An Australian Outlook on International Affairs?
The Evolution of International Relations Theory in Australia

RICHARD DEVETAK*
Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland

Disciplinary histories of Australian International Relations (IR) theory have tended to focus on the 1960s — when a number of Australian scholars returned from the UK to take up posts at the Australian National University’s Department of International Relations — as the beginning of a discipline that has subsequently flourished through various disciplinary debates and global events. This article offers a preliminary attempt at narrating a more complete history of Australian IR by beginning to recover much-neglected contributions made in the early interwar years. From these earliest years through to the current “era of critical diversity”, it is argued, Australian scholars have made considerable contributions not just to the intellectual formation of an Australian outlook on international affairs, but to an understanding of international relations itself.

Introduction

Of the many notable features of the standard historiographical narrative of International Relations (IR), one is the total absence of any Australian contribution until the Cold War. In his masterful, if flawed, history of the discipline from 1919 to 1969, Hedley Bull mentions not a single Australian contribution.1 More recently, Brian Schmidt’s pioneering disciplinary history, though focused on the formative years in America, mentions many British and European writers, but no Australians in the years between 1850 and 1950.2 Lucian Ashworth’s valuable study of the “creation” of international studies, while focused on the writings of Norman Angell and David Mitrany, includes a wide-ranging chapter on the so-called “first great debate” between realism and idealism, but again fails to identify a single Australian in the discipline’s formative years.3 The same holds true for other disciplinary histories, and for the recent spate of

* I would like to thank Jim George and Michael Wesley for sharing their considerable knowledge of Australian IR with me. Thank you also to the two anonymous referees and the journal’s guest editors, Alex Bellamy and Sara Davies, for their constructive comments and advice.

© 2009 The Author. Journal Compilation© 2009 School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland and Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.
Richard Devetak

writings on the interwar years. Only on Hedley Bull’s arrival in the late 1960s do Australians begin to feature in disciplinary histories of IR.

There are of course several Australian contemporaries of Bull who would make substantial contributions to the discipline at home and abroad from the 1960s onwards, pre-eminently including Coral Bell, Arthur Burns, T.B. Millar and J.D.B. Miller. Among most historians of the Australian study of IR there is consensus that the discipline “matures” or “comes of age” only in the 1960s. Indeed, Jim George is no doubt right to say:

[on]e cannot really speak of an International Relations discipline in Australia until the early 1960s when a number of Australian scholars returned from the UK to take up residence in the first designated centre of International Relations excellence at the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra.

In an otherwise useful recent survey of Australian IR from its humble beginnings in the 1920s to the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) in 2008, James Cotton inexplicably misinterprets George to be saying that “prior to the 1960s Australians wrote no international relations of any interest”. Notwithstanding the fact that George never said anything of the kind, this does beg the question of just what was the Australian contribution to IR before the 1960s. Can we assume that Australians made no notable contribution to the academic study of international relations before Bull? More pointedly, does Bull’s judgment of interwar contributions to IR — that “none is worth reading now except for the light it throws on the preoccupations and presuppositions of its place and time” — apply to Australian contributions too?

There is much work to be done before definitive answers can be offered to these questions. In the meantime, however, it will be useful to begin setting out some of the early Australian contributions to the study of international relations. One of the main aims of this article, following Cotton and Michael Wesley, is indeed to begin recapturing Australian contributions to IR before the discipline reached its “maturity”

---


8 Bull, “The Theory of International Politics”, p. 34.
in the 1960s. So much has been written about the Australian discipline since the 1960s, and so little of the period before, that this article will focus more of its attention on the earlier years.

This article is structured around three sections, each pertaining to an historical period in the development of the Australian discipline. The first section surveys Australian writing on international relations in the aftermath of the First World War. This was a time when Australia as a nation felt very insecure as a British outpost in the Southwest Pacific. But precisely because of this insecurity she remained committed to interdependence with other nations through the British Empire and the League of Nations even as she pursued her independence. The League’s failure to prevent another world war accounts for the intellectual mood shift from more sanguine to more pragmatic versions of “institutional internationalism”, which is the subject of the second section. It was under the prevailing mood of realism that the Australian discipline finally “comes of age”, producing scholars of international renown and establishing university Chairs and Departments of Politics and International Relations. Even so, it was rarely a realism of the power politics or Realpolitik variety; nor was Australian IR dominated by the social scientific approach of “behaviouralism” that prevailed in the USA. Instead, Australian IR inclined towards the “classical” or “traditional” approach that frames its inquiry as an interpretive investigation of the rules, norms and moral values that shape the practices and institutions of international relations. The final section offers a brief account of the rise of post-positivism in Australian IR during the 1980s and 1990s. By this time, the Australian discipline of IR, like the nation itself, confidently asserted itself on the international stage. Still unconvinced of the analogy between the natural and social sciences, Australian IR has become the site of what George calls “an era of critical diversity”, which comprises “critical theories” as well as revised versions of realism and the English School theory of international society.

Insecurity, Independence and Interdependence: Australian IR during the Interwar Years

The interwar years were dominated by the long shadow cast by the First World War and its punitive peace settlement, and by the rise and fall of the League of Nations. Under this shadow, Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria, Italy’s 1935 invasion of Abyssinia, and the accession to power of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, all revealed “a deepening sense of fear, insecurity and distrust” between states, as W. Macmahon Ball noted. This was the general global context, but there was a particular geopolitical context, of growing insecurity, through which Australia and Australian scholars would engage these international political issues. As we shall see, the formation of what we might call an “Australian outlook”, to borrow the title given to the nation’s first dedicated journal of international affairs, was shaped by growing

---


awareness of geopolitical trends in Europe and the Asia-Pacific (rising militarism), by shifting distributions of power (the slow and reluctant emergence of America from isolationism), and by the requirement of a more independent foreign policy catering to Australia’s particular security interests. All this made more urgent the need to study international affairs as a distinct field of inquiry, though one still informed by disciplines such as Political Science, History, Law and Economics.

An Australian Foreign Policy: Searching for Security in a Changing World

During the interwar years a rift would develop in Australia’s international outlook between those who sought to remain close to Great Britain and those who sought to cut or at least loosen the apron-strings. The latter would press for closer ties with the USA as an indispensable power in the Pacific. But there were those, such as the young Keith Hancock, then still at the University of Adelaide, who, by disposition, were sceptical of America and the advantages of strategic cooperation with the US. In a letter to British historian A.L. Rowse dated 20 November 1926, Hancock confided:

I don’t want Australia to drift vaguely around the south Pacific, falling under the shadow of the Yank-land, or getting blown up by yellow men, or going on her own isolated narrow self-assertive way. I want her to become more and more an effective part of the British community.

This passage reveals Hancock’s dual loyalties, to Britain and to Australia. In this Hancock was hardly unique. Nor was he alone in his anxiety over the Japanese, whom he disrespectfully called “yellow men”. But for Hancock, writing in the decade or so after the First World War, Australia’s future did not lie in building closer ties with America. He doubted that the US could “give to Australia the security which she now enjoys in virtue of her honourable co-operation with her fellow-members of the British Commonwealth”. He was also sneering about American business methods and scathing of its multiculturalism: “America has too many foreigners and hybrids!”. Though these are views Hancock would later feel rather more uncomfortable about, they fairly represent a strong current of Australian thinking in the 1920s and 1930s. But such views of Australia’s position in the world would fade by the end of the 1930s as more pragmatic and strategic visions exposed the political failings of what was an essentially nostalgic outlook of “Greater Britain”.

One of the stakes in debates during the 1930s was the extent to which Britain’s interests would reliably coincide with Australia’s in “a changing world”. Australia’s habits, interests and sympathies for Britain, to borrow from Hancock, could continue, but the changing strategic circumstances of Europe and the Asia-Pacific, as well as Britain’s limited power projection into the southwest Pacific, compelled Australians to cultivate habits, interests and sympathies for the US too. Once the Second World War

---

13 Miller, “Development of International Studies”, p. 139.
15 In fact, elsewhere Hancock adds a third loyalty to the State of Victoria. See his Argument of Empire (Harmondsworth, 1943), p. 19.
17 Ibid., p. 218.
19 Hancock, Australia, p. 219.
broke out, Fred Alexander would confidently assert that there remained “no serious prejudices to be broken down between the two nations; [...] no deep-rooted suspicions to cloud the issue when negotiations between governments begin, or to preclude negotiations altogether”.20 That is not to say that closer ties between Australia and the US were inevitable. As Alexander showed in his analysis of Australia-US relations, there had been several obstacles that first needed to be overcome, including divergent views on Japan and the Manchurian question.21 To Washington’s astonishment, Canberra was content to appease Japan over its 1931 invasion of Manchuria so as to avoid provoking Japan into any aggression in the southwest Pacific that might harm Australia. But as Alexander argued shortly before Pearl Harbor, the conditions for Australian-American collaboration in the Pacific had been absent until war broke out with Nazi Germany.22 Exemplifying the more pragmatic and strategic outlook, Alexander argued that “a conviction of common interest”, far more than “sentiment and goodwill”, is a necessary condition of collaboration even between two English-speaking democracies.

As this suggests, Australia’s geography began to play a greater role in thinking about foreign policy from the 1920s onwards. Distance from Britain, its Imperial protector, and proximity to Japan, a long-perceived threat, seemed to compel greater attention to the strategic dimensions of the Asia-Pacific region. The “Far East”, or what we would today call North East Asia, was a long-standing concern of the Great Powers. But the world’s “Far East” was Australia’s “Near North”; and this critical fact of geopolitics featured centrally in much writing on Australia’s international affairs. Indeed it would eventually compel Australia to work harder on soliciting American strategic cooperation in the southwest Pacific. Speaking of the decade before the Second World War, Fred Alexander noted the “small but influential school of Australian opinion [which] has for years clamored for greater attention to the thought and culture of other peoples in Australia’s own geographic region”.23 This had led to what he called a “general reorientation of Australian thought toward the Pacific in the ‘twenties and ‘thirties”,24 as Australians began to realise and accept America’s indispensability to regional stability and Australian security. Pragmatic and strategic imperatives triumphed over any lingering suspicions Australians may have harboured towards the US.

During the interbellum period Australia became more aware of the need to develop and control its own foreign policy. In 1930 Hancock could write: “In Australia we are as a rule hardly conscious that we have a foreign policy.”25 To the extent that there was any consciousness at all about Australian foreign policy, it came with “cheerful acceptance of a measure of external direction”.26 In fact, “in terms of international law the British Empire was a single state”.27 But beginning with the Paris Peace Conference, where the irascible and reflexively anti-Wilsonian Prime Minister, W.M.
“Billy” Hughes, made a deep and not altogether positive impression on the international delegates, Australia began to exercise greater voice in international affairs. Australia’s acquisition of an international voice should not be confused, however, with international recognition of independence; Australia persistently refused to countenance formal codification of equal status, and Dominion signatures were only appended to the Versailles Treaty under the name of “British Empire”. By the mid-1930s, the very idea of an “Australian foreign policy” began to grow in plausibility and appeal. Still, arguments in favour of an independent Australian foreign policy had to be carefully worded to avoid accusations of “anti-Britishness”, as Alexander Melbourne confirmed.

Despite the care required to articulate an independent foreign policy, it became obvious to many, including P.D. Phillips, that the added consideration paid to the region was “the first clear demonstration of a positive orientation in external affairs, of a release from the intellectual leading strings of European, and particularly English, political thinking”. But Australian inquiries into international affairs would continue to be influenced by two overwhelming facts: that Australia was a member of the British Empire and the League of Nations. Membership of these two international organisations provided Australia with international forums in which to enjoy greater independence simultaneously with greater interdependence.

International Organisations: from the League of Nations to the British Empire and Commonwealth

Over the twenty years that separate the two World Wars, Australia would emerge as an independent, sovereign state with all the rights and responsibilities that attach to that legal status. Australia despatched its first diplomats to Washington, Tokyo and Ottawa in 1940 and participated in the 1945 San Francisco Conference free of the imperial obligations that seized it in the Paris Peace Conference. The gradual evolution of Australia as a sovereign state with its own foreign policy nonetheless occurred within the context of Britain’s imperial institutions. Although at times Australia seemed, by comparison with other Dominions, a reluctant bearer of greater independence, the Empire’s series of gradual reforms compelled greater consideration of Australia’s international obligations to the Commonwealth and its constituent members, and to the

28 Canada and South Africa, by contrast to Australia and New Zealand, felt that “Failure to define the principle of equality […] was equivalent to an abandonment of the principle”, see W.K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs – Problems of Nationality, 1918-1936 (Oxford, 1937), pp.52-3.
29 Ibid., p. 86; Miller Commonwealth in the World, p. 36.
30 Cotton says the first book to carry “Australian Foreign Policy” as its title was Hector Dinning and J.G. Holmes, eds, Australian Foreign Policy 1934 (Melbourne, 1935). See Cotton, “Celebrating 75 Years”, p. 531.
31 A.C.V. Melbourne, “A Foreign Policy for Australia” in Dinning and Holmes, Australian Foreign Policy 1934, p. 22.
society of states through Australia’s membership of the League of Nations. The study of international organisation became one of the central themes of interwar IR in the UK and USA, and things were no different in Australia, except that unlike the USA, Australians also closely studied the British Empire and Commonwealth. Perhaps because of its British colonial origins, Australia’s steps towards independence were rarely seen as incompatible with membership of a wider international organisation.

The League Ideals and the Search for Security

In Britain the League of Nations drew enthusiastic support from prominent academics and writers such as Norman Angell, Romanian émigré David Mitrany, Australian-born Gilbert Murray, Leonard Woolf, and Alfred Zimmern, to name but a few of the most famous internationalists of the day. But the League also drew political support in the Dominions from hard-bitten politicians such as Billy Hughes, and the respected South African soldier and statesman, Jan Smuts. They were, as even E.H. Carr concedes, “men of political experience and political understanding” who agreed that peace depends on workable international institutions. Arguments for “institutional internationalism” took a variety of forms, envisioning different degrees of institutional integration and centralisation of power, and taking different perspectives on questions of dispute resolution, disarmament and collective security. Woolf’s (1916) *International Government* was among the most influential arguments elaborating the desirability and feasibility of an international machinery for ordering international relations and preventing war, but there were many other late-nineteenth and early twentieth century proposals for international reform through legal institutionalisation.

Midway through the “twenty years’ crisis”, Fred Alexander published one of the most important Australian contributions to the study of international organisation, *From Paris to Locarno and After.* This book stands out not only for its quality, but for its solitude in Australia. It seems to be the sole Australian contribution of its kind, though there were many shorter studies.

Alexander, a highly esteemed historian and public intellectual who taught modern history at the University of Western Australia, provided a detailed historical account of the shifting fortunes of international politics in the decade after the First World War’s end. *From Paris to Locarno* analysed in great detail and with a critical eye the dilemmas and decisions that conditioned attempts to build peace out of war. Foregoing

---


35 Smuts of course wrote a report on the future League of Nations during the Great War. Hughes was lukewarm in his support of the League, believing more in the British Navy than the League, as a source of security, according to Hancock.


39 See F.W. Eggleston, “Collective Security on Trial” in *Studies on Australia’s Situation in the Pacific: a Collection of Papers Submitted to the Sixth* (Melbourne, 1936); and any number of the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin.*
the historical ambition and the reformist internationalism of much contemporary IR, Alexander was content to show how the League’s machinery and functioning could not be separated from the clash of rival Great Power ideals outside the *Palais des Nations*. The competing Anglo-American and Continental peace plans not only ensured that the Covenant would be a product of compromise, but that it would contain ambiguous statements and a necessary degree of incompleteness that would shape the League’s quest to build international security. Unlike the more inspired theoretical visions elaborated by Woolf and his friends, Alexander trained his analytical eye on the actual work done, and capable of being done, by the League in the context of international events and developments. Though he eschewed the abstractness and idealism that often attended earlier discussions of “international government”, Alexander nonetheless affirmed that the world is “very much a better place to-day because of the League of Nations”.40

**The “Britannic Question”**,41 Empire or Liberty?

Though the League was of enormous interest to Australians, there was rather little theoretical engagement with the subject by comparison to the British Empire and Commonwealth.42 Australian scholars of the interwar years made a considerable contribution to the study of the Empire and Commonwealth, beginning with H. Duncan Hall’s seminal *British Commonwealth of Nations*,43 which was said to have been enormously influential on the Balfour Declaration of 1926, K.C. Wheare’s immediately authoritative *Statute of Westminster, 1931* which went through several revisions and editions over the next two decades, and W.K. (Keith) Hancock’s magisterial twovolume *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, written at the request of Arnold J. Toynbee for Chatham House.44 In the third quarter of the century J.D.B. (Bruce) Miller was also to make a considerable contribution to Commonwealth studies with two important books, and a companion to Hancock’s Chatham House volume, *Survey of Commonwealth Affairs — Problems of Expansion and Attrition, 1953-1969*.45 Beyond making immense contributions to Commonwealth studies, these writings ought to be recognised as major contributions to the study of international relations. They were never simply studies of the Empire’s “internal” arrangements; rather, they showed the Empire, a powerful international actor in its own right, to be something of a Möbius strip such that even intra-imperial relations had to be seen as “international” relations, well before Dominions achieved sovereign status.

---

42 As many have previously noted, terminology can be tricky given the changing nomenclature over time and competing usage of the terms Commonwealth and Empire – taking them either as opposites, or as more or less interchangeable terms, or seeing one institution as part of the other. See Miller, *Commonwealth in the World*, pp. 11-17; Hancock, *Argument of Empire*, p. 9; and Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, Volume 1, pp. 52-62, especially footnote 2 on pp. 53-4. Here I shall use “the Commonwealth of Nations” and its abbreviation “the Commonwealth” except where historical context requires the use of “British Empire” or “British Commonwealth”.
By the First World War’s end, the German, Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires had all dissolved. What prevented the British Empire from the same fate, according to its supporters, was its possession of the “spirit of liberty”, its commitment to “national freedom and political decentralisation”. But to combat the prevailing disintegrative tendencies brought about by colonial nationalisms and ensure the Empire’s survival, proponents of “Greater Britain” advanced a range of prescriptions from Lionel Curtis’s federative conception of a “great international state” to arguments for looser cooperative arrangements such as Alfred Zimmern’s notion of an “entente of states”, Richard Jebb’s notion of a “Britannic alliance”, and Smuts’ vision of a “Commonwealth of Nations”.47

The late nineteenth century had seen growing support for the notion of imperial federation,48 but it waned in the twentieth, save a few vocal exceptions such as Curtis. H. Duncan Hall captured the dominant intellectual mood of the time in averring that the Empire was moving along the trajectory of cooperation among independent states, creating something akin to the League of Nations.49 Two of the Empire’s most prominent statesmen, General Smuts and Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden, had already hinted that the British Commonwealth of Nations was an embryonic or exemplary “league of nations”.50 In both cases, according to Hall, the guiding principle was recognition that peace derives from habits of conference and cooperation among free, independent states.51 Many years later Hancock would pass a similar judgment, suggesting that both the Commonwealth and the League were “intermingling projects of CIVITAS MAXIMA”, societies of states built around “customs and institutions of mutual consultation and conference”.52

Whilst acknowledging the uncertainty of the times, Hall thought this trajectory of peaceful international cooperation likely to continue, with Dominions acquiring greater independence and responsibility in the process. But the key challenge was how the Empire would resolve the ongoing tension between equality of status and imperial unity. This would require mutually satisfying arrangements for intra-imperial cooperation and clarifying relations between the Empire’s member-states and the rest of international society. Crucial to the Empire’s future prospects then was resolving the tension between empire and liberty.

This theme of imperium et libertas (empire and liberty) would reverberate through Keith Hancock’s extensive and acclaimed writings on the Commonwealth, especially

---

49 Hall, British Commonwealth of Nations, p. viii.
50 Ibid., pp. 329-330.
51 Ibid., Ch. xi.
volume one of his *Survey of British Commonwealth*. The dilemma of whether and how empire and liberty might be reconciled is, of course, an ancient one to which many great political thinkers have responded, including Machiavelli, Harrington, Milton and Burke among the most illustrious. To modern liberals and republicans alike, empire and liberty would appear to be incompatible. But as Hancock pointed out, far from empire and liberty being antithetical, liberty was the “guiding thread” in the Empire’s history, the glue which held it together:

> Experience was demonstrating with increasing emphasis that liberty was the cement of empire, that each extension of it mitigated irritations, removed frustrations, and liberated an active will for partnership in a common way of life. Experience was progressively refuting the maxim that in sovereignty there are no gradations.

As Hancock perceptively noted, these debates about the means and degrees of imperial unity necessarily raised the question of sovereignty and whether it admits of gradation. Contrary to Dr Johnson, Hancock believed sovereignty does admit of gradations; the British Empire was a living proof. This meant that burgeoning Dominion independence need not spell the end of imperial interdependence.

Empire and liberty were thus not necessarily antithetical; multiplicity and unity could be asserted simultaneously, independence could be enjoyed through interdependence. This, I think, is Hancock’s overarching argument about the Empire or Commonwealth — it is a flexible, evolving institution that permits members to find both order and liberty through interdependence. Hancock constantly sought to demonstrate how apparent opposites can be reconciled or mediated: national economic planning is best pursued through international cooperation; security is achieved with, rather than against, others; “nations can determine themselves either apart or together”.

In a passage presaging globalization, Hancock reiterated his insightful theoretical claim that independence is best pursued through interdependence:

> But now, in a world where the dimensions of space and time are so rapidly shrinking, the success of a single nation or continent or even a Commonwealth of Nations must remain precarious unless it can find an extension in the international sphere.

Recognition that political communities would remain precarious unless integrated into international organisations would, in itself, have benificent effects, Hancock thought. It would leaven “snarling nationalism” and “the swollen political pretensions of the doctrine of sovereignty” by fostering an “enlightened self-interest” in the principled interdependence associated with the Commonwealth and international organisations.

---

54 Hancock, *Argument of Empire*, p. 159.
58 Hancock, *Argument of Empire*, pp. 12, 15.
60 Hancock, *Argument of Empire*, pp. 107, 143, 15.
such as the League and United Nations. Interestingly, these ideas would return to post-Cold War Australian IR embodied in the form of “good international citizenship” and “critical” IR theories.

It might be said, following J.D.B. Miller, that Commonwealth studies “is not the story of international politics at full stretch”. Indeed it is not, as the interwar development of a more wide-ranging IR in America and the UK shows. But the development of Australian IR must be located in its own particular historical and political context, one which is dominated by changes in the Empire and Commonwealth. Insofar as this involved studying the political consequences of the evolving intra- and extra-imperial relations, it plainly addresses relations among peoples, nations and states. Indeed, for half of the twentieth century intra-imperial relations constituted the majority of Australia’s international relations and determined her foreign policy, so it should be no surprise that Australian IR should grow up around studies of the Empire and Commonwealth. This probably helps account for the later establishment of a disciplinary presence in Australian universities, where political scientists, historians and international lawyers were the leading IR scholars, but it does not mean that Australians failed to make a contribution to the study of war and peace as Miller and Cotton have persuasively argued, contra Bull.

**Australian IR “Comes of Age”: From War to Cold War**

By the outbreak of the Second World War the League and the optimism of liberal internationalism were all but dead. The kind of realism Carr had espoused began to strike a chord with those who believed international organizations and the rule of law incapable of preserving peace and security in the face of international anarchy. At war’s end, Hans J. Morgenthau was reinforcing the critique of utopianism and circumscribing the limits of international morality. The urgency and importance of studying the causes of war and the conditions of peace were undiminished, but a less sanguine view of international relations prevailed as the war passed seamlessly into the Cold War, with wartime allies (USA and USSR) rapidly becoming peace-time enemies. Nonetheless, the commitment to “institutional internationalism” remained strong, among scholars as well as practitioners.

It is worth noting that Australia was slow, by comparison with the UK and USA, to institutionalise the study of politics and international relations in universities. Since the turn of the century, university teaching and research of international relations in Australia was nurtured across various disciplines, where it was nurtured at all. It was not until the University of Melbourne established a Department of Political Science in 1939 and the Australian National University established a Department of International

---

63 Miller, *Britain and the Old Dominions*, p. 12.
64 Miller, “Development of International Studies in Australia”; Cotton, “Celebrating 75 Years”.
66 In addition to Ball, Bull and Bell who are discussed below, see H.V. Evatt, *Australia in World Affairs* (Sydney, 1946); and F.W. (Frederic) Eggleston, *Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy* (Melbourne, 1957) for practitioners’ views. For a good general discussion of the Australian outlook in the early postwar years, see David Lee, *Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia’s Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy* (Canberra, 1995).
Relations in 1949 that the Australian disciplines of both Political Science and International Relations began to overcome their disparate origins and take shape as dedicated disciplines.\(^{67}\) While in the UK and USA many Departments of International Relations had been established after 1919, the Australian tendency was to study IR within departments of politics, a feature endorsed by Gordon Greenwood, for many years the editor of the *Australian Journal of Politics and History*.\(^{68}\) This institutionalisation of IR within departments of politics would persist unchanged into the twenty-first century.

During the war years and the subsequent decade, the leading intellectual concerns in Australia were largely a continuation of the interwar years: the foreign policy search for security and the international relations of international organisations — the Commonwealth and the League’s successor, the United Nations. The “high politics” of international diplomacy, alliances, and of course defence and security, were central postwar preoccupations. Continuities persisted in Australia’s international outlook, evident in the idea of “loyalty to the protector”, in Australia’s commitment to international organisation, and in its ongoing anxiety over Japan.\(^{69}\) However, some notable changes accompanied these continuities. Australia’s loyalty shifted from Britain to the USA; under H.V. Evatt, Australia’s engagement with the UN was more vigorously internationalist. These issues were energetically analysed in two leading periodicals of the day such as *The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin* and its successor, the first dedicated academic journal of IR, *Australian Outlook*.\(^{70}\)

In these early post-war years, there was in Australia little effort to produce anything like a comprehensive theory of international relations. In this respect, Australian scholarship diverged significantly from Britain and America. This would change in the 1960s when a generation of British-trained Australian scholars (Coral Bell, Hedley Bull, Arthur L. Burns, T.B. Millar and J.D.B. Miller) would begin to produce “a considerable body of work […] about general and theoretical questions in international relations”.\(^{71}\) It is no exaggeration to say that this cohort of scholars put Australian IR firmly on the global map. Much of the historiography of the Australian discipline has rightly paid attention to the substantial contribution made by this circle of IR scholars at the ANU from the 1960s onwards,\(^{72}\) however, one consequence of this post-1960 focus is a tendency to neglect an important figure in mid-century Australian IR not at the ANU, W. Macmahon (Mac) Ball.

---


\(^{68}\) Greenwood, “The Study of International Relations”, p. 85.

\(^{69}\) See W. Macmahon Ball, *Japan: Enemy or Ally?* (New York, 1949).

\(^{70}\) The journal originally bore the title, *The Australian Outlook*, but dropped the definite article in 1959. The journal’s title was then changed to *Australian Journal of International Studies* in 1989. For an authoritative account of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) and particularly its house journals, see John Legge, *Australian Outlook: A History of the Australian Institute of International Affairs* (Canberra, 1999). He discusses the evolution of the journal’s name at p. 89.

\(^{71}\) Miller, “Development of International Studies in Australia”, p. 141.

The Politics of International Relations: Ball, Bull and Bell

Mac Ball, foundation Professor in Political Science at University of Melbourne, may not have been the dazzling scholar that Hancock was but, says Michael Crozier, “he was a towering figure” inside and outside the academy in mid-twentieth century Australia.73 Outside the academy Ball was subject to heated public attacks by R.G. Casey, Minister of External Affairs, for his robust criticism of Prime Minister Menzies’ virulent anti-communist rhetoric on China and Vietnam.74 Inside the academy Ball occupied the nation’s “first dedicated Chair in Political Science”, according to Crozier;75 this perhaps accounts for one of the main differences between interwar IR and the kind of IR that would emerge mid-century in Australia: namely, that political analysis of events and institutions tended to displace historical analysis. This is not to suggest that interwar writings lacked political analysis or that subsequent writings were bereft of history; it is merely to note a shift in emphasis.

Less the historian than the political theorist, Ball’s Possible Peace76 stands as a minor, albeit neglected, classic in the Australian IR canon. Published three years before E.H. Carr’s theoretical classic, Twenty Years’ Crisis, and one year before Carr’s more historical International Relations since the Peace Treaties,77 Ball’s book is an impressive combination of theoretical analysis and historical diagnosis of the same ground Carr covered in those two books. What it lacked in polemical punch, it more than made up for in acute political commentary and analysis of foreign policy, security, and international organisation.

In a manner not dissimilar to Carr, Ball characterised the interwar years as “a struggle between a politic of Right, and a politic of Might”; the former embodied in the League of Nations’ ideal of “Security, Arbitration, Disarmament”, the latter in the Peace Treaties’ desire for “a return to the pre-war anarchy of rival power systems”.78 The one stands for the rule of international law, the other for the balance of power. Ball argued that the Treaty of Versailles failed to apply international law impartially and equally. While it may have had the appearance of embodying the rule of law, it actually embodied the balance of power, thereby pitching the “League of Victors” against the principles and ideals enshrined in the League of Nations. The First World War’s winners, it turned out, were more interested in securing everlasting victory over the vanquished than in securing a stable peace. “This is the deep tragedy of the League of Nations”, says Ball, continuing:

It has stood for a particular distribution of power between nations, whereas its real work is to change the aims for which national power is used. It has stood for a particular ratio of armaments, when its work is to reduce all armaments. It has stood for the maintenance of particular frontiers, when its real work is to minimize every frontier.79

74 I thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention. For a brief account of Casey’s attitude towards Ball, see W.J. Hudson, Casey (Melbourne, 1986), pp. 243-4.
75 Ibid., p. 18.
76 W. Macmahon Ball, Possible Peace (Melbourne, 1936).
78 Ball, Possible Peace, pp. 23, 22.
79 Ibid., p. 34.
If Carr saw the central problem of international relations as a theoretical clash between realism and idealism, Ball saw it as a practical clash within the League of Nations between its founding principles and their power-political distortion.

In another parallel with Carr, Ball regarded with suspicion the claims of self-determination, nationalism and the nation-state. He did not argue that national independence and self-determination in themselves were the problem; rather, it was the “intense emotions” on which they drew that endangered peace. The nationalism of newly-independent states, emerging from failed empires in the early twentieth century, often produced “strident assertiveness, blindness to the equal rights of other nations, a sense of separateness and exclusiveness, or even a fanatical xenophobia”. These were the forces which fuelled insecurity, instability and war in Europe during the first half of the twentieth century, and which, on Ball’s analysis, were agitating East Asia in the 1950s.

Ball’s argument about national self-determination found common ground not only with Carr but with his compatriot Hancock. According to Ball, the peacemakers of 1919 were wrong to exalt national independence; they should have proclaimed “the urgency of national interdependence” instead. Ball recognised that national self-determination was a legitimate expression of a people’s freedom, but, picking up on a theme elaborated by interwar Australian scholars, emphasised that self-government neither absolves a nation of obligations to other nations and peoples, nor does it eliminate dependence on those other nations and peoples for security and prosperity. There is a mutual dependency that Ball thought cannot be denied and should not be ignored. Dependent peoples should thus strive for “interdependence, not independence”, Ball contended.

Australia’s greatest IR scholar, Hedley Bull, may have been critical of liberal notions imputing a transformative power to complex interdependence (of the kinds that were propounded in the early twentieth century and again in the 1970s), but he nonetheless drew upon a notion of interdependence in his seminal writings. Drawing upon a Grotian proposition that states do not exist in isolation and that their well-being is inseparable from the rules, norms and institutions formed by a society of states, Bull wrote extensively on issues ranging from arms control to the historical expansion of international society and questions of justice, just to name a few of his studied themes. Across all these themes he held to the conviction that, while states may exist in a formal anarchy, that did not preclude their inclusion in a society of states that expresses its rules and norms in its own unique institutions.

Though there is little evidence that Hancock had any direct intellectual influence on Bull, the notion that states mutually constitute each other through international society, what Hancock analysed as “interdependence”, underpins both men’s ideas about international relations.

---

81 Ball, *Possible Peace*, p. 169. Coral Bell passed a similar judgment on the rise of self-determination out of the breakup of empires: “Once the national butterflies had emerged from the broken cocoons of the old empires, they might be expected to flutter peacefully together in the sunshine of democracy and collective security, in the new reformed international politics of the League”. Events of the 1930s shattered any such hope, she says. See Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management* (Oxford, 1971), p. 28.
82 Ball, *Possible Peace*, pp. 170-1.
international relations. It is an idea that penetrated the arguments of several other scholars present at the ANU during Bull’s tenure and beyond; Carsten Holbraad’s work on the Concert of Europe as an informal institution aimed at maintaining international order, R.J. Vincent’s work on the rules and norms governing sovereignty and intervention, Ian Clark’s work on the dialectic between “Concert” and “Balance” practices in maintaining international order, and Paul Keal’s work on “unspoken rules” in great power management of international society under conditions of bipolarity.84

Bull offered structural, functional and historical analyses of international society that have been most influential in Britain and Australia, but have also received widespread attention in the US recently. His seminal text, *The Anarchical Society*, was perhaps rather slow to make its mark, but some two decades after its publication it has become one of the most important and widely cited texts in the discipline. Bull himself has emerged as arguably the key thinker of the English School and one of the dominant thinkers in the twentieth century study of International Relations.85

Though rarely numbered among the English School’s membership, Coral Bell, like Bull, was deeply influenced by Martin Wight and attended several meetings of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics.86 While US foreign policy may have been the immediate focus of many of her books, Bell never lost sight of international society, always retaining an emphasis on its conventions, rules, norms and institutions.87 Diplomacy and the balance of power were never far from her analyses, nor were the normative tendencies that positioned her somewhere between classical realism and the English School. The point of difference between Bull and Bell is that he tended to focus on the *institutions* of international society while she tended to focus on its (diplomatic) *practices*. In *Conventions of Crisis*, for example, she theorises about crises with a view to understanding how conventions of crisis management developed after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite being adversaries, Bell shows how crisis management conventions cleared a solid common ground on which to temper the superpowers’ conflicting interests.88 Though their vitiating effects can never be entirely eliminated, Bell argued that if properly managed, crises “may ultimately enable states to write the peace treaties without first fighting the wars”.89

**Opening up the Discipline? The Rise of “Low Politics” and Behaviouralism**

In response to world events and in reflection of broader disciplinary developments, the Australian discipline began to widen in the 1970s. This was a period in which

---

88 Bell, *Conventions of Crisis*, pp. 50-1.
89 Ibid., p. 116.
Australian scholars continued to address traditional foreign policy and security concerns, but it was also a period which witnessed significant geopolitical change, especially in the region. In the light of Britain’s disengagement east of Suez and the USA’s Guam Doctrine in the late 1960s, Australia was forced to take greater responsibility for its security in a region that remained unstable, with war continuing in Vietnam until 1975, and with China emerging as a great power. The 1970s was also a decade during which mounting international significance was attached to the economy as Japan and the European Economic Community grew in confidence and stature, and as oil crises and Third World demands for global economic justice generated international instability. These developments, together with rising environmental consciousness and nuclear concerns, prompted calls for widening the discipline of IR to include issues and actors traditionally excluded from focus. These calls for IR to encompass the full range of global actors and issues followed on earlier calls to employ new conceptual tools for the purpose of achieving a more scientific study of international relations. It was in this changing international context that Bull made his telling interventions into debates on the discipline’s raison d’être, accepting the need to rethink the subject-matter of IR and to reflect on method, but demurring on the more radical calls for disciplinary renovation.90

Provoked by the rise of behaviouralism in the 1950s and ’60s, particularly in the USA, Bull’s article on “International Relations as an Academic Pursuit” was an attempt to delineate the subject-matter of IR and to lay out a research agenda based on a method he had previously referred to as “the classical approach”.91 While IR may have had a subject-matter focussed on relations among states, it lacked its own distinctive method, he observed. In fact, IR was a “scene of contending approaches and techniques”, most clearly expressed in the differences between the American academy on the one hand and the British and Australian on the other.92 Bull associated the “classical tradition” with “an approach to theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law”, one that jettisons the quest for scientific certitude, favouring instead the exercise of political judgment.93 This hermeneutic or interpretive approach makes no pretension to reduce political complexity and historical contingency into theoretical laws or models. Rather, it takes as its point of departure the historical bodies of “international” thought that have informed both theory and practice, stretching from Thucydides through Machiavelli, Grotius, Hobbes, Vattel, Burke and Kant, to Angell, Zimmern, Carr, Morgenthau and Wight.94


91 Bull, “International Theory”; “International Relations as an Academic Pursuit”.


The scientific approach, by contrast, was dominated by the aspiration to establish a theory “whose propositions are based either upon logical or mathematical proof, or upon strict, empirical procedures of verification”.\textsuperscript{95} Though predominantly an American movement, one of the leading behaviouralists of the 1960s was an Australian, Arthur L. Burns, who published his sophisticated theoretical writings in leading American journals. For Burns, as for Morton Kaplan, the target of Bull’s critique, behaviouralism was intended to deliver a more rigorous theoretical account of “system and process in international politics”, to borrow Kaplan’s book title.\textsuperscript{96} According to this view, the subject-matter of IR was rightly focused on states, security, and the balance of power; but, as Burns sought to show, IR could learn greatly from game-theoretic insights and economic theory.\textsuperscript{97} Bull, however, remained unconvinced by such aspirations, believing that where practitioners of the scientific approach have produced revealing insights it is by “stepping beyond the bounds” of their scientific methods.\textsuperscript{98} Ultimately, Bull adjudged the scientific approach unlikely to contribute much to a theory of international relations because its scientism fails to grasp the political significance of rules, norms, and moral values on the one hand, and history on the other. Eschewing the scientism then prominent in American IR, Bull persisted in his “classical” approach to IR, writing insightfully on strategic studies, the changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, great power responsibility, and justice, all subjects of a traditionally conceived discipline.\textsuperscript{99}

Before proceeding further, it should be noted that the “behaviouralist revolt” was far from monolithic. While some, such as Kaplan and Burns, were content to accept IR’s focus on “high politics”, states and the states-system, others employed behaviouralism to include “low politics” in the discipline’s focus and multiply its conceptual tools by embracing inter-disciplinarity. These inter-disciplinary approaches were self-consciously progressive or radical, aiming to challenge the state-centric, power-political and institutional focus of IR as conventionally studied. In the writings of John Burton, for example, the traditional boundaries of IR were substantially broadened to accommodate new theoretical methods capable of encompassing “high” and “low politics”, war and peace studies, international politics and international economics. While recognising the value of classical approaches to previous times, Burton, for example, believed that new times demanded new theories. In a brief discussion of the so-called “second great debate”, he argued that contemporary phenomena required new behaviouralist and sociological methods and inter-disciplinary analysis to take better account of the way world society is changing.\textsuperscript{100} Indeed, according to Burton, one of

\begin{itemize}
  \item Bull, “International Theory”, p. 362.
  \item Bull, “International Theory”, p. 368.
\end{itemize}
the defining features of contemporary world politics is its “dynamic” quality, something which IR, in its focus on “static” structures and institutions, failed to understand. From Burton’s perspective, the point was to move beyond the traditional concept of state-as-actor, and to see the state as a dynamic site of multiple interactions and transactions. This also entailed replacing the state as the fundamental unit of analysis with “world society”, which takes the appearance of numerous global “cobwebs” individually and collectively facilitating interactions and transactions across multiple intersecting fields of social activity, and flowing across state boundaries.

Burton’s internationally influential approach found favour with two young Australian scholars in the 1970s, Ralph Pettman and Joseph Camilleri. They took the study of international relations in a radically different direction to both Burns and Bull, expanding its scope to include actors and processes beyond the traditional disciplinary boundaries, and adopting a trans- or inter-disciplinary approach better able to account for the multiple pathologies afflicting the human condition in the modern age. Of central importance was the claim that behaviouralism enables various levels and systems to be integrated into a single theoretical perspective. Pettman showed how behaviouralism shifts attention upwards to the level of the global system at the same time as it shifts attention downwards to the level of individual and group behaviour. Camilleri showed how the many pathologies of contemporary world politics (economic inequality, environmental degradation, social conformism, and militarism) could be drawn together and analysed in a single theoretical framework concerned with constructing a peaceful and just world order. Much like the contemporaneous World Order Models Project led by Richard Falk, with which it had a close affinity, Camilleri’s project was openly “utopian”, focusing on the inter-related struggles for peace and justice across the multiple levels of world society. In Burton, Camilleri, and to a lesser degree in Pettman, we can see the theme of interdependence deployed as part of an explicit normative programme.

In the face of these interdisciplinary approaches, Bull’s focus and approach were perceived to be decidedly traditional, conservative even. But Bull’s position has, in at least three ways, been vindicated by subsequent disciplinary developments. Firstly, at the very least, it is clear that IR remains an intellectual battleground between those who aspire to scientific verisimilitude and those who abandon such hopes, positivists and post-positivists as they were respectively called in the 1980s and ’90s. Secondly, post-positivist inquiries into the relationship between knowledge and values are consistent with Bull’s efforts to restore “norms, rules and moral values to the central place in the study of International Relations”. Thirdly, although Bull himself tended to focus on

---

104 Ibid., Chs 9-10.
105 Bull, “International Relations as an Academic Pursuit”, p. 254. This is especially evident in the Habermasian-inspired Critical Theory developed by Andrew Linklater, see *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations* (London, 1990), pp. 15-21; and his chapters 4 and 5 in Linklater and Suganami, *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary
the states-system he was well aware that it existed in a wider global system comprising state and non-state actors, structures and processes. In fact, given the widespread agreement on these three points, it is almost as if Bull did resolve the debate in the minds of most Australian scholars of IR. For even though many would take issue with his substantive contribution, they would themselves continue to engage with philosophy, history and law — the component parts of Bull’s traditional approach — to conduct their inquiries into international relations. In any case, the unresolved methodological questions canvassed by Bull fed directly into the so-called “third great debate”, a debate in which many Australian scholars were to play lead roles.

**Australian IR after the Cold War: the “Post-Positivist Turn”**

The end of the Cold War not only spawned a number of celebratory and cautionary arguments about future world orders, it also raised questions about the capability of both realism and liberalism to understand and explain the changing architecture of world politics. Implosion of the superpower rivalry in addition to the advent of globalization seemed to confirm Walker’s late-Cold War conjecture that conventional theoretical categories were “out of joint with the times”. At any rate, the efflorescence of globalization and the dramatic breach of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 seemed consonant with the breach of the disciplinary wall erected around IR, though admittedly manifestations of popular dissent and disciplinary transgression were noticeable in the mid-1980s. In what became known as the “third great debate”, global political transformation became the backdrop to post-positivist questioning of orthodox international theories. Before surveying the post-positivist “era of critical diversity”, and particularly the place of Australian scholarship within it, it will be useful to recall the changing Australian outlook on globalization and the post-Cold War international order.

In response to globalization and the collapse of the Cold War, Australia, like many other countries, redefined its self-image and its international outlook. Australia was no longer an insecure British outpost in the southwest Pacific. Growing self-confidence encouraged a reconsideration of Australia’s multiple locations (South Pacific, Asia-Pacific, Indian Ocean, global), identities (Western, multicultural, liberal democratic) and interests (strategic, economic and historical). Two dominant themes emerged in the Hawke-Keating governments’ (1983-1996) efforts to reconceptualise the national interest in line with the confident new self-image: greater “engagement” with an economically dynamic Asian region, and the concept of “good international citizenship”. The government-commissioned Garnaut Report advised that Australia should reorient its foreign and economic policies to North East Asia if it is to remain

---


106 Ibid., pp. 252-255.


109 A useful survey of the changed context can be found in John Ravenhill ed., *No Longer an American Lake?* (Sydney, 1989).
economically competitive and prosperous in the longer-term. This was advice on which the Australian government needed no persuading, and was evidence of a greater willingness to consider the national interest and security in terms of international political economy.\footnote{110 On the Garnaut Report, see James L. Richardson, ed., Northeast Asian Challenge: Debating the Garnaut Report (Canberra, 1991). For a general account of the Hawke-Keating governments’ foreign policy challenges, see Richardson, The Foreign Policy of the Hawke-Keating Governments: An Interim Report, ANU Department of International Relations Working Paper No. 1997/4 (Canberra, 1997). For a helpful overview of Australian engagement with Asia, see Cotton and Ravenhill, eds, Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs, 1991-1995 (Melbourne, 1997).}

Further revision of the national interest commenced under the concept of “good international citizenship”. Advanced by Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, to capture Australia’s commitment to the evolution of a more cooperative, just and rule-governed international order, this doctrine seized the interest of several Australian scholars who saw in this idea of “enlightened self-interest” a pragmatic but ethically-informed framework for formulating Australian foreign policy, one that pays a debt to earlier versions of Australian “institutional internationalism”.\footnote{112 For Evans’ exposition of the notion of “good international citizen”, see Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s, second edition (Melbourne, 1995), pp. 33-5 and Ch. 10. For academic responses to the notion, see Linklater, “What is a Good International Citizen?”, in Paul Keal, ed., Ethics and Foreign Policy (Canberra, 1992); Peter Lawler, “The Good Citizen Australia?” Asian Studies Review, Vol. 16, 2 (1992), pp. 241-250; David Goldsworthy, “Australia and Good International Citizenship” in Stephanie Lawson, ed., The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond (Sydney, 1995).}

Closely related to these arguments was the notion that Australia needed to reformulate its identity as a middle power capable of international leadership by initiating and building coalitions around specific issues of national and international interest.\footnote{113 Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Melbourne, 1993). See also the discussion of middle powers in Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations, Ch. 19.} Australia’s foreign policy commitment to multilateralism and what Hancock called “habits of conference and cooperation” once again seemed to chime with IR theories committed to granting rules, norms and moral values a central place in world politics, and to acknowledging the state’s potential to act as a positive force, even as others declared the crisis of the sovereign state.\footnote{114 Bull, “The State’s Positive Role in World Affairs”, Daedalus, Vol. 108, 4 (1979), pp. 111-123; Linklater, “What is a Good International Citizen?”; Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot, 1992).} In all these Cold War- and globalization-induced changes to the global architecture, two tenets earned widespread agreement: firstly, Australia’s identity and agency as a state are inextricably related to regional and global predicaments; secondly, that Australia’s security and prosperity lie in a commitment to multilateralism and international cooperation. These tenets reaffirmed the international outlook expressed by earlier generations of Australian IR — that Australia’s interests are best served through the maintenance of strong ties of interdependence.

This persistent theme of interdependence in Australia’s international outlook betrays a certain distance from realism that is as evident in the history of Australian foreign policy as it is in Australian IR theory. Even during the Cold War years Australian IR theory never fully embraced the realist orthodoxy — as we have seen, Ball, Bull and...
Bell retained an analytical commitment to rules, norms and moral values, and Burton, Camilleri and Pettman undertook more radical and normative critiques of world order. Since the Cold War’s end and even in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks of 2001, Australian IR theorists have deepened and extended their engagement with the English School theory of international society,\textsuperscript{115} and expressed strong criticism of the War on Terror’s threat to a rules-based international order.\textsuperscript{116} A pre-occupation with interdependence, in one sense or another, and a suspicion towards both power-political realism and scientific theory, have continued to shape Australian IR theory through what became known as the “third great debate”. In fact, little has changed other than the diversification and sophistication of Australian IR theory.

The “Third Great Debate”: Australian Perspectives

The “third great debate” manifested itself in a theoretical profusion received by some as perturbing and others as something to be celebrated.\textsuperscript{117} The heart of this debate was a confrontation between positivism and its post-positivist critics. In many ways, it was a reprisal of the second great debate as framed by Bull since it pitted scientific against non-scientific approaches. There are some significant differences, however, not least that in the latest incarnation of great debates, it was the non-scientific approach which sought to restructure international theory by introducing inter-disciplinary theoretical techniques and methods. If in the 1960s and ’70s behaviouralism promised new insights into world politics, it was theories informed by the “interpretive turn” that promised new insights into the globalizing and post-Cold War worlds of the 1990s. This was true of the full spectrum of post-positivist theories which challenged mainstream IR theories, from the more radical “critical theories” (of post-structuralism, postcolonialism, feminism, Critical Theory and Constructivism) to revitalised versions of realism and international society theory. Australian IR saw all these theories flourish in the 1990s.

Post-positivist theories can be understood to comprise two broad elements: firstly, theoretical reflexivity, second, normative reflection. These can be broken down further. Theoretical reflexivity incorporates interpretive theory and social constructivism; normative reflection involves engaged criticism of prevailing social and political realities and inquiry into emancipatory potentials.

\textsuperscript{115} Among others, see Alex J. Bellamy ed., \textit{International Society and Its Critics} (Oxford, 2005); and Linklater and Suganami, \textit{The English School of International Relations}.

\textsuperscript{116} See, for example, the essays collected in Bellamy, Roland Bleiker, Sara E. Davies and Richard Devetak, eds, \textit{Security and the War on Terror} (London, 2008).

**Theoretical Reflexivity: Interpretation and Social Construction**

In his major contributions to the “third debate”, Jim George identifies two precepts of orthodox IR theory that post-positivism rejects: firstly, the empirico-positivist notion that theorizing is primarily a cognitive response to an external world of facts; and second, the denial of theory’s “world-making” or constitutive properties. Against empirico-positivism George argues that theory and practice, knowledge and the world, facts and values, are interdependent. Lest it be thought that only critical theories engage in a critique of empirico-positivism, Martin Griffiths and Roger Spegele both endorse the critique in the process of defending revised versions of realism, and Alex Bellamy endorses the “rise of constructivism” in his defence of the English School’s theory of international society. Common to all these approaches is a suspicion of the Cartesian split between words and worlds, facts and values. This anti-Cartesianism underpins the interpretive or linguistic turn in social and political theory, which draws on deep intellectual lineages that extend from Immanuel Kant to Jürgen Habermas, Friedrich Nietzsche to Jacques Derrida. It is risky to generalise on this complex intellectual development, but, the linguistic turn contends that language expresses a way of being in the world, and the world (social reality) is partly constituted in and through language. This leads to a view commonly known as “social constructivism” — the view that social and political realities do not exist independently of the discourses (words, concepts, and categories of understanding) used by individuals, politicians, diplomats, and activists in society. Words and worlds are interdependent; or, put differently, international relations are discursively constructed.

Again, it should be noted that commitment to realism’s rehabilitation does not necessarily preclude acceptance of reality’s interpretive and constructed nature. Griffiths draws upon the interpretive theories of Max Weber, Karl Mannheim and R. N. Berki to disaggregate different conceptions of “reality”. He is under no illusion that international “reality” is immediate, necessary or true and is persuaded that “ontological assumptions” determine how international politics is conceptualised. We cannot appeal “to some ‘objective’ reality independent of its intersubjective constitution by the actors involved”, says Griffiths, but must exercise “interpretive reason” to understand and explain international relations. This leads him to posit a constructivist view of international anarchy against the naturalistic views of Morgenthau and Waltz. According to Griffiths, the international struggle for power is not a “given”, it is a “variable”. In this interpretation he explicitly aligns himself with Bull’s approach which sees international relations as an essentially contested and historically contingent realm of human practices.

Interpretivist and constructivist elements are also prominent in Constructivism and post-structuralism. American Constructivist Alexander Wendt famously argued that

---

118 George, “Search for Thinking Space”; George, *Discourses of Global Politics*.
120 Griffiths, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics*, Ch. 1.
"anarchy is what states make of it". The structure of anarchy in itself does not cause power politics. In *The Moral Purpose of the State*, Chris Reus-Smit provides an historical validation of this claim by showing how changing institutional practices generated by international society depend on evolving intersubjective beliefs about the state’s moral purpose. His self-consciously Constructivist account proceeds through a close examination of Ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, absolutist Europe, and the modern international society, revealing how different constitutional structures and their foundational values govern these international societies. David Campbell’s two hugely influential books, *Writing Security* and *National Deconstruction*, show how states are performatively constituted through various acts of domestic and foreign policy. Rather than posit the state as a fully-formed, bounded actor, Campbell’s post-structuralism emphasises the ongoing political practices which found and maintain a state and its identity. Roland Bleiker and Anthony Burke have applied these post-structuralist insights in fine studies of Korea’s and Australia’s international outlook respectively.

Normative Reflection: Critique and Emancipation

Where the various critical theories tend to depart from the revised forms of realism it is in the intellectual commitments to critique and emancipation. However, while Spegele and Griffiths argue against idealism of various kinds, they should not be taken to reject ethical or normative reflection altogether; both are clearly disposed to forms of realism capable of evaluation. Griffiths identifies evaluation as an inescapable dimension of realism, while Spegele advocates an “ethical realism” committed to tolerance, democracy and valuepluralism. Having said this, critical theories differ from realism in that they see critique and emancipation as defining the purpose of studying international relations. The Habermasian-inspired Critical Theory pioneered by Andrew Linklater, a Scot who taught in Australian universities between 1976 and 1992, adopts the theoretical reflexivity outlined above to offer a critical analysis of prevailing world orders with a view to identifying immanent potentials for emancipatory change. It not only offers a critique of the dogmatism it sees in mainstream IR theories, it seeks to “denaturalize” extant structures and practices of domination and exclusion. Linklater has developed a powerful philosophical critique of the sovereign state as an exclusionary form of political community in a trilogy of seminal books which has been influential on a younger generation of Australian theorists. Another impressive trilogy, by Vendulka Kubálková and Albert

---

127 Bleiker, *Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation* (Minneapolis, 2005); Burke, *Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety* (Cambridge, 2008).
128 Griffiths, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics*, Spegele, *Political Realism in International Theory*.
Cruikshank, has unfortunately had little impact on the Australian discipline, but it should be noted for its considerable contribution to a Marxist analysis and critique of IR.\textsuperscript{130}

An equal concern with critique and emancipation is evident in feminism and postcolonialism, though the element of critique is arguably more prominent than emancipation. In many respects, feminism and postcolonialism offer the most radical approaches to IR in that they both seek to re-interpret international relations "from the 'ground up'".\textsuperscript{131} By asking, "where are the women in international relations?", feminists highlight the way that how one conceives the world cannot be separated from where one is located in that world. Moreover, this pointed question alerts us to the relations of power and structures and practices of exclusion that shape international relations in ways "gender-blind" theories cannot comprehend.\textsuperscript{132} As Janindy Pettman and Katrina Lee-Koo have amply demonstrated, women’s experiences of the international cannot be assimilated to men’s experiences; women’s experiences will vary depending on their location, race, class and so on, but power and exclusion tend to remain salient factors wherever women are located, especially when peace gives way to conflict and war.\textsuperscript{133}

This sensitivity to the local or "domestic" experiences of men, women and children is also expressed in postcolonialism’s focus on the positions and voices of those excluded and marginalised by the process and legacy of colonialism. Postcolonialism challenges the empirico-positivist notion of objective or neutral knowledge, deliberately aiming to unsettle Western universalist conceptions by asking, “who speaks?” Phillip Darby, who has been one of the leading exponents of postcolonial theory in IR, has powerfully criticized the discipline’s Western bias and failure to attend to the tensions between tradition and modernity, North and South in world politics.\textsuperscript{134} Similar lines of argument have been developed by Paul Keal, Brett Bowden and Bruce Buchan who have used the historical body of international law to re-tell the story of European international society’s global expansion through colonization and dispossession.\textsuperscript{135}
Together, feminism and postcolonialism encourage greater sensitivity to the way different subjectivities (white western males and black female postcolonial subjects, for example) experience the realities of power and domination in international relations. Though they retain a commitment to emancipation, it is focused on the plight of particular segments of humanity rather than humanity as a whole.

Conclusion

This survey suggests that a single Australian outlook on international affairs cannot be identified. However, there are two themes that stand out in the intellectual formation of Australian outlooks on international affairs. Firstly, the enduring theme of interdependence; and secondly, notwithstanding a few important exceptions, the repeated scepticism expressed towards power-political realism and scientific theories. Without wishing to reduce the history of Australian IR theory to a Grotian preoccupation with interdependence, there is nonetheless a remarkable persistence in the theme, even if it is interpreted and grasped in competing ways. Hancock made a point of emphasizing interdependence in international relations, but it is present in subtle ways in the thinking of otherwise diverse thinkers as Mac Ball, Coral Bell, Hedley Bull, John Burton, Joseph Camilleri, Andrew Linklater, and Chris Reus-Smit, to name just a few of Australia’s most prominent IR theorists. Not surprisingly, the emphasis on interdependence has also been closely tied to what Bull called the “traditional approach” to theorizing which emphasizes interpretation and the normative constitution of international relations. Australian outlooks on international affairs, insofar as they can be discerned, tend to exhibit a preference for more interpretive approaches drawing on history, law and political philosophy. The consequence of adopting such an approach is an active consideration of the rules, norms and moral values which bind states together in an interdependent society of states. This is discernible not just in Australian IR theory but also, in varying degrees, Australian foreign policy from the 1920s onwards.

Finally, how should we assess Bull’s judgment about the quality of interwar IR theory? Are Australian contributions to IR theory before the discipline “came-of-age” in the 1960s worth reading now for any reason beyond throwing light on the preoccupations of the times? Surely the answer must be “yes”, at least insofar as an interpretive approach is adopted. Bull’s judgment here rests on the possibility of neatly distinguishing between theory and the history of theory. But his own writing has done much to discredit that distinction, showing how examination of the past, its theories as much as its practices, helps us come to a better understanding of the present. In Bull’s own words, “theory itself has a history”, and necessarily bestows legacies at the same time that it inherits debts.136

This article is a small contribution to more comprehensive attempts to narrate the rich history of Australian IR theory and to record some of the intellectual debts and inheritances that have gone towards shaping and reshaping an Australian outlook. To that end, efforts to reveal and recover early Australian contributions to IR must be seen as being of more than simply historical interest. Acquaintance with the history of Australian international thought may yield more historically-sensitive and conceptually-informed insights into present formations of an Australian outlook on international affairs.

---