A hierarchical agency model of deposit insurance

Carroll, Jonathan and Takayama, Shino (2013) A hierarchical agency model of deposit insurance. Annals of Finance, 10 2: 267-290. doi:10.1007/s10436-013-0240-7


Author Carroll, Jonathan
Takayama, Shino
Title A hierarchical agency model of deposit insurance
Journal name Annals of Finance   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 1614-2446
1614-2454
Publication date 2013
Year available 2013
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1007/s10436-013-0240-7
Open Access Status
Volume 10
Issue 2
Start page 267
End page 290
Total pages 24
Place of publication Heidelberg, Germany
Publisher Springer
Collection year 2014
Language eng
Abstract This paper develops a hierarchical agency model of deposit insurance. The main purpose of the analysis is to propose a micro-founded model of deposit insurance schemes and study their effects on the behavior of depositors and the monitoring problem for a bank. This paper also characterizes a risk-based premium in equilibrium, and conducts a comparative statics analysis of depositors’ optimal actions. The results supply the basic theoretical foundation for designing deposit insurance schemes. Our findings are consistent with the empirical research on depositor behavior.
Keyword Deposit Insurance
Banks
Regulation
Hierarchical agency model
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Institutional Status UQ
Additional Notes Published online 27 June 2013

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Official 2014 Collection
School of Economics Publications
 
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Created: Tue, 02 Jul 2013, 16:26:12 EST by Alys Hohnen on behalf of School of Economics