Two conceptions of reason

D'Agostino, Fred (2006) Two conceptions of reason. Economy And Society, 35 1: 1-21. doi:10.1080/03085140500465683

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Author D'Agostino, Fred
Title Two conceptions of reason
Journal name Economy And Society   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0308-5147
Publication date 2006-02
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1080/03085140500465683
Volume 35
Issue 1
Start page 1
End page 21
Total pages 21
Editor Graeme Thompson
Place of publication Abingdon, Oxford
Publisher Routledge
Collection year 2006
Language eng
Subject C1
220000 Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts - General
Abstract Two conceptions of reason are considered - the planning conception, embodied, for example, in rational choice theory and other familiar paradigms, and the improvisational conception, emerging from work on artificial intelligence and organization theory. Two illustrations are given of the problematic nature of the planning conception: ( 1) the inevitability of incompleteness in contracting and ( 2) the burdens of reason identified by John Rawls. Two diagnoses are provided for these infirmities: ( 1) the inexhaustibility of description and ( 2) the constructed nature of preferences and values. An alternative improvisational model is sketched and risk-spreading and bet-hedging are identified as two of its key technologies.
Keyword Reason
Constructed Preferences
Q-Index Code C1

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Created: Wed, 15 Aug 2007, 09:26:32 EST