Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing

Faravelli, Marco, Man, Priscilla and Nguyen, Bang Dinh (2016) Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing. Social Choice and Welfare, 47 2: 1-17. doi:10.1007/s00355-016-0970-3


Author Faravelli, Marco
Man, Priscilla
Nguyen, Bang Dinh
Title Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing
Journal name Social Choice and Welfare   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0176-1714
1432-217X
Publication date 2016-06-07
Year available 2016
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1007/s00355-016-0970-3
Open Access Status Not Open Access
Volume 47
Issue 2
Start page 1
End page 17
Total pages 17
Place of publication Heidelberg, Germany
Publisher Springer
Collection year 2017
Language eng
Formatted abstract
We generalize Börgers’ (Am Econ Rev 94:57–66, 2004) results to a broad class of power sharing electoral systems. We show that voluntary voting under a power sharing regime Pareto dominates both random decision making and compulsory voting. We also show, however, that voluntary voting is not socially optimal, as individuals vote too frequently.
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: HERDC Pre-Audit
School of Economics Publications
 
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Created: Fri, 01 Jul 2016, 14:53:19 EST by Karen Warren on behalf of School of Economics