Patent pools, litigation, and innovation

Choi, Jay Pil and Gerlach, Heiko (2015) Patent pools, litigation, and innovation. RAND Journal of Economics, 46 3: 499-523. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12095


Author Choi, Jay Pil
Gerlach, Heiko
Title Patent pools, litigation, and innovation
Journal name RAND Journal of Economics   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 1756-2171
0741-6261
Publication date 2015-09-01
Year available 2015
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1111/1756-2171.12095
Open Access Status Not yet assessed
Volume 46
Issue 3
Start page 499
End page 523
Total pages 25
Place of publication Hoboken, NJ United States
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell Publishing
Collection year 2016
Language eng
Abstract This article analyzes patent pools and their effects on litigation incentives, overall royalty rates, and social welfare when patent rights are probabilistic and can be invalidated in court. With probabilistic patents, the license fees reflect the strength of the patents. We show that patent pools of complementary patents can be used to discourage infringement by depriving potential licensees of the ability to selectively challenge patents and making them committed to a proposition of all-or-nothing in patent litigation. If patents are sufficiently weak, patent pools with complementary patents reduce social welfare as they charge higher licensing fees and chill subsequent innovation incentives.
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Official 2016 Collection
School of Economics Publications
 
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