect of status quo values. It may be the case that outsiders to group conflict will always show weaker or null effects of status quo values on appraisals compared with change values. However, both change and status quo values may act to predict appraisals and collective action for people who are members of groups currently engaged in conflict: insiders. Future work that investigates how values shape collective action could also directly manipulate the self-relevance of the group conflict in order to test this cross-domain conflict explanation.

An alternative explanation is that status quo values are associated with a passive (vs. active) motivational orientation (Deci & Ryan, 2012) and prevention (vs. promotion) regulatory focus (Higgins, 2012). Previous work has shown that established antecedents such as anger and perceived efficacy are differentially powerful in mobilizing people to take collective action when the individual is under promotion focus compared to when the individual is under prevention focus (Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2012). If status quo values are indeed associated with
more passive and prevention-focused behaviours, individuals may not appraise or take action in support of either a high-status government or low-status citizen protestors. Instead, they may choose strategic inaction in order to preserve the status quo. Future work could explore the potential association between status quo values, motivational orientation, and regulatory focus as a route to understanding the role of valuing the status quo in facilitating or hindering collective action among outsiders to conflict.

**Implications for theory**

In this paper we extend existing work on values and political action by showing that the personal values of change and status quo can predict established social psychological antecedents of collective action. In addition, we add to the growing body of work that has examined how stable, individually-focused beliefs can affect context-specific appraisals and collective action (Saeri et al., in press; van Zomeren, 2013). Almost all work investigating how values can motivate political action (e.g., environmentalism) has occurred outside social psychology, and has not been updated or integrated with new insights from social identity and self-categorisation theories. We argue that personal values may provide a common ground on which to establish a shared identity. In Study 3, endorsing change values positively predicted identification with a low-status citizen protestor group and negatively predicted identification with a high-status government group. If shared values can form a basis for a shared identity, then values can not only mobilize collective action, but also provide a foundation for close, collective bonds and support across social categories and even geographic borders.

In this paper we also directly compared change and status quo values with established socio-political attitudes and ideologies, including Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1996), in order to confirm the conceptual distinctiveness of personal values (Study 2) and discriminant predictive validity of personal values compared to these ideological variables (Study 3). We might have expected that these variables, especially RWA, to substantially overlap with endorsement of the status quo as a value. Key components of the RWA ideology include the desire for security and conformity, which are themes that were also identified by participants who said they valued the status quo. Despite this conceptual relationship, the small to moderate correlations between values and SDO, RWA, and political conservatism, as well as the unique effect of endorsing change values on context-specific appraisals of group conflict, suggest that personal values are distinct from these established constructs. One implication of this work is that social and political psychological work must not neglect the potential importance of personal values in shaping attitudes and behaviour in intergroup contexts.
The central finding of this paper—that personal values can shape collective action—is consistent with an emerging literature indicating that stable, individual-focused beliefs have implications for appraisals about collective constructs, such as group identification and perceived group efficacy (van Zomeren, 2013; Saeri et al., in press). In addition, endorsement of change as a value explained unique variance in group conflict appraisals above and beyond existing work on political ideologies (Saeri et al., in press). While earlier work has examined the role of individual beliefs in shaping appraisals of conflicts, the present work takes an important step back from the political ideologies studied by Saeri et al. (in press) and the ‘moral convictions’ of van Zomeren (2013). Valuing change versus the status quo is the highest order value identified by Schwartz (1992), and is a highly abstract, de-contextualised cognition. This body of work is especially important when seeking to understand how less-involved third parties or uninvolved outsiders might react to group conflicts. We argue here that abstract universal values, in addition to other variables such as SDO, RWA, and moral convictions (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2011) shape outsiders’ appraisals of which group in a conflict has suffered unjustly and deserves their support. Thus a richer understanding of these individual-focused variables is critical to explaining when—and for whom—third parties and outsiders may take collective action.

**Suggestions for future research**

In the present work, we simultaneously assessed SDO, RWA, political orientation, and the values of change and status quo. However, it is possible that values could act as antecedents of political attitudes and ideology, and we suggest that future work tease out these causal pathways. Duckitt and Sibley (2010a) have described SDO and RWA as components of political conservatism and underpinned by core beliefs about the world as a ruthless and competitive “jungle”, and a dangerous and threatening place, respectively. Jost, Federico, and Napier (2009) describe the liberal-conservative political ideological continuum as shaped by openness vs. resistance to change, and acceptance vs. rejection of inequality.

Expanding on the question of causality, we conceptualised values in the present work as stable. But we do not argue that valuing change or valuing the status quo are somehow innate or immutable. We agree with Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2010) that the strength of endorsement of different values are a product of the social world and a past and present person’s social identities, as well as antecedents of future social identification. Just as endorsing change may lead to increased identification with a group with the explicit goal of change (e.g., a group that wishes to change same-sex marriage from illegal to legal), belonging to and caring about one’s membership of a group that endorses change as a part of its identity may well result in newly valuing change at a personal level. Future work may contribute to the literatures on both collective action and personal values by investigating how personal values may operate within a more
dynamic model of collective action (e.g., the dynamic dual pathway model, van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012).

In Study 3, we portrayed the low-status (disadvantaged) citizen group with the goal of social change, and the high-status (advantaged) government group with the goal of maintaining the status quo. This conflation was convenient for the purpose of demonstrating that personal values can shape appraisals of group conflict and inequality. However, the conceptual overlap between values, political ideology, and goals of each group obscured how values may (or may not) motivate appraisals and mobilize action truly independently of political ideology and the social power position of each group in conflict. For example, change might be valued by groups that support progressive social reform, as well as groups that support corporate deregulation and free-market capitalism. Ideologically, one group may be labelled as progressive/left-wing and the other as conservative/right-wing (Feldman, 2013). Future work could thus investigate how values shape collective behaviour and action in explicitly political contexts. If a high-status group endorsed change values (e.g., pension reform) and a low-status group endorsed status quo values (e.g., rejecting reforms), which group would be supported by outsiders who valued change?

The conflation of values, ideology, and social power provided a more conservative test of the unique role of personal values in shaping conflict appraisals, but future work could disentangle these intricate relationships by modifying the details of the conflict context. Participants could encounter a group conflict in which both groups are of relatively equal social power, such as a lawsuit between a large multinational corporation and a government. In this case, the status quo might support equality, whereas change will result in a difference in resulting social power. In future research, the low-status group may be portrayed with the goal of maintaining the status quo and the high-status group portrayed with the goal of change, such as a conflict between citizens who wish to preserve a state pension, and a government that wishes to abolish it.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, we have sought to integrate the rich literatures of personal values and collective action in a desire to understand how outsiders may appraise and respond to group conflict when they encounter it for the first time. We found that valuing change, but not status quo, affected well-established psychological motivators for collective action. In addition, this relationship between endorsing change as a value and appraisals of a conflict context extended to both the high-status and low-status groups. This work thus adds to a growing body of literature that can illuminate how less-involved outsiders may come to support a particular group in an external conflict.
Chapter 5: conclusions

Despite the fact that outsiders, mobilized by organisations such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International, have taken collective action for decades, they are almost entirely absent from the current collective action literature. In this thesis, I aimed to understand how outsiders respond when they encounter a context of group conflict or inequality for the first time, the specific groups that outsiders might support through their collective action, and the psychological variables that influence these responses. As a whole, this thesis illustrates that outsiders can and do take collective action, that they may support either the advantaged or the disadvantaged group in an external conflict, and that stable, context-independent variables can influence the context-specific appraisals that lead to outsider collective action. In this final chapter, I reflect on how the thesis contributes to our understanding of collective action, describe broader implications for other relevant literatures that investigate intergroup processes such as prosocial behaviour and political ideologies, discuss some limitations and challenges of the work, and suggest several fertile areas for future research investigating and employing outsider collective action.

Contributions to the collective action literature

This thesis investigates collective actors who are not directly involved in a context of group conflict or inequality: outsiders. The diverse theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of collective action include embedded assumptions about who takes action, which group might be supported by others’ action, and the breadth of potential motives to act. In this thesis, I challenge these assumptions by directly investigating outsider collective action (Chapters 2-4) and directly comparing insiders and outsiders’ appraisals of a group conflict (Chapter 2). I also investigate the potential for outsiders to support either advantaged or disadvantaged groups in a conflict (Chapters 3-4), and the potential for stable, context-independent ideologies and values to shape outsiders’ appraisals and collective action (Chapters 3-4). I briefly review the key results from the thesis and discuss their implications below.

Outsiders can and do take collective action

Almost all collective action work has focused on individuals who are involved in a context of group conflict or inequality. The classic collective actor is a member of the disadvantaged group, acting on their own group’s behalf (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Other work has also investigated how members of the advantaged group may take collective action in their own interest (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007) or in support of the disadvantaged group (Iyer & Leach, 2008; 2009; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006). Members of a less-involved majority or audience, who are not directly involved in a conflict but who are still part of the wider social context, are also theorised to act on the basis of a shared social identity following self-categorisation (Subašić,
This thesis broadens the scope of collective action research to include outsiders as collective actors. Chapter 2 directly compared outsiders and insiders in the context of US income inequality. Both outsider (Indian) and insider (American) participants could be motivated to take collective action to challenge income inequality. Furthermore, the predictors for insiders and outsiders were similar: strength of identification with a disadvantaged group, their expressed anger at the disadvantage suffered by that group, and their perceived efficacy in achieving the group’s goals. These findings indicate that the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), which was derived from a meta-analysis of collective action by insiders, may also be fruitfully applied to understand the motives of collective action by outsiders, at least within a given context of conflict.

Despite the congruence between insiders’ and outsiders’ motives for collective action, there were differences in the strength of these appraisals. Outsiders identified less strongly with the disadvantaged group than insiders, and perceived the conflict as less relevant to themselves. The appraisal of a group conflict as self-relevant has been described as a necessary pre-condition for experiencing and acting upon group-based emotion (Iyer & Leach, 2008) and group efficacy (van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012), as was observed in Chapter 2. Consistent with this line of reasoning, participants’ appraisals of group-based anger and group efficacy were mediated by the perception of the conflict as self-relevant. Participants who perceived the issue of US income inequality as self-relevant reported that they were angrier at the injustice, and believed that by working together, they could meaningfully challenge income inequality. Chapter 2 empirically demonstrates the theorised role of self-relevance in the expression of group-based emotion and group efficacy.

**Outsiders may support either advantaged or disadvantaged groups in conflict**

In current collective action theory, it is assumed that members of a disadvantaged group will either take collective action in support of their group’s goals, or they will do nothing. Collective action is conceptualised as the (social) self-interested response to perceived unjust disadvantage (Wright, 1990; 2009; 2010). This assumption is embedded in disadvantaged group collective action work, and it would indeed seem illogical for a disadvantaged group member to act contrary to their own interests by taking collective action that maintains or furthers an unjust conflict or inequality (Walker & Smith, 2002; van Zomeren et al., 2012).

Similarly, advantaged group members may take collective action in their self-interest (e.g., to maintain an unjust status quo). However, they may also take action to benefit a relatively disadvantaged group at the expense of their own, if they believe their group was responsible for the
inequality (Beaton & Deveau, 2005). That is, advantaged group members may take action not out of self-interest, but in the interests of social justice (Iyer & Leach, 2008). One distinction between such self-interested collective action and justice-seeking collective action is in the target and content of the emotions experienced by advantaged group members. In two distinct applications of intergroup emotion theory (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), other-directed emotions of anger predicted collective action by non-Aboriginal Australians that reinforced the unequal status quo (i.e., rejecting compensation for Aboriginal Australians; Leach et al., 2007); separately, self-directed emotions of guilt and anger predicted advantaged non-Aboriginal Australians’ collective action in support of disadvantaged Aboriginal Australians (Leach et al., 2006).

Third-party majority and audience group members, who are part of a conflict context but who are not directly involved in the intergroup conflict, may also choose to intervene in the conflict by taking collective action. The political solidarity model of collective action suggests that majority group members will ally with one group in conflict against the other group when they perceive themselves and the target group as psychologically similar, as sharing a common fate, and as being united in opposition against the opposing group (Subašić et al., 2008). The political solidarity model explicitly allows for collective action in support of the advantaged group against the disadvantaged group. However, this hypothesis has not yet been tested. Instead, the political solidarity model has only been investigated in the context of collective action in support of the disadvantaged group against the advantaged group (Subašić, Schmitt, & Reynolds, 2011).

The present thesis expands upon this promising work by directly assessing outsiders’ willingness to take collective action in support of each group in a conflict. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that outsiders can be motivated to support both the disadvantaged and the advantaged groups engaged in conflict or subject to inequality, and that their intentions to take collective action could be predicted by appraisals specific to each group. For example, collective action intentions to support an advantaged Russian government were predicted by identification with the government and group-based anger felt towards (Russian) citizen protestors who were challenging the government (Chapter 3, Study 1). Conversely, collective action intentions to support disadvantaged (Russian) citizen protestors were predicted by identification with the protestors, and group-based anger felt towards the government (Chapter 3, Study 1). This pattern of findings was replicated across a number of real and fictional contexts of group conflict and inequality (Chapters 3 and 4). These results imply that in existing research, a lack of expressed support for collective action in support of a disadvantaged or target group may actually indicate unmeasured support for an advantaged or opposition group. This is especially the case in advantaged group, majority, or third-party audience collective action, where theory and research has already established that individuals may take action to serve either group’s interest in a group conflict (Leach et al., 2006; 2007;
Subašić et al., 2008). Thus work that measures conflict appraisals and collective action only in support of a specific target group could fail to capture the full range of an individual’s responses to an instance of group conflict, including willingness to take collective action against the target group.

**Outsiders’ pre-existing beliefs influence their appraisals of group conflict and thus their collective action**

Three common predictors of collective action have emerged from extensive theoretical and empirical work over the past 30 years: group identification, perceived injustice (group-based anger), and perceived group efficacy (Stürmer & Simon 2004, van Zomeren et al., 2008, van Zomeren, 2013; Wright, 2010). All three predictors are appraisals of a specific context of conflict: for example, one’s anger about the specific disadvantage of Aboriginal Australians (e.g., Leach et al., 2007) would not be expected to predict collective action in the separate context of anti-whaling (e.g., Stuart, Thomas, Donaghue, & Russell, 2013). The literature’s focus on context-specific appraisals and predictors of collective action is logical when investigating collective action by actors within a context of conflict. However, it does not account for how individuals who do not have access to information about a specific context of conflict might come to appraise the conflict. Instead, these individuals may employ pre-existing attitudes and beliefs about group inequality or conflict as a lens through which to appraise a novel context. In addition, the current literature’s emphasis on context-specific appraisals does not engage with the extensive work in political and personality psychology on socio-political attitudes and their relationship to behaviour.

This thesis integrated the literatures of collective action, political ideology, and values by investigating how Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981; 1996), and Change and Status Quo values (Schwartz, 1992; 1994) could act as distal and context-independent predictors of collective action. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that personal ideological orientations of Social Dominance and Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and endorsement of change as a personal value shaped outsiders’ appraisals in support of each group. Ideological orientations and endorsing change as a value also indirectly predicted the group on whose behalf outsiders were willing to take collective action. In general, the more strongly outsiders endorsed dominance and authoritarianism, and the more strongly they rejected change as a value in their life, the more they supported an advantaged group in conflict. The reverse was also true: the more strongly outsiders rejected dominance and authoritarianism, and the more strongly they endorsed change as a value in their life, the more they supported a disadvantaged group in conflict.

My investigation of ideology and values as distal antecedents of collective action mirrors some recent work on moral convictions as motives for collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, &
Spears, 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011). Moral convictions are inviolable attitudes about a morally-relevant issue (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005), and have been found to act as relatively context-independent predictors of collective action (Skitka, 2010). Furthermore, van Zomeren (2013) argues that shared moral convictions among members of different groups could serve to unite individuals “in a joint struggle for social change” (p. 382). I argue that ideologies and shared values, such as those investigated in this thesis, can also be effective in uniting members of different groups (e.g., insiders and outsiders). Both political ideologies and personal values shape individuals’ beliefs about how the world is, and how it should be (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010). Outsiders who endorse a particular ideology or set of values are therefore readied to appraise a novel group conflict in a manner consistent with that lens.

It is also possible that ideologies and values offer a foundation for the construction of a shared social identity with the ideologically- or value-aligned group in conflict. Recent work on opinion-based groups, where a shared social identity emerges from a shared belief or opinion (e.g., support for a particular political party or policy; Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007; Thomas et al., 2009), rather than a shared social categorisation (e.g., all members are Australian citizens), suggests a possible pathway for how ideologies and values could unite insiders and outsiders in collective action.

**Implications for policy and practice**

The findings of this thesis suggest opportunities for social movement organisations and other groups engaged in protest or conflict to influence and recruit outsiders for their cause.

Outsiders are willing to take collective action. In Chapter 2, outsiders were more likely to sign a petition challenging income inequality compared to insiders who were directly disadvantaged by that inequality. The readiness of outsiders to be mobilized for social justice in a context that does not directly or instrumentally affect them is encouraging for social movements that seek to make their cause known and supported outside their specific intergroup context (e.g., internationally). More speculatively, outsiders may perceive collective action as a symbolic gesture, or as the expression of solidarity with one group in conflict (e.g., Hunt & Benford, 2004). Thus, social movements seeking to maximise participation could emphasise the opportunity that collective action offers outsiders to express their values publicly (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006; Saab et al., 2014).

The strength of outsiders’ identification with a group in conflict, and the intensity of their anger towards the opposing group were each identified as consistent motives for outsider action across the studies in the thesis. Campaigns and recruitment attempts would be most effective when they communicate a shared goal or highlight existing similarities between insiders and outsiders, or stoke outsiders’ anger by emphasising the injustice and illegitimacy of the current situation. In
addition to identification and anger in response to a specific context of conflict, personal ideologies and values also shaped outsiders’ willingness to take collective action. Social movements with goals that align with a particular ideology (e.g., challenging inequality, subverting governments or authorities) may wish to explicitly communicate this ideology when attempting to recruit outsiders to act. However, such explicit alignment with a specific ideology may also alienate potential supporters that do not share that ideology. That is, an outsider who believes that economic inequality is the natural and proper state of the world would potentially reject a persuasive message from a social movement that espouses the opposite ideology (i.e., that economic inequality should be challenged). The relative stability of ideologies and values may prove to be a double-edged sword for social movements attempting to mobilize outsiders to act: by explicitly communicating an ideology, a social movement could gain both allies and enemies.

**Limitations, challenges, and suggestions for future work**

**The inconsistent role of efficacy**

The belief that one has sufficient resources to challenge an unjust status quo is one of the earliest motives of collective action (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Olson, 1965), and perceived group efficacy remains as a key unique predictor in current frameworks (Stürmer & Simon, 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2008). In Chapter 2, perceived group efficacy was associated with willingness to take action on behalf of a disadvantaged group for both insiders and outsiders. But in Chapters 3 and 4, perceived group efficacy did not show stable effects on collective action intentions across contexts and groups. There are two plausible explanations for these unexpected results. First, efficacy is typically measured as the perception that one’s own group has the power to achieve its goals, in line with other context-specific predictors of collective action (van Zomeren, 2013; van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, the wording of the efficacy items in this thesis differed across studies. For example, in Chapter 2, one of the items read: “If we work together, we can reduce income inequality in America”. In Chapter 3, Study 1, the efficacy item read: “The Greek government is able to achieve its goals without help from outside Greece”. In Study 2 for Chapter 3, and Study 3 for Chapter 4, the efficacy item read: “I think that the Silarian citizens have the power to achieve their goals”. To summarise, participants were asked to judge the efficacy of different target groups across the studies in the thesis, which may explain the lack of consistent association between efficacy and collective action intentions. However, the relevant target group of an efficacy judgement for outsiders is less clear than for insiders, since insiders are mobilized by their own group’s efficacy to create social change. Which is the relevant group for outsiders? Is it the group of outsiders, e.g., Americans’ perceived efficacy of Americans to challenge Greek austerity? Or is it outsiders’ perceptions of insiders, e.g., Americans’ perceived efficacy of Greeks to challenge Greek austerity? One way to clarify this issue would be to link the efficacy appraisal to a specific
behaviour of collective action, such as the perceived efficacy of a petition to reduce income inequality in America by half (Louis, 2012).

The second explanation offers a different view: the problem with efficacy was not in its operationalisation, but in its conceptualisation. Specifically, the perception of group efficacy is not merely the perception that by taking a specific act, the group will achieve its goals (Hornsey et al., 2006). Instead, the perception of collective action as raising public awareness, publicly expressing a group’s identity, and recruiting other members to future action are each beliefs about efficacy that may predict collective action behaviour (Hornsey et al., 2006; Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2014). In this case, outsiders’ beliefs about the effectiveness of their participation in collective action may not translate into collective action behaviour because the intended purpose of such behaviour is not made clear. To address each of these explanations for the inconsistent role of efficacy in this thesis, future work could directly compare different targets and different types of efficacy as motives for outsider collective action.

**Distinguishing between third parties, bystanders, and outsiders**

In the present thesis, outsiders have been defined as those individuals who are wholly external to a context of group conflict, in contrast to those individuals who are not actively involved in conflict, but who are psychologically and/or geographically linked to the context in some way. These latter individuals are variously described as third parties, bystanders, audiences, or (silent) majorities. But are outsiders and third-parties truly different? In the political solidarity model of collective action, Subašić and colleagues (2008) argue that third-party majorities may come to take collective action through a process of self-categorisation (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) with the disadvantaged group. Other work on bystanders and audiences tend to emphasise that collective action can occur among audience members when they realise a shared connection with one group, and join with that group in challenging the other group (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). But outsiders are likely to lack an obvious foundation on which to “re-categorise” or reconstruct their status relationships to act in solidarity with one group against another. They may act in service of a group while still affirming their distinctiveness from that group (Wright & Richard, 2009). Individuals may assist disadvantaged groups in taking collective action as a result of experiencing some motivating emotion (e.g., sympathy for their unjust circumstances) without the need for an existing shared identity (Iyer & Leach, 2009).

For the purpose of this thesis, I have drawn a line between individuals wholly external to a conflict (i.e., outsiders) and individual wholly within a conflict (i.e., insiders). However, I acknowledge that this sharp delineation between insiders and outsiders is less clear in many real conflicts. Should the British citizens investigated by Saab and colleagues (2014) who are against Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory be considered outsiders? Ostensibly, as a British citizen
they lack a pre-existing connection with the group conflict. However, an individual may have a personal relationship with a person from Palestine, or have been personally victimised in a manner similar to Palestinians, or many other points of familiarity or history with the conflict context. Some forms of collective action may even transform an outsider into an insider (e.g., joining a group in open warfare, such as the Islamic State in Syria). In this thesis, I sampled from US and Indian Amazon Mechanical Turk users. This choice of sampling allowed me to investigate the experiences of exemplar outsiders: individuals who were naïve to an external context of conflict or inequality. It is, of course, essential in future work to explore the nuanced and dynamic process by which outsiders first discover and encounter a conflict, and the potential psychological consequences of their collective action (or lack thereof).

In sum, these differing perspectives suggest two distinct conceptual definitions of outsiders. First, outsiders may be qualitatively distinct from third parties with a pre-existing connection to the conflict. Their collective action is mobilized by stable, context-independent beliefs and attitudes, such as political ideologies and personal values. Appraisals of identification, emotion, and efficacy in support of one group in conflict thus represent and are the expressions of outsiders’ perceived alignment with the goals, ideologies, and values of that group. Alternatively, outsiders may be quantitatively more distant or disconnected from a context of group conflict, but may come to develop a shared psychological connection through similar processes as third party audiences. Their collective action is mobilized by their appraisals of the conflict context, and these appraisals are shaped by stable, context-independent beliefs and attitudes. If this is the case, then political ideologies and personal values should also influence third parties and other insiders’ collective action. Outsiders and insiders who share the same goals and values may thus come together and form a group that compels action to realise those goals and defend those values, regardless of whether those individuals share membership of pre-existing social categories (Thomas & Louis, 2013; Thomas et al., 2009).

**Can outsiders really make a difference?**

The practical impact of understanding outsiders’ motives for collective action is limited by the extent that outsider action can indeed effect social change. The effectiveness of insider collective action seems self-evident: sustained campaigns of protest and organised social movements precede the overturning of unjust laws, or the securing of increased social status or equality for a previously disadvantaged group (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004). However, the effectiveness of collective action in causing social change is surprisingly underexplored (Louis, 2009; Louis et al., in press; Thomas & Louis, 2013). In this environment of uncertainty, I see two key challenges for future research into collective action, especially among outsiders.
The first challenge is to quantify the prevalence and social impact of outsider collective action in general. In Chapter 2 of the current thesis, outsiders were more willing than insiders to sign an online petition against income inequality. But signing a petition requires little effort. Would outsiders still be willing to act if the behaviour was more effortful or costly (Brunsting & Postmes, 2002)? There is little other work investigating the psychological motives for low-effort collective action, and how they might differ from higher-effort and potentially more effective forms of action (see Shi, Hao, Saeri, & Cui, 2015, for an exception). Some evidence from consumer research suggests that token support (e.g., clicking a box that says “I support Oxfam”) can bolster more substantive collective action (e.g., donating money to Oxfam; Kristofferson, White, & Peloza, 2014).

In popular media, outsider collective action is sometimes derided as “slacktivism”, rather than “activism” (Gladwell, 2010; Christensen, 2011). Slacktivism is a neologism and portmanteau of “slacker” and “activism”, and refers to collective action that is low-effort and low-impact in nature, such as clicking “Like” on a Facebook post about an external group conflict (Thomas, McGarty, Lala, Stuart, Hall, & Goddard, 2015). In Sweden, UNICEF ran a campaign with the slogan “Likes don’t save lives”, and distributed posters that read “Like us on Facebook, and we will vaccinate zero children against polio”, and suggested that instead people could donate money to UNICEF to purchase vaccines (Grummas, 2014). These portrayals imply that the typical act by an outsider to conflict has low social impact. However, this implication presumes that (1) the typical act by an insider will have higher social impact, and (2) the combined influence of outsider action is less effective in achieving social change than that of insider collective action. But in almost any conflict, the total number of outsiders dwarfs the total number of insiders (Moghadam, 2009). If many outsiders could be effectively mobilized to take action, it is possible that the aggregate social impact of that action would be substantial.

The second challenge for future outsider collective action research is to integrate what is already known about motivating outsider behaviour from the intergroup helping literature with the rich existing work on collective action. Individuals may help members of other groups strategically, in order to engender a positive reputation (Levine & Cassidy, 2009), or to maintain unequal status relations and ensure that the other group continues to rely on assistance from the helper and his group (Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Nadler, 2009). It is also possible for individuals to help members of other groups altruistically, by donating money in response to an emergency (e.g., the 2010 Haiti earthquake, after which more than USD$9 billion was donated; Ramachandran & Walz, 2013), or as in volunteerism (Boezeman & Ellemers, 2007; 2008). In each case, individuals engaged in behaviour on behalf of another group, in order to further that group’s interests. Could these behaviours then be described as forms of collective action? How would they manifest in a context
of group conflict or inequality? It is possible that these questions have not yet been explored in collective action research because of its focus on groups within a conflict context. After all, who would disadvantaged group members help, if not themselves? And if advantaged group members could be motivated to help the disadvantaged group, then the conflict between the two groups is already somewhat mitigated (but positive intergroup relations may in fact undermine social equality; Becker, Wright, Lubensky, & Zhou, 2013; Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010). Broadening the scope of potential collective actors to include outsiders, as in the current thesis, offers the challenge and the opportunity to more completely understand how and when individuals may take collective action.

**Final thoughts**

The global reach of information about group conflict and inequality presents uninvolved outsiders with the opportunity to ally with insiders and take collective action on a scale like never before. In this thesis, I set out to investigate how outsiders respond when they first encounter group conflict, and the processes by which they might come to take collective action. As a whole, I believe that the findings of this thesis illustrate the need for models of collective action that include actors both within and outside a context of conflict.
References


