Bidding for Labor

Julien B., Kennes J. and King I. (2000) Bidding for Labor. Review of Economic Dynamics, 3 4: 619-649. doi:10.1006/redy.1999.0089

Author Julien B.
Kennes J.
King I.
Title Bidding for Labor
Journal name Review of Economic Dynamics   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 1094-2025
Publication date 2000
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1006/redy.1999.0089
Volume 3
Issue 4
Start page 619
End page 649
Total pages 31
Subject 2002 Cultural Studies
Abstract We present a competing-auction theory of the labor market, where job candidates auction their labor services to employers. An equilibrium matching function emerges which has many of the features commonly assumed, including constant returns to scale in large economies. The auction mechanism also generates equilibrium wage dispersion among homogeneous workers and constrained-efficient entry of vacancies in large economies. In a dynamic version of the model, we generate implied numerical values for equilibrium unemployment and wage dispersion. The theory makes the novel prediction that wage dispersion is a decreasing function of the discount factor and labor market tightness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E24, J31, J41, J64, D44.
Keyword Matching; wage dispersion; auctions; unemployment; efficiency
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Unknown

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: Scopus Import
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Citation counts: Scopus Citation Count Cited 66 times in Scopus Article | Citations
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Created: Thu, 24 Mar 2016, 11:07:41 EST by Karen Warren