Dishonest Signaling During Aggressive Interactions: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Wilson, Robbie S. and Angilletta, Michael J. (2015). Dishonest Signaling During Aggressive Interactions: Theory and Empirical Evidence. In Duncan J. Irschick, Mark Briffa and Jeffrey Podos (Ed.), Animal Signaling and Function: An Integrative Approach (pp. 205-227) Hoboken, NJ United States: Wiley Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118966624.ch8

Attached Files (Some files may be inaccessible until you login with your UQ eSpace credentials)
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads

Author Wilson, Robbie S.
Angilletta, Michael J.
Title of chapter Dishonest Signaling During Aggressive Interactions: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Title of book Animal Signaling and Function: An Integrative Approach
Place of Publication Hoboken, NJ United States
Publisher Wiley Blackwell
Publication Year 2015
Sub-type Research book chapter (original research)
DOI 10.1002/9781118966624.ch8
Year available 2015
ISBN 9781118966624
9781118966617
1118966619
Editor Duncan J. Irschick
Mark Briffa
Jeffrey Podos
Chapter number 8
Start page 205
End page 227
Total pages 23
Total chapters 9
Collection year 2016
Language eng
Formatted Abstract/Summary
Communication between members of the same species often involves a conflict of interest, and the role that deception plays in this conflict has fascinated researchers for decades. The primary concern has been to understand what maintains honest communication despite the temptation to deceive opponents. In this chapter, we pursue the subject of dishonesty and discuss its importance during communication between animals competing for limited resources. We briefly review the relevant theory and analyze empirical studies that support the existence of deception in animal populations. In considering the mounting evidence for dishonest communication, we consider whether deception provides the only explanation. We also explain how functional studies of animal performance can inform evolutionary analyses of dishonest signalling between competitors.
Keyword Aggression
Deception
Dishonesty
Game theory
Signaling
Q-Index Code B1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status UQ

Document type: Book Chapter
Collections: Official 2016 Collection
School of Biological Sciences Publications
 
Versions
Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 3 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
Scopus Citation Count Cited 4 times in Scopus Article | Citations
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Created: Tue, 21 Apr 2015, 01:15:32 EST by System User on behalf of School of Biological Sciences