Naturalism and the paradox of revisability

Colyvan, Mark (2006) Naturalism and the paradox of revisability. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 87 1: 1-11. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00244.x

Author Colyvan, Mark
Title Naturalism and the paradox of revisability
Journal name Pacific Philosophical Quarterly   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0279-0750
Publication date 2006
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00244.x
Volume 87
Issue 1
Start page 1
End page 11
Total pages 11
Editor D. German
Place of publication United Kingdom
Publisher Blackwell Publishing
Collection year 2006
Language eng
Subject C1
780199 Other
440102 Epistemology
Abstract This paper examines the paradox of revisability. This paradox was proposed by Jerrold Katz as a problem for Quinean naturalised epistemology Katz employs diagonalisation to demonstrate what he takes to be an inconsistency in the constitutive principles of Quine's epistemology. Specifically, the problem seems to rest with the principle of universal revisability which states that no statement is immune to revision. In this paper it is argued that although there is something odd about employing universal revisability to revise itself, there is nothing paradoxical about this. At least, there is no paradox along the lines suggested by Katz.
Keyword Philosophy
Yablos Paradox
Q-Index Code C1

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Created: Wed, 15 Aug 2007, 08:57:27 EST