In J Philos Logic 34:155-192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155-192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb's original definition. Moreover, we show that once the appropriate repairs have been made, the resultant definition is equivalent to a version of the supervaluation definition suggested in J Philos 72:690-716, 1975 and discussed in detail in J Symb Log 51(3):663-681, 1986. The upshot of this is a philosophical justification for the simple supervaluation approach and fresh insight into its workings.