Moral vitalism: seeing good and evil as real, agentic forces

Bastian, Brock, Bain, Paul, Buhrmester, Michael D., Gomez, Angel, Vazquez, Alexandra, Knight. Clinton G. and Swann, William B. (2015) Moral vitalism: seeing good and evil as real, agentic forces. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41 8: 1069-1081. doi:10.1177/0146167215589819

Author Bastian, Brock
Bain, Paul
Buhrmester, Michael D.
Gomez, Angel
Vazquez, Alexandra
Knight. Clinton G.
Swann, William B.
Title Moral vitalism: seeing good and evil as real, agentic forces
Journal name Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 1552-7433
Publication date 2015-08
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1177/0146167215589819
Volume 41
Issue 8
Start page 1069
End page 1081
Total pages 13
Place of publication Thousand Oaks, CA, United States
Publisher SAGE Publications
Collection year 2016
Language eng
Abstract Moral vitalism refers to a tendency to view good and evil as actual forces that can influence people and events. We introduce a scale designed to assess the belief in moral vitalism. High scorers on the scale endorse items such as “There are underlying forces of good and evil in this world.” After establishing the reliability and criterion validity of the scale (Studies 1, 2a, and 2b), we examined the predictive validity of the moral vitalism scale, showing that “moral vitalists” worry about being possessed by evil (Study 3), being contaminated through contact with evil people (Study 4), and forfeiting their own mental purity (Study 5). We discuss the nature of moral vitalism and the implications of the construct for understanding the role of metaphysical lay theories about the nature of good and evil in moral reasoning.
Keyword Morality
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Official 2016 Collection
School of Psychology Publications
Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 0 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article
Scopus Citation Count Cited 0 times in Scopus Article
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Created: Tue, 28 Jul 2015, 02:53:46 EST by System User on behalf of Scholarly Communication and Digitisation Service