Process hazard analysis, hazard identification and scenario definition: are the conventional tools sufficient, or should and can we do much better?

Cameron, Ian, Mannan, Sam, Nemeth, Erzsébet, Park, Sunhwa, Pasman, Hans, Rogers, William and Seligmann, Benjamin (2017) Process hazard analysis, hazard identification and scenario definition: are the conventional tools sufficient, or should and can we do much better?. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, . doi:10.1016/j.psep.2017.01.025


Author Cameron, Ian
Mannan, Sam
Nemeth, Erzsébet
Park, Sunhwa
Pasman, Hans
Rogers, William
Seligmann, Benjamin
Title Process hazard analysis, hazard identification and scenario definition: are the conventional tools sufficient, or should and can we do much better?
Journal name Process Safety and Environmental Protection   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0957-5820
1744-3598
Publication date 2017-02-03
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/j.psep.2017.01.025
Open Access Status Not yet assessed
Total pages 18
Place of publication London, United Kingdom
Publisher Elsevier
Collection year 2018
Language eng
Abstract Hazard identification is the first and most crucial step in any risk assessment. Since the late 1960s it has been done in a systematic manner using hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) and failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA). In the area of process safety these methods have been successful in that they have gained global recognition. There still remain numerous and significant challenges when using these methodologies. These relate to the quality of human imagination in eliciting failure events and subsequent causal pathways, the breadth and depth of outcomes, application across operational modes, the repetitive nature of the methods and the substantial effort expended in performing this important step within risk management practice. The present article summarizes the attempts and actual successes that have been made over the last 30 years to deal with many of these challenges. It analyzes what should be done in the case of a full systems approach and describes promising developments in that direction. It shows two examples of how applying experience and historical data with Bayesian network, HAZOP and FMEA can help in addressing issues in operational risk management.
Keyword Dynamic Bayesian net
Hazard identification
HAZOP automation
Process hazards
Scenario generation
System approach
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: School of Chemical Engineering Publications
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Created: Tue, 28 Feb 2017, 01:00:09 EST by Web Cron on behalf of Learning and Research Services (UQ Library)