Alternating offer games and private rulings of the Australian Tax Office

Wagner, L. D. (2003). Alternating offer games and private rulings of the Australian Tax Office. In: R. R. Moore, ICIAM 2003. International Congress of Industrial & Applied Mathematics, Sydney, (207-207). 7-11 July, 2003.

Author Wagner, L. D.
Title of paper Alternating offer games and private rulings of the Australian Tax Office
Conference name International Congress of Industrial & Applied Mathematics
Conference location Sydney
Conference dates 7-11 July, 2003
Proceedings title ICIAM 2003
Place of Publication Sydney
Publisher ICIAM
Publication Year 2003
Sub-type Other
Editor R. R. Moore
Volume 1
Start page 207
End page 207
Total pages 1
Language eng
Abstract/Summary The concept of submitting oneself to a voluntary negotiation is by no means new to big business. Formal bargaining has been quite successful over the years in providing the venue for agents to explore a more logical and mathematical approach to bargaining. However in more recent times external influences have been applied to agents who provide better deals for favored executives. This external influence has displayed itself in taxtion negotiations to the extent that tax office agents have been dismissed for irresponsible conduct. We explore this specific type of negotiation using an alternating offer bargaining game to model the particular influences, which create unfair rulings in negotiations. By the constraints of this systematic mathematical approach to negotiation, we will explore the advantages of a more formal game theoretic approach. In this presentation we will also elaborate on finding Nash Equilibrium in alternating offer games.
Subjects EX
239999 Mathematical Sciences not elsewhere classified
780101 Mathematical sciences
Q-Index Code EX

Document type: Conference Paper
Collection: School of Economics Publications
 
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Created: Fri, 24 Aug 2007, 13:01:03 EST