Composite auction method for suppressing unreasonable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market

Duan, G., Dong, Z. Y. and Wang, X. F. (2005). Composite auction method for suppressing unreasonable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market. In: J. McDonald, K. P. Wong, G. Andersson and B. Pal, IEE Proceedings: Generation, Transmission and Distribution. 2005 IEE Annual General Meeting, San Francisco, CA, U.S.A, (460-468). June, 2005. doi:10.1049/ip-gtd:20045055


Author Duan, G.
Dong, Z. Y.
Wang, X. F.
Title of paper Composite auction method for suppressing unreasonable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market
Conference name 2005 IEE Annual General Meeting
Conference location San Francisco, CA, U.S.A
Conference dates June, 2005
Proceedings title IEE Proceedings: Generation, Transmission and Distribution   Check publisher's open access policy
Journal name Iee Proceedings-Generation Transmission and Distribution   Check publisher's open access policy
Place of Publication Stevenage, Herts.
Publisher IEE
Publication Year 2005
Sub-type Fully published paper
DOI 10.1049/ip-gtd:20045055
ISSN 1350-2360
Editor J. McDonald
K. P. Wong
G. Andersson
B. Pal
Volume 152
Issue 4
Start page 460
End page 468
Total pages 9
Language eng
Abstract/Summary The existence of undesirable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market requires an efficient auction mechanism. However, many of the existing auction mechanism have difficulties in suppressing such unreasonable price spikes effectively. A new auction mechanism is proposed to suppress effectively unreasonable price spikes in a competitive electricity market. It optimally combines system marginal price auction and pay as bid auction mechanisms. A threshold value is determined to activate the switching between the marginal price auction and the proposed composite auction. Basically when the system marginal price is higher than the threshold value, the composite auction for high price electricity market is activated. The winning electricity sellers will sell their electricity at the system marginal price or their own bid prices, depending on their rights of being paid at the system marginal price and their offers' impact on suppressing undesirable price spikes. Such economic stimuli discourage sellers from practising economic and physical withholdings. Multiple price caps are proposed to regulate strong market power. We also compare other auction mechanisms to highlight the characteristics of the proposed one. Numerical simulation using the proposed auction mechanism is given to illustrate the procedure of this new auction mechanism.
Subjects C1
290901 Electrical Engineering
669900 Other
Keyword Engineering, Electrical & Electronic
Q-Index Code C1

 
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Created: Wed, 15 Aug 2007, 16:53:30 EST