Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games

Dindos, M and Mezzetti, C (2006) Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games. Games and Economic Behavior, 54 2: 261-292. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.12.001


Author Dindos, M
Mezzetti, C
Title Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
Journal name Games and Economic Behavior   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0899-8256
Publication date 2006
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2004.12.001
Volume 54
Issue 2
Start page 261
End page 292
Total pages 32
Language eng
Subject 2002 Cultural Studies
2003 Language Studies
Abstract We consider n-person games with quasi-concave payoffs that depend on a player's own action and the sum of all players' actions. We show that a discrete-time, stochastic process in which players move towards better replies - the better-reply dynamics - converges globally to a Nash equilibrium if actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements for all players around each Nash equilibrium that is asymptotically stable under a deterministic, adjusted best-reply dynamics. We present an example of a 2-person game with a unique equilibrium where the derivatives of the best-reply functions have different signs and the better-reply dynamics does not converge.
Keyword Aggregative games
Better-reply dynamics
Strategic complements
Strategic substitutes
Weak finite improvement property
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Unknown

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: Scopus Import
 
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 8 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
Scopus Citation Count Cited 9 times in Scopus Article | Citations
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Created: Thu, 02 Jun 2016, 12:47:07 EST by Karen Warren