This thesis examines whether changes in the continuous disclosure regulations and its enforcement intensity have improved the quality and timeliness of disclosure in the financial market, as reflected in financial analysts' information environment. Although continuous disclosure has long been a requirement for companies listed on the ASX, there has been limited empirical research that considers the quality and timeliness of corporate disclosure under the continuous disclosure regulations in the Australian context. Using not only the conventional measures of analysts' forecast error and dispersion, but also the additional measures from the Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998) model, the results suggest that the proposal and passage of the Continuous Disclosure Regime (the CDR) have had a positive effect on analysts' forecast error, dispersion and the precision of their common, idiosyncratic and total information. However, the increased enforcement of the ban on selective disclosure after 1997 appears to have caused a deterioration in analysts' forecast error, dispersion and idiosyncratic information precision. The increase in expected legal cost after 2001 also appears to have improved corporate disclosure, resulting in an improvement in analysts' forecast dispersion and the precision of analysts' common, idiosyncratic and total information.