The properties of condorcet jury games with multiple signals

Young, Benjamin Garry (2011). The properties of condorcet jury games with multiple signals Honours Thesis, School of Economics, The University of Queensland.

       
Attached Files (Some files may be inaccessible until you login with your UQ eSpace credentials)
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads
s41206515_Benjamin_Young_ECON_Hons_thesis.pdf Full text application/pdf 578.80KB 64
Author Young, Benjamin Garry
Thesis Title The properties of condorcet jury games with multiple signals
School, Centre or Institute School of Economics
Institution The University of Queensland
Publication date 2011
Thesis type Honours Thesis
Supervisor Prof Andrew McLennan
Dr Shino Takayama
Total pages 99
Language eng
Subjects 340000 Economics
Formatted abstract

In order to formulate efficient committee voting mechanisms, it is imperative to establish the theoretical basis on which groups with a common objective aggregate the private information of their members. The extensive literature focussed on these so-called Condorcet games has utilised a jury setting in which each juror receives a single, private signal before undertaking a simultaneous vote to either convict or acquit a defendant. However, it seems plausible that the information acquisition process is much richer in reality, with each juror receiving his or her information set through a multidimensional process. This research extends the Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) uni-signal jury model to allow for each juror to receive two private signals relevant to the case. Firstly, the socially optimal verdict given a public revelation of privately held information is derived. Secondly, it is shown that this social optimum cannot, in general, be implemented by the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria that result from any threshold voting rule. Thirdly, the role of deliberation in ameliorating this inefficiency is discussed. A class of deliberative mechanisms are introduced that both minimise the amount of information transmission required in deliberation and induce the social optimum. Finally, these informationally efficient deliberative mechanisms are shown to be robust to alternative formulations of multi-dimensionality in the information acquisition process.

Keyword Condorcet
Committees
Voting Procedures
Juries
Common Interest
Multi-dimensionality

 
Citation counts: Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 174 Abstract Views, 64 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Tue, 28 Feb 2012, 12:49:43 EST by Carmen Mcnaught on behalf of School of Economics