Bidding for money

Julien, Benoit, Kennes, John and King, Ian (2008) Bidding for money. Journal of Economic Theory, 142 1: 196-217. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.009


Author Julien, Benoit
Kennes, John
King, Ian
Title Bidding for money
Journal name Journal of Economic Theory   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0022-0531
1095-7235
Publication date 2008-09-01
Year available 2007
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.009
Open Access Status Not Open Access
Volume 142
Issue 1
Start page 196
End page 217
Total pages 22
Place of publication Maryland Heights, MO, United States
Publisher Academic Press
Language eng
Abstract We analyze monetary exchange in a model that allows for directed search and multilateral matches. We consider environments with divisible goods and indivisible money, and compare the results with those in models that use random matching and bilateral bargaining. Two different pricing mechanisms are used: ex ante price posting, and ex post bidding (auctions). Also, we consider settings both with and without lotteries. We find that the model generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those with random matching and bargaining, but with different comparative static and welfare properties.
Keyword Money
Directed search
Multilateral matching
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Non-UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: School of Economics Publications
 
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Created: Fri, 18 Mar 2016, 14:27:34 EST by Karen Warren on behalf of School of Economics