Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences

McLennan, Andrew (2011) Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47 3: 370-375. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.012

Author McLennan, Andrew
Title Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
Journal name Journal of Mathematical Economics   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0304-4068
Publication date 2011-02
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.012
Open Access Status
Volume 47
Issue 3
Start page 370
End page 375
Total pages 6
Place of publication The Netherlands
Publisher Elsevier
Collection year 2012
Language eng
Formatted abstract
A decision scheme (Gibbard, 1977) maps profiles of strict preferences over a set of social alternatives to lotteries over the social alternatives. A decision scheme is weakly strategy-proof if it is never possible for a voter to increase expected utility (for some vNM utility function consistent with her ordinal preferences) by misrepresenting her preferences when her belief about the preferences of other voters is generated by a model in which the other voters are i.i.d. draws from a distribution over possible preferences. We show that if there are at least three alternatives, a decision scheme is necessarily a random dictatorship if it is weakly strategy-proof, never assigns positive probability to Pareto dominated alternatives, and is anonymous in the sense of being unaffected by permutations of the components of the profile.
Keyword Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Institutional Status UQ
Additional Notes Received 28 October 2009; revised 29 August 2010; Accepted 16 December 2010. Available online 24 February 2011.; Published on line still in Press ; Originally published as Working Paper in 2008

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collections: Official 2012 Collection
School of Economics Publications
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 2 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
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Created: Thu, 06 Oct 2011, 08:46:50 EST by Ms May Balagaize on behalf of School of Economics