Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium

Mezzetti, Claudio and Renou, Ludovic (2012) Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 147 6: 2357-2375. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.004

Author Mezzetti, Claudio
Renou, Ludovic
Title Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium
Journal name Journal of Economic Theory   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0022-0531
Publication date 2012-11
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.004
Open Access Status Not Open Access
Volume 147
Issue 6
Start page 2357
End page 2375
Total pages 19
Place of publication Maryland Heights, MO United States
Publisher Academic Press
Language eng
Abstract A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives for all cardinal representations of the preference profile. Unlike Maskin's definition, our definition does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure equilibrium. We show that set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskin's monotonicity, is necessary for mixed Nash implementation. With at least three players, set-monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient. Important correspondences that are not Maskin monotonic can be implemented in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Non-UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: School of Economics Publications
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Created: Thu, 02 Jun 2016, 11:48:35 EST by Karen Warren on behalf of School of Economics