Nuclear arms control has been a central theme of superpower relations for at least a quarter of a century. Everyone agrees that there are valuable lessons to be learned from those decades of experience: the disagreements arise only when attempts are made to identify those lessons. Individuals and organizations advocate policies based on their own vivid perceptions of arms control's past-perceptions often derived more from emotion and ideology than from evidence and analysis.
In this volume, we test the views held by important actors in the arms control process against the historical record of negotiations and accords, and we identify those lessons that are consistent with the evidence and those that are not. Our goal is to present an accurate and objective picture of arms control's past. Although we make no attempt to predict or prescribe its future, we believe that our findings can serve as a useful foundation for thinking about what might come to pass. In any event, we fully expect that readers will have little difficulty in formulating their own versions of implications for ' the future. Our intention and aspiration are for this study to be of interest and utility to many different kinds of readers, including policymakers, experts, students, and members of the general public who care about the role that arms control might play in altering the risk of war.
This book is based largely on a research project, ' ' Learning from Experience with Arms Control, "conducted during 1985 and 1986 at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government under the direction of Albert Carnesale. The project was sponsored by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We are indebted to ACDA and its director, Kenneth Adelman, for providing not only financial support but also the encouragement and freedom essential to truly objective scholarly inquiry. This study benefitted also from our association with Harvard's Project on Avoiding Nuclear War, which is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Researchers actively engaged in the arms control project met biweekly to review work in progress. Participants in this working group were Professors Albert Carnesale, Ashton Carter, and Joseph Nye ; Drs. Charles Glaser, Stephen Flanagan, Richard Haass, and Fen Hampson; doctoral candidates Andrew Bennett, Robert Beschel, lvo Daalder, Thomas Graham, Elisa Harris, Sean Lynn-J ones, James Miller, and Kiron Skinner ; and research assistant John Wertheimer. Valuable advice and counsel was provided by an advisory committee comprised of Graham Allison, Robert Blackwill, Paul Doty, Samuel Huntington, William Kaufmann, Ernest May, Stephen Meyer, Robert Murray, Joseph Nye, and Richard Pipes.
A two-day workshop to review a preliminary draft of this volume was conducted at Harvard on May 7- 8, 1986. The researchers and advisors were joined at this workshop by Abram Chayes, Antonia Chayes, Jonathan Dean, Lynn Eden, Sidney Graybeal, Steven Miller, Michael Mobbs, Louis Nosenzo, Thomas Schelling, Jane Sharp, and Herbert York. Still others commented along the way on ideas, outlines, and drafts. These drafts were "processed" by Betty Miele with skill, patience, and assorted combinations of computer hardware and software.
Those of us who performed this research are grateful to all of these people for the help we've received. Credit for what's good in this book is to be shared with all of them: blame for what's bad is ours alone. Finally, we note that views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Harvard University or of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.