Are the sorites and liar paradox of a kind?

Hyde, Dominic (2013). Are the sorites and liar paradox of a kind?. In Koji Tanaka, Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares and Francesco Paoli (Ed.), Paraconsistency: logic and applications (pp. 349-366) Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Science+Business Media. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4438-7_19

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Author Hyde, Dominic
Title of chapter Are the sorites and liar paradox of a kind?
Title of book Paraconsistency: logic and applications
Place of Publication Dordrecht, The Netherlands
Publisher Springer Science+Business Media
Publication Year 2013
Sub-type Research book chapter (original research)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4438-7_19
Series Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
ISBN 9789400744387
9789400744370
9400744382
Editor Koji Tanaka
Francesco Berto
Edwin Mares
Francesco Paoli
Volume number 26
Chapter number 19
Start page 349
End page 366
Total pages 18
Total chapters 20
Collection year 2014
Language eng
Abstract/Summary In this paper I consider attempts to unify the liar and sorites paradoxes. I argue that while they both may be said to exhibit indeterminacy and be alike in this respect, attempts to model the indeterminacy by way of a paracomplete logic result in the two paradoxes diverging in their logical structure in the face of extended paradoxes. If, on the other hand, a paraconsistent logic is invoked then the paradoxes and associated extended paradoxes may be seen to be of a kind in having their source in the indeterminacy of the relevant predicates involved. Paraconsistency then offers the prospect of a unified treatment of these vexing puzzles.
Q-Index Code B1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Institutional Status UQ

 
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Created: Mon, 04 Mar 2013, 11:24:12 EST by Lucy O'Brien on behalf of School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry