Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions

Mezzetti, Claudio, Pekec, Aleksandar Sasa and Tsetlin, Ilia (2008) Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 62 2: 591-609. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.002


Author Mezzetti, Claudio
Pekec, Aleksandar Sasa
Tsetlin, Ilia
Title Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
Journal name Games and Economic Behavior   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0899-8256
Publication date 2008
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.002
Volume 62
Issue 2
Start page 591
End page 609
Total pages 19
Language eng
Subject 2002 Cultural Studies
2003 Language Studies
Abstract We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k = k1 + k2 objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement. When the first-round winning bids are announced, we also identify a positive informational effect on the second-round price. Total expected revenue in a sequential uniform auction with winning-bids announcement may be greater or smaller than in a single-round uniform auction, depending on the model's parameters.
Keyword Affiliated values
Information revelation
Multi-unit auctions
Sequential auctions
Uniform-price auction
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Unknown

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: Scopus Import
 
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 10 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
Scopus Citation Count Cited 11 times in Scopus Article | Citations
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Created: Thu, 02 Jun 2016, 12:31:26 EST by Karen Warren