In the aftermath of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May this year, Professor Michael Wesley (2005) and Associate Professor Marianne Hanson (2005) have offered us two different views of the NPT, its effectiveness and its likely future. This debate is an important one, because at its heart lies a disagreement about the place of nuclear weapons in global security. For Wesley, the NPT is already ‘on life support’: it’s unfair, ineffective and dangerous. Moreover, it fails to provide us with the instruments we need to ‘stabilise the process of proliferation’. Wesley proposes scrapping the NPT and designing a new regime which would accept the inevitability of further proliferation but attempt to modify the ‘conditions’ under which such proliferation occurs. On the other side of the debate, Hanson tells us that the NPT*/despite a number of specific weaknesses*/remains the principal pillar in humankind’s normative rejection of nuclear weapons. In this view, blame for the current poisonous atmosphere in the non-proliferation regime (and more broadly across the global security environment) should be assigned elsewhere, principally to American policy and the centrality of nuclear weapons in US strategic doctrine. Scrapping the treaty, Hanson argues, would merely invite instability and danger, since the world cannot afford a greater number of nuclear weapon states.