Domestic unionization and import competition

Mezzetti, C and Dinopoulos, E (1991) Domestic unionization and import competition. Journal of International Economics, 31 1-2: 79-100. doi:10.1016/0022-1996(91)90057-D

Author Mezzetti, C
Dinopoulos, E
Title Domestic unionization and import competition
Journal name Journal of International Economics   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0022-1996
Publication date 1991
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/0022-1996(91)90057-D
Volume 31
Issue 1-2
Start page 79
End page 100
Total pages 22
Language eng
Subject 2002 Cultural Studies
2003 Language Studies
Abstract We develop a Cournot duopoly model of a domestic unionized firm and a foreign firm. The negotiated wage and employment levels are simultaneously determined through efficient Nash bargaining. A union is employment (wage) oriented if the employment elasticity of its utility is higher (lower) than the corresponding excess wage elasticity. An increase in the bargaining power of an employment oriented union increases domestic output and welfare. If the union is wage oriented, then protection may decrease output and welfare. A credible threat to shift production abroad increases domestic profits and lowers the negotiated wage.
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Unknown

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: Scopus Import
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 83 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
Scopus Citation Count Cited 105 times in Scopus Article | Citations
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Created: Thu, 02 Jun 2016, 12:33:05 EST by Karen Warren