Consciousness: emergent and real

Maleeh, Reza and Stephan, Achim (2015) Consciousness: emergent and real. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 6 3: 486-491. doi:10.4453/rifp.2015.0047

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Author Maleeh, Reza
Stephan, Achim
Title Consciousness: emergent and real
Journal name Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 2039-4667
Publication date 2015
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.4453/rifp.2015.0047
Open Access Status File (Publisher version)
Volume 6
Issue 3
Start page 486
End page 491
Total pages 6
Place of publication Sesto San Giovanni, MI, Italy
Publisher Mimesis Edizioni
Collection year 2016
Language eng
Abstract In this paper, we propose three lines of argumentation against Nannini’s eliminativist approach towards consciousness and the Self. First, we argue that the premises he uses to argue for eliminativism can equally well be used to draw a completely different conclusion in favor of naturalistic dualism according to which phenomenal consciousness irreducibly emerges from a physical substrate by virtue of certain psychophysical laws of nature. Nannini proposes that in contrast to dualistic theses which represent the manifest image of the world, eliminativism represents the world’s scientific image just as classical physics and theories of relativity respectively represent the world’s manifest image and scientific image. And if developments in a scientific field reveal a conflict between these two images we should always vote for the scientific image. In our second line of argument, we challenge this claim by comparing two rival interpretations of quantum mechanics, i.e. the Copenhagen and Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics. Finally, we argue that Nannini’s identification of consciousness and the Self as illusions does not shed any light on the hard problem of consciousness since illusions themselves are instances of phenomenal experiences and need to be explained.
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status UQ
Additional Notes Abstract also in Italian.

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Official 2016 Collection
School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry
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Created: Tue, 05 Jan 2016, 14:30:20 EST by Lucy O'Brien on behalf of School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry