Persuasion by causal arguments: The motivating role of perceived causal expertise

Tobin, Stephanie J. and Raymundo, Melissa M. (2009) Persuasion by causal arguments: The motivating role of perceived causal expertise. Social Cognition, 27 1: 105-127. doi:10.1521/soco.2009.27.1.105

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Author Tobin, Stephanie J.
Raymundo, Melissa M.
Title Persuasion by causal arguments: The motivating role of perceived causal expertise
Journal name Social Cognition   Check publisher's open access policy
ISSN 0278-016X
1943-2798
Publication date 2009-02
Sub-type Article (original research)
DOI 10.1521/soco.2009.27.1.105
Open Access Status File (Author Post-print)
Volume 27
Issue 1
Start page 105
End page 127
Total pages 23
Place of publication New York, United States
Publisher Guilford Publications
Language eng
Abstract We examined how perceived causal expertise affects the processing of causal persuasive arguments. In Study 1, participants received strong or weak causal arguments from a content-area expert who was high or low in causal expertise. Participants in the high causal expertise condition processed the causal arguments carefully: they were more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. In Study 2, participants received a high or low causal confidence prime and then read a message from a source who was high or low in content-area expertise. The message contained strong or weak, causal or non-causal arguments. Participants who received both the causal confidence prime and the high content-area expertise information processed the causal arguments carefully: they were more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. These findings demonstrate that causal and content-area expertise can increase motivation to attend to causal arguments. Implications for the persuasion literature are discussed.
Q-Index Code C1
Q-Index Status Provisional Code
Institutional Status Non-UQ

Document type: Journal Article
Sub-type: Article (original research)
Collection: School of Psychology Publications
 
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 7 times in Thomson Reuters Web of Science Article | Citations
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Created: Mon, 16 May 2011, 16:58:34 EST by Dr Stephanie Tobin on behalf of School of Psychology