Deviant logic and the paradoxes of self reference

Restall G. (1993) Deviant logic and the paradoxes of self reference. Philosophical Studies, 70 3: 279-303. doi:10.1007/BF00990117


Author Restall G.
Title Deviant logic and the paradoxes of self reference
Journal name Philosophical Studies   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0031-8116
Publication date 1993
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1007/BF00990117
Volume 70
Issue 3
Start page 279
End page 303
Total pages 25
Publisher Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject 1212 Religious studies
1211 Philosophy
Abstract The paradoxes of self reference have to be dealt with by anyone seeking to give a satisfactory account of the logic of truth, of properties, and even of sets of numbers. Unfortunately, there is no widespread agreement as to how to deal with these paradoxes. Some approaches block the paradoxical inferences by rejecting as invalid a move that classical logic counts as valid. In the recent literature, this 'deviant logic' analysis of the paradoxes has been called into question. This disagreement motivates a re-examination of the philosophy of formal logic and the status of logical truths and rules. In this paper I do some of this work, and I show that this gives us the means to defend the 'deviant' approaches against such criticisms. As a result I hope to show that these analyses of the paradoxes are worthy of more serious consideration than they have so far received.
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Unknown

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: Scopus Import
 
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Created: Tue, 26 Jul 2016, 03:19:51 EST by System User