This paper is about the book The Order of Public Reason by Gerald Gaus. Before considering some of the key arguments of that book and raising some issues about some of the apparatus Gaus deploys, I would like to begin by saying something about my own trajectory across the terrain of public-reason philosophy. I recount this trek, not only because it is always nice to talk about one's own work but also because Gaus and I have been tracking each other across this landscape for a long time now, so that the story of my enquiries can provide a way of introducing his own current approach and also, and more importantly, some salutary warnings, as it might be said, about how not to do it. My ways of approaching this problem led over and over again to dead ends in the middle of nowhere. And Gaus's approach is "the road not taken," but, in this case (if not in the poem), the unequivocally better approach, one that opens out, I think, into an interesting vista not much explored so far and worthy of the consideration it is indeed already receiving.