Agent-based theories of right action

Cox, Damian (2006) Agent-based theories of right action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9 5: 505-515. doi:10.1007/s10677-006-9029-3

Author Cox, Damian
Title Agent-based theories of right action
Journal name Ethical Theory and Moral Practice   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 1386-2820
Publication date 2006-11
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1007/s10677-006-9029-3
Volume 9
Issue 5
Start page 505
End page 515
Total pages 11
Place of publication Dordrecht, Netherlands
Publisher Springer Netherlands
Language eng
Abstract In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to satisfy this principle.
Keyword Moral deliberation
Moral evaluation
Right action
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Non-UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: ERA 2012 Admin Only
School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry
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Created: Fri, 13 Jan 2012, 14:06:36 EST by Kimberly Dobson on behalf of School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry