after him....
If I do not need the money I would continue working just because I like being with a lot of people during the day.
I will work for as long as I can. I do a lot of voluntary work now. When I get old(er) and frail I will work for the church and for older people and for my grandchildren.
I’m retiring in a few weeks...my mother is 80 years old and I want to spend more time with her. My husband and I are going to redecorate the house.
For men, part-time paid work and leisure activities were the dominant themes in their comments about retirement:
Work until I am financially secure (estimates 55) then off to the Whitsundays and South Pacific.
Fix trolleys at Woolworths or something like that you know. Just to keep myself interested.
I think I would feel, when you are 65 or retire, you’ve got to have hobbies of some description. Or, you know, I am a plumber right? I can go around next door and say “if you want all your taps washing or something...yeah come in” You’ve got to have something to occupy your mind. But I think some people say ‘65, that’s it’. Go back and put their feet up and that’s the end of it. But you’ve got to have hobbies ... I mean I play golf OK, but you are going to get sick of golf everyday.
Middle manager at local council:
I might retire from the council but become a planning consultant and work 1 or 2 days a week at my leisure around the place, so I am still employed technically but retired from full time work.... health and money are the two main factors in determining retirement. To control my own destiny. That is the only reason I would retire early. It depends on your personal circumstances. I can’t sit still. I have always got to be doing something, the same with employment. I would like to be doing something constructive, if the situation arose where I could not do that, I don’t think I would last 5 minutes. The notion of just retiring, putting your feet up and going fishing, that’s not for me at all.

Discussion
Our study showed that while the reasons for considering retirement were not gender specific, the attitudes, expectations and projected activities maintained a traditional gender focus. Both men and women expressed a generalised disquiet with changing workplace practices which significantly reduced workplace attachment and influenced the timing of their retirement. Participants identified a range of factors including restructuring, technological change and reduced trade union influence which resulted in the abolition of the traditional ‘job for life’ concept and a shortened working life through early retirement and ‘downsizing’.
Post-retirement there was a gender differentiation in that men planned to take up part-time paid work and/or pursue leisure activities, while women planned to retire from full-time paid work to take up unpaid work in the family and community. Older men remained service-oriented anticipating caring for their spouse, children and grandchildren, and engaging in voluntary community work. Many older, male blue collar workers either had established small, local service type enterprises or planned to establish, or expand, them in retirement. These activities had the benefits of minimum financial outlay, could be operated from home with equipment already owned, and of being cash transactions.
Despite the changes which have taken place in the structure of Australian society throughout the post war period the results of this study show that there are still major gender related differences in attitudes to paid and unpaid work which carry over into post-retirement activities. The strength of this study is that it demonstrates that a group of blue and pink collar workers were anticipating retirement with the health and financial resources to engage in active retirement. Despite these attributes, gender remained the major determinant of post-retirement activities. While it is possible that future cohorts of retirees will exhibit different attitudes, expectations and priorities our research showed no indication that this change is in process.

References

Refashioning sociology in Latin America: the responses of radical development sociology to the new world order

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Introduction
Soon after the fall of the USSR, US president George Bush announced the establishment of a ‘New World Order’: a place of prosperity and peace guided by the principles of free market economies, liberal democracy under the protection of US military might. As international developments unfolded, Bush’s triumphalism waned and the much touted New World Order concept went the same way as the Republican party’s 1992 election campaign (Petras and Morley 1995: 1-2).
For sociologists, however, a kind of New World Order has been instituted, not by Bush or even by Reagan and the brand of economics that bear his name, although their efforts certainly influenced some features of modern capitalim. The New World Order that interests sociologists in general but development sociologists in particular, has been in the making since much earlier and refers to the new ways in which late capitalism is organised, the effects these have on different societies and the social responses to new phenomena.

What follows is a discussion that focuses on development sociology theoretical responses to the New World Order in the context of changing political alliances, economic circumstances and the need to find new theoretical explanation to seemingly intractable socio-economic problems. I argue that both radical and neoliberal ideas of development are firmly entrenched in modernist approaches to progress that are intimately connected to socio-economic and political power. The emergence of radical and neoliberal theories is analysed in the context of policy making at the state and non-state levels.

The first section of this paper examines the ideological paradigm in which development studies emerged, the following section analyses the rise of neoliberalism in Latin America and the subsequent fragmentation of the Left. This will be followed by a discussion of the responses of radical development sociology to the New World Order. Throughout the paper the use of the term Latin American development sociology is purely instrumental specially when one considers among other aspects the theoretical hybridity that exists in the area of development studies, the academic exchanges between Latin America and the rest of the world and the agendas that non-resident funding sources impose on resident researchers (Castaneda 1993: 181).

Modernity and development in Latin America.
The idea of development as it is presently understood emerged in the context of colonial decline at the end of WWII and at the instigation of figures like US president Truman and economist W.W. Rostow. The importance of development ideas in economic and sociological policy making intensified as the Cold War gathered momentum and in the case of Latin America after the triumph of the Cuban revolution (Berger 1995: 67-69). The official aim of these ideas was simple: to achieve rapid material well being for the majority of the world’s population. Even though the push to problematise poverty within the framework of economics originated in the US, elites around the world soon became sympathetic to developmental aims (Escobar 1995: 4). In Latin America, the seeds of development sociology fell on fertile ground thanks to the privilege position of modernity. The project of modernity, which assumes that the new and the recent represent progress, was firmly entrenched in the minds of the local intelligentsia from both the Right and Left of the political spectrum. From the time of independence from Spain, debates involving mercantilists and protectionist views, among others, sought to find ways to achieve European and US levels of material prosperity. As Grosfoguel argues:


its progressive development. The further elaboration of these ideas in classical political economy produced the grounds for the emergence of a developmentalist ideology (1996: 134).
Radical sociologists too jumped in the development bandwagon, always careful to note that their aims were different to those of a liberal persuasion. As Escobar points out:

[even those who opposed the prevailing capitalist strategies were obliged to couch their critique in terms of the need for development, through concepts such as ‘another development’, ‘participatory development’, ‘socialist development’ and the like (1995: 5).]

The discourse of development in Latin America thus extended the trajectory of modernity by allowing long held beliefs to be expressed in different ways. By the time CEPAL (Spanish acronym for Economic Commission for Latin America) and Raul Prebish’s policies on import substitution and Fernando Cardoso’s and Enzo Faletto’s dependency theory become dominant features in the Latin American sociological landscape it was clear that developmental assumptions remained embedded in their analysis (Grosfoguel 1996:146). These assumptions allowed, among other things, a considerable number of debates in radical sociology, all of which influenced government policy making and the Left’s overall political strategies in the 60s and 70s. This intellectual ferment is described by Stern thus:

[the result was a complicated series of dialectics-between CEPAL oriented intellectuals and policy makers and the mainstream West; between “moderate” Latin American advocates of development, influenced by the CEPAL idea and the promise of import substitution, and their more “radical” Latin American critics and associates: among CEPAL-oriented colleagues, as part of a healthy process of self-evaluation; and between the orthodox left, inclined to see the necessity of a “bourgeois revolution” to transform a Latin America still encumbered by feudalism, and an innovative left, increasingly convinced that it was the historic spread of international capitalism, beginning in the Age of Discovery, that explained Latin America’s poverty and apparently archaic economic structures (1993: 26-7).]

After the success of export oriented development policies in the Newly Industrialised Economies of South East Asia and the rise of the OPEC cartel, CEPAL’s import substitution policies began to loose some of their appeal among academic and policy making circles. This was partly because these success stories helped build an image of confidence in endogenous development efforts. Meanwhile the failure of the Left’s various revolutionary aspirations proved fatal to dependency theory as did the emergence, from within and outside Latin America, of Marxist and non-Marxist inspired alternative sociological explanations of enduring inequality (Berger 1995: 114-5). Moreover both dependentalistas and CEPAL-influenced policy makers were limited by factors such as the theoretical inability to mix autonomous and semiautonomous forms of development and the lack of research centres that analysed development from a state-centred approach (Bitar 1984: 134).

The rise of neoliberalism and the refashioning of radical sociology
Despite Latin America’s slow incremental growth during the period 1965 to 1986, the 2.4 percent per capita yearly figure was enough in absolute terms to integrate
some of the continent’s economies to those of a rapidly changing West (Castaneda 1993: 188, 392). This trend was harnessed and forced by the Reagan administration through the instigation of policies that emphasised the market element in restructuring national, regional and sectoral economies which later facilitated their integration into international markets or their eventual marginalisation. The introduction of these policies coincided with the collapse of the import substitution model prevalent in Latin America until the late 70s, the debt crisis and for Central America, the onset of revolution. Also the transitions from dictatorial regimes to liberal democracies allowed the establishment of a technocracy that was sympathetic to neoliberal policies. The welcome reception was partly due to the strengthening of existing alliances between local and foreign bureaucrats. These bureaucrats had, for a long time, looked to neoliberalism as a source of inspiration and the aggressive anti-state activity of various business circles that sought new sites of profit generation for which a deregulated environment was required (Conaghan et al. 1990: 5-6).

Unlike traditional development policies, neoliberal policies do not attempt programmatic or planned management of the economic. These are thought to be implemented by governments as catalysts for further change that will later be picked up by the ‘market’. Some neoliberal policies do not even take into account the role of government in the way households or individuals make sense of economic life. Neoliberal policies based on rational expectations theory, for example, take consumers, not producers, as the economic dynamic (Cole 1995: 55). Like traditional development ideas, neoliberalism relies on modernist ideas of rationality with the exception that these are rarely applied to the nation-state as an entity. Instead it is the individual company, household or person that is supposed to take full control of their destiny.

While neoliberalism gripped the elite’s imagination, the steady rise of civil society can be partially understood as the people’s response to the new paradigm. After a long period of oppression under military dictatorships, the resurgence of social movements not only revived hopes for democracy but allowed people to participate in organisations that did not make direct claims to state power. Social movements like peasants, grassroots and non-government organisations, the ecological and women’s movement, however, are finding it increasingly difficult to operate in political climates that are dominated by technocratic elites. Despite the move from authoritarian to liberal democratic forms of government many in these movements find themselves excluded from the decision making process. Conaghan, Maloy and Abugattas, for example, argue that neoliberal economic advisers view social movements as opponents that should be kept outside government policy making (Conaghan et al. 1990: 27).

Despite all the problems, new social movements are on the ascendancy, boosted by the profound economic changes that the continent has experienced in the last 15 years like the rise of informal economies, the establishment of export oriented industries and the growth of the services sector; specialty tourism and finance (Portes et al. 1989: 1-15).

These shifts, the eventual fall of Soviet forms of socialism and the electoral defeat of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua in 1990 signalled major reassessments by both the Left intelligentsia and political parties. Some of these reassessments still rely on a modernist teleology, a centralised conception of power relations and in discourses that create their own opposites (Mires 1996: 25). At least two different theoretical responses can be identified: the state centered approach and the modes of production approach. The former conceptualises the acceleration of capital accumulation at the state level. Drawing on the works of Poulantizas and Miliband in the mid 70’s, the state-centered approach emphasises class structure in post-colonial societies and the role of the state in peripheral economies (Petras 1990: 31-35). Because of its reliance on political economic discourse this approach has influenced some of the guerrilla and revolutionary backed Left wing parties in Latin America like the FMLN (El Salvador), the FSLN (Nicaragua), Causa Radical (Venezuela) and to some extent the Workers’ Party in Brazil. The Modes of production approach is associated with Ernesto Laclau’s debate with Andre Gunder Frank on the articulation of the semi-feudal and capitalists systems (Tandeler 1976: 7). It seeks to explain Latin America’s development problems by analysing the ‘vestiges’ of the old social systems that prevailed in the continent before Spanish colonisation, the semi-feudal character of class relations and the way these interact with modern capitalism. As such the influence of this approach has been limited to historical and anthropological works like Enrique Semo’s ‘tributary despotism’ which explains the subjugation of some of Mexico’s indigenous populations in relation to the state tributary system (Stern 1993: 32).

A third response is that of Neoliberalism. This response builds and updates historic-structuralism which was the basis for CEPAL’s various concepts on development including import substitution. This revised version assumes that socioeconomic development in highly integrated economies cannot be analysed in terms of simple dichotomies like import vs export, protection vs free trade, state and private, planning and the market and so on. This approach emphasises the versatile nature of capitalism and examines the best way of accommodating to current international economic trends. An intimate relationship exists between social democratic parties and the various proponents of neoslaveism-structuralism, many of whom occupy policy making positions in the Chilean and Argentinian Socialist parties and Costa Rica’s Liberation National (Castaneda 1993: 136).

Finally, what I call postmodern radicalism, is best represented by articles like Arturo Escobar who calls for the abandonment of the development project altogether. In his own words:

- instead of searching for grand alternative models or strategies, what is needed is the investigation of alternative representations and practices in concrete local settings, particularly as they exist in contexts of hybridization, collective action, and political mobilization (1995:19).

Postmodern radicalism assumes that a qualitative break from industrial to postindustrial capitalism has occurred. Even though this break is not well justified, followers of this position point to the fragmentative and integrative dynamics of the present system and the inception within capitalism of alternatives forms of economic organisation that have the potential to undermine it (Burbach 1997: 166). They argue that the kinds of realities that developmental assumptions seek to create carry with them unintended consequences that negate the development goals in the last instance. For those involved in development discourse this can be disconcerting at best. Developmental assumptions allow the formulation of questions that can only
be answered in terms that make reference to rational outcomes. For many in the field this means that even in the face of absolute increment in the standard of living in many Latin American societies, the preoccupation with totalising solutions do not allow for local differences.

The use of postmodern radicalism has meshed with and informed the rise of social movements and grass roots organisations in the region. Even though these organisations not respond solely to the effects of neoliberalism on the conditions of the poor, many of their demands borrow directly from postmodern radicalism’s calls to ‘localise’ knowledge and experience. It still remains to be seen, however, if these approaches are capable to abandon the use of essentialisms and determinisms that have so far been Marxism's great strength and but also the cause of its weaknesses. In addition, we still do not know the ill-effects of adopting perspective that problematises modernity in general and development in particular. A postmodernism gone mad can be represented by the resilience of the Shining Path in Peru which is characterised by precisely those attributes that many postmodern radical most admire: a hybrid identity, use of localised knowledge, a rejection of the modernist project. The Taliban in Afghanistan is another case in point.

Conclusion
This paper showed the trajectory of a limited but representative strand of radical development sociology in the last 30 years and explored some of the links and influences between proponents of these theories and those in the policy making process. A brief examination of the rise of neoliberalism and the responses to this phenomenon was done from a radical perspective taking into account the US administration’s attempts to introduce far reaching changes to the region’s economies. I argued that both neoliberal and radical development theories rely on modern conceptions of progress and a teleology that perceives history in incremental stages. Moreover, Marxists also assume that power is centralised and is connected to class relations, the state or the economy. Finally even though postmodern responses to new world order go beyond addressing neoliberal economic policies but include a rejection of development ideas as formulated thus far.

References

Globalization, social protection and sociology: Old problems in a new world order?

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If there is a new world order what does it mean for sociology? I feel a bit awkward both asking this question and trying to answer it. I am neither a sociologist nor as you will see believer in any new world order. But I hope you will allow me to venture a few answers because my core discipline, political economy or in America, political science shares a common set of intellectual origins with sociology and it is by turning to those origins that I hope to be able to answer these questions. In fact, I’m here to say that rather than any new world order, what we see today is an old world order in both senses: a world order very similar to that which was constructed by the great powers of the old world, one which we have already seen albeit in a geographically more limited form at the turn of the last century. It is a world order whose major terrain had already been fairly well mapped by people like Simmel, Marx, Weber, and, somewhat later, Polanyi. By returning to them, I hope to frame some answers to questions about the relationship between two major traditional areas of inquiry within both sociology and politics: the nature of the ever expanding world economy - or globalization if you wish - and people’s efforts to cope with the effects of markets on their lives - or the welfare state if you wish.

The debate about the new world order generally asks: “has globalization eroded, destroyed, or made impossible the keynesian welfare state that has existed in varying degrees in most OECD countries since the Great Depression?” But this