This thesis examines the use of antidumping laws by Australian manufacturing industries within a political economy framework. The analysis takes place in light of two broad approaches to trade policy - the 'economic self interest' and 'social concerns' approach. A series of limited dependent variable models to capture the decision making behaviour of the industries filing for protection and the authorities and policymakers who supply protection. The factors motivating the decision of industries to file an antidumping suit, and the decision of the bureaucratic agencies responsible for ruling in antidumping cases, are examined. This thesis also attempts to implement a model representing the policy formation stage of the process. This analysis indicates that the characteristics of industries receiving protection from antidumping contrasts markedly with those receiving protection from tariffs. In particular, while industries receiving tariff protection are generally low-wage, low-skill and labour intensive, the predominant recipients of antidumping protection are high-wage, capital intensive and politically organised. These results suggest that while tariff policy is made broadly in line with the social concerns approach, antidumping policy can be more closely modelled according to the economic self interest approach. It is suggested that the difference between the determinants of the two forms of protection relates to the differing methods of implementation of the two policies. Tariff policies are a legislated form of protection, in which industries directly appeal to government for protection. On the other hand, antidumping protection is distributed through administrative measures, thus industries can appeal to administrative bodies for the provision of protection.