The causal uncertainty model revisited

Weary, Gifford, Tobin, Stephanie J. and Edwards, John A. (2010). The causal uncertainty model revisited. In Robert M. Arkin, Kathryn C. Oleson and Patrick J. Carroll (Ed.), Handbook of the Uncertain Self (pp. 78-100) New York: Psychology Press.

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Author Weary, Gifford
Tobin, Stephanie J.
Edwards, John A.
Title of chapter The causal uncertainty model revisited
Title of book Handbook of the Uncertain Self
Place of Publication New York
Publisher Psychology Press
Publication Year 2010
Sub-type Critical review of research, literature review, critical commentary
ISBN 9780805861877
0805861874
9780805861884
0805861882
Editor Robert M. Arkin
Kathryn C. Oleson
Patrick J. Carroll
Chapter number 5
Start page 78
End page 100
Total pages 23
Total chapters 24
Collection year 2011
Language eng
Formatted Abstract/Summary
A decade ago, we developed a model focusing on causal uncertainty beliefs and feelings, and associated uncertainty reduction strategies, This model built upon the functionalist theories of uncertainty (Berlyne, 1960; Kagan, 1972; Tolman & Brunswick, 1935). All of these theories posit that some uncertainty is, of necessity, inherent in perceivers' understanding of the world. That is, they argue that because of the limitations of humans' cognitive and perceptual systems, our knowledge of the structure of the world is probabilistic, When cognitive representations of the world are incompatible with our experience or with other stored representations of reality, then we experience uncertainty and an inability to predict the future. The functionalist theories all also share the notion that such uncertainty motivates us to take action, to gain new knowledge or to relate an uncertain stimulus to stored knowledge about which we might be more certain. Whatever the strategy employed to resolve uncertainty, the desire to know is viewed as fundamental to our survival.

Over the past decade, we have continued our research on the role of CU beliefs and feelings in social information processing with an eye toward testing a number of the key assumptions and central hypotheses of the CU model. After a decade of work, it would seem to be a propitious time to take stock of the model and currently available research, and we will do so in this chapter. We also will attempt to provide additional conceptual detail for some parts of the model that originally were left underdeveloped.
Q-Index Code B1
Q-Index Status Confirmed Code
Institutional Status Non-UQ
Additional Notes Published in Part 4: "General Commentaries".

Document type: Book Chapter
Collections: Non HERDC
School of Psychology Publications
 
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Created: Tue, 08 Mar 2011, 17:31:48 EST by Dr Stephanie Tobin on behalf of School of Psychology