Savage games

Grant, Simon, Meneghel, Idione and Tourky, Rabee (2016) Savage games. Theoretical Economics, 11 2: 641-682. doi:10.3982/TE2068


Author Grant, Simon
Meneghel, Idione
Tourky, Rabee
Title Savage games
Journal name Theoretical Economics   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 1555-7561
1933-6837
Publication date 2016-05-01
Year available 2016
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.3982/TE2068
Open Access Status DOI
Volume 11
Issue 2
Start page 641
End page 682
Total pages 42
Place of publication New York, NY United States
Publisher Society for Economic Theory
Collection year 2017
Language eng
Formatted abstract
We define and discuss Savage games, which are ordinal games of incomplete information set in L. J. Savage's framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Every Bayesian game is ordinally equivalent to a Savage game. However, Savage games are free of priors, probabilities, and payoffs. Players' information and subjective attitudes toward uncertainty are encoded in the state-dependent preferences over state contingent action profiles. In the class of games we consider, player preferences satisfy versions of Savage's sure-thing principle and small event continuity postulate. Savage games provide a tractable framework for studying attitudes toward uncertainty in a strategic setting. The work eschews any notion of objective randomization, convexity, monotonicity, or independence of beliefs. We provide a number of examples illustrating the usefulness of the framework, including novel results for a purely ordinal matching game that satisfies all of our assumptions and for games for which the preferences of the players admit representations from a wide class of decision-theoretic models.
Keyword Subjective uncertainty
Strategic interaction
Strategically irrelevant events
Ambiguity
Bayesian games
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: HERDC Pre-Audit
School of Economics Publications
 
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