The coincidences of time travel

Dowe, Phil (2003) The coincidences of time travel. Philosophy of Science, 70 3: 574-589. doi:10.1086/376926

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Author Dowe, Phil
Title The coincidences of time travel
Journal name Philosophy of Science   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0031-8248
Publication date 2003-01-01
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1086/376926
Open Access Status File (Publisher version)
Volume 70
Issue 3
Start page 574
End page 589
Total pages 16
Editor J. Barrett
Place of publication Chicago, IL, United States
Publisher University of Chicago Press
Language eng
Abstract In this paper I consider two objections raised by Nick Smith (1997) to an argument against the probability of time travel given by Paul Horwich (1995, 1987). Horwich argues that time travel leads to inexplicable and improbable coincidences. I argue that one of Smith's objections fails, but that another is correct. I also consider an instructive way to defend Horwich's argument against the second of Smith's objections, but show that it too fails. I conclude that unless there is something faulty in the conception of explanation implicit in Horwich's argument, time travel presents us with nothing that is inexplicable.
Keyword Philosophy
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Unknown

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Excellence in Research Australia (ERA) - Collection
School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 2 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
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Created: Mon, 13 Aug 2007, 13:44:16 EST